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Chapter 1 . Introduction 
 
   My research is a political and moral denunciation of the political representation 
that scholars-- in collusion with the state, and NGOs-- have developed for the Quechuas 
living in the rural Andes in Peru. This auto-reflexive critique highlights how, despite the 
good intentions researchers may have in emphasizing the conditions of exclusion and 
poverty of the rural population, they have reproduced the same hierarchies of race and 
power that they aimed to denounce. This is what I call ‗moral denunciation,‘ a common 
practice developed by scholars working in postwar societies, who often forget to ground 
their comments and analysis in the social and political realities of the society they are 
analyzing.  
This work is the result of an analysis and reflexive critique about my experience 
as a researcher in Peru. My approach emerges from within the Peruvian academia, shaped 
by the theoretical tools that I have developed as a doctoral student in a North American 
university. Analyzing the Andes and its population from beyond the local frames that 
Peruvian scholars often employ to explain the Andes and its inhabitants (for examples see 
Degregori 1990, Quijano 1980, IEP 2000), has allowed me to develop a deep analysis 




Focusing on Chungui, a convulsive Quechua-speaking district in the Peruvian 
highlands—the epicenter of several episodes of political violence across the twentieth 
century and continuing up to the present—I explore the discourse of ‗marginality.‘ 
Today, Chunguinos use this narrative to avoid any mention of political beliefs or actions 
during two insurrectionary periods, in 1965 and during the1980s and 1990s. This allows 
them to portray themselves as passive victims caught between two fires. In order to better 
comprehend this, it is critical to comprehend actors‘ choices and analyze them in 
 the frame of their political understandings and their historical experiences. 
Today, people in the rural Peruvian Andes use the discourse of ‗marginality‘ to 
represent themselves in face-to-face interactions with different governmental offices, 
NGOs and Human Rights activists. By portraying themselves as ‗marginal‘ they avoid 
talking about political beliefs or actions during the two insurrectionary movements they 
lived, first during the ELN guerrilla movement in 1965, and later during the internal war 
provoked by the Shining Path between 1980s -2000s. As will be discussed extensively, 
when Chunguinos use the word ‗marginal‘ they address different ideas, some of which 
are closely related to the way they understand and experience the state and its different 
programs and institutions. This research looks how Chunguinos use ‗marginality‘ to 
identify themselves as subordinate members of the Peruvian society. Along with focusing 
on how people in a rural community describe themselves as ‗marginal,‘ I will analyse 
how the social mediation performed by anthropologists, NGO workers and activists has 
crafted, from outside and above of the social structure, the image of a ‗marginal people‘ 




The community of Chungui, or Oreja de Perro as it is generally known, is located 
in the region of Ayacucho in the central Peruvian Andes. It is divided in two peasant 
communities: Chungui and Chapi, these communities have maintained a hierarchical 
relationship in which Chapi is seen as the backward area inhabited by ignorant and 
illiterate former hacienda workers. Among scholars, NGO workers and state officials in 
Lima and Ayacucho city, this community elicits fear and sorrow, piety and guilt, 
abandonment and resignation. The community of Chapi (as I prefer to call Oreja de 
Perro) is a geographically distant community situated in the central Andes of the region 
Ayacucho (see Figure 1), and its story of violence became public with the release of the 
Final Report of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (PTRC) in 2003. I 
was part of the group that made this story public, as I conducted the research and wrote 
the report about Chungui that was included in the Final Report (see Los Casos de 
Chungui y Oreja de Perro in PTRC 2003a).This experience has given me a privileged 
position, able to speak from inside the PTRC, as witness (of how the PTRC have 
developed its researches and work inside as institution) and researcher.  
The report about Chungui became one of the most important representations of 
the internal war in the countryside because it provided detailed information about how 
the Shining Path (a Maoist insurgent group that declared the war on the Peruvian state in 
1980) organized rural communities to escape from the national army in a strategy called 
retiradas (En. withdrawals).1 This information, along with detailed stories of violence 
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and the high number of fatalities documented in the report (?), positioned Oreja de Perro 
and Chungui as the ‗most marginal community‘ affected by the internal war. 
This history of violence lived by Chapi and Chungui was ‗discovered‘ by the 
Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (PTRC), and thereafter continuously 
exposed by Peruvian and North American scholars, NGOs and Human Rights activists. 
These scholars and activists have assumed the role of the ‗humanitarian witness‘ (see 
Fassin and Rechtman 2009), who feel the moral urge to transmit people‘s stories of 
suffering and violence in order to publicly denounce the atrocities relayed through these 
stories. This problematic since, in most cases, the core of their denunciation is empathy, 
crafting a narrative of what the group considers important and rather than the story that 
the primary actors want to tell. In so doing, the urge of the humanitarian spokesmen to 
denounce the violence and suffering caused by the Peruvian internal war denies rural 
Quechuas the power to speak for themselves and the possibility to be heard.2 The 
protective role that activists and scholars have assumed thus reinforces a historical 
subordination of rural Quechuas. In this context, the good intentions of the intelligentsia 
become tools of domination. 
Almost ten years have passed since the communities of Chungui and Chapi have 
entered into the public narratives of the internal war, becoming the ‗most marginal‘ and 
‗forgotten communities‘ in Peru. As a result, today it is common to find that people in 
Chungui and Chapi use the narrative of ‗marginality‘ in every public meeting to 
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introduce themselves as a community in much need, especially before government 
agencies and NGOs. However, what people in Chungui and Chapi mean by ‗marginal‘ 
and ‗forgotten‘ is different than the official narrative of ‗marginality‘ used by the state, 
activists and social scientists (for an extended discussion see Chapter 4). For them, being 
‗marginal‘ becomes a strategy to become visible and talk about their relationship to the 
central state. Although ‗marginality‘ does not seem to be a part of everyday life, we 
should not conclude that this is only an instrumental tool to achieve visibility. In some 
contexts, especially when people in Chapi (other than authorities) talk about their 
relationship with the state, and how they experience it, it seems that people have 
internalized the position of a ‗marginal community.‘ The multiple personal interviews 
and stories of families that I collected suggest that to label themselves as a ‗marginal 
community‘ is also a way to experience being at the margins of Peruvian society. 
 Each time I am back in Lima and Ayacucho, I am confronted with narratives that 
portray Chungui and Chapi as the ‗marginal,‘ ‗forgotten‘ and ‗isolated‘ community that 
lives on the frontier of the modern Peruvian state. Moreover, it is often taken for granted 
that these communities are only ‗war victims,‘ as if there was not anything else to say 
about them. It is clear that all of these representations aim to produce compassion and 
empathy by calling for the civil society‘s ‗moral obligation.‘ Beyond the temporal 
empathy that these stories provoke, the concrete historical and socio-political problems of 
this community and the Peruvian state are not addressed. This, in turn, prevents a 
complete understanding of the problems of violence and the hierarchies upon which 




The humanitarian witness role, self-assumed by NGOs and scholars, produces a 
context in which people in Chapi and Chungui do not have the authority to act as 
spokespeople, despite all they have lived through. Thus victims of violence are deprived 
of the power to express themselves; instead, professionals step out to defend the cause 
and speak on their behalf, also crafting demands of compensation for them.3 The 
Peruvian and North American intelligentsia finds the need to protect the helpless rural 
Quechuas by nurturing a traditional role of domination. 
This research looks at the way ‗marginality‘ is used as a label and narrative by 
people in Chapi when they interact with the state and NGOs in the current postwar 
context. Originally used in the 1960s by scholars of dependency theory, and particularly 
explored by Perlman (1976),4 ‗marginality‘ aimed to call attention to the economic 
exclusion experienced by one group of the population. However, at the same time, this 
label and narrative has reproduced a hierarchical and racialized discourse about rural 
Quechuas that reinforces the colonial domination.5 In this sense, a discourse that attempts 
to highlight the rural population‘s particular conditions of economic exclusion and 
isolation ends up imposing a hierarchy of race and power. By using the category of 
‗marginality‘ and the discourses this generates, people in Chapi look to call attention to 
their needs, demanding the attention of the state (in the form of different agencies and 
social programs) that they feel are absent. Moreover, they use ‗marginality‘ in particular 
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Rights groups and they state what the state should give the rural population, not what they have asked for. 
4
 For an extended analysis see Chapter 6. 
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ways to highlight their relationship with the state and to explain the intense violence they 
lived during the internal war.  
The challenge of describing concrete social phenomena is to do it without using 
the descriptive terms already in use. In this sense, my work avoids this trap by creating an 
analysis that avoids the flaws and failures that arise from our acceptance of constrained 
conventional thinking. If we choose to name what we study with the words that the 
people involved already use, we acquire, with those words, the attitudes and perspectives 
they imply (Becker 2003: 661). Therefore, in analyzing ‗marginality,‘ I address the ideas 
and practices of race that are closely related to ideas of modernity and knowledge, which 
are at the same time deeply embedded in the way most scholars have represented rural 
Quechua communities (for examples of this approach see: Fuenzalida 1970; Matos Mar 
1969; Quijano 1980). At the same time that ‗marginality‘ condenses ideas of economic 
and political exclusion it consolidates a particular way of reproducing the rural Andes 
and its population. ‗Marginality‘ reproduces dichotomies by imagining the Peruvian 
society as composed of two groups, one modern and progressive, and the other marginal 
and backwards. This division is closely related to other dichotomies used on a daily basis 
by Peruvians: Criollo/mestizo vs. indigenous, urban vs. rural, and educated vs. illiterate.  
To understand this production process, it is important to look at how names for 
things reflect a relationship of power: to be ‗marginal‘ is to be a racialized and pre-
modern subject, one who antagonizes the non-racial, unmarked and modern subject living 
in the urban centers. Although some may find that this distinction has the danger of 




Quechuas), I find it important to establish a clear distinction between the groups 
analyzed. Acknowledging the homogenization that these categories have produced, I 
nonetheless recognize the different levels and forms of ‗marginality‘ that exist inside 
each of these groups (Chapters 2 and 3 highlight these different levels within the district 
of Chungui).  
Criollo/mestizo is an unmarked category that is assumed to be the norm, against 
which those who look or behave different is compared. Therefore, in Peru campesino 
(En. peasant) and indígena (En. indigenous) are racialized terms that mark and tacitly 
address a group living in rural and poor areas, without basic services (like running water 
and electricity), who are illiterate and Quechua monolingual. Race discourses frame a 
group‘s origin in natural terms, and racializing defines a polarity between the 
Criollo/mestizo and rural Quechua groups (cf. Urciuoli 1996: 15).  
‗Marginality,‘ as other categories, cannot be fully thought through (unless we are 
conscious that the word itself is an element of the problem (Sapir [1929]1985 162). Since 
words and categories are implicated in the way we conceptualize reality, it is important to 
acknowledge the limitations that this may bring. Chunguino often related to be ‗marginal‘ 
with being ‗ignorant‘ and ‗easily deceived.‘ These categories are only used in the district 
of Chungui to talk about former hacienda workers and its families who live in Chapi. 
Moreover, these words are commonly used by people in Chapi (especially the younger 
generation) to explain why they lived them lived under the hacienda regime and how they 




My dissertation looks at the ways anthropological discourses, in collusion with 
the state and NGOs have created the very social realities that they presume to study. 
These discourses not only have shaped people‘ subjectivities but also they have produced 
knowledge and power apparatuses. I aim to show how anthropologists play an essential 
role in transforming subordinates‘ lives, creating them as ‗marginal‘ and contributing to 
their subordination (Rosaldo 1989, Trouillot 1991). I bring out anthropology‘s rhetorical 
power, focusing on its political undertones and the implications of our analysis in 
academic and non-academic domains alike, in this case in the daily lives of people in 
Chungui. My final goal is to open a discussion about the power of academic discourses 
(‗scientific‘ knowledge), and especially the power of anthropological discourses to create 
the particular realities that it intends to study.  
The following Chapters work independently, but all of them are connected 
through the discussion of how Criollo/mestizo urban knowledge is imposed on rural 
Quechua communities, producing a cultural, social and political subordination. This 
creates a hierarchical system in which rural Quechuas accept that to be included into the 
Peruvian state they need to ‗de-indianize‘ themselves through the acquisition of Western 
knowledge, which implies modern rationality. The cases analysed in the following 
Chapters deal with the production of rural Quechuas as ‗marginal‘ subordinate subjects 
often treated as infants in need of guidance by the Criollo/mestizo knowledge, in many 
instances led by social scientists and activists.  
By engaging an integrated view of the micro and macro—the local and the global 




been understood. This approach more accurately reflects the complexity of social life in 
the Andes, keeping in mind that the same phenomenon is repeated at different levels by 
different actors. The community of Chungui constantly discriminates, producing a racial 
subordination against people in Chapi. By considering themselves superiors, subjects in 
Chapi are portrayed as backward and ignorant group that has caused much suffering by 
supporting the Shining Path. In the same path, people living in the city of Huamanga 
discriminate and subordinate those who live in the countryside, because they are seen as 
backward and pre-modern, in other words, they are ‗Indians.‘ Finally, at a national level, 
elites in Lima consider that all the Andes (even urban areas) are the problem in Peru, 
because this region and its people halt the progress of ‗modern‘ Criollo Peru by maintain 
traditional practises and speaking Quechua.  
1.  Peru: race and modernity in the post-war context 
The Shining Path (Sp. Sendero Luminoso), a Maoist insurgent group born in the 
University of Huamanga in the south-central city of Ayacucho, started the internal war 
against the Peruvian state on May 18, 1980. This group emerged from one of the multiple 
factions of the Peruvian Sino-Left (for the extended history see Degregori 1990; Poole 
and Rénique 1992; PTRC 2003a; Stern 1998), that between 1977 and the beginning of 
the1980s worked underground, gathering supporters in rural high schools and peasant 
communities in the central region of Ayacucho. Although Abimael Guzmán6 is 
recognized as the official leader, an important ideologue behind the Shining Path‘s 
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 A. Guzman, along with other important Shining Path leaders, was captured on September 12
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project was Diaz Martinez, an agricultural engineer also working at the University of 
Huamanga (see Harding 1988; Hinojosa 1987). The twenty years of internal war 
produced 69,280 victims (among dead and disappeared citizens), of which 75% were 
native Quechua speakers living in rural areas (PTRC 2003a).  
In 2001, at the fall of President Fujimori‘s regime, the transitional government of 
President Valentín Paniagua appointed a group of scholars and intellectuals to investigate 
the crimes committed by the Peruvian state and the Shining Path between 1980 and 2000. 
After some changes, the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (PTRC) finally 
began its work and submitted its Final Report in August 2003. 
Although the Final Report did not consider the internal war to have been a racial 
conflict (PTRC 2003a), race is one of the explanatory factors of the high number of 
native Quechua-speaking victims.7 The racial ideology upon which Peruvian society has 
been constructed played an important role in the daily lives of civilians and security 
forces in identifying Shining Path suspects. During the internal war, Limeños were likely 
to suspect that someone with brown skin, dark hair and the particular accent that people 
have when Spanish is not the mother tongue, were was member of the Shining Path. 
Likewise, being Ayacuchano was synonym with being a terrorist, and having a rural 
background made people immediately suspect of Shining Path affiliation. Racial 
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how the racial practices work in everyday life in Peru. Accordingly, the PTRC and its Final Report did not 
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practices did not need to be formal or explicit to influence the state‘s behavior (Lemon 
2002) and actions. 
In Peru race works through social practices that rarely use explicit racial 
terminology. Racial terms –such as Indio and indígena– are instead silenced and 
masqueraded with euphemisms like illiterate, rural, ignorant and marginal; these racial 
terminologies mark hierarchical differences in every sphere of social, political and 
cultural life. In this sense, race becomes one of the more determinant means of 
domination. The category of race has evolved from identifying subjects by phenotypic 
features (mainly skin color) to identifying subjects through other racial markers, such as 
economic activity (peasants vs. professionals8), dress, residence and level of education. 
For example, when subjects are identified by education level, categories like i lliterate and 
ignorant are naturally associated with rural Quechuas by the rest of the Peruvian society. 
In this process of discrimination, subordination or domination, subjects living in the 
countryside are racialized by those living in the city, and also by some rural communities 
that consider themselves superior to others (like the community of Chungui9). Through 
intertwined linguistic signs, body language and the particular situation itself, subjects 
evade, subvert, transform or perpetuate hierarchies in face-to face interactions (Huayhua 
2010: 84).  
                                                 
8
 Professionals (Sp. Profesionales) is the label used in Peru to name people working in the city. This does 
not necessarily mean that they have a college degree; however, it is assumed that there was some 
educational training after finishing college.  
9




Rural communities are constantly racialized not only by urban institutions and 
subjects, but also amongst themselves. In this sense, the peasant community of Chungui, 
which has historically been an independent community, racialized Chapi because it was a 
former hacienda and its inhabitants were former hacienda workers. In this context, to be 
‗marginal‘ in Chapi is different from being ‗marginal‘ in the community of Chungui. 
Within each community, therefore, there are different levels of experiencing 
‗marginality,‘ depending upon the characteristics of the different social and economic 
groups living in each community. 
Although racialized practices are not new, contemporary scholars, NGOs and 
state officials also tend to ‗Indianize‘ rural Quechuas by keeping them silent and 
dominated under the labels of ‗ignorant‘ and ‗marginal.‘10 Racialized practices are 
relational, processual and dynamic. People categorize others in order to assert a particular 
social standing or position in the socio-political structure, or to exert power in everyday 
life. For Peruvians living in centers of power like Lima, the rural Andes are seen as 
containers of backward, pre-modern, illiterate and monolingual groups that hold back the 
development of the Peruvian nation-state. In contrast, the coast of Peru and the urban 
areas of the highlands, such as Cusco and Huamanga, are inhabited by Criollo/mestizos 
who are seen as modern, educated, rational, Spanish-speaking groups that work toward 
the progress of the nation-state. Within this racial ideology, phenotypic distinctions are 
not as important as other racial markers. In other words, a person from a rural community 
may look, phenotypically, like any other urban settler; however, what classifies someone 
                                                 
10




as one or the other (as indigenous or Creole/ mestizo) is constrained by the set of racial 
markers displayed in their daily interactions.11 These markers sometimes can be 
controlled and changed, and this process is seen as an important ascension in the social 
hierarchy. For example, regional NGO workers often have a rural background, which 
they feel they have surpassed (or erased) by acquiring a college degree.12 At the same 
time that upward social mobility implies respect and power, it also implies leaving behind 
the possibility of being a proud indigenous Quechua. In Peru racial ideologies and 
practices position being indigenous as antagonistic to being a modern and rational 
subject.  
For the purposes of my analysis, I use the term ‗rural Quechuas‘ for individuals 
whose first language is Quechua, although some of them speak Spanish fluently. They 
live in rural communities in the Andean highlands, and their main economic activities are 
agriculture and raising livestock. In contrast with Ecuador and Bolivia, they do not 
recognize themselves as ―Quechuas‖; therefore, rather than use Quechua as an ethnic 
label I use it to refer to the language used by these communities. In addition, and more 
polarizing than it deserves to be, in order to simplify a complex reality I use ―urban 
Criollo/mestizos‖ as only one category. This category refers to those people who speak 
Spanish as a first language, live in urban centers and practice economic activities not 
directly related to agriculture. Although Creole (Sp. criollo) was the term used during 
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colonial times to refer to Spaniards born in the Americas, since the early 20th century it 
has been used to refer to those who live in Lima and are seen as ‗whiter‘ than the rest of 
the Peruvian population. ―Mestizo‖ is the category traditionally used for the offspring of 
a Spaniard (‗white‘) and an indigenous Quechua. During the 1920s, Cusco‘s intellectuals 
began to use the term to refer to themselves, positioning themselves closer to Creole 
status and opposite to the ‗Indio‘ who lived in the countryside. I use the term urban 
―Criollo/mestizo‖ precisely because of these ideas of superiority that provincial 
intellectuals imagine themselves to have in relation to the rural population, and the equal 
status they claim to have in relation to the coastal Creoles,. This is certainly a more 
radical and sharp distinction than what we find in the field. Indeed, ―rural Quechuas‖ and 
―Criollo/mestizos‖ are not homogenized categories, and there are important differences in 
how communities within those categories understand ‗marginality.‘ However, I find that 
that this sharp distinction is necessary—at least in a relational sense--in order to 
effectively explain how social relationships work.  
For a long time, ―modernization‖ served as the Peruvian state‘s paradigm for 
development. It was assumed that in order to develop the country, the first task was to 
modernize the countryside and its population. Even today, Quechua-speaking 
communities are seen by state officials, some scholars, NGOs workers and international 
aid agencies as the major obstacle to achieving modernization and progress in Peru, due 
to the traditional practices that are considered backward (such as farming and raising 
livestock).. In other words, it is believed by the state that Peru does not develop because 




Amazon) still ‗live in pre-modern times‘ and urgently need to be modernized. The 
modernization project has been a major topic among scholars, NGOs and state officials 
who have proposed the ―urgent need‖ to include these ‗underdeveloped‘ indigenous 
communities into the modern structures of the nation-state. However, these projects have 
often treated rural Quechuas as minors in need of guidance and knowledge imagined to 
only exist in the urban coast of Peru.  
The division in Peru between modern and pre-modern implies a racial 
classification that goes beyond physical features (as race is not only about skin color), 
and refers to discursive practices of racial identification that legitimize the power that 
urban groups exert over rural communities. Thus rural inhabitants are marked as Indios 
(En. Indian), an extremely pejorative term in Peru. As Alaina Lemon highlights, other 
things could signal race on their own; anything isolated as a difference can be made to 
signal some ostensibly essential nature connecting a particular group (2002: 58). Thus 
‗marginal‘ becomes the euphemism to refer to rural Quechuas as Indios without uttering 
these words, but embedding its same meanings. Racial logics not only live in the terms 
that refer to things, but in the various ways in which people use language to index 
relationships in specific contexts.  
The rural Andean highlands are constructed as a subordinate container in which 
‗Indians‘ live. The ‗Indian problem‘ is defined as the lack of integration of the indigenous 
group into the modern Creole society that emerged after at the beginning of the 20 th 
century (as I will explain in Chapter 6). Trying to solve the ‗Indian problem,‘ Peruvian 




to fight. The outcome has been an academic tradition that, despite possible good 
intentions, has only reinforced the historical domination upon which the Peruvian society 
has been built.  
The Peruvian Andes is a geographical space as much as a discursive reality, it is a 
set of images upon which Peruvian society has built fantasies, fears and desires. Although 
there is a material reality, the difficulty is that this materiality is defined by discourses 
and through words (Mignolo 2007; quoted by Vich 2010: 157 ). Thus, ‗reality‘ cannot be 
independent from language and the images that are configured as social representations, 
which influence the ways people interact with reality (Vich 2010). The images of the 
Andes dominating the Peruvian imaginary need to be rethought and desedimented, 
enabling us to localize the ways in which this space has been conceptualized. Although 
the set of images through which the Andean highlands and its inhabitants are produced 
have political importance, these representations exercise social and political forms of 
control and domination (for extended discussion see Said 1979). 
The imaginaries regarding the Peruvian Andes play a central role in the analysis 
of the problems that the central state faces, as fantasies that hamper any relationships 
between the centers of power and the Andes (Vich 2010: 155). Thus, the current 
depiction of the Peruvian Andes as ‗static,‘ ‗barbarous,‘ ‗violent‘ and ‗marginal‘ (among 
others), flows among different governmental, academic and development spaces, and 
exemplifies the exclusion of the region from different national projects. Vich suggests 
that no political-economic project regarding the Peruvian Andean highlands will succeed 




Since colonial times, the Peruvian Andes have been the source of several 
imaginaries that circulate within different political and academic domains. Some of the 
images produced by dominant groups are still present and shape the way coastal elites 
interact with the Andean highlands. According to Victor Vich, these images are:  
A) The Andes is perceived to be a degraded and abject reality, a space understood as 
barbaric and in need of education –in a guardianship way– and to be excluded from all 
political participation (Vich 2010: 159). In this context education demands to ‗de-
indianize,‘ which stresses the need to leave behind all forms of (the considered inferior 
and pre-modern) Andean cultural heritages.  
B) The sierra (the Peruvian geographical region surrounding by the Andean highlands 
that goes from 8,000 to 14,000 feet above the sea level) is imagined to be an empty 
reality where there is no important knowledge, which contrasts with the developed coast 
as the space that has ‗everything‘(Vich 2010: 160). Andean provincial cities are still 
imagined by coastal elites as backward and static in which development cannot be 
achieved. In contrast, coastal cities are seen as centers in which knowledge is available to 
all (coastal elites, mestizos and rural Quechuas). The coast has been constituted as the 
place of civilization and the market (Vich 2010: 160), and in this discussion the 
opposition between urban and rural is critical.  
C) The sierra is an extended, unknown and difficult territory to control, a ‗savage‘ space 
impossible to govern. Yet at the same time, it is a natural, virgin, romantic, and bucolic 
scenario (Vich 2010: 161) that is the subject of national pride. This is a space in which 




productive‘ coast. In this sense, projects promoted by the Peruvian government, like 
sierra exportadora (En. Sierra Export),13 suggest that the Andean region is an available 
and vast space that can satisfy the demands of the global market. However, within this 
image Andean communities living in this space do not matter, and are systematically 
transformed, erased and silenced (Vich 2010: 164). Consequently, the sierra is portrayed 
by the state as a space without proper actors, one that needs to be conquered by the 
modern state. 
These perceptions/ideas of the Peruvian Andes form the backbone of the national 
imaginary, which functions as the means of domination and justification for the hierarchy 
between Creole-mestizo/Quechua, urban/rural and coast/Andes. To change this, the 
Andean region needs to be reinvented as a space of possibility; rather than an obstacle, it 
needs to be conceived in a dialogical process with its native population, which needs to 
be considered equally intelligent and capable. 
2.  From Said’s Orientalism to the ‘marginal’ Andes  
Ruling and dominant elites, including scholars, have often pictured the Andean 
Indigenous population in landscapes associated with isolation and barriers to 
development (Orlove 1993, Radcliffe 1996, Weismantel 2001), ignoring the close 
articulation between indigenous labor and regional political economies (Andolina, et al. 
2009: 57). This dominant image problematically creates a reality that is imagined to be 
isolated and backward.  
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The social and political representations that will be discussed in the following 
chapters will be better understood if they are analysed in light of Edward Said‘s work. 
Said‘s discussion of Orientalism is helpful for understanding how the Andes, like Asia 
and other non-European societies, have been produced as exotic spaces inhabited by 
backward and pre-modern subjects. Said defines Orientalism as the body of knowledge 
produced by the West about the Orient. As a representation, Orientalism entails particular 
interests, claims, projects, ambitions and rhetoric. Therefore, the challenge to overcome 
Orientalism and the colonial era is to surpass the muteness imposed upon the Orient as an 
object (Said 1985: 93). In the same line of argument, my research challenges the 
imagined passivity and silence historically imposed upon rural Quechua subjects, who 
have their own way to interpret and explain social life.  
The development of Orientalism has depended on four elements: expansion, 
historical confrontation, sympathy and classification; without these, Orientalism could 
not have occurred (1979: 120). Expansion refers to the European interest in expanding 
their knowledge about the Orient beyond Islamic lands, promoting European exploration 
in the rest of the region. Said argues that the expansion of Europe fortified its sense of 
being the cultural strength of the world. Therefore, Europe established itself as the 
privileged centre that is also the privileged observer. The expansion of the Orient lands 
dissolved and reshaped the world map, incorporating areas like India, China and Japan as 
references on the map (Said 1979: 120).  
By ―historical confrontation,‖ Said refers to a knowledgeable attitude toward the 




found it profitable to compare the European experience with the older civilizations that 
they were ‗discovering‘(Cf. Said 1979: 117). The possibility of dealing historically with 
non-European and non-Judeo Christian cultures strengthened History as a discipline. 
Consequently, a proper understanding of Europe meant comprehending the relations 
between Europe and its reachable cultural frontiers (Said 1979: 120).  
Said used ―sympathetic identification‖ to explain how, before the eighteenth 
century, all cultures were believed by Europe to be organically and internally coherent, 
bound together by a spirit or national idea which an outsider could penetrate only by an 
act of historical sympathy. Thereby imbued with this populist and pluralist sense of 
history, the eighteenth-century mind (like Herder and others) could breach the doctrinal 
walls erected between the West and Islam, and see hidden elements of kinship between 
himself and the Orient. Napoleon and Mozart are famous examples of this identification 
via sympathy (Said 1979: 118). 
For Said, the fourth element of Orientalism was the need to classify nature and 
man into types, creating networked systems of related generalizations. The idea was to 
reduce vast numbers of objects into a smaller number of objects and describable types. A 
type has a particular characteristic that provided the observer with a designation and a 
‗controlled derivation.‘ These types of characters belong to a system, a network of related 
generalizations (Said 1979: 119). Therefore, classifications of mankind were 
systematically multiplied, as the possibilities of designation and derivation were refined 
beyond categories (Said 1979: 120). In short, for Said the modern Orientalist theory and 




influx of objective knowledge about the Orient, but as a set of structures inherited from 
the past, secularized, redisposed, and re-shaped by such disciplines as philology, which in 
turn were naturalized, modernized, and laicized substitutes for Christian supernaturalism 
(Said 1979: 122).  
In ‗Orientalism Reconsidered‘(1985), Said calls for the inclusion of Orientalists 
as part of the study of Orientalism because 
the social world includes the person or subject doing the studying as well as the object or 
realm being studied, it is imperative to include them both in any consideration of 
Orientalism, for, obviously enough, there could be not Orientalism without, on one hand, 
the Orientalists , and on the other, the Orientals (Said 1985: 90) 
Similarly, my research considers the need to include the different groups that have 
produced the 'rural Quechuas' and their space as ‗marginal.‘ My work aims to highlight 
the importance of relating the observed to the observers, and knowledge to the site of the 
information, which may result in a better strategy to understand the historical production 
of the Other (Coronil 1995).  
In the 1990s Orin Starn, using Said‘s Orientalism as a model, wrote a provocative 
article that triggered an important discussion among North American scholars working in 
the Andes (for a complete analysis see Starn, et al. 1994). Starn argued that social 
scientists did not foresee the emergence of the Shining Path in the Andes because they 
were not attuned to the conditions that made the rise of this group possible: by ignoring 
the inter-linkage of Peru‘s rural and urban; scholars overlooked the climate of unrest in 
the countryside. To understand this practice, Starn coined the phrase Andeanism 
(andinismo) to refer to ‗the representation that portrays contemporary highland peasants 




this piece provoked I explain the limits of the concept of Andeanism, and discuss some of 
the problems embedded in the call by Starn (although he is not the only one practicing 
this) to develop an anthropology of (moral) denunciation.  Starn argues that studies in the 
Andes have overemphasized the continuity and otherness of Quechuas, and thus, like 
Orientalism, ―Andeanism‖ dichotomizes the Occidental, coastal, urban, with the non-
Western, highland, rural, indigenous, and essentializes the Andean population. 
Comparing the work of Billie-Jean Isbell and Antonio Diaz Martinez, Starn develops his 
argument for what the role of anthropology should be in places like Peru. According to 
Starn, Isbell‘s work To defend ourselves (1977) represents Andeanism, while Diaz 
Martinez‘s work Ayacucho: Hambre y Esperanza (1969) considers important changes 
that Andeanism did not. These are different works with different agenda that aimed to be 
read by different groups. While the work of Isbell is an anthropological analysis 
performed by a North American scholar and framed in the anthropological tradition of 
the 1960s, the work of Diaz Martinez is a moral-political denunciation realized by a 
Peruvian agricultural engineer who aimed to justify the Shining Path‘s ideology of 
violence. Even though these are completely different works with different goals and 
methodologies (for instance, Isbell did first-hand ethnographic while Diaz Martinez did 
not), Starn chose them to highlight how ―Andeanist‖ anthropology has done little to 
include the discontent of peasants and their actions in their work. Starn celebrates the 
political denunciation in the work of Diaz Martinez, and condemns the ‗celebration‘14 of 
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Andean culture that he considers Isbell was doing. He argues that Andeanist 
anthropology did not recognize the explosive pain and discontent in the highlands  (Starn 
1991: 69); consequently, he argues for the need to dismantle the binary logic of 
Andeanism: Andean/European, indigenous/western, traditional/modern. Rather than 
presume the separateness of the Andean and the West, he calls for an approach that 
considers plural identities as particular ways of living (Starn 1991: 85). However, his 
analysis is trapped in a moral denunciation by refusing to engage in an historical analysis 
of the sort Said called for in his analysis of Orientalism. 
Among all the critiques that the idea of Andeanism and Starn‘s positions 
provoked, the most relevant problem is the one generated by his characterization of 
Andeanist anthropology. This homogenizes earlier works from the 1960s as static and 
primitivizing, assuming that they have negative political impact. Through a random 
selection of works and quotes, Starn actually excludes from his discussion and analysis 
the indigenous resistances and postcolonial practices considered in other academic works. 
In other words, he barely includes a political history of Andean anthropology, which 
results in an extremely selective set of works that removes from the analytical scope 
many important contributions that fought the representations of the Andean subject as 
timeless and isolated. In addition, his claim that anthropology focused on peasants 
because of its obsession with ‗primitive otherness‘ is untrue. In the 1950‘s the work of E. 
Wolf and S. Mintz pioneered the study of peasants explicitly located within the context of 
modern complex societies and global forces, outside the bounds of the primitive world. 




being trapped in the primitivizing assumptions of Andeanism (Comment by David 
Nugent, in Starn, et al. 1994: 28).  
Starn also fails at reproducing the historical and literary analysis developed by 
Said on Orientalism. While Said offers a critique of the intellectual European-
Westernized production and representation of the Orient, Starn limits the idea of 
Andeanism to an idealized discourse about the socio-historical reality in the Andes. Said 
stresses that Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and 
epistemological distinction between the West and Orient (the rest) (Poole and Renique 
1994: 81). Moreover, an important part of Said‘s contribution is the form through which 
the textual and discursive constructions of the racial and cultural differences become the 
political and institutional foundations of the imperialist power: 
Orientalism is more valuable as a sign of European-Atlantic power over the East than as 
a truthful discourse about the Orient (which is what, in its academic or scholarly form, it 
is meant to be). However, we must respect and try to understand the coherent and 
persuasive power of Orientalist discourse15 (Poole and Renique 1994: 81-2) 
 
The difficulty with Starn‘s piece is that he does not develop, beyond the obvious, an 
analysis of the similarities between Andeanism and Orientalism. In fact, as Poole and 
Renique emphasize, Starn‘s model is different from the one followed by Said. First, Starn 
rejects Said‘s methods of careful readings, such as his Foucauldian definition of 
Orientalism concerning a wide multidisciplinary spectrum. Rather, Starn develops an 
essentialist operation, and seems to be arguing that a close reading becomes too 
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meticulous a polemic. Instead, Starn chose a simple sampling of texts and authors, 
restricting his discussion to a reduced sample of North-American and Peruvian 
anthropologists. In addition, entire books and research are reduced to phrases and quotes 
pulled out of context that seem to be crafted to achieve his purpose (Cf. Poole and 
Renique 1994: 81-3).  
A final relevant difficulty with Starn‘s piece is the selection of Diaz Martinez‘s 
work as the example of moral denunciation that Andean anthropology should make. The 
result of his argument is an abstract and general claim for a change in scholarly approach 
in which it is irrelevant whether it is formulated in Ann Arbor in the 1990s or Lima in 
2011. In other words, there is not any temporal or historical context to ground his 
argument that may explain the particularities of analysing the Andes. The danger of this 
sort of denunciation is that it talks about the past without considering the politics of the 
present. In Starn‘s piece, the morality of the past is not grounded and does not have a 
political perspective of any concrete response. The culpabilities of the past provoke the 
‗need‘ to perform a moral denunciation for not having seen what was in front of them at 
that particular moment. In other words, Starn started his argument by accusing scholars 
working on the Andes of not recognizing the emergence of the Shining Path; however, 
his argument does not include the important mobilization (and the consequent research) 
developed in the 1960s and 1970s during the land struggle for the land.  
Moral denunciation is a general practice by some scholars (such as Diaz Martinez 
and Starn) who either look to justify violence or denounce the violence suffered by 




denunciations intend to provoke empathy and sorrow for a particular cause, and can be 
performed by insurgent leaders or Human Rights activists. However, the outcome of 
these pledges (like the pledges of Diaz Martinez and Starn) is shallow, in the sense that 
they do not address the concrete historical conditions that made these situations of 
violence and suffering possible. 
Therefore, I find that Starn‘s critique of Andeanism and Shining Path‘s ideology 
are closely related in the way they ground their arguments. Shining Path neatly divided 
the world into absolute good or absolute evil, providing simple answers to the complex 
problems of Peru and its youth. Shining Path saw the armed struggle as an Olympian 
battle between good and evil fought at all levels of existence, from the individual soul to 
the universe (Poole and Rénique 1992: 48). This black-and-white vision of political 
struggle derives from Guzman‘s idiosyncratic (Kant-influenced) understanding of the 
Maoist and Marxist concepts of contradiction. Guzman departed from the Marxist-
Leninist tradition, assuming that all contradiction is antagonistic. Rejecting with this the 
basic Marxist principle of unity of opposites, Guzman constructed his theory of 
contradiction on Kant‘s concept of real or exclusive oppositions, which are only 
resolvable through the intervention of a supra-human agency (the divine). Guzman 
concludes that the solution to this antagonism is irreconcilable, and must be through the 
eradication of one of the poles (Poole and Rénique 1992: 50-1). Building on Kant‘s 
theory of causal necessity, Guzman sees the party and its armed struggle as the necessary 
consequence of all past events leading up to that moment. For Guzman, as for Kant, there 




cannot be reopened.‘ Through Guzman‘s writing and speeches, history is presented as an 
inexorable material force lacking human agency (Poole and Rénique 1992: 50-1).  
3.  Geopolitics of Knowledge  
Peruvian and North American scholars (some exceptions are Allen 1988; de la 
Cadena 2000; Poole 1994b; Quijano and Ennis 2000; Seligmann 1989) have historically 
understood the rural Andes and its population through representations that produce the 
image of separate units, when in reality they are bounded together. These representations 
disaggregate relational histories and transform difference into hierarchy, naturalizing 
these representations and intervening in the reproduction of the existing power 
relationships that justify the domination of urban Criollo/mestizos over rural Quechuas 
(Cf. Coronil 1995: 57). Thus, what should be understood as one historical phenomenon, 
that gives origin to Peruvian society, is understood as two different social groups placed 
against each other as antagonists. In other words, rather than seeing the Sierra as a 
production of the dominant relations between urban and rural, it is understood as two, 
sometimes even unrelated, distinct groups. Understanding the Sierra as an independent 
unit not related with the history of the coastal region (mainly Lima) does not allows us to 
uncover the hidden relational nature of the representation of social groups, bringing out 
the origin of asymmetrical power relations, which often tend to represent the historical 
outcomes of connected peoples as internal and separate attributes of bounded entities 




and its communities have been produced and reproduced as independent realities that are 
labelled as ‗marginal,‘ emphasizing the racial practices used in this process.  
The asymmetrical way in which rural Quechua communities are understood and 
incorporated into the Peruvian imaginary cannot be separated from the Western 
hegemony embodied by the Criollo/mestizo Peruvian coast. At the same time, these are 
neither homogenous groups. Since colonial times, the Peruvian coast has been considered 
the centre of Hispanic power. That Lima was one of the most important cities in the 
Spanish colonies influenced the production of an identity different from the Andes. Lima 
and the coast were considered the dominant form of knowledge, expressing Western 
power and domination, establishing a specific bond between power in the West and 
superior knowledge (Said 1979).  
Thus our task should be to recognize the implications of the representation and 
images we produce as scholars, their dominant effects and the historical consequences 
they have. This type of analysis will lead us to be accountable for our statements and 
analysis, in terms of politics and in relationship to the politics of epistemology and the 
epistemology of politics (Cf. Coronil 1995: 73). Challenging the domination performed 
by Criollo/mestizos upon the rural Quechua implies overturning the polarity between the 
Andes and the rest of Criollo/mestizo society in Peru, which involves understanding 
cultures in relation to each other and constituting each other, rather than comprehending 
them as autonomous entities. Moreover, differences need to be historicized rather than 
essentialized, and boundaries and groups understood as historically determined within 




tangible reality by urban Creoles/mestizos; therefore the connection between knowledge 
and power becomes important to analyse since it directly influences how we understand 
rural Quechuas (Coronil 1995: 73-5). 
Knowledge is constituted by the ways in which people categorize, code, process 
and assign meaning to their experiences. This is true of academic (‗scientific‘) and non-
academic knowledge. In this sense, knowledge should not be equated exclusively with a 
professional set of ideas. Rather, knowledge is something that everybody possesses, 
although the beliefs and procedures for its validation may vary from group to group. 
Western societies are built upon the dominant ideology that holds that academic 
knowledge is superior because it is objective and provides literal accounts of what the 
world is like. 
To understand how Western knowledge has been established as the dominant 
paradigm for understanding and explaining the world and its differences, it is important 
to go back to the colonization of the New World, which sheds light on the origins of how 
boundaries between Western Europe and the rest of the world have been drawn. Within 
these boundaries, ―cannibals‖ and ―savages‖ were located in a space that began to be 
conceived as the New World at the end of the 15th century (Mignolo 2000: 283). At the 
end of the 19th century, the ―cannibals‖ and ―savages‖ were converted into primitive and 
exotic Orientals. The question was not about the human conditions of these groups, but 
rather how far removed these primitives were from the present and civilized stage of 




people into a chronological hierarchy rather than a geographical place (Mignolo 2000: 
283). 
After WWII, the civilizing mission was reconverted under the leadership of the 
U.S., producing new encompassing ideals of Western civilization. The first change was to 
establish Human Rights as a new international standard, and the United Nations as a 
transnational organization dedicated to avoiding international discrimination and abuses 
(Mignolo 2000: 296). However, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was 
pronounced by protagonists of a European-North American history that projects a 
particular global design of how subjects should behave. The Christian and civilizing 
tradition of the West produced the standards for the ‗Declaration of Human Rights‘ with 
universal values based on a local history that is presented as universal. Although the 
Human Rights declaration may be seen as ‗necessary‘ to rule basic aspects of humanity 
(like behaviour during war and conflict), it is also true that old Western standards of 
civilization have survived and continue to oppress through this universal declaration 
(Mignolo 2000: 298-7). The practice of imposing ideas like the Human Rights 
Declaration as a universal truth led to the idea of superior, rational and scientific 
knowledge that is decontaminated of magical and ‗irrational‘ believes. 
The second change in the ideals of Western civilization was the establishment of 
the ‗standard of modernity,‘ which manifests itself through different masks such as 
education level and place of residence (this will be largely discussed in Chapter 4) . As a 




construction that sought to claim that science was not bound by cosmology (Mignolo 
2000: 297).  
Following these changes, the configuration of transnational economic alliances in 
the 1970s, and the erosion of national power states, provoked the strengthening of 
repressed communities. In Latin America, there was a revival of indigenous movements 
for their rights, especially language, land, and control of natural resources. These new 
social actors contested the idea that global designs can only emerge from one particular 
local history. However, the inequality of power is still evident in these groups (Mignolo 
2000: 296-300). Although there have been some improvements regarding indigenous 
groups in the Americas over the last three decades, the production of knowledge is still 
organized by norms that remain within the parameters of the West (Mignolo 2000: 300).  
Assumptions guiding local and international aid agencies have been recast, 
allowing indigenous groups to renegotiate their relationship to development, as subjects 
who may contribute and participate. Nonetheless, this does not challenge the fact that 
indigenous people and their cultures have become objects of intervention, and this 
development model has often remained silent on key concerns such as racism, national 
inequalities, and international dependencies (Andolina, et al. 2009: 11). Some projects in 
the world of development and international aid have represented indigenous groups as 
inherently different from the rest of the national populations. Based on rigid notions of 
culture and space, indigenous groups are portrayed as homogenous, poor, spatially 
circumscribed, vulnerable communities. These representations mark indigenous 




in social capital, possessing an endogenous form of development (Andolina, et al. 2009: 
58). The International Development Bank states, for instance, that ‗indigenous culture 
becomes an asset, rather than an impediment‘ to progress and development (Deruyttere 
197:9: quoted by Andolina, et al. 2009: 58-9). In addition to the problematic idea of a 
poor and vulnerable indigenous group that lives in isolation in remote locations (like the 
rural Andes), the re-marking of ―culture‖ as a form of social capital capable of providing 
the indigenous with a route to development is equally troubling;.  
It is rarely stated by development practitioners that indigenous communities are 
equal and valuable subjects, and often within the discourses of NGOs and aid agencies, 
indigenous knowledge is only recognized as positive if it fits in their (linear) 
interpretation of modernity, and when it is not related to anti-Western or anti-capitalist 
assumptions. This type of ethno-development produces an indigenous subject that serves 
certain neoliberal precepts. Thus these neoliberal forms of development constitute a racial 
project, capitalizing upon the image of a polarized economy, society and geography in 
which the indigenous can take a modern role, albeit premised on their vulnerability and 
poverty (Andolina, et al. 2009: 60). 
The difficulty with these models is that Western and indigenous knowledges are 
imagined as opposing forms, differentiated by the use of technology. The opposition is 
set up in and by the epistemological descriptions of what technology does to improve 




1950s.16 Some authors, like Andolina (2009), believe that there have been important 
advances in some ethno-development tendencies, by presenting more flexible notions of 
culture and spatiality that downplay the concept of social capital as a guiding principle. 
This flexible model bring together the efforts of the state, NGOs and social movements, 
and is believed to articulate concerns regarding indigenous rights, structural constraints 
and the fight against racism. This model is considered some indigenous organization (in 
Ecuador and Bolivia) and development practitioners to be more in tune with activists in 
indigenous organizations because it offers a better explanation for indigenous problems 
and views them as embedded within a wider network.  
Even though there are different interpretations about indigenous knowledge (IK) 
in the world of development, there is confusion over what is understood as knowledge. 
The existing literature about Indigenous Knowledge discusses how it has been 
incorporated into development projects, and how beneficiaries become active participants 
by contributing to changes in their life conditions. In this line of thought, NGOs and aid 
agencies finance traditional forms of technology to improve and increase agricultural 
productivity. These agencies are promoting, under the label ―knowledge,‖ the use of the 
local savoir to improve people‘s condition in order to increase their economic production 
and insert them into the market. In this sense, they are dealing with different forms of 
indigenous technologies, organization, practices, etc.  
By constraining the definition of knowledge to technologies and techniques, the 
concept of Indigenous Knowledge does not consider the particular forms through which 
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people interpret, understand and imagine their experiences. The different ways to 
experience, to conceive and to understand the world are still placed as subordinated to 
those of the West. Western knowledge, especially in the form of the scientific and Human 
Rights paradigms, continues to set the parameters through which the world is measured 
and understood (Mignolo 2000). In this frame of analysis, the belief in animate nature 
could be understood as a pre-modern belief still practiced by rural Quechuas in the 
remote Andes (see Chapter 7 for an extended discussion). The colonial power structure 
communicates particular cultural and socio-political presuppositions that elevate Western 
knowledge as ‗real knowledge,‘ while ignoring other knowledge— except to validate 
their own master narrative (Doxtater 2004: 619). 
During my fieldwork in Peru (and in contrast to cases in Ecuador and Bolivia), 
the superiority of mainstream Criollo/mestizo knowledge about the internal war and 
Human Rights discourse (especially about issues like the validity of the findings of the 
Final Report of the Truth Commission, the need for monetary compensation and the call 
to developed sites of memory), were rarely challenged. In addition, metanarratives such 
as the need to ―improve oneself‖ (Sp. superarse) through achieving formal education (Sp. 
ser alguien en la vida) are generally embraced without question, even if it implies ‗de-
indianizing.‘. 
I use Raymond Williams‘ concept of ‗structures of feelings,‘ to understand the 
narrative of marginality. This is a more accurate means for describing a process that 
combines thoughts and feelings shaped in an on-going social process. Williams argues 




the strongest sense a ‗culture,‘ but a culture which has also to be seen as the lived 
dominance and subordination of particular classes‘(Williams 1977: 110). In this sense, 
hegemony is always a dominant, but never complete or inclusive, phenomenon. It is not a 
one-way phenomenon, but rather a dialogical production through the social and linguistic 
interactions of individuals (Mannheim and Tedlock 1995: 9). Like the analysis of 
domination, it is not just the act of domination that should be examined, but rather a 
process of domination depends upon accepting and resisting.  
The idea of structures of feelings provides researchers with a way to talk about the 
inchoate, often unconscious stirrings that signal potential changes in the status quo. 
Because culture and society should be understood in the process of formation, social 
forms are actively lived by individuals and tensions arise when the received 
interpretations of social forms clash with the individual‘s personal experiences, ideas or 
feelings. This tension cannot yet (if ever) be termed resistance or social transformation; 
rather it is an embryonic phase, a social and material kind of thinking and feeling that is 
not (yet) fully articulated or explicit (Ahearn 2001: 52).  
William‘s concept of structures of feelings effectively describes the attitudes and 
experiences surrounding the practice of ‗marginality‘ in Chapi because it attends to 
qualitative changes in the way people experience and interpret events and relationships. 
These changes are subtle yet strong enough to exert pressure and set effective limits on 
experience and action (Williams 1977: 132). Therefore, ‗marginality‘ is as much a 
strategy to become visible in order to be attended to by the state as it is a way to 




that the state or the urban Criollo/mestizo exert domination over them, when people say 
that their communities are placed in the corners and forgotten, it is a way to express that 
they are dominated. By using structures of feelings, our attention is directed to how 
changes occur in ‗meanings and values as they are actively lived and felt‘ by individuals 
(Williams 1977: 132). In this sense, ‗feeling‘ does not merely refer to emotions but rather 
encompasses changes in thoughts and feelings, as well as the grey area between the two. 
It is this dimension that better represents the complexity of being ‗marginal‘ from 
Chapi‘s point of view. My project seeks to understand how thoughts are felt, and feelings 
are thought. Therefore, by introducing themselves as a ‗marginal community,‘ people in 
Chapi feel as if they are outside the structure of the state. They experience the state as a 
careless and distant institution (sometimes described as a person in the form of particular 
state officials) that hides and deceives them, and exerts power in the form of military 
violence or complete indifference toward their demands. At the same time, people in 
Chapi do not talk directly about domination, 17which could also be interpreted as being in 
a formative phase. Therefore, my dissertation is not only considering a hegemonic 
domination performed by urban groups, but rather an on-going process fully articulated 
with domination and its acceptance. 
The methodological consequence of understanding ‗marginality‘ in the frame of 
structures of feeling is that specific qualitative changes are not assumed to be 
epiphenomena of changed institutions, formations and beliefs. Likewise, they are, from 
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the beginning, taken as ‗social experiences,‘ rather than personal experiences. They are 
social because they are changes in the present, and because they are emergent or pre-
emergent, which means that they do not have to await definition, classification or 
rationalization before they exert palpable pressure and set effective limits on experience 
and action (Williams 1977: 131-2). These changes, Williams argues, can be defined as 
changes in structures of feelings, feelings chosen to emphasize a distinction between 
more formal views like ideology and worldview. The stress / emphasis is placed upon 
meanings and values as they are actively lived and felt, and the relationship between 
these and the formal or systematic beliefs vary in practice. At the same time, Williams is 
defining a social experience that is still in process, and not always recognized as social 
but taken to be by scholars as private, idiosyncratic and even isolating (Williams 1977: 
132). 
4.  Fieldwork and Methodology 
My first fieldwork in Chungui and Chapi took place between October and 
November 2002. The data were gathered collectively with Edilberto Jiménez and Nory 
Cóndor, who were members of my team in the Ayacucho region. We stayed one week in 
the community of Chungui, and one week in Oronqoy. Interviews were conducted in 
Spanish and Quechua. I personally conducted the interviews in Spanish, since I did not 
know Quechua at that time. In Oronqoy we interviewed mainly Quechua speaking 
informants that Jimenez interviewed, because they have met him before as an NGO 




analysis for this dissertation, revealed that many of these were guided and words were 
suggested to the interviewee. In addition, I noticed that the translations of these 
interviews were not carefully done, and they were translated with Spanish expressions 
commonly used by NGO workers.18 These translations were the main source of the report 
I wrote in 2002. The general practice in Ayacucho was to translate every testimony and 
interview from Quechua to Spanish. These were never transcribed in Quechua, only in 
Spanish, and became the main source for the PTRC‘s Final Report.  
My second fieldwork, as a doctoral student, was completed over a period of 24 
months, combining three months between 2005-2006, with the main fieldwork developed 
between November 2007 and October 2009, and was concentrated in the Ayacucho 
region located in the central area of the Peruvian highlands (see Figure 1). The first part 
of my work was developed in Ayacucho, and combines data from the regional archive 
with life stories, interviews and participant observation in the villages of Chupón and 
Oronccoy in the community of Chapi, in the district of Chungui (Figure 2). I spent 9 
months in these villages trying to build close relationships with the population, who were 
extremely skeptical about the real purpose of my research. Some families did not believe 
that I was doing research about the community, because they did not find any importance 
in such a project, and they argued that this was a cover for a bigger project that aimed to 
take their land and give it back to Chapi‘s former hacienda family (the Carrillo family). 
The fact that I was an outsider, although I had all the credentials from the authorities of 
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local NGOs in the city of Ayacucho. NGOs are the main source of jobs for anthropologists and social 




Chapi, only nurtured the image of a gringa who claimed to be an anthropologist, but in 
reality was there working on behalf of the former hacendado families. It took me several 
visits to convince them that I did not have any connection with the former hacendados, as 
well as signing a written commitment of no harm to the community. Even after my active 
participation in meetings and festivities, and the relationships of compadrazgo19 that I 
established in both villages, not everybody agreed to talk to me, and some people 
considered me a threat. As my relationships started to consolidate, people opened up and 
told me stories about politics during the times of the hacienda.  
Most of my interviews were gathered in Spanish and Quechua, and I take full 
responsibility for the quotes translated from Spanish to English, and the final translations 
of the Quechua quotes. For security reasons, the names of community members of Chapi 
and Chungui remained pseudonyms. However, local authorities like the Mayor of 
Chungui, NGOs workers and officials from the state are presented with their real names 
and the state institutions they represent.  
In my last visit to Oronccoy in August 2008, rumors circulated about a group that 
was visiting villages in Chapi, forcing people to gather in meetings where they were 
asked about problems in their communities. At the time, the information was mixed and 
confusing, with stories alleging the presence of the Colombian FARC or the Bolivian 
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 Rooted in the pre-colonial and Catholic morality, compadrazgo is a fictive relationship established between 
two families. It is fictive in the sense that is not a real kin, but is understood as highly significant and a way to 
fortify one‘s kindred (see Leinaweaver 2008 for a complete explanation of ritual kinship). For example, I 
became the godmother of a child in a ritual called cortapelo (En. hair cutting) in Oronccoy; and in Chupón 
I became the godmother of a couple who married in a civil ceremony. Both families made important 
connections every time I arrived to their villages, and our kins relationship established certain behaviour. 
For instance they offered me lodging, food and extended conversation hours, while I offered some 




army of Evo Morales. When I returned to the region‘s capital, Huamanga (also known as 
the city of Ayacucho), I received the warning from people in Chapi and Chungui to avoid 
returning to Chungui and Chapi; because I was a gringa they warned that my safety could 
be in danger, and explained that I could be kidnapped. 
During those weeks, the Peruvian army was carrying out an operation in Vizcatán 
in the northern part of the VRAE (see Figure 3), bombing remaining groups of Shining 
Path members and civilians in the Amazon jungle. This attack seemed to provoke the 
temporary abandonment of the area and the displacement of Shining Path camps toward 
Chungui, Chapi and La Convención in the neighbouring region of Cusco. During this 
displacement, Chunguinos claimed that they received visits from different Shining Path 
members looking to apologize for their cause, which frightened the local population (see 
figure 4).  
After consulting with Dr. Bruce Mannheim and local specialists in Lima about 
this military project and the on-going political situation, the advice was clear I needed to 
stop my work in the district and to reframe my original research. These changes made me 
rethink the region, and I contacted two NGOs working on the topic of reparations for the 
1980s war victims. I joined them in different activities and workshops, in which they 
allowed me to observe and record the interactions between beneficiaries and NGO 
workers. In addition, I conducted interviews with their field personnel and the directors in 
the main offices. The opportunity to observe the dynamics of NGO workers and their 
beneficiaries illuminated the racial practices happening in the countryside, as well as the 




During my fieldwork I found that different forms of knowledge meet and 
sometimes clash when the state and NGOs interact with rural Quechuas. Knowledge 
emerges out of a complex process that involves social, situational, cultural and 
institutional factors, and takes place on the basis of an existing conceptual framework and 
set of procedures that are affected by skills, orientations, experiences, interests, resources 
and patterns of social interaction characteristic to that group. However, at the same time 
that knowledge by itself is an open possibility, it also has the power to destroy other 
possible frames of conceptualization and understandings that are delegitimized because 
they are seen as inferior (usually called magical, irrational, Andean beliefs, or by other 
euphemisms).  
To better understand the production, reproduction and transformation of 
knowledges and how they are hierarchized, we must analyse face-to-face interactions. 
Every actor carries with him/her a particular knowledge that is deployed in each 
encounter, establishing a unique relationship with other actors. In this sense, when 
Chapi‘s population is on one side, with governmental officials, NGOs, insurgent groups 
(like the ELN– National Liberation Army– a Cuban oriented guerrilla movement from 
the 60s, and the Shining Path) and Peruvian intellectuals on the other side, a situation is 
produced in which each side brings their knowledge to the interaction. The process of 
adapting to everyday life is continuously changing and accommodating itself to new 
phenomena and variant situations (Arce and Long 1992: 212). When individuals process 
information, they produce cognitive maps that categorize and classify experiences into 




When face-to-face interactions are ethnographically described, it is important to 
explore the cognitive world of the groups concerned (Arce and Long 1992: 212-3). 
‗Marginality‘ contains a certain meaning for rural Quechuas, since it is used exclusively 
in Spanish (there is no Quechua word for marginality) and only within the context of 
interactions with external actors. As such, ―marginality‖ can be understood as a category 
that addresses their knowledge as the way they experience the state in the post-war 
context. Contrasting this, governmental officials and NGO workers define rural 
communities as ‗marginal‘ to emphasize the economic and social exclusion that these 
communities experience in relation to the central state, which has permanently ‗forgotten‘ 
and ‗deceived‘ them.  
 At issue is not only the different ways that each group understands ‗marginality‘; 
rather, the tension develops as these different groups interact, and when rural Quechuas 
decide to define themselves as ‗marginal‘ after they have interacted and negotiated with 
Criollo/mestizo knowledge. These interactions lead to the transformation and 
reinforcement of particular types of knowledge, and this process is shaped by the power, 
authority and legitimation available to the different actors involved (Arce and Long 1992: 
214). 
A face-to-face encounter occurs between individuals with different interests, 
resources and power (Arce and Long 1992: 214). Therefore, the analysis should not be 
restricted to observing what goes on during face-to-face encounters, but rather to also 
look beyond and to incorporate influential actors and resources that may not actually be 




processes, the analysis should be situated within broader institutional and power fields 
(Arce and Long 1992: 214). 
The analysed face-to-face interactions entail an acute awareness of the ways in 
which different, possibly conflicting, forms of knowledge intersect and interact. In 
contrast to more conventional works, my dissertation takes an actor-oriented vision and 
focuses upon the interplay of different social constructions of ‗reality‘ developed by the 
various parties of the interaction (peasants, governmental officials, farmers, etc.), tracing 
out the social and political effects of using the category of ‗marginality.‘ Nevertheless, I 
do not make any ontological distinction between what is seen as academic knowledge 
and everyday knowledge, between western Criollo knowledge and rural Quechua 
knowledge (Arce and Long 1992: 214). Within these encounters, actors may believe in 
the superiority or inferiority of their knowledge but, when analysed, the different sets of 
knowledge brought to the interaction should be seen within the same horizontal 
framework. 
The discussion about the state and NGOs discussed in Chapter 6 share a common 
view of development and social change as naturally emanating from centers of power. 
These take the form of interventions led by state or international agencies, which follow a 
determined developmental path (Cf. Long and Long 1992: 19). In contemporary 
academic literature, indigenous knowledge is linked to natural resource management, 
attributed to a specific territory or information held by a particular group that is assumed 




on Human Rights, indigenous knowledge and experiences with it are subordinated and 
erased in order to impose the assumed superiority of urban and modern knowledge.  
Knowledge processes are embedded in social processes that imply aspects of 
power, authority and legitimation, and they are just as likely to reflect and contribute to 
conflict between social groups as they are to lead to the establishment of common 
perceptions and interests (Long and Long 1992: 27). It is in this way that Human Rights 
activists and NGOs deploy their power and domination upon rural communities, shaping 
people‘s narratives and demands for compensation to the state. The Peruvian Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission‘s recommendations were developed as a body of ‗specialist‘ 
knowledge that an elite group from the Peruvian urban society presented to the rural 
victims of the 1980s violence. Although this was an important political project for the 
Peru, it cannot be said that it was the work of the civil society; rather, the project must be 
understood as the demands that one (especially influential) group considered important 
and beneficial for the nation to grant.  
Knowledge encounters involve a struggle between actors who aim to enroll others 
in their projects/agendas and convincing them to accept particular frames of meaning. 
These struggles focus around the ‗fixing‘ of key points that have a controlling influence 
over the exchanges and attributions of meaning, including the acceptance and reification 
of positions related to ‗authority‘(Long and Long 1992: 27).  
This dissertation is organized in two parts. The first focuses on the community of 
Chapi, and includes Chapter 2 through Chapter 5. Chapter 2 presents how the community 




backwardness, isolation and ‗marginality.‘ Chapter 3 discusses the political history of the 
region, looking at the ways historical events unfolded to create a particular interpretation 
of the area and its population. Chapter 4 uncovers how, in the aftermath of the internal 
war, people in Chapi used the label of ‗marginal‘ to describe themselves in relation to the 
Peruvian state. Chapter 5 then analyses two interactions between Chapi and the state, 
looking at the particular ways ‗marginality‘ is reinforced by state officials. I conclude this 
section by arguing that being ‗marginal‘ is a strategy used by Chungui‘s authorities, and 
supported by the younger generation, to become visible to the state.  
The second part of the dissertation looks at scholars, NGOs and the state as 
composing one social actor. Chapter 6 presents a brief analysis of how the social sciences 
developed in Peru and focused particular attention on solving the ‗Indian problem.‘ I 
argue that since the 1920s, social scientists in Peru and North America have contributed 
to reinforcing the domination and exclusion of indigenous communities. In Chapter 7, I 
argue that NGOs act as statelike institutions and proxies of the state, reproducing the 
state‘s domination and subordination in the rural Andes. By analyzing how two NGOs act 
as statelike institutions on the ground, I argue that the social mediation these institutions 
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Representations of the Oreja de Perro 
Chungui is a district located in the Northeast of the Ayacucho region, between the 
limits of Cusco and Apurímac regions (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2) in the area known as the 
Valley of Apurímac and Ene River (VRAE). This district, specifically the southern part 
of it, is usually called Oreja de Perro (En. Dog‘s ear); label coined by the national army 
during the internal war, use to recognize the region in the regional map. The name 
corresponds to the shape of the Ayacucho map which has the shape of a dog; its eastern 
part, where Chungui is located, would correspond to the dog‘s ear.  
I first heard about a place called Oreja de Perro when I was working as researcher 
at the PTRC in 2002. This occurred during a meeting in our office in the city Ayacucho 
where one of the teams gathering testimonies20 was narrating amazing stories about an 
isolated community near the border with Cusco. I was told that during the internal war 
there was a ‗slave market‘ in which women and children were sold as commodities to 
local families. This type of story was combined with others that talked about the 
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 The PTRC had two different groups working in the Ayacucho office. One group was in charge of 
collecting people‘s voluntary testimonies in their communities. The other group, in which I was working, 
was focused on develop researches (ethnographies) about the particularities of the political context in 




complete disappearance of villages and the existence of thousands of mass graves 
unknown to the rest of the Peruvian society. For some people in Ayacucho, these stories 
were not surprising, because many of them had previously heard incredible and fantastic 
stories about the hacienda of Chapi, and the cruelty its owners practiced against the 
workers. One of the PTRC directors remembers, 
They [people in Ayacucho city] had a fabled view of this hacienda (Chapi) they talked us 
about the jungle, the mountain, gigantic turtles, and when they were seat in a rock, it 
moved! At the end they were not seating in a rock, it was the turtle and it was moving! 
(Coronel, Ayacucho 2008)21 
The stories heard in the meeting22 with my PTRC colleagues produced and nurtured 
earlier images of a forgotten community in which the worst of the war was allowed to 
occur. There were only two NGOs (CEDAP and Proande23) who were sporadically 
working in the district, and first knew about this region when they organized the return of 
a displaced group living in the city of Andahuaylas. These stories surprised the directors 
and researchers from Ayacucho‘ and Lima‘s offices at the PTRC. The political and 
personal guilt, as well as their ignorance about these stories made them feel compelled to 
publicize this story and transform it in to a public narrative. For my colleagues in Lima, 
who assumed that they knew everything about the significant crimes that occurred during 
the internal war, the story of Oreja de Perro was an important milestone that deeply 
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 ―tenían una visión fabulada de su ex hacienda. ¿No? Nos hablaban de selva, de monte, de tortugas gigantes y 
cuando se sentaban en una pierda y total se estaba moviendo y total era la tortuga, ¿No?‖ 
22
 Instead of stating that the team narrating these stories were the ones responsible of crafting these 
representations, I consider that was a collective process, of the attendants to this meeting, producing this 
image of an exotic and unknown community. 
23
 CEDAP work agricultural and health topics in the community of Chungui. Proande works from 
Andahuaylas similar topics, but its work focuses on Chapi. At the moment of my fieldwork, both NGOs 




questioned their real knowledge and comprehension about the internal conflict.  
For me this was the start of many years of research in Chungui, and especially in 
Oreja de Perro. In 2002, I led the team that was sent to the region to investigate the 
characteristics of internal war, along with E. Jiménez and N. Condor, both 
Anthropologists from Ayacucho. Our report24 challenged the myths about ‗slave markets‘ 
and explained that there was a long tradition of states and rebellions in the district.25 The 
report also added important insights about the camps or retiradas (En. withdrawals) that 
the Shining Path developed in the upper Amazon area to protect the population from the 
national army (this will be explained later). Rather than preventing the emergence of 
exotic images, Oreja de Perro --as produced by the PTRC and its heirs--became the 
‗most marginal community‘ in the Peruvian Andes. The Final Report affirmed that 
between 1983 and 1994 the internal war claimed 1384 victims (between deaths and 
disappeared), which means the disappearance of 17% of the district‘s total population in 
1981 (Degregori 2009: 20). After the release of the Final Report, Oreja de Perro, 
especially because of its previously unknown story, became fodder for news articles, 
documentaries and fiction novels that have nurtured the image of the region as ‗the most 
marginal and forgotten community‘ in Peru. 
Although outsiders use Oreja de Perro to refer to the whole district, Chunguinos 







 I need to recognize that I wrote the report that was later completed and edited by several persons. 
However, the core of the report is the original that I submitted in January 2002. After nine years, I 




themselves barely use this label and prefer to use ‗hacienda area‘ when they refer to 
Chapi, highlighting the difference between the independent community of Chungui and 
the former hacienda of Chapi. Nevertheless, in the last 5 years local authorities (who are 
originally from the community of Chungui) frequently use Oreja de Perro when they 
interact with political officials and governmental agencies expecting to get more 
attention. To avoid confusion, I use ―Chungui‖ when I refer to the whole district, ―the 
community of Chungui‖ when I refer to the independent community, and ―Chapi‖ to refer 
to the former hacienda area.  
This chapter will place Oreja de Perro, and particularly the community of Chapi, 
in the geopolitical and social context of Peruvian society. The first section presents 
Chungui and Chapi, emphasizing their respective relationships and characteristics. The 
second part starts by describing some of the narratives about the internal war presented in 
the Final Report, and continues by discussing how the region has been portrayed through 
different means, building an image of a community whose existence seems to be 
restricted to the extreme violence it suffered. We need to acknowledge, as Fassin and 
Rechtman (2009) suggest, that in most contexts, the only possibility that these voices will 
be heard is by highlighting the trauma and misery they have lived. However, this does not 
mean that Chunguinos only see themselves as victims of the internal war. 
1. Oreja de Perro and Chapi 
Chungui is a district located in the south central part of the Andean highland of 




also part of the region called Valleys of the Apurímac and Ene Rivers (VRAE), known 
for the illicit production of coca and cocaine paste (see Figure 1.3). The district is 
bordered on the east by the Pampas River and the Apurímac region and on the west by 
the Apurímac Rivers and the region of Cusco. This is an area difficult to access, with a 
harsh geography that shares three ecological niches: valley (6561 feet over the sea level), 
puna (over 13000 feet) and the upper Amazon jungle (6000 feet over the sea level).  
The district of Chungui has been historically divided in two regions. One is the 
community of Chungui, which has been an independent peasant community since the 
1920s; and the other is the community of Chapi, which until the 1974 was the hacienda of 
Chapi26 (see Figure 1.2, previous chapter). This latter region, with more than 30,000 ha, 
includes the villages of Chupón and Oronccoy, where I focused my fieldwork during 
2008. 
The relationship between Chungui and Chapi been has historically hierarchical 
and full of conflicts. The community of Chungui has been an independent peasant 
community for a long time (late 19th century) which has nurtured a self-assumed image of 
superiority as ‗free‘ subjects. This contrasts with the image they have of Chapi‘s 
inhabitants as monolingual Quechua and illiterate ex-hacienda workers. People in 
Chungui explain that the ignorance (lack of formal education) of Chapi‘s people has 
allowed them to be exploited and deceived, first by the hacendado, and later by the 
Shining Path. This imaginary dominates the population in the community of Chungui, 
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who have established a hierarchical relationship tinted by exclusion and domination with 
people in Chapi that is still at play. The community of Chungui has produced its own 
identity by placing themselves as the antagonist to Chapi, shaping an image of 
progressive and modern farmers (they do not call themselves peasants but agricultores –
En. farmers– as a marker of distinctiveness), intelligent and educated. It is important to 
notice, that in a micro level there is a reproduction of the strongly socio-cultural 
differences that work between rural and urban, sierra and coast, between the ignorant 
Quechua and the modern Criollo/mestizos (which will be extensively discussed in the 
next chapters).  
The 2007 National Census showed that the district of Chungui has a total 
population of 6311,27 most of which work on agriculture and live in the rural areas of the 
district (INEI 2007). The sierra part of the district produces potatoes, the low valley 
produces peaches and corn, and the jungle produces coca, coffee, cocoa beans and 
peanuts. During my fieldwork, the rapid rise in the coca price made it the most rentable 
product in the district (24.2 pounds of coca are sold at US$30). The local production of 
coca is usually purchased in advance by local groups dedicated to make cocaine paste 
(Sp. Pasta Básica de Cocaina or PBC). In the last five years, a fungus attacking the coca 
plants has spread in the region,28 which has influenced a change toward the production of 
peanuts and coffee; however, the labor demanded in the latter is much more intensive 
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Jimenez‘s work (2009), as well as the local authorities in Chungui, considers that the district of Chungui 
has over 8,000 persons. However, I will use the official numbers provided by the Peruvian Institute of 
Statistics and Information (INEI) which is in charge of processing this information. See: www.inei.gob.pe 




than in the cultivation of coca.29 Nevertheless, neither the fungus nor the intensive police 
control in the neighboring districts over illicit coca production have provoked a 
significant reduction in the annual volume of coca leaves harvested. This is supported by 
the official numbers that show an increase from 11,475 has dedicated to coca production 
in 2007, to 17, 486 has in 200930 (OPD and Devida 2010). In addition, there has been an 
increase in the number of pozas de maceración (En. coca maceration pits), which has 
become a profitable business in some villages in the community of Chungui, especially in 
the Amazon jungle.  
The fact that there is no direct police control in the district (because of the lack of 
roads) makes this a ‗protected‘ area suitable for drug production. For the transportation of 
the coca paste the neighboring cities of Andahuaylas and Cusco, groups of young men 
are hired as mules to carry up to 5kg (11 pounds) of coca paste, receiving in exchange 
around US$200 for 3 days of travel. In some occasions, these mules are caught by the 
police near the Pampas River on the Apurímac side, and the police patrols confiscate the 
drugs. However, the police only report a fraction of what is caught, selling the rest to 
other cartels and firms in the region (personal communication with a mule‘s family). The 
implication of the local police complicates the drug problem in the region, and has been 
used to build the image of Oreja de Perro as ‗no man‘s land.‘31 When I was doing some 
archival research in the Superior Court in Huamanga, judges and lawyers considered the 
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 In average, people affirm that the production of coca does not need special care because it ‗grows by 
itself.‘ In contrast, the production of coffee demands a selection of beans and a drying process, which 
means high intensive labor. 
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 For exact numbers see Annex 2-1 
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In the last five years there have been mysterious murders in the region, which the Major and other 




district of Chungui as a ‗liberated zone‘ for drugs in which groups of mules walked 
around the capital of the district armed and talking openly about their business. In fact 
this is the image that state officials in Ayacucho have themselves crafted about the area, 
representing Chungui as a district in which the rule of law does not exist.  
Oronccoy is the getaway from Chapi to the city of Andahuaylas, which is known 
as a money laundering city.32 It is common to find groups of mules passing toward 
Andahuaylas, but mainly at night trying to avoid be seen by the community. The scenario 
is much more discreet and secret than the image Ayacucho‘s state officials have spread. 
The local population knows them and their business; however nobody talks openly about 
this with strangers. During the summer months (January to March) high school students 
from the district and neighboring areas are recruited to transport drugs. In Chupón, the 
community also knows who is involved with the drug business, as some mothers told me 
that people in Huaccana—where their children go to high school—were contacting 
students from Oreja de Perro to transport drugs. The impact of drug money is neither 
visible in Chupón nor Oronccoy, however, I was told that this is only visible and an 
openly discussed topic in the forest around the community of Chungui.33 
 The district has only one road leading to Chungui (the capital of the district) 
which was constructed in 1999. Since 2005, there have been small projects to extend the 
road connecting the capital with its surrounding villages and with the Apurímac region, 
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 See interview with Jaime Antezana, a Peruvian specialist about drug trafficking 
http://www.larepublica.pe/node/20764 
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 Due to security issues, I did not visit myself the forest villages located in the community of Chungui. 
However, people say that families in this area are wealthy and have all the commodities that people have in 




but this is restricted to the community of Chungui (no more than 20 km). During my 
fieldwork, the road only led to Sonccopa (located in the border between the community 
of Chungui and Chapi), from where it was required to walk around 6 hours in order to 
arrive to the village of Chupón. To arrive to Oronccoy, people usually walked around two 
days through the district from Chungui. Nevertheless, people from southern villages of 
Chapi used to walk to Oronccoy, where they descend twelve hours from a path that ends 
into the Pampas River. Here there is a bridge called Kutinachaka (En. returning bridge), 
from which there is a road to Huaccana, the neighboring town in the Apurímac region. 
Every month, regional traders from the Apurímac region gather on the riverside of the 
Pampas River, at the end of the Kutinachaka Bridge, to hold a market. People from all 
communities in Chapi descend to buy oil, candles, soap and other products, and they 
often sell handmade blankets, agricultural products and cattle. From Huaccana there is 
public transportation to the city of Andahuaylas (capital of the region), from where it is 
possible to take a bus to Ayacucho (12 hours on an unpaved road). Since the hacienda 
time, Chapi has been conflated with the Apurímac region, because of the proximity; and 
although these villages depend politically upon Chungui, services like education and 
health are supervised by offices in Apurímac. 
Since May 2008, Chapi and Chungui have had several visits from a group that 
claims to be the Shining Path. This group approached people from Chupón and Oronccoy 
(as well as people from Chungui and other villages), asking questions about the political 
situation in the district and the major problems the population is facing. The group 




have learnt their lesson from the internal war. They state that Guzman‘s politics (the 
official leader of the Shining Path) were wrong because they included the physical assault 
on the local population. Although the group seems to be in an early phase, they are 
looking for supporters, offering US$400 if people join the group). In addition, witnesses 
state that this group has new weapons (AKMs and war weapons), although they have not 
been seen using them. Some of my informants argue that this is a new Shining Path that 
recognizes the errors from the past, and now look to fight for people‘s well-being. Others, 
such as the elderly, are traumatized and want to leave the community as soon as they can. 
The local authorities (mainly the Major and his workers) argue that in contrast with the 
1980s, now they know about politics and Human Rights, and they strongly affirm that 
they will stay defending the community and all the progress they have achieved during 
the last decade. These incursions also have provoked an official request, with a detailed 
map of the days and villages visited by the insurgents (see Appendix 2-2), to the 
authorities in Lima to open a military base. However, the memories regarding the internal 
war are still present and most people do not want the army nearby.  
It is a fact that Chungui is a district located in a geographically isolated area, and 
that it has problems with violence and drugs; however, portraying this as a ‗no man‘s 
land‘ where there is not any state presence is inaccurate. Images of Chungui as an 
extremely dangerous place have been present in the national imaginary for a decade, and 
this has been provoked by the multiple representations that emerged after the release of 
the PTRC Final Report. Therefore, a major challenge for researchers, is to dismantle 




violence is only possible in the uncivilized (=Andean) parts of the Peruvian territory. 
2. Understanding the internal war in Chungui 
   On May 18th, in 1980, Peruvians returned to the polls after eleven years of 
dictatorship to elect a democratic government. That same day, the Peruvian Communist 
Party-Sendero Luminoso (PCP-SL) declared war against the Peruvian state. Led by 
Abimael Guzman (alias President Gonzalo), a professor at the University of Huamanga, 
the Shining Path recruited schoolteachers and provincial intellectuals trained at the 
university to be sent to work in rural areas. Throughout the rural school system, the 
Shining Path indoctrinated hundreds of young students who were eager to change their 
lives of poverty and exclusion. The hierarchical education system, in which the teacher 
was seen as the bearer of truth, did not allow students to question or criticize the Shining 
Path‘s discourses (for a complete discussion see Degregori 1989). 
 When the Shining Path entered Chungui, it exacerbated the community‘s internal 
conflicts and differences (see Chapter 3 for a detailed historical account). Several works 
have analyzed in detail the Peruvian internal conflict of the 1980s (see Degregori 1985; 
Degregori 1990; Stern 1998), including the Final Report of the Peruvian Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (PTRC 2003a). Rather than repeating what others have said, 
I will focus on the ‗retiradas,‘ which were one of the reasons why Chapi and Chungui 
became important to the PTRC Final Report.  
 In the beginning, the Shining Path was developing an underground indoctrination 




under threats to their lives. Students‘ parents had different reactions to the Shining Path 
project; some found that at the beginning (1980–1982), this group looked for justice by 
promising an egalitarian society that the Agrarian Reform had not achieved. Others were 
skeptical about this project that was giving local power to young students and allowing 
them to question the traditional system of authority and respect in Andean villages.  
During the war years, people often changed sides, specifically after the police or 
army came to town asking for the names of Shining Path members. Eventual treason 
from one side or the other was the main reason for the first executions on either side. In 
Oronccoy, Emeterio Huamán, who was a well-known political leader from the 1960s and 
the Agrarian Reform, was against the PCP-SL and he was soon identified as a threat to 
this project. His nephew accused him of robbery and abusive behavior, which ended in a 
‗popular trial‘ (Sp. juicio popular) after which Emeterio was executed.  
In 1982, the Shining Path burned all the machinery used to produce sugar cane 
brandy in Chapi. Afterward, the PCP-SL organized the comuneros to follow the armed 
struggle. Days later the police arrived in Chapi, and by threatening to kill a man held on 
gun, they got the names of those Shining Path members who had burned the machines. 
Later the police arrived with the accused, and after they were identified by the 
community as Shining Path members, the police killed them. In response to this event, 
the Shining Path arrived in Chapi to punish the traitors (Qu. Yanauma, En. black head) 
and avenge the killing. One person accused three people as traitors, and the Shining Path 
members executed them (PTRC 2003c: 94).  




PCP-SL to organize themselves in retiradas (En. withdrawal). The retirada was the 
Shining Path strategy deployed in Chapi and Chungui to displace the local population in 
to the jungle where they were organized, directly controlled by the Shining Path, 
avoiding any possible escape or contact with the national army.  
Between 1982 and 1987, hundreds of Chapi‘s families lived in the retiradas in the 
upper Amazon jungle of the district. Within the Shining Path‘s structure, those recruited 
(willingly or coerced) were organized into supporting groups that represented the Shining 
Path‘s government in the region. For the Shining Path, the people organized in retiradas 
became the mass that was the base of the new government. These families provided 
militants to the Local Force, which acted locally as middle-level leaders from the region, 
and who supervised the mass (PTRC 2003c: 101).  
The people who had followed the Shining Path were treated equally, namely the 
women responsible for taking care of orphan children who were still too young to be a 
part of the local force. At the beginning, life within the retiradas was seen as a form of 
ideal community in which there were no differences at all. Everybody had to work for the 
benefit of the group and there was no individualism. The socioeconomic differences were 
the source of several internal conflicts within the community after the Agrarian Reform, 
and the Shining Path was able to erase them. Some people did not participate in this 
project by coercion, and actually shared in the ideal community that the retiradas 
provided, that no other project (like the Agrarian Reform) would offer. 
While the communication system was deteriorating among the Shining Path‘s 




control visits became more and more sporadic, giving more autonomy and power to the 
Local Force and the mass. People stated in 2002 that most of the abuses were coming 
from the Local Force, who attacked their village neighbors, punishing and executing 
them. Moreover, personal and familiar conflicts were used as reasons to execute people 
in the name of the PCP-SL. The Shining Path had a rigid structure that did not allow 
treason or even the suspicion of treason, and any questioning or contradiction was 
repressed with physical punishments or death (PTRC 2003c: 103). 
I was concerned because that fellow called for a meeting and those who did not attend die. 
Because I was very afraid I went to the assembly. My husband and my dad, because they 
did not go they were lashed until they got sick. Then we cooked together because when they 
found us cooking individually, they punished us. (PTRC.BDI-I-P608. interviews, Huallhua 
(Anco). Female, 35 years)34 
Life was becoming more violent and dangerous. The ideal of community life was not 
only being threatened by the continuous national army patrols in the area, but also by a 
lack of food, and the consequent malnutrition. Camps were constantly moved from one 
place to another as they were threatened by the army‘s presence, which was also 
supported by civilian patrols. These patrols chased and killed anyone found in the jungle. 
Until 1987, people strongly believed that any attempt to escape from the camp and 
approach the army would lead to death. 
 Between 1987 and 1989 the Peruvian army acknowledged that in order to win the 
war, they needed the trust of the civilian population. To gain people‘s confidence, they 
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Yo estaba preocupada porque los compañeros llamaban a asamblea y los que no asistían iban a morir. De 
mucho miedo fui a la asamblea. A mi esposo y a mi papá, como no fueron les dieron mil látigos hasta que 
se enfermen. Luego cocinábamos juntos porque cuando nos encontraban cocinando individualmente se 






compelled the commandos and the civilian army to rescue those living in Shining Path‘s 
camps. This was one of the most important elements that allowed the Peruvian state to 
win the war. Things started to change slowly in Chapi and Chungui, and by 1989 the 
army had achieved complete control of the area. A military base remained in the district 
until the 1990s.  
The retiradas put into practice the ideal community: communal life that included 
the equal sharing of food and goods. This offered a project where internal differences 
were theoretically erased, and that a significant number of people were willing to support. 
However, the ideal community started to fail when food was not available (for a detailed 
account of the retiradas see PTRC 2003c). Sharing a raw piece of maize, running away 
without shoes, malnutrition, violence, and death were powerful conditions that helped to 
destroy that ‗dreamed community.‘  
3.  Representations of Peru’s most ‘marginal community’  
After the release of the PTRC‘s Final Report in August 2002, Chungui entered 
into the public discourse as the most marginal and forgotten community in the country. It 
was often presented as the community that suffered the most during the internal war, all 
happening without the knowledge of the rest of the Peruvians. The emerging 
representations of Oreja de Perro have only further nurtured existing image of an 
isolated community where the worst violence can occur without any public outcry. The 
representations that have circulated produce this community exclusively as a war 




understanding this community, arising from people‘s initial commitment to Shining Path 
or from the earlier struggles to dissolve the hacienda system. I do not intend to accuse or 
to judge people‘s involvement in insurgency projects—rather I strongly believe in the 
importance of understanding people‘s own ideas and beliefs about the urge to change 
sociopolitical and economic structures through insurgency and violent projects. In the 
following sections, I analyze a journal article, news article, graphic book and a 
documentary, to show how the representation of Chungui is strictly focused on a 
community that has suffered the worst of the internal war. 
3.1 In Journal article 
Oreja de Perro has not provoked research interest among Peruvian social 
scientists since its history became public, probably because its security problems.35 
However, in 1970 Diaz Martínez, an agricultural engineer (usually consider to be the 
Shining Path‘s ideologue and number 2), wrote a provocative article about the life 
conditions of the La Mar region in Ayacucho. Diaz Martínez describes the different 
districts that surround Chungui, highlighting that 98% of the population was dedicated to 
agriculture and that they had extremely low life expectancies, low literacy rates and a 
high infant mortality rate. The piece also describes this as a region in which communities 
and haciendas lived together in a highly productive land and argues that like many other 
Andean communities that are far from commercial centers, their participation on the 
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During my all my years of fieldwork in Chungui, I only met two people working about Chungui. The first 
one was a photographer who made an exposition in Lima. The second is E. Jimenez, who will be analyzed 




monetary economy was scarce, accusing the mestizo society of an unbalanced 
commercial exchange (Diaz Martínez 1970: 310). 
Through this work, Diaz Martínez also looks to emphasize that the local peasantry 
lacks economic resources, since they scarcely consume kerosene, sugar and salt. In 
contrast, local teachers in these communities buy cooking oil, canned goods, soap, sodas, 
coca and sugar cane brandy (1970: 311). In addition, the author believes the community 
is weary (Sp. fatigada) and that they know that with such few services they cannot 
survive, because their main issue is the land problem (1970: 311). What is quite 
interesting is that Diaz Martínez does not care to provide evidence about what he has 
interpreted as people‘s demands, and does not mention the ongoing land reform that was 
being executed in Ayacucho in those years.  
He continues the piece by describing the important haciendas of the valley region 
of La Mar, which were the property of local families that have traditionally governed the 
region as Majors and congressmen. Although these are extended haciendas, they have not 
been modernized and still used traditional forms of production, which is focused on 
oranges and sugar cane brandy; they also own numerous cattle for which they produce 
grass. Overall, the final production in these states was not as productive as it could be, 
since the technical work performed in the haciendas has several faults.36 Diaz Martinez 
believes that even if they have the best technical work available in the region, the 
haciendas‘ production would be still deficient. He finds the hacienda‘s fields are poorly 
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preserved and the cattle has not improved (Diaz Martínez 1970: 314). He accuses the 
hacienda owners of not being interested in productivity; instead, he argues, hacendados 
are focused on hobbies such as raising horses, which can be practiced because of the free 
land and the cheap and abundant labor force they have. Rather than invest on increasing 
their productivity, haciendas are seen as symbols of political power and social status. 
What Diaz Martínez does not explain is that during the 1970s, the haciendas‘ owners 
were living in urban centers, and haciendas were frequently seen as country houses. The 
haciendas that Diaz is analyzing are not contextualized within the political and historical 
moment, and he does not include the dwindling number of haciendas in the Ayacucho 
region since the early 1920s. The hacienda system was decaying in the Ayacucho region, 
and more than a means of production, it was a status symbol (for a discussion seeUrrutia, 
et al. 1988).  
Diaz Martínez also visited the house of hacienda worker, and he describes  
We visit the colono37‘s house. He is working, but the wife kindly receives us. Three 
barefoot children showing a bared belly, with a shirt and panties destroyed, played on 
the ground […] in one corner of the small patio there are three pigs and five hens. The 
owner also tells us that they have five goats, one ‗chusca38‘ cow and an a donkey (My 
translation 1970: 314). 
The author continues describing the hacienda workers, by stating that they are 
monolingual Quechuas and they have never gone to school. This is an arguable point in 
the 1970s. My archival research shows that people in the community of Chungui had at 
least two years of elementary schools since the late 1960s, and that the first school in 
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Colonos is the Spanish word for hacienda workers.  
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This is the label used in Spanish for  an animal that is the result of mixed races, which does not have any 




Chapi was established after 1966. Education since the 1960s was seen as a means of 
social ascension. In addition, the image of a monolingual community also needs to be 
questioned, since many families living in the district of Chungui have been bilingual and 
have strong ties with the city. Like representations of war and suffering, Diaz Martínez 
expects to provoke compassionate sentiments that would be able to erase distances and 
differences.  
Later in the article he describes how a community, seeing the problems they were 
having, decided to organize with neighbouring communities to develop projects, like a 
road that would connect their communities to the regional road. Diaz Martínez 
emphasizes how people in villages organized themselves communally to develop 
infrastructural projects in benefit of their communities. 
Overall, Diaz Martínez‘s work is remarkable. On one hand, he describes La Mar 
communities‘ situation with a careful selection of words, as poor and economically 
excluded communities that lack the technological means to increase their agricultural and 
cattle production. On the other hand, he also describes the potential that other 
communities have developed with the resources they have at hand. Therefore, by 
organizing themselves with neighboring villages, they achieve some important changes. 
However, the population in the countryside faces other problems that depend on national 
laws, like the land problem.  
 Lastly, it is worth mentioning that this article was written after the Agrarian 
Reform was proclaimed in 1969, which is a milestone event that affirmed the end of the 




the emergence of peasant unions that acquired regional power and political 
representation. However, all of this is absent from Diaz Martínez‘s account.  
 In contrast with other articles on the hacienda regime, this piece has a political 
agenda to ‗convince‘ the reader that the Agrarian Reform has not or would not have 
worked and that people‘s conditions have not changed at all. This is a particular 
interpretation to justify the needs of the rural community and the importance of the 
Shining Path work in this area. Diaz Martínez pleas to establish empathy between the 
reader and the ‗poor‘ peasants he describes.  
3.2 In the news 
In 2003 when the Final Report was submitted, it influenced the emergence and 
spread of news articles about those communities where massacres took place. Chungui 
was one of these ‗unknown‘ communities whose history was publicized to let Peruvian 
society know the magnitude of the events during internal war. In this context, Chungui 
received ephemeral attention and publicity as one of the emblematic stories of the 
internal war: 
In fact [about Chungui being an emblematic story], there the concentration of deaths was 
enormous, especially between 1983 and 1985. Chungui‘s communities were virtually 
vaporized by the Shining Path‘s insurgency and later by the counter-insurgency deployed 
by the state. If some place in the country was between two fires, it was Chungui. This is 
an entire community that needs to be repaired, and to which a new dignity, a new sense 
of life needs to be given39 (Hidalgo Vega 2005a) 
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―En efecto allí la concentración de muertes fue inmensa, especialmente entre los años 83  y 85. Las 
comunidades de Chungui fueron virtualmente vaporizadas por una estrategia de insurgencia de Sendero 
Luminoso y luego contra insurgente por parte del estado. Si en algún lugar del país estuvo frente a dos 
fuegos, fue en Chungui. Es una comunidad entera que requiere ser reparada, y a la que debe dársele una 




Two years after the submission of the final report, Chungui was in the public discourse as 
the most affected community during the 1980s. This quote belongs to an interview in 
which Javier Ciurlizza (PTRC former Executive Director) places the community at the 
crossfire, granting them full status as ‗war victims,‘ an identity that does not allow them 
(the victims) to deploy agency or any political involvement in the 1980s war. 
The unknown violence, and guilt, that leftist progressive and academic groups of 
Peruvians felt were expressed in the media. As Fassin and Retcher (2009) suggest, the 
media and Human Right Activists became the humanitarian witnesses and the spokesmen 
for the ‗war victim.‘ For instance, in an article which appeared in the most important 
Peruvian newspaper in 2005 (see Appendix 2-3), describes Chungui as a town that lived a 
holocaust, with 17% of its population dead and disappeared. Describing the violence, the 
article reveals that the atrocities committed by ‗the Shining Path surpassed the humanly 
possible.‘ It constructs a surreal image when the article states:  
A testimony says that one day an army patrol ended playing soccer with the head of a 
peasant that they just murdered. There were men burned alive, decapitated women, entire 
human groups throw to abysms. There were people forced to eat their own body parts and 
soldiers that presented themselves with mutilated hands as symbols of their accomplished 
mission. It is not only the number of deaths. In this place prevailed the most obscene 
cruelty40 (Hidalgo Vega 2005). 
This article talks about how people suffered, and looking to be more graphic, it expresses 
how people were burnt alive; their hands were mutilated as proof of accomplished 
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 ―Un testimonio decía que un día una patrulla terminó jugando fútbol con la cabeza de un campesino que 
recién habían ejecutado. Muchos hombres fueron quemados vivos, se decapitaron mujeres, y grupos 
personas fueron arrojados por los abismos. Hubo gente forzada a comer partes de su cuerpo y los 
soldados presentaban manos mutiladas como prueba de haber completado su misión. No es solo un 




missions. Thus, in the way the article is presented, Chungui becomes important only 
because of the violence it experienced, the bloodiness of the war they survived, and their 
condition as ‗war victims.‘This sort of representation only reiterates the morbid and 
pornographic part of the violence (Daniel 1996), as if there were not any other stories to 
tell. Issues like peoples‘ strength to continue their lives after terrible violence are not 
worth mentioning. Thus, discourses circulate beyond groups, becoming elements the 
elements that nurture the national news that in turn becomes the national narrative, and 
shape images that circulate through different domains (Cf. Fassin and Rechtman 2009).  
3.3 A graphic work: suffering images 
 Edilberto Jiménez is an anthropologist from Ayacucho who has worked in 
different regional aid agencies. He is the son of a renowned local artisan from the 
Ayacucho region, where in his youth he learned the art of crafting retablos,41 and today 
he is considered the best young artist who makes them. In 1996 when he was working at 
CEDAP, an NGO in Ayacucho, he arrived to Chungui for the first time to work on 
communication projects and cultural promotion. Here he met the local population, who 
recounted to him their experiences during the internal war. Jiménez, who lived through 
the internal war in the city of Ayacucho, listened to peoples‘ stories; encouraged by his 
insightful approach and his commitment with the defence of Human Rights, these 
narratives were later transformed in to drawings of peoples‘ testimonies. 
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 Retablos are rectangular boxes built from cedar. The classic retablo is around 32 cm high and 26 cm 
wide. At the back figures of about 6cm are placed, the back part is a slim wood and the doors are united to 




 I met Jiménez when I was working with the PTRC, and he became part of my 
research team in Chungui. He knew the region, as well as important informants that 
contributed to our understanding of the district. His ability to transform peoples‘ horrific 
stories into drawings allowed him to establish closer relationships with the local 
population, which I believed helped him to approach the intimate narratives of suffering 
and violence. Jiménez explains his own work 
Every drawing has a story. [In his final form] some were done in Chungui, others in 
Ayacucho, Lima, and the last ones in Tokyo. But my notes were done next to the people 
and they were indicating how the events happened, and I was making notes, therefore I 
often did not use the tape recording (Degregori 2009: 22) 
Degregori believes that the earlier informants were transformed into the co-authors of 
their drawings, illustrating and expressing the content of their testimonies, intensifying 
and expanding upon the potential of the narrative from unexplored ‗spaces of vision‘ 
(Degregori 2009: 22). The author continues by stating that Jiménez‘s work proposes a 
different way to know and ‗feel‘ what happened in Chungui and rural Peru during the 
internal war. For him, Chungui lived a dehumanization process (in the literal phrase) in 
which the barriers that divided culture from nature, civilization from barbarism were 
cracked (Degregori 2009: 22). Although collectively people in Chungui participated in 
the drawings, at the end this was only recognized and treated as Jiménez‘s work. Just as 
when we do ethnographies, our data comes from peoples‘ willingness to share their 
stories, but at the end we shape a work that is recognized as the ethnographer‘s. 
 Moreover, Degregori continues by arguing 
The communities were disarticulated, their authorities not recognized and murdered. The 
families were systematically destroyed, dividing parents from children, imposing new 




feelings. In the delirium, it was forbidden to be sad even in the middle of the worst 
disgraceful events, prohibited to cry, even in the moment that someone witnessed the 
murder of a family members, neighbours or friends (Degregori 2009: 22).  
Degregori considers the violence between 1984 and 1987 to be similar to a human life 
potlatch. He adds that the peasantry organized itself into aggressive civil patrols, but the 
propulsion of the violence was the fragmentation of rural society, specifically of these 
communities; as much as this pragmatism had an impact, in this limited situation it 
served as a strategy for survival and depredation (Degregori 2009: 24).  
In contrast to what Degregori and others stated in this work, Chungui is only one 
more narrative of the war that was made available by the PTRC. The violence may seem 
particularly cruel and irrational here because of the retiradas. Thus, most of Jiménez‘s 
texts and drawings represent life during the retiradas. Degregori considers: 
The retiradas were hell, not only for the mass forced to live or to die there, in many cases 
as a concentration camp, but also for Shining Path‘s authorities. This is because the 
Shining Path started with a group of erroneous ideas. The first is that the longer the 
armed conflict, time will be in their favor. Inspired by Mao‘ strategy of a ‗prolonged 
popular war‘ they supported the slow deterioration of the ‗ancient state.‘ […] the base of 
their premises was to consider the peasantry, specially the poor peasant, and the natural 
Shining Path‘s ally. Therefore, they will remain loyal to the Party throughout the long 
and bloody process (Degregori 2009: 25-6).   
 Degregori repeats what the Final Report has already argued six years before: that the 
Shining Path did not considered the heterogeneous nature of Chungui‘s population, and 
the importance of the local culture not only in the form of thoughts but also social and 
political organization. However, Degregori adds that the Shining Path did not recognize 
that people in Chungui had their own interests and ability to act (agency). Rather than 
expanding on this, the authors decide to just mention that this agency made some 




resistance (Degregori 2009: 26-7). 
The following essays of the book are descriptions of Chungui and Oreja de Perro, 
and they particularly focus on life during the retiradas and the violence deployed by the 
national army. Although the original narratives were all in Quechua, the author has 
translated them into Spanish without identifying those who are from the community of 
Chungui and those who are from Chapi. This is a problem because for historical reasons, 
it is important to know the political difference between the two communities in Chungui 
in order to identify the particular features of the war and the degrees of violence. The 
war, just as the population, cannot be taken as a homogenous phenomenon that attacked 
everybody in the same way. The wealthy families of Chungui had the opportunity to 
leave the district, while many young students were convinced to participate in the Shining 
Path project. People were forced to live in the retiradas, but there was also a significant 
group that joined this Party because they believed in its ideas, many of them teenagers, 
and also adults. While this does not deny the fact that suffering and death was a daily 
issue, taking people‘s testimonies as transparent facts is a common practice in the 
Peruvian academia that limits a full comprehension of the phenomenon. Rather than 
support a particular argument, the quotes within Jiménez‘s essays constitute the only 
argument per se. When Degregori argues that the Shining Path did not recognize people‘s 
agency, it is important to question if, as scholars, using these techniques does not also 
make us complicit in denying people‘s agency. I understand that this book is a 
compelling plea, but just as with all narratives, we should not take them as transparent; 




personal beliefs and involvement are erased from the account. 
In the next part of the book Jiménez presents his drawings, along with excerpts of 
the testimonies that inspired them. These are some examples, 
 
Figure 2-1 
And they have to be quiet 
 [Sp. Y tuvieron que permanecer calladas] 
                      Source: Jiménez 2009 
One morning when I was looking for small branches, a Shining Path member reached me 
in the path, and threatened to kill me. Showing me his gun, he raped me. I could warn my 
husband. After that the military arrived, they were abusive, and they took women to the 
military base, but the worst was done with the women of those who supposedly were 
Shining Path members. They raped them saying to them ‗terrucas42‘ (En. terrorists). One 
day, a lieutenant came to my house and he came on, closed the door, took me by force 
and raped me. (My translation Jiménez 2009: 170)  
Figure 2-2 
Shining Path Members reaped in Yerbabuena 
[Sp. Los senderistas segaron Yerbabuena] 
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                  Source: Jiménez 2009 
Members of the army organized the villagers into a civil defence committee, to confront 
Shining Path members. In May 1983, one hundred terrorists entered Yerbabuena, when 
the villagers were sleeping together in the local school. The shining Path members took 
them prisoners, tying their hands, women and children too. The Shining Path accused 
them of forming a civil defence committee, then, taking them out, the people were 
delivered to a senderista group that was waiting outside the school. The group was hit 
and attacked with knives. A lot of fathers and mothers died alongside their children. The 
killing was more than four hours, and then in the early morning, the Shining Path 
members went house by house looting them. After that, they left the village imposing and 













All was suffering for those who did not have parents 
[Sp. Todo era un sufrimiento para los que no tenían padre ni madre] 
            Source: Jiménez 2009 
 
Members of the civil defence killed my mother in Mollebamba … I was only six and my 
sister seven. We were orphans; we were near my uncles in the local mounts (camps). We 
suffered everything, nobody protected us, our fate was to follow our elders everywhere, 
and they gave us food. […] the work for orphans, to go to the chakras to cultivate maize, 
potatoes and other product, watch the paths. If one was a little older he/she was 
incorporated into groups that had to perform dangerous missions like being in the local 
force, the main force. There were a lot of dead bodies in the path and a lot of disappeared. 
[…] Everything was suffering for those who did not have a father or mother, they were put 
at the end of everything, and food was the end, all of us we slept on the side. We had filthy 
clothes full of lice (Jiménez 2009: 192)  
Although Jiménez‘s book is framed by Degregori‘s essays (and other collaborators43), 
which intends to be an academic approach to the region, this is a graphic book and not an 
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analytical work. The district is well-described, as well as the life during the years of the 
internal conflict; however, this is not a different story from what was presented by PTRC 
Final Report in 2001. It is more complete in the sense that it includes examples of the 
local folklore, and includes a list of historical events. Nevertheless, the book focuses on 
Jiménez‘s drawings and the suffering they narrate as a plea for compassion, which is how 
the authorities in the district are using the book for. The idea among Chungui‘s 
authorities is that any type of work—even this dissertation—will stimulate interest in the 
region, and may possibly lead to the financing of infrastructure projects or allocations of 
foreign aid. Overall, Chunguinos seem to have learnt that the more suffering they show 
increases possibilities of monetary donations to the district. Since the PTRC, Degregori 
and other scholars have believed that showing peoples‘ suffering is a political act that 
allows Peruvian society to know what happened during the war years. In this sense, 
Degregori argues at the end of his piece, 
Peru and Peruvians have an outstanding debt with Chungui. This book is a way to 
redeem through ethnography and art […] In these pages it is demonstrated that the 
submission of the PTRC Final Report was only the beginning of a long and arduous task 
that needs to be continued and ameliorated in the look for a perfectible and purified truth 
that opens our doors to justice, compensation and reconciliation of the country 
(Degregori 2009: 35)  
The debt the Peruvian society has with Chungui is the same it has with the hundreds of 
Andean communities and thousands of people that suffered the internal war between 
1980 and 2000. Although some things have improved in the district of Chungui since the 
submission of the Final Report, this population have not received the governmental and 
investment attention that other communities have received. This is partly because of all 




and NGO personnel from working long term in the region. However, while it is a worthy 
recognition of their suffering, I do not find that this book is a way to redeem the debt the 
Peruvian society has with Chungui. The book pleas to compensate them; but it is worth 
asking if Chunguinos and people in Chapi consider this project a compensation. 
Moreover, I wonder how much of this book is about an intelligentsia‘s moral 
redemption that masks itself by stating that it is benefiting the people in Chungui. It is 
like the PTRC‘s task, in that it was needed but it was not necessarily to benefit rural 
Quechuas. In the same line, this book does not necessarily benefit Chunguinos, and 
especially not people in Chapi. Our moral redemption as scholars does not mean a 
significant improvement on Chunguinos‘ lives. As it will be later discussed in Chapter 6, 
‗war victims‘ question how their suffering has become a source of great income for 
artists, anthropologists and film producers, all who seem to forget them like the state 
does. In my interviews, I often found that people feel that they have been used and 
deceived (as always). This time, in contrast to previous experiences, scholars and NGOs 
do seem to have an important role in this.  
3.4 A Documentary: suffering without tears? 
Between 2008 and 2009, a Peruvian film director produced a documentary about 
Chungui, inspired by Jiménez‘s graphic work. As earlier works about this community, 
the documentary is represents the district of Chungui only as a 1980s war scenario, 
The horror of Chungui in the years of conflict beat the worst of hell imagined by Guamán 
Poma [...] violence spread unevenly, throughout the national territory, reaching their 
highest shares in two scenarios away from the main urban and commercial centres. 
Asháninkas in the Amazon, and ... especially Chungui district, located on the eastern 




land without landlords, without state and without alternative political projects44. 
(Degregori 2010) 
The film represents the community as a frontier space, isolated from urban centers and 
commercial circuits. This is the image of the most remote community that ever existed, 
with a historically absent state. To claim that the state was not present at all is a general 
misconception that contradicts historical evidence. In fact, the Shining Path entered into 
these communities because the state was present; though perhaps in precarious forms, it 
was there through the education system and political authorities. In addition, Chungui 
was certainly not the only community without alternative political projects in the 
countryside.  
The documentary continues by affirming, 
Thus, the retiradas built a reality, a fold from culture toward nature [...] Then, reduced 
to the condition of food gatherers, the return to previous times, to the civilization of fire, 
the rupture of differences between the raw and the cooked, between the dirt and hygiene, 
with omnipresent lice as a painful mark of their new status. And at the end of the road 
hunger, disease, and death.45 (Degregori 2010) 
The retiradas are one of the main reasons why Chungui was included in the Final Report 
of the PTRC. However, the documentary does not mention that many people participated 
in the Shining Path because they saw this project as the promise of the egalitarian 
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community that the Agrarian Reform could not offer them. Although this film does not 
intend to do an analysis of Chungui‘s war years, it is important to highlight that 
Chunguinos are portrayed as the most victimized ‗victims of the war.‘ The piece stresses 
how Chunguinos were reduced to ‗savages;‘ emphasizing that their lives in the jungle 
‗erased‘ their culture. It presupposes that culture is only the material artifacts that people 
use during their daily lives, forgetting that ideas are also cultural and do not disappear by 
living in harsh conditions. The extreme violence lived during the war years was the result 
of culture, a culture of violence, rather than a lack of it. 
There are many ways to tell a story, but there should be ways to do it responsibly 
without doing a ‗pornography of violence‘ (Daniel 1996). The question is how to 
comprehend violent acts, for the readers and ourselves, without compromising its sheer 
excess but also without falling into the morbidity of the images it produces. It is true that 
scholars and the civil society may choose to only observe when violence and terror 
destroy peoples‘ lives in their own countries. However, some have chosen to question 
and denounce these actions, such as Daniel‘s exploration of life and death in 
contemporary Sri Lanka (1996). Overall in Peru, after the release of the Final Report, 
there is barely discussion about the internal war, and what we see is a pre-ordered 
rhetoric that speaks about faceless victims and perpetrators. The discursive field is 
occupied by a morality that only erases the cause and consequences of the internal war 
(see Interview to Rocio Silva Santiesteban, Saravia and Wiesse 2011). 
If we choose to speak out, it is important to acknowledge the power of the 




ideas and behavior. These images and selection of words intend to produce surprise and 
sadness, emphasizing the cruelty of the war. However, at the same time, they tell us a 
story of human suffering loaded with death and violence; this is also a story (like any 
other community‘s) of people joining an insurrection to change the social and political 
structure that they find unjust. This part of the story is erased from people‘s narratives, 
because it is though it will diminish attention to the actual suffering. This is problematic, 
because war and violence cannot be denounced without addressing the concrete politics 
that were enacted behind it, and without offering a (concrete) political alternative. We 
cannot talk about violence and ‗war victims‘ in abstract, approaching these phenomena 
from outside the political context that originally provoked the violence gives us false 
ideas of what is really happening. 
4.  The challenges of ‘representing war victims’ 
Some scholars (e.g. Mehl 1996) have stated that the media has forged a strong 
relationship with their audience around suffering and misfortune, in which a ‗protocol of 
compassion‘ interacts with a surge of compassion. The intimate is opened to the public 
view and can be extrapolated by humanitarian action and its work of bearing witness, 
where the use of the media means simplifying causes and above all, giving them 
emotional color. In several cases (like the Biafran crisis) the television acted as 
intermediary, showing starving children and presenters pleading for aid. In this context, 
the faraway ‗victims‘ came close to hand, reducing the complex political reality to an 




galvanize public opinion (Fassin and Rechtman 2009: 194). 
In order to be socially effective, the work of translating violence and oppression 
into suffering must begin by disseminating information. It is often the case that when war 
testimonies are mixed with professional data, the effects of war narrative lose potency. 
Within these narratives, emotions are prioritized over precision, the power of 
demonstration over showing and professional diagnostics (Fassin and Rechtman 2009: 
202). By asking war survivors to talk about their suffering multiple times, professionals 
force them to recite their troubles yet again; they also attempt to make them believe that 
this is the only, or at least the most, effective way to make their story heard in the 
national and international arena. The humanitarian movement tends to channel the 
different forms of experience that are possible into a singular voice that delivers a unified 
message, which reduces a cause to simple and accepted expressions. The problem is that 
this leaves out important issues also essential in order to understand the problems of 
insurgency and violence. In order to be heard, they have to highlight those aspects that 
evoke compassion and bring facts to regarding what are considered legitimated concerns. 
War survivors are compelled to show a suffering body and a suffering soul (Fassin and 
Rechtman 2009: 211-2) in their most naked state. 
In the case of Chungui, and especially Chapi, subjects have spoken about their 
suffering and have exposed their misery publicly multiple times. Yet in fact no one 
knows how this presentation of oneself and one‘s misfortunes modifies psychic and 
social subjectivity. However, it is clear that it affects people as political subjects. The 




translation of this reality into political terms, are affected by the fact that they realize they 
are seen purely as victims, and that often their identity is reduced to this aspect (Cf.Fassin 
and Rechtman 2009: 212). The problem is that what we have seen through these 
representations is what circumscribes Chunguinos identity as victims, which leaves 
outside of the public domain other identities that they have. 
It is important to consider that in post-war contexts, like the one seen in Chungui, 
the truth of the trauma lies as much in people‘s experiences as in the moral economy of 
contemporary Western society (Cf.Fassin and Rechtman 2009: 276). The politics of 
reparation, testimony and proof demonstrate practical ways in which trauma is applied in 
the field of action. However, in each case the focus is empathy as well as on claiming 
one‘s rights. At the same time ‗war victims‘ emerge in the context of an ethos of 
compassion, they are also a tool used to demand justice. Fassin and Rechtman suggest 
that  
We know nothing or almost nothing of their subjectivity as victims. Survivors of disasters, 
oppression, and persecution adopt the only persona that allows them to be heard- that of 
victim. In doing so, they tell us less of what they are than of the moral economies of our 
era in which they find place […] (2009: 279) 
It is easy take ‗war victims‘ for granted and see them as what they profess to be. The core 
of the analysis should not be about questioning people‘s claim to be recognized as 
‗victims.‘ Instead, we need to be aware that the language used in these narratives is 
neither neutral nor universal, and it certainly fails to shed light on certain signifiers and 
agents (Fassin and Rechtman 2009: 280-1). Although ‗war victims‘ look to erase it, 
people always have some degree of agency; ‗war victims‘ have to learn to deal w ith the 




rights, is to show us their suffering and misery. An example of these strategies is 
deployed in the Chapters 4 and 5. 
Conclusion 
The journal article, news article, graphic book, and documentaryanalyzed in this 
chapter have ‗good intentions‘ as they look to raise awareness about the suffering lived 
during the internal war. However, as they look to denounce the violence and pain that 
happened in Chungui, they reproduce racialized representations of the population. Rural 
Quechuas in Chapi are portrayed as ‗war victims,‘ savages, ignorant, pre-modern, violent 
and voiceless. They are not political subjects but victims of the violence; they are only 
recipients of all the actions coming from the Shining Path and the state. 
These representations, rather than being the accounts of the victims themselves, 
are the narrative voice of self-appointed spokesmen. In this context, the humanitarian 
witness46 (Jiménez, Degregori, Ciurlizza, etc.) replaces the first-hand witness, editing—
consciously or not— the testimony reported (Cf.Fassin and Rechtman 2009: 193). These 
surrogate witnesses only make public the parts that they think make sense, which is 
complicated in this case by conditions of emergency and danger, and by the moral stance 
that is characteristic of humanitarian intervention in war zones (Fassin and Rechtman 
2009: 194). 
 Having survived the Peruvian internal war, or any other trauma, does not imply that one‘s 
experience is circumscribed by this event, or even that one desires that it be reduced to 
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this event. Indeed, this is what victims (defined as such by others) often say as they adjust 
as best they can to this obligatory label, which will afford them the status of recognized 
victims. We should not assume the fact that though they must pass through this process of 
recognition in order to win financial compensation and public awareness of their plight, 
this does not imply that they agree with this image (Fassin and Rechtman 2009: 281).  
Statements like at the ‗margins of the state,‘ and a ‗marginal community,‘ are 
rarely questioned yet extensively used as if they were unquestionable truths to portray 
rural Quechuas. Nothing concerning them in the public discourse is an active verb; 
everything refers to them in a passive voice; they are only ‗war victims‘ with no agency 
during the war years. This is precisely the difficulty: they are seen as ‗victims‘ because 
they have been conjointly produced by the state, NGOs and scholars, among others, only 


















 Chapi: A History of rebellions 
 
This chapter explores the central political events that Chapi inhabitants have faced 
in the last 50 years. This time period covers some of the political struggles that occurred 
in the hacienda of Chapi, passes through a Cuban-oriented guerrilla struggle in 1965, and 
ends in the 1980s internal war between the Peruvian state and the Shining Path (a Maoist 
insurgent group). Through a brief analysis and description of these events, I will argue 
that these experiences have shaped subordinate groups‘ understanding of the Peruvian 
state, acknowledging their position within the social and political structure. These events 
share in common the violence executed by the Peruvian army, and through these 
experiences Andean subjects have learned to diminish and silence their political agency 
and beliefs in order to protect themselves. Even today, talking about a direct participation 
in any of these struggles is a dangerous subject that may be interpreted as supporting 
insurgent movements. 
My search to understand the complexity of the local history of this period took me 
to investigate the regional archive in Ayacucho. With the information I gathered in the 
archive, I was able to conduct more precise interviews and to trigger subjects‘ memories 




archival research or by people‘s narratives; rather it is a combination of both sources.  
1. The Hacienda of Chapi 
The Andean hacienda system has its origins in the colonial time, when Spaniards 
received portions of land as payments for new territory conquered. These lands were 
produced by indigenous labor, and were administered by Spaniards and later by 
Creoles47. The arrival of Peruvian independence in 1821 did not improve the quality of 
life in indigenous communities. Rather, it took away the protection indigenous peoples 
had during the colonial era, which had prevented estates from expanding their territories 
over indigenous land. New rules were established with the beginning of the Republic, 
allowing the elite (mainly composed of Creoles) to enlarge their properties, and 
consolidating the formation of extensive estates in Peru; these estates were called 
haciendas.  
In 1863 the hacienda of Chapi, a former property of the Catholic Church, was 
bought by Jose Manuel Carrillo de Osorio y Altamirano, and his family became the 
landlords of this property until 197448. After several divisions within the first decades of 
the 20th century, the land was finally reunified under one administration, performed by 
the Carrillo Rocha family who were the grandsons of the first owner. Since then this state 
has been known in the Ayacucho region as the hacienda of Chapi. As did many other 
landlords, the Carrillo family lived permanently in the hacienda, going occasionally to 
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Huamanga city. However, around 1940 the next Carrillo generation changed this pattern, 
living permanently in Huamanga, which offered a ‗modern‘ life,49 while the hacienda 
became the occasionally visited country house.  
At the death of Benjamín Carrillo Figueredo, in the early 1920s, Chapi‘s main 
administration passed to his sons, until one of his grandsons was appointed manager in 
the 1950s. In contrast with other Andean estates that have a person from outside the 
family appointed as steward (Sp. mayordomo), Chapi was always directly administered 
by one of the Carrillo family members. This manager traveled occasionally to Huamanga 
city to sell the cattle and the sugar brandy produced in Chapi.  
At the death of Benjamín Carrillo Rocha in the 1950s, none of the Carrillo 
brothers wanted to take direct control of the hacienda since it implied living there. As a 
consequence, the mother, Cristina Rocha, appointed Miguel Carrillo, her eldest grandson, 
as Chapi‘s manager. Miguel was the offspring of Benjamin Carrillo and the family maid , 
Eusebia Cazorla. His dark skin became a sign of his illegitimate origin that contrasted 
with his brother‘s fair skin and blue eyes, which gave Arturo the important features to be 
recognized as a legitimate Carrillo. The family, and especially the grandmother, raised 
Miguel‘s brother as part of the family, giving him an education. In contrast, Miguel was 
sent to Chapi without going to school like his brother; this distance kept him far from the 
family, and from the benefits of urban life.  
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I met Olga Carrillo in Lima in 2008. She was with her husband Leoncio, who was 
Chapi‘s last manager, and who knew all the main events and names I found in the 
archive. Olga is one of the granddaughters of the Carrillo family (she is Miguel‘s cousin), 
and she is the only remaining living member of the family who had lived in Chapi during 
the 1950s and 1970s. When we started the interview she told me that like any other 
family, hers had many dark stories and resentments, and one of them was Miguel‘s 
behavior in Chapi. She confessed to me that he grew up with the stigma of being rejected 
by his family in Huamanga, who always reminded him that he was the illegitimate son of 
the maid. Later, her daughter explained to me 
Cristina raised Arturo. She educated him because he has a fairer skin than his brother. 
Miguel was dark skinned, and he was left in the hacienda... the same occurred the next 
generation ... (Carola Samanez Carrillo 2)50 
The family rejection was not the only one that Miguel had to face during his life; 
he also had to deal with the comments made by Chapi workers, who considered that 
although he tried to behave like previous landlords, he was not a ‗real‘ Carrillo. The 
family hid Miguel in the aggressive geography and remoteness of Chapi, while his 
brother and family enjoyed a ‗good life‘ in the city under the family‘s protection. In what 
seems an attempt to excuse and understand his violent behavior, Olga and her family 
argue that he had a rejection trauma. She clarifies that Miguel was a lovely person outside 
the hacienda, but that something happened to him when he was in Chapi, transforming 
him into an aggressive and violent person with the hacienda‘s workers. Using this 
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narrative, the family essentializes Miguel‘s behavior in the hacienda with the hard 
geography in which he was living, associating with this geography a ‗natural‘ component 
of violence as if this behavior was a natural outcome of living in this environment.  
Poole (1994a) suggests that in the ―Provincias Altas‖ of Cuzco, a regional 
identitywas shaped over the ideas of braveness, unruliness, and masculinity. Taking this 
idea further, I argue that Chungui, and especially Chapi, are the equivalent of Poole‘s 
tierras bravas, which fulfill a double role as a dangerous fringe that defies the urban 
civilized center, being at the same time a romantic uncontaminated space. Thus, people 
living in Chapi are essentialized as violent and aggressive, like the nature that surrounds 
them.  
Chapi had 35,000 ha (86486.52 acres) organized into seven sections (Sp. pagos), 
each of which had a mayordomo (en. steward) who was responsible for informing the 
landlord about all internal conflicts and about the peons‘ activities, including people 
leaving the hacienda. The hacienda‘s extension and variety of ecologic niches (between 
6000 and 14700 feet over the sea level) allowed the production of a range of products 
(sugar cane to potatoes) and the raising of livestock. Although the land was the family‘s 
property, only the plots suitable for intensive agriculture were worked for the hacienda‘s 
profit. The rest of the land was divided between pastures for the hacienda‘s livestock, and 
pagos where the local families were settled. In each pago, families produced a small plot 
for their personal consumption. In exchange for using Chapi‘s lands, each household‘s 
head had to work during one month for the hacienda. The work was varied, and included 




the highlands. In addition, each household had to pay the landlord one animal each year 
for the individual plot his or her family was working.  
 Chapi‘s most important income was sugar cane brandy, which was distilled in the 
hacienda house, and was sold locally or transported to Huamanga. Families in the 
community of Chungui51 were traders and they used to have a good relationship with 
Miguel Carrillo. In addition, as many other landlords in Peru, the Carrillo family had 
excellent relations with the local and regional authorities. Even though Chapi politically 
depended on the administration in Chungui, the Carrillo family effectively made 
decisions on all matters concerning Chapi.52 For a worker, daily life in the hacienda 
depended on the quality of the worker‘s relationbship with the hacendado.  
As in many other haciendas in Peru, education was forbidden in Chapi. The 
general belief was that an educated peon was the threat to the system, and the landlords 
thought that the educated subject would provoke and organize rebellions against the 
landlord, which could mean the end of the hacienda system. Landlords and the ruling 
class believed that education would overturn peons‘ docility (and the natural 
submissiveness associated with them), and would provoke them to halt the hacienda‘s 
profit by demanding pay and improvement in working conditions. Despite all of this, two 
families considered education as the way to overcome their peon condition, and 
challenged the landlord‘s orders by sending their children to study in the neighboring 
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 The district of Chungui is divided into two areas. In the northern part contains the community of 
Chungui, which is composed of independent agricultural workers. In the south is located the community of 
Chapi. 
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city. Although there was an important control over the hacienda territory, it was almost 
impossible to control all the lands, and the hacienda‘s work depended on the local 
workers. The landlord‘s trustworthy people received several favors and special 
considerations, such as allowing educated people to return to the hacienda (see the case 
of Emeterio Huamán in section 1.2). 
Relationships in the hacienda: race, legitimacy and violence 
The relationship between the gamonal53 and his workers was hierarchical and 
violent, but at the same time it was one of paternalism and respect. Today people call the 
Chapi landlord gamonal and hacendado; however, still there are some elder workers who 
refer to him as ‗papa Miguel‘ as an expression of respect and hierarchy. This relationship 
of fear and respect was one that legitimated the dominance of the landlord family over 
the people in Chapi, and over the land.  
[Hacienda workers] believed that he was God and worshiped their master ... they were 
very good and submissive people. There were not people like them. They were gentlemen, 
very good people, although the hacendado mistreated his workers (Leoncio Samanez)54 
Leoncio, in the conversation that I had with his wife Olga, was interested in 
highlighting that people loved the landlord, and it seemed as if Leoncio was trying to 
reinforce that they adored him because the indigenous were good people. Like many 
traditional landlords, the Carrillos thought that people were happy and enjoyed living in 
the hacienda, and that their workers were ―good people‖ because that was their nature. 
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 Also called ‗strong man.‘ For further discussion about gamonales, see Poole 1994. 
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 ―[la gente] cree que era dios y adoraban a su patrón… eran gente sumisa gente muy buena era gente 
como esa no había. eran unos caballeros gente muy buena, a pesar del maltrato que el hacendado daba a 





Even if the data contradicts it, Samanez imagines that workers considered the landlord to 
be like their ―God,‖ even if he mistreated them. The essentialization of hacienda workers 
is common in urban areas, especially in people who had administered or grew up in a 
hacienda. They consider hacienda workers to be submissive by nature (further discussion 
of racial essentialization in chapters III and IV).  
In addition, people from Chungui considered that  
workers lived, had their small cattle, things, [...] and they were used to live like that years 
after year, generation by generation, under such abuses, murders, and that was normal 
to them. I guess that was normal (Homero Juárez)55 
Hacendados and people in urban areas thought that hacienda workers were 
submissive by nature, which becomes their way of explaining that the submissive attitude 
is natural to Quechua inhabitants (further discussion of this essentialization practise in 
chapters 3 and 4). Mestizos and notables (en. notable) in Chungui state thought that 
hacienda peons allowed the physical punishments that the gamonal inflicted on them 
because they were ‗ignorant.‘ The relationship between landowners and workers is more 
complicated than just stating that people did not know any other way to live and did not 
want to change a life conditions that they saw some times as abusive and unjust. There 
were conditions accepted in this relationship, but there were also issues that were 
challenged by hacienda workers. The landlords and their managers controlled daily life, 
but transgressions in this relationship were punished on both sides (for further discussion 
on this subject, see Lyons 2005).  
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 ―gente vivía, tenía sus ganaditos, cosas, […] ya estaban acostumbrados a vivir así tras años, por 
generación por generación, a ese tipo de vejaciones, de asesinatos, ya era normal, a ellos supongo que era 




 In the Ayacucho region Chapi was known as one of the biggest and most violent 
haciendas, with a traditional servitude system that was seen as cruel by other landlord 
families. 
[Chapi] was the only hacienda in the area, it was very important, it has sugar cane (...) 
That region barely had state presence, the hacendado was the lord of the gallows and the 
knife. (Pepe Coronel)56 
Violence was practiced by all Carrillo managers and took the form of physical 
punishment, sexual abuses, and in some cases, the death of the worker. In addition, if one 
of the hacienda‘s animals died, was hurt, or was lost, Miguel considered this to be the 
shepherd‘s responsibility. Thus, he used to take the peon‘s best animal to replace the one 
he had lost. In other cases, any non-hacienda animal that was found on Chapi‘s pasture 
was appropriated or killed by the landlord without further explanation.  
Although violence had been practiced by previous managers at Chapi, the local 
memory recalls Miguel as the most violent and aggressive. This is probably also because 
while previous managers were seen as legitimate landlords, Miguel was not. People used 
to call him alqa ñawi (En. spotted eyes), in direct allusion to his dark eyes, which 
contrasted with the blue ones that characterized most Carrillo family members. 
Moreover, he was the steward who had served the longest in the hacienda in recent times 
and the one who was killed by the guerrillas in 1965. 
I met Benjamín when I as first arrived in Chapi in 2006. Although he was the 
eldest in the community, he had an impressive memory that confirmed several historical 
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 ―[Chapi] era la única hacienda de la zona, muy importante, cañavera (…) Eran zonas de escasísima 





details I had gathered in the regional archive. He is the only person who remembers 
abuses by other gamonales prior to Miguel. Part of this hierarchical relationship between 
landlords and workers was the respect that was shown each time the landlord gave an 
order. Questioning the order was not allowed, and following it immediately was part of 
the relationship of respect that workers needed to show.  
As Lyons (2005) suggests, the hacienda was a social order in which coercion 
came wrapped in an ideological argument which took varied forms with deep cultural 
roots. Locally organizing the pagos and its workers, Chapi‘s stewards reproduced the role 
of the landowner at a micro-level. These local managers were often Carrillo‘s trustworthy 
persons, and assumed a role of moral regulation that constructed and reproduced 
relationships of gender, age, and class, infused by a moral language of respect (Cf. Lyons 
2005).  
Hacienda landlords and stewards, as well as indigenous authorities, administered 
discipline in ways that went beyond simply enforcing an oppressive labor regime, and 
discipline was complexly articulated with internal community politics and with workers‘ 
notions of morality and respect (Lyons 2005: 103-4). Between 2008–2009, Chapi elders 
said that the hacienda-era disciplinary practices allowed their own elders to demand 
respect with more persuasive force than they are able to demand today, and complained 
that today‘s generation is lazy and disrespectful to the elders. However, at the same time, 
they contradict these narratives when they emphasize narratives about the gamonal‘s 
cruelty and sexual perversity. Although the hacienda era was a time of respect, it was also 




Lyons 2005).  
The relationship between hacienda workers and the gamonal implied a set of 
understandings about what the former could ―rightly‖ expect in return for their labor that 
was sustained through cultural practises as labor exchange on usufruct plots (Lyons 2005: 
115). In this sense, rather than understanding the hacienda system as a coercion system, 
we need to understand it as an asymmetrical relationship, based on exchange in which the 
higher position needs to provide more than the lower one, becoming this basis of the 
relationship. As I will later discuss (see Chapter 5), the same structure is still used to 
understand the role of the state in the Peruvian post-war context. 
 The hacienda regime allowed landowners and stewards to employ violence and to 
give instructions in ways that legitimated their authority. Discipline was associated with 
the domain of symbolic representation, in which respect is the central category. This was 
as much a part of the hacienda power as a part of the culture and the social relations of 
the indigenous peons (see Poole 1994a). The hacienda system is more complex than just 
assuming there was a clear line between oppressors and oppressed. Workers played either 
role, depending on their relationship with the gamonal. Thus, forms of discipline 
blending persuasion and coercion could contribute to patterns of loyalty and disunity, 
thereby complicating the lines between oppressor and oppressed and constraining or 
undermining resistance (Lyons 2005: 120-1).  
1. Regional politics in 1960s: rebelling against murder 




understood in the frame of the regional struggles in La Convención-Cusco (see Appendix 
3-1) that produced the end to the hacienda regime. The work and relationships that 
Emeterio Huamán established with union leaders in the Amazon jungle of Cusco were an 
important trigger of the events that occurred in Chapi during this time. The impact of the 
political struggle in La Convención in the 1960s needs to be understood as an important 
influence in the small scale rebellions that occurred in several haciendas in the 
neighboring areas, such as Chapi. Only through understanding these relationships do the 
workers‘ political struggles have a regional and national significance. 
 2.1 La Convención 
In the late 1950s the emergence of a peasant movement expressed major social 
contradictions within the Peruvian society. One of the most important events occurred in 
La Convención and Lares, in the Cusco region between 1958 and 1964. During this time 
peasant unions, looking for better labor conditions, started to struggle against landlords, 
and in the end achieved important changes in the Peruvian agrarian structure (Fioravanti 
1974). 
 La Convención‘s unions were made up of local peasant groups, with important 
support from the Regional Workers‘ Federation and lawyers in Cusco, who although they 
were gamonales themselves, sided with the workers against the oligarchs of the jungle. 
The haciendas in this region were located in the Amazon upper land, and the main 
production was coffee, a profitable crop originally introduced by Andean migrants. By 
the time hacendados were converting to the production of coffee, this was already the 




tried to expand their crops over the workers‘ land on slopes, which was a more suitable 
area to produce coffee and, since the coffee ripens all at once, the time of greatest need 
for labor in the hacienda clashed with the same time the workers needed to work their 
own land (Whyte 1969). This exacerbated the conflict between workers and landowners. 
To protect themselves against the landowners‘ abuses, and to support their 
demands to limit their labor obligations, La Convención‘s workers started to organize 
unions. During the 1950s the union work mainly took place in the Ministry of Labor, and 
focused on the workers defending themselves against landlords‘ incursion over their 
lands,. The government was not particularly symmpathetic to the workers‘ claims, and it 
held back from answering the union‘s demands. This situation only fostered the sense of 
exploitation and injustice that would manifest in radical and violent actions during the 
next few years. Hacendados in the La Convención area were repressing their workers 
through threats and evictions performed by the police. In addition, the landlords 
denounced union leaders, who were arrested by the police and sent to prison in Cusco for 
agitating the hacienda workers. In response to these actions, workers blocked bridges, 
took control of hacienda lands, and confronted the police when they were entering the 
hacienda.  
The peasant movement and these struggles caught the attention of the Left. 
However, only Hugo Blanco was accepted by the workers‘ organizations. Blanco was a 
Trotskyist Quechua-speaking Cusqueño who had completed a university education in 
Argentina. He was familiar with the local situation, and in 1958 settled in Chaupimayo, 




hacienda union in the peasant federation (Brown and Fernández 1991). In one of the 
union‘s meetings Blanco proposed modifying the union‘s strategy; rather than continuing 
with a passive struggle, he called for a radical change to confront the hacendados‘ 
growing repression. He suggested the development of an armed struggle to show the 
state, and the landlords, how serious their organization and their claims were. Although 
not everybody in the major union supported Blanco‘s proposal, a group decided to follow 
him. Elder leaders were looking for land rights, not a revolution (Gustavo, personal 
communication, Quillabamba, July 2009). As a result, the union movement in the region 
was divided into two groups. 
In November 1962, Blanco led a group of union followers to a police post in 
Pucyura (La Convención) to capture the policemen‘s weapons. However events grew out 
of control when a policeman resisted and was killed in the struggle. Hugo Blanco was 
charged with murder, and this led to the escalation of violence in the valley when Blanco 
fled from the murder scene, which provoked a police intervention. Confrontation between 
the police and workers culminated in massacres, like the one that occurred in Chaullay 
where thirty peasants were killed on December 25, 1962. During the next months the 
tensions in La Convención grew until its union leaders agreed to stop the violence if the 
government would enact the Agrarian Reform law. Blanco was finally captured in May 
1963. Today former workers believe that the violence the armed struggle provoked 
outweighed its benefits to the cause: 
a policeman was killed, and a chase came to us saying that unions have killed the guards, 
the Armed Force. The government was armed and it started chasing us everywhere. Then 




and in that way Mr. Hugo Blanco has troubled us. (Gustavo, Quillabamba)57 
Gustavo is one of the historical leaders of the union faction that did not support 
Blanco‘s armed struggle. For him, as for many others, the original struggle was 
transformed into a political persecution that resulted in the deaths of many workers. 
In 1963 the union mobilization, after suffering the brutality of the state‘s political 
repression, achieved the enactment of the first agrarian reform. Although this reform was 
only applied in the La Convención area, it had an important impact on the politics of the 
region. For Chapi‘s workers these struggles highlighted the possibility of change, and 
inspired alternatives to traditional problems they had with the hacendado. This struggle 
also showed that it was possible to take actions into their own hands in order to call 
attention to a state that was only ruling for the benefit of the land oligarchy. 
2.2  La Convención‟s impact in Chapi 
The respect (Sp. respeto) that people have toward the hacendado did not keep 
them from resenting his arbitrary and excessive use of violence, and his inflexible labor 
demands. This respect set the terms of contention between workers and bosses, in which 
over violence and obedience were important. It also constructed workers‘ acts of 
resistance as wild, which limited the external view of resistance. Thus rather than being 
considered as a rebellious act, resistance was seen as an spontaneous response to 
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 ―murió un policía y de allí ya vino una persecución para nosotros, diciendo que los sindicatos han 
matado a la fuerza armada a los guardias. El gobierno se armó y nos empezó a perseguir por todo lado. 
Después llegaron a saber que dice que hay una guerrilla encabezado por Hugo Blanco, y pucha noticias 





particular conditions (Cf. Lyons 2005: 118-9). 
During the 1960s, Emeterio Huamán was the most important political leader in 
Chapi, not only because he was committed to political changes, but also because he was 
both fluent in Spanish and educated. I suggest that these qualities were be the most 
important features that allowed him to become the main figure in the legal files that 
recorded the workers‘ struggles against the Carrillo family.  
Emeterio was the son of a worker family living in Oronccoy. His father was one 
of the people most trusted by the landlord, and he managed to send his son to primary 
school in Ocobamba. In order to be allowed to return, Emeterio‘s father gave the 
hacienda a newborn calf for each year his son was away. Once Emeterio finished third 
grade, he returned to Chapi, and through his family‘s good connections with Miguel, 
became the landlord‘s trusted employee.  
In 1960 a formal complaint against Miguel Carrillo was filled in the provincial 
court. The complaint was made by the father of Julian Huamán (a cousin of Emeterio‘s 
family), who accused the hacendado of murdering his son (ARA 1960)58. This accusation 
came about because there was money missing from the sale of sugar cane, for which 
Julian was responsible. He was called by Miguel to Chapi, where he was tortured. 
Finally, it is said by witnesses and documents in the regional archive that Miguel killed 
Julian by cutting his throat.59 Although the judicial file states that the origin of the 
conflict was the missing money, witnesses in Chapi argue that the real reason was that 
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This file had not been classified nor codified by the Regional Archive when I collected this information in 
November 2007–March 2008. 
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Julián Huamán was having a love affair with Miguel‘s mistress.  
In the early 1960 politics were changing in the region, influenced by the political 
struggles going on in La Convención-Cusco, which provoked the workers to file 
complaints in the justice courts against Miguel Carrillo‘s abuses. Therefore, as discussed 
in the next section, people‘s formal complaints and rebellions were not triggered by a 
particular event; rather, it was the combination of what they saw was happening in La 
Convención, and the constant abuses they had suffered over the years that started a new 
period in Chapi. 
When Julian Huamán was killed by Miguel Carrillo, the relationship between the 
workers and the hacendado was significantly affected. Probably under other political 
circumstances this would not have had any further repercussion; however, under the 
impact of the struggles in the Cusco area, this event catalyzed a search for changes in and 
to the hacienda regime. About this time Emeterio‘s daughter remembers:  
... my dad, when the hacendado cut his throat like an animal[Julian], my dad was angry, 
"this cannot stay like this. I'm going to find a solution for this hacienda ... so people could 
be respected. How is that to his will, to the people, poor people was suffering, we are 
suffering? (Ana 1)60 
In a way, the traditional patron-worker relationship allowed animal expropriation 
and physical punishments; however, this relationship did not allow the murder of those 
who were found at fault, at least not at this moment. Carrillo, in performing the role of 
father, was entitled to punish his workers to correct their behavior and lack of respect, but 
                                                 
60
 ―…mi papá cuando le habían cortado el cuello como carnero [a Julián], mi papá se amargó: «esto no va 
a quedar así, yo voy a buscar solución como sea a esta hacienda,… o sea, para que a la gente sea 
respetada. ¿Cómo pues él va a hacer así a su gusto, a la gente, pobre gente que estamos padeciendo, que 





the system did not allow killing.  
As a mayordomo, Emeterio had a position of power as Miguel Carrillo‘s trusted 
employee, and Carrillo often demonstrated this trust by sending him as a messenger to 
other haciendas, and to sell sugar brandy and cattle. In the Andahuaylas region (see 
Appendix 3-1) workers had news about the political struggle in La Convención through 
their relatives who were working in that region (Gustavo, personal communication, 
Quillabamba, July 2009). This news drew the attention of Chapi workers and particularly 
of Emeterio, who was interested in the unions‘ organization and its demands. Emeterio 
‗secretly‘ travelled to meet the union leaders in the valley.  
Emeterio travelled to La Convención several times between 1961 and 1962, often 
going with other Chapi workers to meet and engage in the union struggles. This allowed 
him to know the problems other hacienda workers were confronting, and exposed him to 
a highly politicized environment,  
About three years ago, Emeterio Huamán invited me to go to a place called Challhuay, in 
La Convención region, to attend a meeting of peasants that expected to form a union. In 
that place I met Gerardo Mormontoy, Huamán informed me that he was the leader. I did 
not hear the details because I was working in a coffee plantation at the suggestion of 
Mormontoy. (Archive of the Peruvian Army-Manifestation Eduardo Mendoza, October 8, 
1965 at the hacienda Chapi)61 
In the hacienda of Pomabamba, around December 1963 (1962?) I met with Eduardo 
Mendoza, Porfirio Casa, Ceferino Orihuela and Daniel Vargas from Huallhua; 
Sebastian Quispe, Julian Orihuela; Justiniano Rivas and Lorenzo Castro from Oronccoy, 
with the goal to attend the workers meeting from Pomabamba, and learn the way they 
spoke and then test it on this estate, but it was never possible. (Archive of the Peruvian 
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 ―Hace aproximadamente tres años, Emeterio Huamán me invito a ir a la Convención al lugar 
denominado Challhuay, para participar en una reunión de campesinos con el fin de formar el sindicato, en 
este lugar conocí a Gerardo Mormontoy, de quien Huamán me informa que era el dirigente, no 
habiéndome enterado de los pormenores por encontrarme trabajando en un cafetal por indicación de 




Army-Manifestation Raúl, October 5, 1965)62 
These quotations are from the national army‘s archive and, along with some of the 
interviews I conducted, are the only available testimonies that confirm the Chapi 
workers‘ interest in learning about the progress of the struggle in La Convención. The 
fact that these conversations were collected by the army during the 1965 guerrilla 
movement, and that these testimonies accuse Emeterio as the main contact with the 
region‘s political forces, does not deny their importance. These testimonies were 
probably gathered under threatening and violent circumstances; however, they also 
confirm what other interviews suggest about the close relationship between Emeterio and 
La Convención‘s leaders. Overall, it can be said that Chapi‘s workers were looking to 
replicate the union organization in Chapi, expecting that this would help to stop the 
abuses committed by Miguel Carrillo.  
2.3 The 1963 Rebellion 
 On one of his return trips from La Convención in 1963, Emeterio Huamán found 
that a group in Oronccoy had taken Miguel Carrillo prisoner. Although there are many 
stories about what provoked this event, the fact is that a group of women from Oronccoy, 
apparently led by Ignacia (Emeterio‘s wife) and Catalina Orihuela, took action against 
Carrillo‘s abuses. With a story about the appropriation of cattle by neighbors, Catalina 
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 ―En la hacienda Pomabamba, aproximadamente en el mes de diciembre de 1963 (1962?), nos reunimos 
con Eduardo, Porfirio Casa, Ceferino Orihuela y Daniel Vargas por Huallhua; Sebastián Quispe, Julián 
Orihuela y yo por Panto; así como Justiniano Rivas y Lorenzo Castro por Oronccoy, con el fin de asistir a 
la asamblea de colonos de Pomabamba, y aprender la forma como hablaban y luego ponerlo a prueba en 






stopped Miguel Carrillo in his way out the hacienda nearby Oronccoy, and with the help 
of other women, took away the gamonal‘s gun and tied him up. People in Oronccoy came 
out to help the women, and called for a meeting. When they were discussing what to do 
with the gamonal, a group called for his execution, without witnesses. However, 
Emeterio changed the course of events. 
Once in Oronccoy, Emeterio approached the meeting, and after a long talk he 
convinced the group to denounce the hacendado in San Miguel. The news of Miguel‘s 
capture spread quickly through Chapi, and provoked the general support of Chapi 
workers who reached the group near Chupón. A group gathered in order to take the 
prisoner to the regional authorities; they took his horse, his shoes, and his gun, and they 
tied his hands but left his feet free in order to walk him to San Miguel. 
The commission‘s first stop was Chungui, where they tried to get the local 
authorities‘ support for their demands, without success. After a rally in the plaza in which 
Emeterio Huamán and others denounced Miguel Carrillo‘s abuses, the group continued 
















Chapi workers denouncing Miguel Carrillo in San Miguel, January 1963 
 
           Source: ARA, La Mar Superior Court, criminal causes, leg. 1889 first file 1963 
  
In San Miguel, the group approached the civil governor‘s office in order to 
denounce Miguel Carrillo for the abuses he had committed over the previous years. Each 
of the sixty-three workers filed complaints that accused Carrillo of crimes from 
expropriation of animals to murder and rape. However, the government officials were not 
cooperative with the workers, and Carrillo was treated as a victim by the regional 
authorities. He filed a formal complaint against his workers for robbery and physical 
abuses.  
The excellent relationship between the Carrillo family and the regional 
authorities, most of whom were also landlords in the region, allowed Miguel to be seen as 




and he directly blamed this, as well as Emeterio‘s leadership, for inciting the workers to 
rebel against him.  
The judiciary process 
 The first information I collected about the 1963 rebellion led by Chapi workers 
was in Ayacucho‘s regional archive (ARA), and like any other historical record, I looked 
to understand it in the historical context in which it was produced. There are two 
elements to be aware of: the monolingual Quechua and the illiteracy of the Chapi 
workers, and the structure of the Peruvian judiciary system. With the exception of 
Emeterio, the rest of the workers were monolingual and illiterate. Although most of them 
were asked to testify, these testimonies were transcribed in Spanish by an official. The 
archive does not keep records of any Quechua declaration because Spanish is the only 
formal language of the state. Thus, we should see this material as an interpretation made 
by state officials about monolingual subjects, in a historical period in which the regional 
oligarchy was feeling threatened by the agrarian reform enacted in La Convención.  
On January 18th 1963 Emeterio Huamán, his brother Saturnino Huamán Aspur, 
and Espirita Huamán Ccorahua were sent to jail and accused of leading the rebellion. 
Carrillo explained that they were directly influenced by La Convención‘s political 
leaders, with whom they had been in contact. Although the plaintifs included Carrillo‘s 
most trusted men, these men excused themselves in front of Carrillo by arguing that they 
had been forced to go to San Miguel. These men played an essential role in punishing the 
group leaders by accusing Emeterio of being in contact with political leaders in Cusco. 
Emeterio Huamán ordered Nicanor Ccorahua to capture Carrillo, because Huamán was 




Eduardo Mendoza to receive communications with the Communist Party‘s chief, for 
which had sent money to the society that is in Quillabamba, collecting 10 soles per 
Oronccoy, Chillihua, and Panto resident. (ARA legajo 1885, nro 143, Corte Superior de 
Justicia de La Mar)63 
While Emeterio was in jail, his wife and youngest daughter stayed near him. They 
managed to live in San Miguel, collecting some money from selling the family‘s cattle. In 
addition, Emeterio received help from twenty Chapi workers, who stayed two months in 
San Miguel doing occasional jobs in order to pay for the lawyer they had hired (Archive 
EP, Manifestation Roman Guevara, October 1965). Even if the argument against Huamán 
and the others was not solid enough, Carrillo‘s direct influences in the regional justice 
system succeeded in keeping Emeterio incarcerated for several years. 
During the years Emeterio was in jail, he was denied any political contact with 
people in La Convención, although he was allowed to go to the region to work 
temporarily in one of the haciendas. His defense was focused on denouncing the 
mistreatments and abuses against Chapi‘s workers that Carrillo had often practiced. In 
addition, he highlighted that, having had the chance to kill Carrillo in Oronccoy, he and 
his fellow workers had instead brought him to the authorities to denounce him because 
they had believed that the Peruvian state would give justice to ‗humble peasants.‘ In his 
statement Emeterio affirmed that  
The theft of animals by the landowner had not been reported before any authority for fear 
of being expelled from the hacienda. Facing the current situation [haciendas and 
peasants] is that he requests the authorities to divide the estate into individual plots. 
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 ―Emeterio Huamán Aspur dio orden a Nicanor Ccorahua [para capturar a Carrillo], pues Huamán 
Aspur se encontraba en Quillabamba en contacto con los comunistas, quienes habían conformado un 
despacho con Eduardo para pertenecer o recibir comunicaciones con los jefe del partido comunista, para 
lo cual se había mandado dinero a esa sociedad que se halla en Quillabamba, recogiendo 10 soles por 




Because the goal of the yanaconas is the division of the hacienda property to alleviate 
their terrible situation.(ARA Superior Court of Justice La Mar, 1963, file 1885Nr. 143, 
letter to the judge from Emeterio)64 
Here Emeterio is asking for an agrarian reform as a way to stop the gamonal‘s abuses, 
and he is also calling attention to the fear people have of denouncing the gamonal 
because of the power the patron has over workers‘ lives. One year later in 1964, seeing 
that he was not being sentenced, Emeterio wrote another letter where he declares 
In November 1960 Miguel Carrillo accused Julian Huamán of theft, and then Carrillo 
found this worker with a cut on his neck. In his agony Huamán accused Carrillo of 
murder. This crime has not had any legal significance, because the death of a humble 
worker has no importance in our society [...] the amount of what the hacendado accused 
of us stealing does not compare with the hundreds of thousands he is robbing to his 
workers, and the crimes based on hunger and the needof his desperate workers. They link 
us with Chaupimayo leaders, in front of which we are absolutely innocent. With hunger 
and abuses, we did not have time to know politics for being asleep. (ARA Superior Court 
of Justice La Mar, 1885 file no. 143)65 
Emeterio‘s political discourse allowed him to called attention to his cause in the 
local media. The words he used to make his argument may have been influenced by 
political groups interested in his cause. However, it is not clear if Emeterio was being 
directly advised by any political party or group. His language is extremely political, but 
no different than that of other leftist discourses for agrarian reform in the 1960s. His 
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―los robos de sus animales por el hacendado no han sido denunciados antes a ninguna autoridad por 
temor a ser extrañado en su residencia. Frente a la situación actual [haciendas y peones] es que solicito a 
las autoridades la parcelación de la hacienda. Pues el fin de la persecución de los yanaconas es la 
parcelación de la hacienda para aliviar la agobiante situación en la cual se encuentran.‖ (ARA Corte 
Superior de Justica La Mar, 1963, legajo 1885 nro. 143, carta de Emeterio al juez) 
65
 ―En noviembre de 1960 Miguel Carrillo acusó a Julián Huamán de robo y luego se encontró a este 
yanacona con un corte en el cuello, y en su agonía acusó a Carrillo de asesinato. Este crimen no ha tenido 
ninguna trascendencia jurídica, porque la muerte de un humilde chacarero, no tiene importancia en 
nuestra sociedad [...] la cantidad de lo que se nos inculpa no convalidan los cientos de miles que le está 
robando al pueblo y sus crímenes a base del hambre y la necesidad de sus desesperados pobladores. Nos 
vinculan con los dirigentes de Chaupimayo, frente a lo cual, nosotros somos absolutamente inocentes. Con 
el hambre y los desgarramientos, no hemos tenido tiempo de conocer la política por estar adormecidos‖. 




contacts with La Convención seem to have influenced his discourse, which contrasts with 
common workers‘ discourse that stresses ignorance rather than innocence.  
During these years calm did not return to Chapi, and the continued imprisonment 
of workers only nurtured the struggle for changes among local workers, especially in 
Oronccoy. While Emeterio was in jail, he kept in contact with his fellow workers in 
Oronccoy through letters he sent from jail via ELN guerrilla members (see guerrilla 
section for details).  
In 1965, Gonzalo Carrillo presented a formal complaint against Marcelino 
Sánchez, Ismael Huamán, Ignacia Orihuela, and Catalina Orihuela66accusing them of 
political agitation. Carrillo accused his workers of trying to kill the hacendados, and of 
provoking a climate of tension and danger in the hacienda. In order to refute this claim, 
Ignacia Orihuela, Emeterio‘s wife, declared that all of Carrillo‘s denunciations were 
false, and that she did not know what the guerrillas or communism were. She stated that 
this was a false accusation that was intended to complicate her and her husband‘s 
situation. In September 1965 the gamonales of the hacienda of Chapi were killed by the 
ELN guerrillas, resulting in the closure and dismissal of this and other denunciations. 
3. Guerrillas: the liberators 
―We were the liberators"- H. Béjar  
[Nosotros éramos los libertadores]  
The success of the Cuban revolution in 1959 and the social movement in La 
Convención, encouraged two Peruvian leftists groups to go to La Havana, with the goal 
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of changing the Peruvian agrarian structure after their return. This experience produced 
two guerrilla movements, the MIR and the ELN, with different political projects that 
were simultaneously applied in 1965. This insurrection did not last long, and was rapidly 
crushed by the national army. However, historians consider that this was an important 
moment that put the need for a social and political change on the agenda in Peru (Matos 
Mar and Mejía 1980). 
The guerrillas used the ‗focalized‘ strategy that Che Guevara described as an ideal 
way of jumpstarting the revolution, 
A small revolutionary vanguard trained in Marxist ideology and guerrilla tactics. By 
establishing themselves in isolated parts of the countryside, the revolutionaries enjoy 
some protection from the police while they educate the rural masses in the reality of their 
situation (Brown and Fernández 1991) 
This strategy, as will be later discussed, assumed that the rural masses did not 
know the reality of their dominated condition, thus the guerrillas needed to educate them. 
3.1 The Cuban experience: two irreconcilable projects 
In 1962, two Peruvian groups of different political affiliations arrived in La 
Havana, Cuba. The MIR (Revolutionary Leftist Movement) led by Luis de la Puente 
Uceda, and the ELN (National Liberation Army) led by Hector Béjar. A third group, 
composed of eighty college students, also arrived on scholarships provided by the Cuban 
government. A three-week tour around the Sierra Maestra was provided to help the latter 
group ―choose‖ between professional careers or joining the revolution. After this 
decision, they were introduced to de la Puente‘s and Béjar‘s groups. These men 




The MIR and ELN were looking to learn from the Cuban experience so they 
could reproduce it in the Andes. However, both groups had different views of the role of 
the political party. The MIR saw itself as part of a major project that originated in the 
APRA and that worked with its regional leaders over a long political trajectory, bonded 
by the persecution, jail, and exile experiences (Renique 2004). In contrast, the group led 
by Béjar was against the party system and wanted to go directly into action. Rather than 
building a political party, they wanted to be a free revolutionary association, a disciplined 
military group that acted as the center of the People‘s Revolutionary Army. For them, this 
was the only way to go deep into the problem, by shortening the distances between 
guerrilleros and workers. They considered that only inside the masses could the party 
emerge—where revolutionary and exploited people were together as one body (Renique 
2004). 
The MIR members planned to return to Peru individually, and to introduce 
themselves into the guerrilla areas through a slow process that would establish the best 
places for military actions. This project was impossible to reconcile with Béjar‘s model 
of armed action. The ELN wanted to enter the Bolivian frontier as an armed group in 
green uniforms with a pre-established organization (Renique 2004). 
The lack of capacity to bring together these two closely related projects was 
clearly exposed in La Havana. It was not only different political stances that prevented 
these groups from working together, it was also their leaders‘ ambitions for power that 
constrained the success of these guerrillas (Former trainee in Cuban guerrillas, personal 




3.2 ELN and Chungui 
 Horacio Juárez La Rosa was the son of a wealthy family from the community of 
Chungui. He was sent to Huamanga and Lima to study, and while at the University he 
received a scholarship to go to La Havana. Once in there, and after a tour around Sierra 
Maestra, Horacio decided to join the guerrillas‘ school. Horacio met Béjar, and this 
seemed to be the connection that would decide the ELN‘s actions in Chapi. 
Among many people who entered the Cuban schools was Horacio Juarez, and then we 
became friends and came to Chungui. Chungui at that time, you can imagine what 
Chungui was[...] it was a very important community. Chunguinos were very organized, 
led by strong families and one of these families were the Juárez, and the older brother 
was Horacio who was with us [the guerrillas]. (Hector Béjar 1)67 
Before starting the armed struggle, ELN members visited Ayacucho City looking 
to develop a network that would help to start their project in Chapi. ELN members68 
visited Emeterio Huamán in Ayacucho‘s jail. Although the real contents of this 
conversation are unknown, Emeterio‘s daughter remembers that after the visit her father 
affirmed that he would be freed soon.  
So we were supported by the Huamán‘s network. The Huamán were prisoners and they 
communicated by letters to the community ... The Huamán were in contact with the 
national peasant movement and we managed to contact them. (Béjar 1)69 
Emeterio and his network were the central element of the ELN guerrilla project 
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―Entre mucha gente que entro a las escuelas cubanas, estaba Horacio Juárez, y entonces nos hicimos 
muy amigos y nos vinimos a Chungui. En aquella época Chungui, te imaginarás lo que era Chungui […] 
era una comunidad muy importante. Los Chunguinos eran gente muy organizada, liderada por las familias 
fuertes Chunguinos y una de estas familias eran los Juárez, y el hermano mayor era Horacio que estaba 
con nosotros [en la guerrilla].‖ (Hector Béjar 1) 
68
 Béjar says that he does not remember the names of those who contacted Emeterio. 
69
 ―Entonces, nosotros fuimos muy avivados por la Red de los Huamán. Los Huamán estaban presos y se 
comunicaban por cartas con la comunidad... Los Huamán estaban en contacto con el movimiento 





because they became the connection with the rest of Chapi‘s workers. This relationship 
was crafted by the ELN members who acted as messengers between Emeterio and his 
fellows in Oronccoy. Through his letters Emeterio encouraged the community to continue 
their struggle against the hacienda system by supporting the ELN project (Béjar 2, 
personal communication, October 2009)  
In March 1965, the ELN guerrilla force, composed of twenty men and led by 
Hector Béjar, entered the district of Chungui. Around ten people from the community of 
Chungui joined the cause as direct participants. This became an important element for the 
ELN‘s cause, first because these members were fluent in Quechua, and second because 
through their family relationships the ELN also found support for its project in the forms 
of money, food, and guidance.  
The guerrillas attracted the participation of young Chunguinos studying in the city 
of Ayacucho, and of former local authorities who had suffered incarceration. The main 
group of locals who were aiding the guerrillas were from the town of Chungui. During 
previous months, this group had confronted Salvador Arce (a provincial lawyer, Sp. 
tinterillo) who was appropriating the most productive land in the jungle area, 
Rosaspampa. This confrontation, led by Edwin García Miranda (a local authority and the 
son of a landowner), ended in the incarceration of the local leaders for several months. As 
a literate and bilingual group, this group felt that the Peruvian state had betrayed them; 
they saw their land allowed to be appropriated by an abusive lawyer who was deceiving 
illiterate agrarian workers. They felt close to the Chapi workers‘ plight of injustice and 




themselves70 from the oligarchy‘s abuses and appropriations. Béjar remembers 
we were dedicated to make contacts with local workers at the same time we were doing 
propaganda for our cause, without incorporating in the group any worker who agreed 
with the ideas of the guerrilla movement. But we had supporters, we reached their homes 
in order to stock up on food and to know the terrain that was quite large, that the reason 
why we settle there (EP archive, statement Béjar 1966, pp.3)71 
This was an alien project for Chapi‘s workers. The ELN looked for the support of local 
peasants and hacienda workers, but they did not want to include locals as direct 
participants in their actions. Although this quotation is an extract from Béjar‘s declaration 
to the national army, he asserted in both of the interviews I conducted, and in the books 
he wrote after his years in jail (see Béjar 1969), that he knew that in case of repression, 
peasants and workers would not be safe if they were participating in the guerrilla actions. 
The ELN‘s project was not joint work between the guerrillas and workers; rather, the 
workers‘ support was mainly oriented around food supplies, lodging, and guidance in the 
area.  
People in Chupón and Oronccoy do not talk about the 1965 guerrilla movement, 
even though many of them supported and witnessed it. In Chupón, people have relatives 
who were executed by the national army, and what they remember is the months during 
which the army settled in the area to find all guerrilla collaborators. In Oronccoy most of 
those who had helped the ELN were killed during the 1980s. In contrast, in Chungui 
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 They did not consider themselves as indigenous. 
71
 ―nos dedicamos a efectuar contactos con los campesinos del lugar a la vez que hacíamos propaganda a 
favor de nuestra causa, sin llegar a incorporar al grupo a ningún campesino que esté de acuerdo con las 
ideas del grupo guerrillero, pero sí teníamos simpatizantes, que llegábamos a sus casas con la finalidad de 
aprovisionarnos de víveres y conocer el terreno que es bastante amplio, motivo por el cual optamos por 





there is a memory of the ELN, because many people here believed that the guerrilla 
movement helped to transform the Peruvian countryside. The ELN tried to avoid any 
direct attacks on landlords because they knew that this would lead to an immediate 
incursion of the national army. Today they recognize that their major fear was that the 
army would execute the local population as a way of combating the insurgency. Although 
the ELN argues that they were aware of the threat represented by the army, Béjar believes 
that events got out of control, which provoked a massacre. It is not clear that all workers 
of them were aware of the consequences of supporting the guerrillas. However, there was 
a group in Oronccoy and Chupón that was convinced that the only way to continue the 
movement was to end the hacienda regime. 
The ELN, says Béjar, could not trust everybody, especially because Carrillo still 
had an important group informing him about its movements and supporters. Moreover, 
Béjar believes that people were confused because agrarian reform was being applied in 
La Convención. Thus, Béjar believes that some people in Chapi confused the ELN with a 
governmental agency that was trying to apply agrarian reform in the area. 
The local imagery was very difficult, because they also did not have all the information. 
First, they thought we were a large army, a huge army, because they did not see us, and 
they found footprints on the trails. Then, for many this great army was the army of 
Belaúnde. Others thought that it was the army of the brothers because it was not said 
comrades, brothers, and the brothers had come to liberate them. (Béjar 1)72 
There were several events happening at the time in the region: the enactment of 
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 ―El imaginario de la población era muy complicado, porque además ellos no tenían toda la información, 
primero ellos pensaban que nosotros éramos un gran ejército, inmenso ejército, como no nos veían, 
encontraban huellas en los caminos, en los senderos. Entonces, ese gran ejército era el ejército de 
Belaúnde, para muchos, no para todos. Otros si pensaban que era el ejército de los hermanos, porque no 





the Agrarian Reform in La Convención, the MIR and ELN guerrilla actions, and the 
national army‘s actions, and it was difficult to clearly understand who was doing what in 
the area. In addition, since the relationships between the ELN and the workers were 
secret, people had different ideas about what was happening. However what is important 
to highlight from this quotation is the last idea about the ―army of brothers‖ that was 
coming to liberate the workers. Béjar still believes that his project was liberating workers 
from the oppression in which they lived. The need to emphasize this is interesting, 
because it shows the leftist political imagination of the period that Béjar represents: he 
believes that the hacienda workers were not able to overthrow the system by themselves. 
They needed to be liberated by the army of brothers, who he assumes had a clear 
understanding of the problem. 
In addition, Béjar does not question whether this liberation was what the Chapi 
workers were looking for. His statement here highlights that the guerrillas were freeing 
people but ignores the workers‘ previous local actions to defend their rights and halt 
abuses by the hacienda regime. Although Béjar recognized the previous actions led by 
Chapi workers that ended in the imprisonment of its leaders, he minimizes these in favor 
of the ELN project. 
In September 1965, after nine months of political work among Chapi‘s workers 
and peasants in Chungui, Miguel and Gonzalo Carrillo were killed by the ELN in a 
confrontation. The national army summarized these events, with statements from local 
witnesses,  
On September 25th at 5.00 am, the workers of the hacienda heard successive detonations 




They heard two bells (...) so they went into the courtyard of the hacienda house and found 
several gunmen, only one of those who spoke Quechua. He ordered to stay in the yard, to 
let them know that they had killed the Carrillo and since that moment Chapi‘s land would 
be theirs, as well as all the products. They also said that they could have the cattle and 
every good the hacienda had (...) It was also communicated that by error they had killed 
'a brother' (EP file, party of the second sector and Andahuaylas police investigations, 
accounting for attack by extremists finances Chapi)73 
During the assault in Chapi, the guerrilla members killed a young man by 
accident. They paid his mother for their ‗error,‘ returned the child‘s body to her so he 
could be properly buried, and gave her an economic compensation hacienda. A witness 
from Oronccoy told me,  
I was there when they killed the gamonal, some [workers] were several days without 
food, worried, sad and said 'now what will happen to us?‘ people said. When the 
gamonales were killed, then with black paint the guerrilla painted on the hacienda‘s wall 
'we are the army of the peasants.‘ They took things out from the store and they give them 
to the people. Then the guerrilla cooked in large pots and they ate alone. In addition, 
they took the money but we (workers) do not know what they did with the money (Manuel, 
Oronccoy)74 
When witnesses in Chapi were questioned by the army about the relationships 
local workers had with the guerrillas, some identified Pablo Guevara from Chupón as the 
ELN central informant; they asserted that he had helped the guerrillas enter the hacienda 
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 ―El día 25de setiembre a las 5.00 am, los colonos de la hacienda escucharon detonaciones de disparos 
sucesivos con armas de fuego, comunicándoles que habían llegado hombres extraños y armados a la 
hacienda. Escuchando dos toques de campana (…) por lo que se dirigieron al patio de la casa, 
encontrando varios hombres armados, siendo uno de estos que hablaba quechua, ordenándolos formar en 
el patio, para hacerles conocer que habían matado a los Carrillo y que desde ese momento las tierras de 
Chapi serían de ellos, que todos los productos les pertenecían, que podían disponer del ganado y todo 
cuanto hubiera en la hacienda (…) Así mismo les hicieron conocer que en forma equivocada habían dado 
muerte a ‗un hermano‘‖  
74
 ―Yo estaba cuando mataron al gamonal, algunos [peones] varios días sin comer, preocupados, tristes y 
decían ‗¿y ahora qué nos pasará?‘ decía la gente. Cuando a los gamonales mataron, entonces con pintura 
negra en la casa-hacienda pintaron ‗somos el ejército del campesino.‘ Sacaron las cosas de la tienda las 
tiraron y ahí la gente cogió las ropas. Luego en pailas grandes cocinaron conservas y ellos solos 






property. However, people in Chupón did not want to talk about their direct experience 
with the guerrilla action and its consequences, nor about their expectations of the guerilla 
movement. This silence should be seen as the result of all the years of army repression, 
concentrated from 1966 through 1980s and 1990s. Although people confirm that the ELN 
was in the region, they carefully state that they did not have anything to do with the 
killing of the Carrillos. Rather than a project that looked to free them, they seem only to 
remember that because of the guerrilla movement they suffered a brutal repression in 
1966 that caused the execution of some of their neighbors. 
The police and the national army arrived in Chapi on October 7 , 1965, with two 
Carrillo family members, to bury the bodies of the former gamonales. The Peruvian army 
formally occupied the region in October 1965, after the death of de la Puente Uceda, the 
MIR leader, in Mesa Pelada-Cusco. Their orders were to eradicate all insurgents, 
avoiding prisoners (kill everyone). Everything was carefully planned: prisoners were 
interrogated, tortured, and finally executed. Béjar remembers: 
.. [the guerrilla members] were captured during a mission, the fact is that they was 
captured, and the army did not let them go [...] Many died during the interrogation. They 
were shot (Béjar 275) 
The army‘s strategy was to confuse Chapi‘s workers by acting as if they were 
guerrilla members in order to get information about the locations of the leaders. About 
this strategy Béjar argues, 
Sometimes we arrived at night to the house of our comrades, and there was a peasant 
that was ours (...) and we said ―brother, little brother, how are you?‖ and he said ―the 
comrades have passed through here‖ 
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 ―… lo capturan en una misión de la guerrilla, el hecho es que le echaron guante inmediatamente, ya no 




 - ―yes?‖we asked. 
"Yes, but they are very tough these comrades, because they have forced me me to look for 
their mules‖ 
 He was not able to distinguish between the treatment of a friend and an enemy. (Béjar 
1)76 
The ELN guerrilla plan was secret, and the guerillas acted in the region as an 
invisible army, in people‘s eyes. Affirming that the people were not able to distinguish 
between friends and enemies is to essentialize Andean subjects, as if by nature they were 
not able to distinguish an enemy from a friend. Béjar does not recognize that the problem 
was not about distinguishing friends from enemies, but rather that these people (for 
whom he was fighting) were not central actors in the guerrilla strategy. Consequently, 
they did not know who the ELN members were. It cannot be assumed that the local 
population would be aware of the army‘s plan to capture the guerrillas. The guerrilla 
movement was a top-down foreign project for workers that did not include people‘s 
views or demands, and their participation was only supportive. By essentializing the 
workers, and by stating that bad treatment may come either from friends or enemies, 
Béjar represents the workers as easily deceived subjects, naïve, and so dominated by the 
gamonal that they could not think for themselves, which was a common leftist belief 
during those years. 
During the months the army was settled in Chungui, several extrajudicial 
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 ―A veces nosotros llegábamos de noche a la casa de los compañeros y había un campesino que era 
nuestro, (…) ya llegamos hermano, hermanito que tal, y nos decía «han pasado por aquí los compañeros  
 -¿sí?, les preguntábamos. 
 -Si, pero son bien recios esos compañeros porque me han llevado a patadas a cada cumbre para que les 
busque unas mulas. Él no era capaz de distinguir el tratamiento entre una persona amiga y una persona 





executions were performed. Some of the executed were original members of the guerrilla 
groups; others were accused by their neighbors of supporting the project by giving food 
and lodging to guerilla members. The army, using the excuse of sending suspects to 
Cusco by helicopter, took suspects from their villages, executed them in lonely areas, and 
discarded the bodies. Although there were confrontations between members of the ELN 
and the army, not all the guerilla members were killed in combat. Although many of them 
were reported as ―dead in conflict‖, the archive shows statements of death for some 
people dated months later. For example, Edwin Garcia Miranda (one of the ELN 
members) appears as ―dead in combat‖ in December 1965, but he signed a statement in 
November 1965 when he was supposedly detained in Cusco (Appendix 3-3). Homero 
Juárez confirms that he witnessed Garcia Miranda‘s imprisonment and execution in 
Soccos. In other words, the army archives show contradictory evidence that seems to be 
protecting their members from being accountable for these executions. 
In its final report, the national army concluded on February 26, 1966 that 
The peasants of the Haciendas Chapi, Soccos, Chupón and others, have been 
forced to collaborate in different activities (providing accommodation or serving 
as guides) sometimes under threat of death, and other times by promises of free 
land distribution. In addition the followers of the detachment 'Javier Heraud' 
were those who participated in the murder of the brothers Carrillo from the 
hacienda of Chapi, and committed to this group is Jose Homero Juárez La Rosa 
(EP archive, Declaration no. 2000 CRM, 1965 guerrilla)77 
The army states that hacienda workers only supported the ELN because they were 
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 ―se desprende que los campesinos de las Haciendas Chapi, Soccos, Chupón y otras, han sido obligados 
a colaborar en diferentes actividades (dando alojamiento o sirviendo de guías) bajo amenaza de muerte 
unas veces i otras por las promesas de repartición de tierras en forma gratuita.- Que los seguidores del 
destacamento ‗Javier Heraud‘ han sido los que han participado en el asesinato de los hermanos Carrillo 




coerced, and because they were persuaded by the reward of free land. Further, it reflects 
that the state did not believe that workers could have been ideologically convinced to 
support the guerrillas, or that they could have had political consciousness about their 
condition. This reflects the political imagination about the land problem in the 1960s: 
politicians and intellectuals did not consider hacienda workers as people capable of 
changing their life conditions and as people who needed to be rescued and liberated by 
the educated Left.78 In addition, although in this discourse workers were not held 
accountable for the events that occurred in Chapi, they were executed for their support of 
the guerillas. 
The violent repression of the state not only killed the ELN guerrilla members, but 
also those who supported them in several ways, from which there is no record of the 
executions. The extrajudicial executions are barely remembered and those who have a 
memory of this period justified the army‘s actions, arguing that supporters of the guerrilla 
were responsible for the murder of the landowners and that they needed to be punished.  
Beyond the fear of the communist project that characterized some Latin American 
states during the 1960s, there are two other important issues to highlight. First, both the 
state and the ELN did not considered the hacienda workers as subjects capable of 
participating in the end of the hacienda system. Béjar contradicts himself by arguing that 
he wanted to protect peasants and accusing them of being serfs. In this sense, while Béjar 
believes that hacienda workers were not capable of distinguishing enemies from friends, 
the state believed that people only supported the ELN through coercion. Both share the 
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same imagined view of rural subjects, as a group easily deceived and manipulated, who 
do not have any political consciousness of their oppressed condition. The low status of 
hacienda workers implies an assumption that they lacked knowledge about politics and 
could not be interested in changing the domination structure, because, as a rigid Marxist 
would state, political consciousness cannot be developed under the structure of 
domination.  
When I asked a Marxist professor from the University in Ayacucho about people 
rebelling against the hacienda system, he explained, 
I think it's difficult... difficult for the same situation. If I do not have to buy books or to 
educate my kids, who will give me the ideological preparation. The landowner is the one 
who exploit them. He has them in subhuman conditions, and how they would educate 
their children on the countryside? The average education is practically illiterate, ... Here 
in Peru it is basically the influence of political parties, Cuba played an important role, 
APRA and PPC are the ones you near to the peasants bringing them a set of new ideas. 
(Prof. Pinto)79 
This statement summarizes the ideology that dominated the Peruvian left‘s 
understanding of the political struggles hacienda workers underwent in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. For these intellectuals and scholars the only way to change hacienda 
workers‘ life conditions was through the superior knowledge given by political parties. 
Workers and peasants could not have developed an ideological education if they were 
kept under the hacendado‘s exploitation (Cf. Brass 1991). They cannot open their eyes if 
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 ―yo creo que es difícil… difícil por la misma situación. Si no tengo para comprar libros, ni educar a mis 
hijos quien me va a dar esa preparación ideológica. El hacendado es quien los explota. El los va a tener en 
condiciones infrahumanas, y como educarían a sus hijos en el campo? el promedio de educación, es 
prácticamente analfabeto, … Aquí en el Perú básicamente la influencia de los partidos políticos, Cuba tuvo 
un papel importante, el APRA y el PPC son los que van allegar a los campesinos trayéndoles pues un 





they are not taught about the conditions of their exploitation. This type of statement 
became the foundation of the Peruvian social sciences in the 1960. Indigenous literate 
leaders, like Emeterio Huamán, were escalated in the social hierarchy because the 
education they received de-indianized them. The idea of the indigenous culture as pre-
modern and irrational became a burden that only formal western education could combat. 
Thus, becoming a Peruvian citizen implied getting rid of the Quechua culture. This 
process was called cholificación by Peruvian intellectuals (for an extended discussion see 
Chapter 6). 
 
4. Changes: Samanez and the Agrarian Reform 
Between 1966 and 1972 the hacienda system continued to rule the daily life of 
Chapi‘s workers. After the deaths of Miguel and Gonzalo Carrillo, Samanez (Olga 
Carrillo‘s husband) was appointed as the new hacienda manager. He knew the hacienda, 
since he had worked there for several months during the late 1950s and he had a good 
relationship with the workers.  
The change in Chapi‘s administration improved the relationships between the 
landowner and the workers. One of the first changes, demanded by the local families, was 
to establish an elementary school in the area. Samanez ordered the school built in 
Vacawasi near the house hacienda, and hired a teacher from Cusco. In addition, families 
in Oronccoy organized another school in their area, at which they managed to pay a 
teacher for almost two years. Part of Samanez‘s improvements also included monthly 




changes represented progress, for many young workers Samanez was still a gamonal, 
Samanez arrived to Chapi, bought animals, and we worked two weeks and then we 
returned to our plot. He began to open the jungle Torre [exploit the forest]. Samanez 
paid us wages, he was not like Carrillo... but that house in Andahuaylas [Samanez's 
house in the city] of 20 rooms, 'we' with our work, we have built it, but it has been only 
for Samanez (Manuel, Oronccoy)80 
Most of the former workers with whom I spoke expressed that Samanez was 
different from Carrillo. However, as in the previous quotation, they still highlight that 
their work was used to benefit Samanez. Specifically, the house Manuel says he helped to 
build in the city was not a paid job, and Samanez kept it to live in with his family. 
Although work conditions changed, the relationship between workers and hacendado was 
still framed into the traditional hacienda system in which the gamonal had free labor at 
his disposal. 
4.1 The Agrarian Reform: “the land is for those who worked it” 
In 1968 General Juan Velasco overthrew President Belaúnde in a coup organized 
by an elite group of the national army. The Armed Forces‘ Revolutionary government 
(Sp. Gobierno Revolucionario de las FFAA), as the new military government was called, 
took power with the intent to change the traditional structures of power that had ruled the 
country, which former civilian governments had not been able to change. Among these 
changes, the government proclaimed the Agrarian Reform in 1969 that stated that ―the 
land from now on would be for those who work it‖ (Sp. la tierra es para quien la 
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 ―Samanez llegó a Chapi, compró animales, y así trabajábamos dos semanas y luego regresábamos a 
nuestra chacra. Se empezó a abrir la selva de Torre [explotar el monte]. Samanez nos pagaba jornal, ya no 
era como Carrillo… pero esa casa en Andahuaylas [La casa de Samanez en la ciudad] de 20 cuartos, 






Before Chapi was affected by the Agrarian Reform law, Samanez was accused by 
his workers of exploitation. This argument ended in Samanez‘s expulsion from the 
hacienda. When Samanez narrated these events in 2008, he was still convinced that this 
incident could not have been the workers‘ idea, because they wanted him to stay. Rather,  
he was assured that their ideas had been ‗poisoned‘ by local teachers in the school who 
imported communist ideas to end the hacienda. After this event Samanez acknowledged 
that without his workers‘ support he would not have had enough labor to carry on the 
work of the hacienda. Therefore, he decided to leave. 
In the time of the Land Reform all went to Chapi, there was a teacher who encouraged 
them ... all of them went like flies to honey ... one day my dad was coming back and he 
saw the people gathered with the Vacahuasi‘s teacher in Chapi, the teacher put ideas on 
their heads about the Agrarian Reform ... My dad left because they stopped working. 
(Carola Samanez 2)81 
In Samanez‘s views the Agrarian Reform and the end of the hacienda regime 
could not be an idea that originated with Chapi workers; rather, it needed to be foreigners 
and communists who had placed these ideas on their heads. When I asked him to specify 
this, he stated, ―they were such good people, they loved my family. They did not know 
anything about politics, they were good and innocent. However, the teachers poisoned 
their minds‖ (Leoncio Samanez)82.  
From the data I gathered during my fieldwork, I found that young people wanted 
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 En la Reforma Agraria todos fueron a Chapi, había un profesor que los alentaba… toditos fueron como 
moscas a la miel… un día mi papá estaba regresando y vio a la gente reunida con el profesor de Vacawasi 
en Chapi, el profesor les metería ideas en la cabeza sobre la Reforma Agraria… Mi papá se fue porque 
dejaron de trabajar (Carola Samanez 2). 
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― Ellos eran buenas personas, adoraban a mi familia. Que van a saber ellos de política, eran bueno, 




the end of the hacienda regime in order to become owners of the land they worked. In 
contrast to what Samanez suggests, I did not find that the workers were manipulated by 
school teachers. Instead, the younger generation was more influenced by the political 
events that had previously occurred in the region, and they were willing to work to 
change land ownership. As did many other workers in different parts of the countryside, 
they saw their political struggles and demands as part of the national movement that 
resulted in the end of the hacienda system, and this was explained and contextualized by 
the school teachers in the region. The Agrarian Reform law was far from perfect, but it 
profoundly changed the social structure of the countryside, and showed how a social 
demand could become a national policy. 
Like many other gamonales, Samanez knew that the Agrarian Reform would 
eventually be implemented in Chapi. Thus, before this happened, he sold all the 
hacienda‘s cattle so the government would not distribute them to Chapi‘s workers. The 
only thing that was left in the hacienda, besides the land, was the machinery to distill 
brandy. Finally, the Agrarian Reform affected Chapi in 1974, after Emeterio Huamán 
announced to the Home Secretary in 1972 that the delay of the agrarian law was causing 
Chapi‘s land to be invaded by its neighbors. Chapi was formally affected by the Agrarian 
Reform on June 2, 1975. 
The end of the hacienda system did not mean egalitarian economic conditions for 
the workers, and indeed it increased the economic and social inequality among local 
families in Chapi. Although there were visible inequalities (often expressed through the 




legitimate head of the system that prevented these inequalities from becoming a source of 
struggle. However, once the hacienda and the hacendado disappeared, the struggle for 
power and resources emerged. 
  
Table 3-1 
Number of animals per worker in 1975 
 
Name Number of Animals 
Emeterio Huamán 311 
Ramon Cusi Pacheco 383 
Basilio Casafranca Inderica 39 
Fausto Cusi Pacheco 49 
Alejandro Guevara Sedano 336 
Nicanor Ramirez 51 
Pablo Orihuela 123 
Teofilo Guzman 131 
Lorenza Casa 74 
           Source: ARA. Agrarian Section 1962-1977, Chapi‘s expropriation file, nr. 25, year 1977. 
 
At first, the nature of the struggle among former Chapi workers was around the 
land each hacienda section was assigned in the Chapi area. Later, this escalated as 
conflicts among families: some families had less cattle and found themselves obligated to 
work for their neighbors. During this time, Emeterio Huamán was appointed as legal 
representative of the community of Chapi for Agrarian Reform purposes. One of his 
duties was to fill the required paperwork so Chapi could be officially recognized as a 




position to get profits for his family and for Oronccoy. Emeterio‘s powerful position and 
his literacy, as well as the large number of cattle his family owned, may have provoked 
mistrust among Chapi‘s inhabitants, many of whom did not believe that he was working 
for the benefit of the whole community.  
   It is common to find that those who had more resources, because of education or 
better relationships with the Carrillo family, were later accused of behaving like 
gamonales. Differences in cattle herd size were not only seen as the result of good luck 
with animals, but also as the result of powerful families exploiting the poor in the 
community. The period between 1975 and 1980 was burdened with local confrontations 
and group fractures. The breach between those who had formal education and those who 
did not was also the source of internal conflicts, full of envy and mistrust, which 
continued to characterize local relationships. 
Conclusions  
This chapter has covered fifty years of Chapi‘s history. Rather than to write an 
extensive account of historical details, my intent in this summary is to look at the ways 
people‘s agency has been manifested. And although I believe that Chunguinos have 
clearly expressed their political opinions by confronting the hacendado, supporting the 
ELN, and participating in the retiradas, they deny their political roles in these accounts. 
The extreme violence and abuses that they have suffered at the hands of insurgent groups 
and the Peruvian state have a central role in explaining this phenomenon. Even today, it 
is not safe for people to talk openly about what they really believe, since the state‘s 




for this they need to be seen as only war victims or passive actors, then they will 
represent themselves as such.  
Nevertheless, this strategy does not imply that as scholars we have to deny people‘s 
political beliefs and actions. Nor does it justify the position of both the ELN and the state 
that agricultural workers are easily deceived and manipulated, unable to act according to 
their own convictions, as has been traditionally believed by the Peruvian intelligentsia 
and the state. But this idea of Andean subjects as always being manipulated goes beyond 
the ELN. As I will discuss later, the Peruvian intelligentsia, especially Marxist-oriented 
social scientists, has believed that subordinate subjects in the Andes were not ‗ready‘ to 
achieve political change, and thus it was the Left‘s responsibility to teach them about the 
conditions of exploitation in which they lived. Part of this belief comes from by a rigid 
Marxist approach that does not recognize that subjects may have political consciousness 
under conditions of exploitation. However, this is not only about the ideological frame 
through which social reality has been understood in Peru. This is also about the 
intelligentsia‘s superior attitude that does not allow it to understand difference in a 
horizontal way. Rather, difference is transformed into hierarchy and into justified forms 





“We are a Marginal Community” 
 
The previous chapter outlined Chapi‘s last 50 years of history, and highlighted 
how its history has been written by insurrectionary (ELN and the Shining Path) and 
political (PTRC and Human Rights activists) groups. As each contextualized its project, 
be it scholarship, human rights, or insurrection, these groups have produced narratives of 
violence and suffering embedded in the specificities of the region. By taking the role of 
humanitarian witnesses, the group of politicians, scholars, and activists on one side and 
rebel and insurrectionary groups on the other side, have silenced Chapinos‘ original 
voices. In Peru, subordinate subjects are rarely recognized and respected as actors of their 
own stories, and they often represented only as victims of a story that somebody else is 
entitled to craft and voice. 
 Peruvian social scientists have often affirmed that people in the rural Andes are 
‗marginal‘(for examples see Matos Mar, et al. 1971[1975]; Quijano 1977), a label 
imagining that rural communities live outside the border of a national culture and polity. 
The Peruvian elite (also including scholars) envisions a national space that has a tangible 
border marking zones of inclusion and exclusion. Within this image of Peru, the 
Criollo/mestizos inhabiting the urban settings are portrayed as living inside a closed 




space is imagined to be separate from (and sometimes unrelated to) the Andean 
highlands, usually represented as an ‗isolated and remote‘ space, whose inhabitants, 
considered as pre-modern, practice subsistence agriculture and animal husbandry. This 
narrative denies the historical, economic, political and socio-cultural connections that 
have shaped the multiple groups composing Peruvian society. In this context, the rural 
population is identified by urban elites as ‗marginal,‘ pre-modern. and needing to be 
rescued by the modern Criollo/mestizo subject. 
During my fieldwork, engaging people to talk about ‗marginality‘ and exploring 
the meanings they imparted was not always easy. In many cases people used 
‗marginality‘ constantly, but did not always want to explain what they meant by it. 
However, I found that those who had migrated to the city had more to say about the 
multiple uses they gave to ‗marginal.‘ Although I call this group rural Quechuas, I 
acknowledge that this group is also composed by families who have migrated to coastal 
cities and jungle areas during the internal war. It is precisely the experience of migration 
what reinforces their idea of Chapi as a ‗marginal community.‘ By comparing their 
community to the places in which they have lived, people in Chapi find that their 
community is ‗marginal‘ in relationship with more prosperous regions in Peru. This 
reinforces the idea that ‗marginality‘ is about a subject position that needs to be 
experienced and understood outside the community borders, in relationship with an Other 
that in most accounts is embodied by the state. 
This chapter is organized in four sections. The first summarizes how race and 




program developed under the Fujimori regime in the 1990s. The second part looks at how 
‗marginality‘ works in the daily life of Chapi inhabitants. By focusing on these stories, 
this part aims to understand what people mean when they use ‗marginal community‘ and 
‗marginal,‘ going beyond what is uttered in order to find connections with other major 
themes.  
1. Race, modernity and marginality 
‗Marginality‘ was first explained by Perlman in 1976 in her analysis of the favelas 
in Brazil. She argued that ‗marginality‘ is an ideology that shapes the self-image of the 
poor who were absorbing and internalizing the social features associated with this label  
(Perlman 1976). Her approach was built on urban settings, focusing on how rural groups 
migrated to the city and established themselves in favelas (shantytowns). In the context of 
urban migration, favelas and their population were perceived as a social problem, as 
containers of criminals, the marginal, and the poor. Worried about the rapid growing of 
favelas, the city of Rio decided to eradicate the problem by removing favelas from the 
city, which meant burning and bulldozing houses, forcing residents to move outside the 
city area (Perlman 2005: 2-3).  
Taking Perlman‘s approach further, I look at ‗marginality‘ beyond the urban 
setting, to understand how rural Quechuas have been produced and reproduced as 
‗marginal.‘ Furthermore, ‗marginality‘ also needs to be recognized as a narrative rarely 
challenged by both people in Chapi and social scientists working in the Andes. This is not 
only a scholarly label, but also a discourse through which Andean subjects have learned 




In Peru, ‗marginality‘ has been extensively used to talk about rural Quechuas and 
their problems of integration into the Peruvian Criollo society (See Chapter 6 for an 
extended discussion about ‗The Indian Problem‘). ‗Marginality‘ is used as a euphemism 
of ‗Indio‘ that addresses economic, social, political and cultural discrimination. I expect 
to explain how this category and the narrative it produces works from Chapi inhabitants‘ 
perspective, by deconstructing the social metaphysics that work within ‗marginality.‘83 
As other racial categories (like illiterate and ignorant), ‗marginality‘ belongs to a 
classificatory system that is based on a racial ideology that influences people‘s daily 
interactions. Mannheim (2010) identifies this as a polythetic system, that is, a 
classificatory system based on multiple, overlapping criteria that are assumed to align 
with each other, but really don‘t. In using a polythetic classification system, people select 
the criteria that fit the circumstances that they are talking about (say, ―agriculturalist‖ and 
assume that all the other categories (for example ―Quechua speaker,‖ ―illiterate‖, poor) 
come along with it, even if they don‘t empirically.  
In addition, people in Chapi select categories that others  (like government 
agencies, officials of social programs),commonly used to define them but they (people in 
Chapi) use these categories to define themselves in public interactions with state 
agencies. The acceptance of a lower rank position appears to be only economic: somos 
pobres, necesitamos ayuda del estado (En. we are poor we need the state‘ support). 
However, it is also a process in which they accept the lower socio-political status in the 
Peruvian (racialized) hierarchy. Moreover, there are distinctions among how this category 
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is used by local authorities, the elderly and the younger generation.  
Identifying rural Quechuas as ‗marginal‘ is a racialized practice which produces 
hierarchical relationships between this group and the Criollo/mestizos. This praxis has 
become a naturalized statement in Peru. By labeling rural Quechuas as ‗marginal,‘ it 
becomes accepted that the ‗normal,‘ ideal form is to be a Criollo/mestizo living in a 
modern city. The anomaly is to be a rural Quechua, who are identified through features 












    Source: Mannheim 2010 
 
The interchangeable use of these categories addresses the same racial ideology 
that conceptualizes people in Chapi, and rural Quechua in general, as pre-modern, 
illiterate and ignorant subjects caught in past traditions. This system works as an 
assemblage in daily racial practices, essentializing and reinforcing the Peruvian social 




While rural Quechuas are perceived as savage, barbarous, pre-modern and living on the 
margins of civilization, urban Creole/ mestizo groups are assumed to be the paradigm of 
modernity and the path toward which the Peruvian state should develop. This 
classificatory system entails different forms of mutuality, which reflect the hegemony of 
Western knowledge and the close bond between this knowledge and western power (Said 
1979). 
The different interactions are ideologically mediated by its participants and its 
observers (Irvine and Gal 2000:76). In other words, the polythetic system in Table 4-1 is 
a historical production that justifies the colonial ideology that legitimizes the inferior 
status of the rural Quechua population. Indeed, this racial ideology still pervades the way 
the Peruvian state (with the support of NGOs, scholars and politicians84) comprehends 
and rules the population in the Andes. 
1.1 Governmental discourses: „they are not identified by race, but because they are 
marginal‟ 
Since the early years of the Republic, the military has assumed the role of 
controlling the state, through coup d‘état, every time the ruling class does not respond to 
national problems. In this current of thought, in 1968 President Fernando Belaúnde85 (a 
Christian Democratic Politician elected in 1964) was overthrow by the national army, led 
by the General Juan Velasco. This coup d‘état was justified (by the army) because of the 
inability (and unwillingness) of the Belaúnde government to answer to the land struggles 
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 This is extensively discussed in Chapter 7 
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Fernando Belaúnde was re-elected as President in 1980, the day the Shining Path declared the war against 




proliferating the southern Andes. The army considered an agrarian reform an imperative 
change that Belaúnde and the land class did not want to apply. Although the government 
of Velasco was a dictatorship, it distributed the land of the haciendas to its workers, and 
nationalized enterprises in charge of the extraction of minerals and oil. Velasco, as other 
progressive elite military personnel, was trained in CAEM,86 a military school focused on 
the critical problems of the state that felt compelled to assume the role of the Peruvian 
ruling class, whom (the military considered) did not answer to the national interests.  
Following this tradition, in the late 1980s an elite military group prepared a secret 
analysis of the Peruvian society, called Cuaderno Verde (En. the green notebook). This 
analysis set the politics that the next elected government (in 1990) needed to urgently 
address in order to defeat the Shining Path, and to rescue the national economy from the 
deep crisis provoked by President Alan Garcia‘s first term (1985-1990).87 
The Cuaderno Verde was filtered into the national press in 1993, after some of its 
controversial policies were applied by President Fujimori.88 One of this was the massive 
sterilization program, originally designed by the national army and presented to the 
Peruvian population as a Family Planning program, oriented to the rural population. This 
program was intended to reduce the national birth rate, without considering that the 
choice of how many children a couple wants should not be the government‘s decision. 
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 In 1948, the Peruvian government created the School of High Military Studies (CAEM). The 
school‘s purpose is to train an elite group of analysts for the study and creation of laws, and policies 
oriented to the integral formation of the Peruvian armed forces (see 
http://www.caen.edu.pe/historia.php). 
87
 Garcia governed between 1985 and 1990, and part of his economic policies implied halting all external 
debt payments, which submit the national economy into deep crisis. He was re-elected in 2006 for a second 
term. 
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 Alberto Fujimori was considered an outsider in the Peruvian politics. However, he won the second round 




Instead of a sexual education program, the Family Planning program became the forced 
sterilization of Quechua women living in rural communities in the Andean highlands (for 
a detailed description see Huayhua 2006).  
This ‗ethnic cleansing‘ was justified because a controlled birth rate would mean 
the better distribution of national resources and the consequent reduction of the national 
poverty rate. However, the targeted population was living in the rural Andes and its was 
seen as savage, and lacking the ability to decide the matter by themselves. The Peruvian 
state (through civilians, health personnel, bureaucrats, politicians and the elite military 
group) assumed the imperative of controlling the bodies of the ‗marginal‘ (=‘Indians‘) 
because they were seen as the source of poverty and subversive groups like the Shining 
Path. Seen as the national problem, like the favelas in Brazil, the poor and marginal 
needed to be eradicated, by eliminating their reproductive rights. The reduction of the 
rural Quechuas was considered to have a positive impact on the economic growth and 
progress of the nation state. The Cuaderno Verde argued  
In the short-term, problems are economic disarticulation, the excessive and distorting 
state intervention in the economic and social life of the country ... but the important thing 
is that the demographic trends have reached epidemic proportions ... The subversion will 
not be defeated if there continues to be an increase by 500 thousand people per year in 
demand for food, education, housing, services, jobs, water, energy ... The need has been 
demonstrated to stop this growth as soon as possible, and it urges a treatment for 
existing surplus: widespread use of sterilization in groups culturally backward and 
economically impoverished ... compulsive methods should be only on an experimental 
basis, but tubal ligation should be standard in all health centers... We need to 
discriminate the excess populations and harmful segments of the population.89 (Oiga 
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 ―Los problemas de corto plazo, son la desarticulación económica, la excesiva y distorsionante 
intervención del estado en la vida económica y social del país… pero lo importante reside en que las 
tendencias demográficas han alcanzado proporciones de epidemia… De nada servir á derrotar a la 
subversión si seguimos incrementando en 500 mil personas anuales la demanda de alimentos, 
educación, vivienda, servicios, empleos, vivienda, agua, energía … Ha quedado demostrado la 





Rural Quechuas were labeled as ‗culturally backward and economically impoverished,‘ 
and although the word ―indigenous‖ is not stated explicitly, from the polythetic system 
(Table 4-1) the culturally backward are the rural Quechuas. During the 1990s, the Health 
Ministry, the elite personnel of the national army, and the state offices urged to control 
the rural female body. The family planning program, in response to NGOs‘ accusation of 
forced massive sterilization practices in the rural Andes, stated that the tubal ligature of 
rural Quechua women was not genocide because these women were identified not on the 
basis of race but because they were ‗marginal‘ and poor.  
But within the Peruvian imaginary, the ‗marginal‘ (often used as a label that 
express social, economic, political and cultural discrimination) population is composed of 
‗the pre-modern poor‘ who inhabit the Andean highlands (the extreme examples are the 
illiterate Quechua women), a hostile and isolated space located at the margins of the 
nation-state.However, ‗marginal‘ is also grounded in a larger discourse that considers this 
group as (naturally) poor, pre-modern, illiterate Indians whose bodies and actions need to 
be controlled because they are irrational and harm the progress of the country. Through 
its governmental agencies, the Fujimori government, like the Health Ministry, tried to use 
‗marginal‘ as a transparent, non-racialized category; however, this concept is so 
embedded in an ideological discourse that it can never be a non-racialized category.  
                                                                                                                                                 
tratamiento para los excedentes existentes: utilización generalizada de esterilización en los grupos 
culturalmente atrasados y económicamente pauperizados… los métodos compulsivos deben tener 
solo carácter experimental, pero deben ser norma en todos los centros de salud la ligadura de 
trompas… Hay que discriminar el excedente poblaciones y a los sectores de la población nocivos. 
Consideramos a los subversivos y a sus familiar directos, a los agitadores profesionales, a l os 
elementos delincuenciales, a los traficantes de PBC como excedente poblacional nocivo… para estos 




 ‗Marginality‘ as a category has entered into the state and NGO discourses in 
order to explain problems of the Andean population such as ‗isolation,‘ associated with 
the lack of progress, and backwardness. Its use presents several problems. First, it 
assumes a social world composed of two groups: one that is ‗marginal,‘ rural, indigenous, 
irrational, and traditional, and another that is urban Criollo/mestizo, rational, and modern. 
Second, it assumes that those who are ‗marginal‘ are part of a homogenous body, which 
does not allow us to see differences inside the group. Third, ‗marginal‘ is a category that 
does not account for people‘s actions, but rather accounts for actions performed toward 
them. And fourth, it is a discourse that places subjects as ‗passive,‘ nurturing the 
traditional Criollo/mestizo prejudices about rural Quechuas as passive subjects. 
In summary, ‗marginality‘ is a racial category and narrative extensively used by 
different actors, who acknowledging or not, reinforce the historical domination of the 
rural Quechuas. However, racialized practices other than marginality are also used by the 
rural Quechua. The next section analyzes how people understand and use ‗marginal‘ as a 
category and narrative to explain their problems and the internal war.  
2. ‘Marginality’ in Chapi  
In Chapi and Chungui, people often articulate that they are a ‗marginal 
community‘ as an explanation of the internal war and the high degree of violence they 
had to endure during the 1980s and 1990s. In most of my interviews, informants 
explained that the extreme violence they suffered was possible because they are a 
‗marginal community.‘ This discourse cannot be approached only as an imposition from 




cultural constructions that contribute to their continuing subordination (Glick Schiller 
1992; Williams 1977). In other words, people have internalized the idea of a ‗marginal‘ 
position in relationship with the state as a way to understand and experience domination 
and subordination. Therefore it should not be interpreted only as an instrumental mean to 
become visible to the state and the Peruvian society. 
Chungui consists of two communities: Chungui, a historical independent 
community; and Chapi, a community that until 1974 was a hacienda. Although both 
communities get along fairly well, the people in the community of Chungui considered 
themselves superior to Chapinos because they did not serve on the hacienda and because 
they consider themselves to be educated. By placing themselves as educated and 
intelligent, Chunguinos reproduce the image of Chapi‘s inhabitants as ignorant and 
illiterate, people easily deceived by hacendados and the Shining Path. Local authorities 
and young families frequently use the terms ‗marginality‘ and ‗marginal community,‘ 
accompanied by ‗forgotten,‘ ‗ignorant‘ and ‗deceived‘ (Sp. engañado). Although people 
in Chungui label Chapinos as ‗marginal,‘ some groups inside Chapi also used this 
category to explain their experiences with the state and the internal war.  
Today, expressions like ‗marginal‘ and ‗marginal community‘ are commonly 
found in Andean rural communities; former hacienda workers‘ narratives in Chapi are 
indeed not unique. In those narratives these concepts are commonly used to explain their 
everyday life in the aftermath of war. Nevertheless, the particular context in which these 
expressions are produced is framed by the explanations of their lives during and after the 




elderly Quechua monolingual speakers that refers to ‗marginal.‘ When I asked Chungui‘s 
authorities to help me with a proper translation, they used ‗poor and suffering,‘ (Que. 
Sufriqkuna also based on a loanword from Spanish), emphasizing it within the context of 
the internal war. The use of ‗marginal‘ works as a bridge to communicate with the 
national society: the state, NGOs, activists, etc.; for this purpose, a Spanish word is 
necessary. The lack of a specific reference in Quechua is not a problem, because it is a 
category to communicate with the state and its different agencies (that by definition is 
Spanish speaking). Understanding ‗marginality‘ in this way allow us to better understand 
why there is not a word in Quechua for it, and why some of the elderly in Chapi deny that 
they are ‗marginal.‘ 
The discourse of marginality was not originally coined by the PTRC, but the way 
this organization and its heirs have shaped and used the term has produced the actual 
‗marginal communities‘ as war victims. As I explained earlier (see Chapter 1) the 
production of ‗victims‘ without political agency is an outcome of the PTRC and its heirs, 
so in this context when agency is erased, people in rural communities –like Chapi–have 
appropriated this discourse and re-shaped it with their own experiences, imaginaries and 
goals. Chunguinos highlight that they are ‗marginal,‘ but in a different way than the 
PTRC has framed it, or than Human Rights NGOs and activists have interpreted it. As 
Strathern suggested, it is not surprising to encounter these appropriations in many 
different contexts, although it would be quite naïve to imagine that along with the 
borrowing of these expressions goes the borrowing of their original meanings (Strathern 




2.1 Marginality as a forgotten place 
When I first arrive to Chupón, most of the people in the community were outside 
the village, living in the jungle area because it was the rainy season. However, I managed 
to get a meeting and introduce myself to those who were present. Since some people 
knew me, and I was presented by the Mayor of Chungui, I naively assumed that this was 
enough to at least stay in the village and begin my work.90 This turned out to be 
extremely difficult, because people did not trust that I was doing a historical work for the 
University (although I presented several letters from a Peruvian University with which I 
was affiliated), and they were sure that my presence aimed to harm the community. Some 
of the arguments alleged that I was a mining engineer working undercover to steal 
minerals from the local mountains. Others argued that since I was gringa I was the grand-
daughter of the Carrillo family, and my goal was to recover the land that the family lost 
in the Agrarian Reform. In other words, all the stories that arose from my presence 
invoked ideas of taking something that belonged to them, of harming the community. 
After some days wandering around, signing agreements to do no harm, and a lot of 
talking, I was allowed to do my fieldwork. However, this did not mean that everybody in 
the community was willing to talk to me, or to answer questions about the time of the  
hacienda and the 1965 guerrilla movement. However, other topics, like how much they 
suffered during the internal war and how traumatized they are, arose in conversations for 
no apparent reason.  
During my second visit in April 2008, I met Teresa, a wife and mother of five 
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who was born in Chupón, a context in which the community (again) was discussing not 
allowing me to continue my research. Teresa stood up in the meeting and defended my 
work, arguing that it was important that people in Lima and other places know about 
Chapi, how they live and all the needs they have. After the meeting Teresa invited me to 
her house to explain to me why people mistrust my work. She is 45 years old, and as 
other women in the community do, she takes care of the cattle, her children and the field 
when it is sowing and harvesting time. She has an excellent command of Spanish that 
shows her years living in the coastal region. When I visited her, we were chatting about 
the community when she confessed that she did not like people in Chupón. She explained 
that her neighbors mistrust everybody outside the community; even her husband, who is 
from Cusco and has lived in the community for the last 8 years, is mistrusted. When I 
asked her why she finds herself different from the rest of the community, she explains 
that it is because she left Chapi when she was a teenager (mid 1970s), when her family 
was trying to marry her to an older man. Fearing a life she did not want, she escaped with 
a girlfriend, first to Huamanga and then to Moquegua. In both places she worked as a 
maid because, she says, she did not finish elementary school and that was the only job 
she could get. She met her first husband, a military man from Moquegua, when she was 
still a teenager, and then had two children. However, things did not work out with her 
husband in the city, and she returned to Chapi with her two children in 1995 after the 
military left Chungui.  
Hoping to better understand what Chapi‘s people express when they assert that 




people who were not from the community. This provoked her to talk about the hacienda 
time, marginality and the state. Teresa explains that the people in picture 4 (Figure 1) are 
hacienda runa (En. People from the hacienda),  
Teresa: I think that they are from here, the countryside [people are], you see ... during 
the hacienda time ... these fabrics I believe were brought by the landowners. For 
example, they were given these ‗rebosas‘ [traditional skirt worn by women in Ayacucho]. 
The fabric was brought to them and then the people sewed their clothes [...] Oh this 
makes me feel so sad! 
Q: Why are you sad? 
Teresa: Because during that time we did not know shoes [meaning we did not have 
shoes] ... we were so far from the city, these children [referring to those in the picture] 
did not have the right to be educated, and they [the people] were under the command of 
the landowner.91 (Teresa 1, Chupón 2008) 
During this conversation, Teresa described growing up during the hacienda regime. 
When she analyzed picture 4 (Fig. 1), she remembered growing up without shoes and the 
excruciating pain she suffered every time she was sent to gather the cattle. She expressed 
sadness when she looked at the photograph, and explained that this wass because of the 
hard conditions in which they lived, including not having the right to be educated and the 
domination of that the hacendado exerted in people‘s lives. Not only for Teresa, but for 
her generation of former hacienda workers‘ children, to be educated and to see the end of 
domination by the hacendado were the two most precious achievements of the Agrarian 
Reform.  
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 ―Teresa: me parece que de acá del campo [son], ves… en tiempo de hacienda… estas telas creo que los 
hacendados traían. Por ejemplo, le regalaba pe estas rebosas. Tela no más traía y se cosían pe […]¡Ay 
qué pena me da esto! 
P: ¿por qué te da pena? 
Teresa: Porque anteriormente no conocíamos ni zapato… sería tan lejos pues, sería la ciudad estos niños 






Family Workers from a hacienda in Ayacucho 
                                         Source: Baldomero Alejos Photographic Archive 
 
After showing her all the pictures, I placed them on the ground so she could see them 
together, and I asked Teresa to look at them, inquiring which of the pictures she 
considered to represent the ‗marginal,‘ and she answered Fig.1. Trying to dig into her 
answer, I asked her to clarify what it means when people assert that ‗Chungui is a 
marginalized town‘ (SP. Chungui es un pueblo marginado), and she stated,  
Marginalized, marginalized is that they [the state, the society] do not even remember. Or 
putting them in the corner, right? Neither governments nor anybody else remembers 
them, right? [They are] marginalized and they turn away from them... like despising 
them... they are not remembered. In fact the people from here in town, they do not even 
know about the national government. Now in some degree some aid arrives here to the 




were forgotten here....92 (Teresa 1, Chupón 2008) 
In this quote, Teresa explains that a ‗marginal community‘ is about ‗being placed in a 
corner,‘ a hidden place that nobody remembers. The action of forgetting (Sp. olvidar) 
refers to an action performed by someone else, who places the community in a corner, 
where the actor can forget about them. Then, talking about governments, she argues that 
the problem is not just one government but rather all of them that have forgotten about 
those who are ‗marginal.‘ In the way this quote is phrased, the state does not remember 
the community, it ignores it. As she claims for a state that would ‗acordarse‘ (En. 
remember) them, her statement directs us to her understanding of the state as an 
institution that does not keep rural communities present, that does not act as a guardian to 
look out for the wellbeing of its citizens. Important here too, is the Quechua word for 
―recordar‖, yuyay,  which carries the moral weight of recognition. In a certain way, it is 
related to the relationship between the landowner and his workers, because the former 
‗cared for‘ his workers (see Chapter 3). 
To despise someone (Sp. despreciar) is a particularly strong word in Spanish, as it 
expresses a close relationship and extremely negative feelings from one party to another. 
Thus, by placing the community in a corner Teresa understands that her community is 
being despised. This is possible because Teresa and her neighbors consider that the 
community is not important to the government and the state. She emphasizes the 
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 ―Marginado, marginado es que ni se acuerdan. O ponerle a un rincón ¿no? No acordarse de ellos. 
Ni los gobiernos, nadie se acuerda de ellos, ¿no?, marginados y se apartan de ellos pues, ¿no? 
…como un desprecio pues… no se acuerdan nada, ¿no? en realidad de acá del pueblo ni si quiera 
sabe pe el gobierno nacional. Ahora más o menos llega ¿no? las ayudas, algunas cositas acá al 





hierarchical relationship that the state establishes with the community, in which the state 
despises the indigenous population. At the end of the quote, Teresa compares how before 
there was not any ‗help‘ (Sp. ayuda) arriving to the community; however, today, ‗some 
things‘ arrive. She is referring to the visibility that Chungui  as a district has acquired after 
the submission of the PTRC‘s Final Report. For Teresa, today aid is arriving in the form 
of infrastructure and assistance projects. 
Teresa only uses ‗marginalized‘ (Sp. marginado) and ‗people‘ (Sp. pueblo) to 
address those who are in a marginal position in relationship with the rest of the Peruvian 
society. This is important to highlight because she directly addresses a racial category 
when she uses despised. In the Peruvian racial ideology ‗despised‘  is a strong word that is 
commonly used within racial practices.93The combination of ‗despised‘ and ‗people‘ 
infers that the indigenous community is despised by the state because they are rural 
Quechuas, who are poor and illiterate. For Teresa, Chapi is marginalized because they are 
rural Quechuas, backward ‗Indians‘ (Sp. Indios) that do not live the modern urban life. 
By doing this she is placing herself into the national discourse that racializes rural 
Quechuas and places them far from modernity. 
Desprecio is particularly used when racial categories are at play, especially when 
Creoles talk about indigenous communities. Racial practices in Peru need to be 
approached through interactions, especially when a particular group talks about the other 
(for example, Criollo/mestizos talking about rural Quechuas). Racial practices are more 
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 To explain how racial ideologies works is not an easy task. Therefore, it is  important to look at the racial 
practices that racialized particular groups. Even though I am trying to explain how these practices work, the 




clearly expressed when urban Creoles/mestizos imagine that there are not any rural 
Quechuas around; the same occurs when rural Quechuas talk about Creoles/mestizos. 
During my years of fieldwork, questioning the Peruvian intelligentsia about indigenous 
Quechuas was not a problem. It was generally assumed that I shared their view, and I was 
seen and treated as an insider sharing the same racial ideas and practices tacitly assumed 
(a position that I do not, however, necessarily share). In contrast, while establishing 
relationships in Chapi, especially with elderly people, I was called a gringa all the time, 
especially when the conversation was only in Quechua, which assumed that because I 
was a gringa I did not understand their language. Building on this experience and upon 
other analyses (see Huayhua 2010), because race as an ideology is not openly discussed, 
we need to focus on racial practices performed daily not only in rural communities like 
Chapi, but also in urban centers, NGOs and academic spaces (like colleges and 
universities, training social scientists).   
Teresa‘s husband, Miguel, is a Cusqueño miner who arrived to Chapi from 
Maldonado, a city in the Amazon jungle, during the 1990s. In every conversation we had, 
he compared Chapi to Santa Teresa (the district in La Convención-Cusco where he grew 
up), highlighting the progress that Cusco‘s communities are achieving in contrast to the 
permanent ‗backwardness‘ that he considers Chapi to be mired in. When I asked him to 
explain if he thinks Chapi is a ‗marginal community‘, he explained: 
Totally! We're talking about a marginalized area, forgotten ... we are 40 years behind 
[any other community] Here there is not any sort of help, what help do we have? The 




since the day I came [1994] I have not seen any progress.94 (Miguel 3, Chupón 2008) 
For him, Chapi is a ‗marginal community‘ because there is no progress; it is like being 40 
years in the past in contrast with the communities he is familiar with in Cusco. Going 
beyond Teresa‘s words, Miguel associates ‗marginality‘ with aid that is not being 
provided. Although he does not single out the state as the source of help, he argues that 
the municipality (Sp. municipalidad) has the power to make important changes:  
The difference is the mayor. He has all the authority and when will this community 
progress? If the district has a secretary for agriculture he must work on agriculture, if a 
secretary enters to make infrastructure projects, he must do that. He (Mayor) shall have 
the power to put this in place. Here is the difference with Santa Teresa (a community in 
Cusco), because in Santa Teresa people have a modern life.95 (Miguel 3, Chupón 2008) 
For Miguel, Santa Teresa has achieved progress (modernity) because of the 
municipality‘s work, and its commitment to developing the community. He is referring to 
developing projects, such as roads and technical assistance, but to develop these 
municipalities must budget properly. Miguel does not acknowledge that the budgets of 
Cusco region receive an important percentage of their imposed taxes from the production 
of natural gas (Sp. canon minero). This generates a larger budget that does not compare 
to the limited assets that Chungui and the region of Ayacucho receive annually. Rather 
than looking at the economic differences between Cusco and Ayacucho, Miguel 
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―¡Total! Estamos hablando de una zona marginada, olvidada… estaríamos hablando de 40 años 
atrasados estamos hablando ninguna clase ayuda acá hay, que ayuda hay, la carretera que está 
viniendo eso no es ayuda… claro es una ayuda pero imagínese desde el día en que he venido [1994] 
yo, no veo progreso.‖  
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 ―la diferencia es el mismo alcalde. Toda la potestad todo el poder tiene y cuando va progresar así 
pe, si el distrito tuviera un regidor entra para hacer agricultura debe ser agricultura, si un regidor 
ha entrado de obras debe ser de obras. El (alcalde) debe tener esa esa potestad esa fuerza por 






considers that the problem in Chungui is concentrated in the authorities who do not work 
toward the development of the region. For him, it is not the central government that is 
accountable for these projects; rather it is the municipalidad, because they have a direct 
relationship with the government and should ask for more help.  
Trying to understand what Miguel meant when he asserted that ‗people lived 
modern‘ in Santa Teresa, I asked him to explain what he considers a modern life. Rather 
than answering with a direct explanation, he narrated his travels to Cusco with his 8 year 
old son for a family visit to Santa Teresa. Returning to Chapi, the son told his mother 
(Teresa): Here we live like primitives, we do not have a TV, we eat sitting on the floor. 
We do not eat sitting at a table like people96 (Miguel, Fieldnotes, Chupón 2008). Miguel 
frames the story as reported speech, trying to reduce his responsibility in shaping this 
quote (see Hill and Irvine 1993); however, it is clear that it is he who believes that rural 
life is ‗primitive.‘ Because he is talking with an urban Limeña anthropologist (gringa), he 
may have felt it was proper to tell the story through his son‘s voice. In Peru, the narrative 
of modernity is associated with urban settings, where basic services like running water 
and electricity can be found. Being a ‗modern‘ subject does not go along with rural life,97 
which is seen as backward and primitive. People aspire to move upward in the social 
structure, and to achieve this, they consider essential to leave the countryside. This is one 
of the most important markers of social success and social mobility for rural inhabitants. 
The idea of living in a rural area as ‗primitive‘ is grounded in people‘s experiences 
                                                 
96
 Acá vivimos como primitivos, no tenemos TV, ni comemos sentados en la mesa como la gente. 
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 During the hacienda time, the estate Chapi generated its own electricity; however, the enormous distance 
from the city of Huamanga make this country house for the Carrillo family, especially at the second half of 




through direct discrimination and marginalization. State offices, health care workers, 
teachers, NGO officers and others, impose the idea that those in the rural Andes lack 
modernity because they possess a different life style and living conditions from those 
viewed as the ‗norm.‘ A different way to be ‗modern‘ does not exist; it is forced along the 
life pattern that is intrinsic to the urban life style. For example, the social programs 
Juntos (En. Together) demand beneficiaries to organize their kitchens as a space free of 
animals (like guinea pigs), to build cabinets in order to protect utensils from getting dirty, 
and to build a ‗cocina mejorada‘ (En. improved stove), which is supposed to reduce the 
amount of smoke entering into the house.98 The problem is that it is so cold during the 
rainy season that the stove has a double purpose: both a stove and a fire to warm the 
house and family members. In addition, guinea pigs need to live in a warm close space or 
they die, and finally, it is not so easy to build cabinets when you are more focused on 
making money to survive. Social programs sponsored by the central state and NGOs 
rarely consider important to understand why people keep particular practices. Rather than 
exploring these practices and understanding them in terms of  local knowledge, 
foreigners assume that these practices are pre-modern. Finally, this only produces a 
process of Othering and subordination. 
Carlos is a young leader from one of Chapi‘s villages. I met him in Oronccoy, 
while we were waiting to make a radio call, which is the only means of communication 
among the villages in the district.99 We talked about problems with the radio and 
communications in general, and when I asked him if he considers Oreja de Perro to be a 
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 People in Chapi cook with wood placing this in a corner, with some small rocks that would hold the pans.  
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‗marginal community,‘ he said that it might not be marginalized, but that it is definitely 
forgotten; 
…marginalized, when people say that they are marginalized they refer to racial reasons, 
there is a marginalization from people of the city. In this case, for example, I hear some 
comments about how people living in other places marginalize us, because we are 
hacienda people... in that way there is marginalization. Marginalization is like 
discrimination, it can be also in the Sierra… like people from here migrated to the coast 
and they are always treated like a Serrano, but if it's bad. I think that it is 
marginalization or discrimination. There is always the same (marginalization) from 
foreign countries toward Peru.100 (Carlos, Oronqoy 2008) 
For Carlos ‗marginality‘ is being excluded or discriminated against because of race and 
place of origin. Having been born and living in a rural community is by itself a strong 
racial marker in Peru. Discrimination is particularly strong when people from Chapi 
interact with the community of Chungui. On one level, the village of Chungui 
discriminates against people in Chapi, because they used to be hacienda workers, which 
Chunguinos see as the lowest occupation. To highlight this Chunguinos still address 
Chapi as ‗hacienda property‘ (Qu. hacienda quru), even after 40 years of the end of the 
hacienda regime in Ayacucho. The marginalization that occurs at a micro level is 
reproduced at all levels, between Ayacucho city and the Chungui district, and between 
the Coast and Sierra. As in the case of Teresa, ‗marginalization‘ becomes a racialized 
term to stress hierarchical differences, even though people do not say it clearly because 
they themselves are indigenous and are being discriminated against. Here it is important 
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 ―o sea, marginados, cuando se dice marginados quiere decir hay razones de raza, hay una 
marginación con la gente de la ciudad. En este caso por ejemplo yo escucho comentarios de que hay 
gente que vive en otro sitios nos marginan de que nosotros somos gente del hacendado en esa forma 
podría haber una marginación… La marginación es como discriminación, también puede ser la 
sierra…hay con la gente de la costa de acá de la sierra migran y la gente costeña siempre te t ratan 
como serranos, así pero en si es malo. Yo pienso eso es marginación o  discriminación siempre hay 




to clarify that people in the Peruvian Andes do not define themselves through racial 
categories. They use the word ―Runa‖ (En. people) and ―peasants‖ to identify 
themselves, although even these terms are open to racialization. It is important to note 
that—much as Huayhua (2010) found in rural Cusco,  they do not seek to be identified 
ethnically.. This is an important phenomena that might enlighten our comprehension of 
how racial ideologies work in the Peruvian countryside. 
Calling themselves a ‗marginal community‘ implies recognizing and accepting the 
state‘s position of power within the national hierarchy, one that allows the state to hide 
rural communities in a corner, and to forget them as unimportant. Accepting that they are 
a ‗marginal community‘ recognizes a subordinate place within the national structure and 
justifies it through racial ideologies; it is a hegemonic process in which domination is 
accepted through the practices of everyday life.  
The quotes from Teresa and Miguel explain how Chapi is a ‗marginal 
community.‘ This category connotes a lack of progress associated with a lack of 
modernity that places the community as ‗primitive,‘ but that is also significantly related 
to rural spaces. The state (and the civil society) imaginary has placed the community in a 
hidden corner because it despises it, which also allows it to forget them (Sp. olvido). 
Placing rural communities in (an imaginary) hidden place prevents them from being seen. 
The contrary becomes to be attended by the state through development projects and 
social programs. In short, it is the state aid that the people of Chapi consider would 
change the ‗marginal‘ condition of the community. To be ‗marginal‘ and to live in a 




cannot change. Rather it is a condition that depends on the central state‘s attention and 
care, on the state‘s volition. 
‗Marginality‘ is both a relationship and a place. It becomes the construction of a 
place that embodies traits such as weakness, pre-modern, ignorance, easily deceived, 
being despised, forgotten, and lacking the state‘s interest and support. This produces the 
community within a space that is seen as distant and isolated, where it is easy to be 
hidden and forgotten. When people talk about being marginal, they refer to both a 
geographical and socio-political distance. These elements (to be despised, hidden, and 
forgotten) produce this community as distant from the state, in the same way that other 
rural Andean communities are distant. This is not a feature specific to Chungui; rather, I 
would suggest that this becomes a particular way that people experience and understand 
the state in the rural Andes especially in the postwar context. 
2.2 „Marginality‟ as cause and consequence of the internal war  
The experience of been forgotten and excluded is not new, and people explain that 
this is one of the reasons for the emergence of insurrectionary groups l ike the Shining 
Path. 
 [...] Long ago this area was completely left [abandoned,] the government did not 
remember anything. Thus, the Shining Path came to Chapi; they were looking to change 
this situation [of injustice and exploitation], that is why they caused so much harm 
during that time. Of course, at the beginning they talked nice, they did not do anything 
[in the sense of, did they kill people], but when the others came [the national army,] the 
others [the Shining Path] also came and attacked. That is when the problem started: one 
comes and kills, and later, the other comes and kills too.101 (Esteban 2, Oronqoy 2008) 
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 ―[…] anteriormente esta zona estaba totalmente dejado [abandonado] esto el gobierno, no se 
recordaba de nada. Entonces seguramente así sendero venia, ellos buscarían esa situación [que 




Esteban was a child (7) when he was captured by insurgents after his parents were killed 
by the army. He joined the armed struggle (Sp. lucha armada), and was a Shining Path 
military commander until he was caught by the national army at the end of 1990. After 
being sentenced by an anonymous tribunal during the Fujimori‘s regime (Sp. Tribunales 
sin Rostro), his trial was declared invalid in 2002 (on recommendation of the PTRC). A 
new trial took place, following the  agreements before the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, and Esteban was found not responsible for his actions because he was 
abducted by the Shining Path as a minor. He was released after being in jail for 10 years, 
and returned to his village in Chapi, where he has since behaved as a model citizen. I met 
Esteban in Oronqoy while we were waiting for a meeting sponsored by the state. He 
arrived from a neighboring village in the community of Chapi extremely concerned 
because a national newspaper published his picture on the cover page, accusing him of 
being the main leader of the Shining Path in the Oreja de Perro. He denied all the 
accusations, and told me that he does not understand where this information was coming 
from. To support him, the local authorities signed a letter defending him against these 
accusations. However, Esteban was too frightened to leave the community and he 
preferred to stay in Chapi and keep a low profile.102 
 In our conversation Esteban explained that the violence started because the state 
                                                                                                                                                 
bonito, no han hecho nada, pero ya cuando el otro viene [el Ejercito], el otro [Sendero] también 
viene y ataca. Es en ahí lo que empezaron el problema: el otro viene y mata, el otro viene y mata 
también.‖ (Esteban 2, Oronqoy 2008) 
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 I later confirmed that the information came from the National Direction against Terrorism (DINCOTE), 
and a political decision (by the APRA, the government party) to open all the cases in which accused of 
terrorism were absolved of charges. This was a direct political reaction to the possibility that the bomb that 




had historically abandoned regions like Chungui. For him, the Shining Path was an 
opportunity to change the injustices and the situation of abandonment in which they 
lived. This is particularly important because the conditions of abandonment and being 
forgotten caused by the state (that my informants declared), existed before the internal 
war. Following this thought, Chapi and Chungui consider the state doubly indebted to 
them because not only did it not defend them properly during wartime, but it also 
provoked this very violence by its attitude toward the Andean communities: 
This community is totally secluded. Governments nor any of its authorities have ever 
been here. It is a community abandoned, and just when those problems (Shining Path) 
started, military bases came. Before that who remembered this community? Nobody. It 
was completely abandoned and because of that the problem (internal war) started. 
Therefore I think that now the government needs to take care of us, the government has 
the obligation to pay more attention to this region103 (Esteban 2, Oronqoy 2008) 
Esteban is highlighting how forgotten and isolated this community has been: they became 
visible only when the military opened bases in the area. But his quote refers to the need 
for an important outbreak of violence in order to receive the state‘s attention. Esteban 
considers the state as having the duty to compensate all the affected communities because 
it has forgotten them, and for this is what caused the war. The best way to compensate 
people is through jobs and giving them money so they can recover the cattle and things 
they lost during the internal war. 
During all my fieldwork years (before and after this project), I gathered opinions 
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 ―Esta comunidad está totalmente apartada. Nunca desde gobierno, ni sus autoridades no llegan 
aquí pues. Es una comunidad dejada, abandonada, ya cuando han entrado esos problemas (PCP-
SL), recién las bases también vienen, los militares viene. Antes de eso ¿quién recordaba este sitio?  
Nadie estaba abandonado por ahí mismo ha suscitado este problema. Entonces pienso que ahora 
debe preocuparse pienso que el gobierno tiene obligación de prestar más atención a toda esta  zona‖ 





that mainly agreed with accusing the national army of being the main perpetrator during 
the war; however, the Final Report considers the main perpetrator to be the Shining Path 
(for details see PTRC 2003a). Within Esteban‘s narrative, the presence of military bases 
in the district implied that the state remembered this community. The community is only 
visible because of the violence experienced. For Esteban, and many others, the internal 
war made them visible to the state and government. As I argued in previous chapters, for 
outsiders, the district of Chapi started to exist with the Final Report and because of the 
abuses and extreme violence committed in this region.  
2.3 Marginal people as „ignorant and deceived‟ 
Two other words emerge when Chapi‘s inhabitants assert they are marginal: 
ignorant (Sp. ignorante) and deceived (Sp. engañado). Engañado is constantly uttered 
within the narrative of the 1980s internal war. Through it, Chunguinos explain to 
outsiders how their neighbors committed (Sp. comprometerse) to the Shining Path‘s 
project. At the same time, those who were ignorantes are easily fooled by others, by the 
state and the Shining Path. 
In every narrative I gathered, stories about the 1980s violence arose ‗naturally‘ as 
if my presence silently demanded this. On one hand, I see this as springing from a 
necessity to talk about what has shaped people‘s daily lives and experiences in the last 30 
years. On the other hand, this narrative is the means through which they interact with the 
world outside the community. It has become a narrative for outsiders. The close 
racialized relationship between ignorant and easily fooled becomes even more 




Chungui, who are at least perceived as educated. However, this is more complex because 
education was available in Chapi since 1966, and the Shining Path entered these 
communities through the education system, and it was because they had some education 
(they used to go to school) they joined the Shining Path. In this context socio-cultural 
essentialism is intrinsic to the social discourse about Chapi; historical facts are erased (for 
a detailed account see Chapter 3), with only the racial ideology of inferiority remaining.  
I noticed that what I gathered during this research were ‗processed‘ internal war 
narratives, which contrasted with the ones I gathered during my first research in Chungui 
(when I was a researcher for the PTRC in October and November 2001). During this first 
work in Chungui, for the first time people talked to foreigners about the internal war; they 
were less careful about what they said and the accountability of their stories. For 
example, they affirm that they were convinced by the project of an ‗egalitarian 
community‘ that the Shining Path proposed to establish, 
In my base, the organization of the masses (in Shining Path‘s retiradas) was: women 
cooked and –adults worked on the chakra (En. plot), women brought them food. Adults 
and the youth participated in the Main Force and were farmers at the same time. All the 
people worked for the benefit of everyone else. There was no individualism. Older 
children helped in what they could, and the Shining Path leader SF taught us to read, to 
write, and he made us sing and play. I was seven during those years. What hurts me is to 
remember how the masses died because they could not escape from the military‘s 
attacks104 (Testimonio202014, quoted on the Report on the Oreja de Perro, vol. V. CVR 
2003) 
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 ―… La organización de las masas (SL) en mi base era: las señoras se ocupaban en cocinar y – si 
los adultos trabajaban en la chacra, llevar la comida, los adultos y jóvenes participaban en la fuerza 
principal y a la vez eran agricultores. Todos trabajaban para todos. No había individualismo. Los 
niños mayorcitos ayudaban en lo que podían y a los más pequeños, el senderista SF nos enseñaban a 
leer, escribir, nos habían cantar y jugar. Yo tenía siete años en ese entonces. Lo que me duele 






This quote is the type of narrative that I gathered during my first work in Oreja de Perro 
(2001). Five years later (when I started this research), the narratives were different. On 
one hand the methodology was different, as I did not need to translate the interviews I did 
in Quechua. On the other hand, I find that there is a critical influence of the PTRC‘s Final 
Report within the current stories. Chunguinos today try to explain to me –or maybe 
convince me–how they were coerced to support the Shining Path, explaining that their 
lack of education and political experience made them believe in the Shining Path, 
because they were ignorant. 
What will we, the farmers, know, about politics; in the countryside we do not know about 
that! This movement (the Shining Path) started with students from San Cristobal [the 
University in Huamanga], they arrived as teachers and then got involved... and because 
people in the countryside are ignorant, they believed in this project.105 (Roberto, 
Fieldnotes, Chupón2008) 
Roberto is the local Evangelical Pastor, a fluent Spanish speaker who lives with his 
family in Chupón. In the quote above, he states that peasants, as he identifies himself and 
his neighbors, did not know about politics and that this is what allowed the Shining Path 
to easily fool them. Showing me that ‗he knows‘ the origins of Shining Path, he carefully 
explains that this group started in the University of Ayacucho, among its students and 
faculty members. It is this group that came to the countryside with the Shining Path‘s 
politics, and that involved (Sp. comprometido) the villagers in its projects. The quote is 
framed in a way that intends to erase any reason why people in villages may have 
supported the insurgent group. Rather, he chooses to point out that people outside the 
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 ¡Qué vamos a saber los campesinos de esa política, acaso en el campo sabemos de eso! Ese 
movimiento (SL) ha empezado de los estudiantes de San Cristóbal, ellos han venido co n profesores y 






community are responsible for the internal war. Roberto aligns himself with the official 
story that explains that the Shining Path expanded through the rural education system, 
which protects villagers from being liable for the internal war. Then, he explains that 
people in the village had believed these students and teachers because they were ignorant 
and did not know politics.  
What Roberto narrates is the official story promoted by the PTRC Final Report, 
and constantly repeated by the Peruvian intelligentsia; which today everybody uses to 
explain how the violence started in the Andean highlands. This official narrative has 
carefully erased the complexities of the war, as well as the problems of race deeply 
embedded in the war. Moreover, it does not recognize people‘s participation as political 
subjects, stating that they do not get involved in politics, which forgets that people in 
Chapi participated in land struggles during the 1960s and 1970s. Even if Chapinos do not 
recognize it, they are conscious political subjects. Being labeled by themselves and others 
as ignorante and engañado aligns the community with the official academic and NGO 
discourse, in which the 1980s war victims are caught between a ‗rock and a hard place .‘ 
This type of assertion simplifies the complexity of the Peruvian internal war, and 
diminishes the role of race within this conflict.  
I met Nelly during my second visit to Chupón, and she invited me several times to 
spend the night in the field where they were harvesting potatoes. She is a middle-aged 
woman who lives in Chapi with her family. During the war years she migrated with her 
family to the central jungle (Junín), where they settled as seasonal workers. During the 




able to send her children to the high school and college in Andahuaylas. When I asked 
her about the people from Chapi who joined the Shining Path, her first reaction was to 
deny it, stating that nobody in the community supported it. However, when I included the 
name of a person in question, she admitted  
Certainly they have been deceived ... because they are ignorant people from the 
countryside, they have been fooled. They (people from the countryside) have thought, 
they have believed, I do not know. But people in Chapi did not believe. That girl Diaz, 
she was young, and because she was young she believed, right... There have been people 
like her who were deceive,d right?106 (Nelly I, Chupón 2008) 
By acknowledging that I knew the name of a girl from Chupón who was a Shining Path 
member, Nelly accepts that some of her neighbors participated in this insurgent project. 
However, she carefully crafts her answer explaining –justifying– that they were 
engañados because people in the countryside are ignorant. She uses ‗they‘ to stress the 
distance between herself and those who were ‗deceived,‘ indirectly stating that she was 
not deceived by the group. Although she asserts that Chapi‘s people did not believe in the 
Shining Path, she finds that being young (Sp. chica) may be one of the reasons that 
explain how a young girl from the community participated in the insurgency. When she 
frames this, she is borrowing from the explanation given by the PTRC that argued most 
of the Shining Path‘s members were young students. However, she carefully highlights 
that all in the community are ignorant –an assertion that does not have ground, since 
school have been present in the community since the second half of the 1960s– but the 
girl was deceived, which is imagined to place the community in a position where 
                                                 
106
 ―seguramente los han engañado … como somos así ignorante de campo se habrán engañao pe, 
ellos habrán pensao, habrán creído, no sé. Pero la gente de Chapi no creía, esa chica Díaz bueno 




members are not responsible for their actions. 
This quote also connects ignorantes and rural people, emphasizing the 
relationship between them, as if ignorance was a natural characteristic of the countryside 
population, an essential component of being Quechua. Nelly continues explaining how 
people got involved with the Shining Path‘s project:  
Nelly: Because they were opas, because they were ignorant they got involved [with the 
Shining Path] 
Q: If people had gone to school, they had studied more… Would they have been involved 
with the Shining Path?  
Nelly: I do not know, how it would have been. Some of them, because of their studies they 
wanted to become the boss, they could also have been fooled, because of that they would 
have wanted to be leader.107 (Nelly I, Chupón 2008) 
Nelly qualifies those who were committed to the Shining Path, first as opas, a Quechua 
word meaning ignorant, and here referring to someone lacking formal education. Then, 
she explains that young students wanted to have power and control, and because some of 
them had education they could have been group leaders. Students‘ desire for power is one 
of the main seductive tools that attracted the youth to the Shining Path. The traditional 
power structure in the Andes was controlled by the adults, and this system was 
challenged by the Shining Path‘s members which the elderly and authorities controlled 
(like Emeterio Huamán). 
Most of the time people use ‗ignorant‘ in two ways. One refers to a lack of formal 
education, and the second to a lack of knowledge about Criollo Peru. For Teresa, her lack 
of formal education was remedied by her migrant experience … I did not finish school, but 
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―Nelly: por opas, por ignorantes por eso se habrán comprometido pe, se han comprometido  
Q: si la gente hubiese ido a la escuela, hubiese tenido más estudio ¿se habrían metido con ‗esa 
política‘?  
Nelly: no sé pe, cómo habrán sido pe. Algunos por su estudio entrando algo jefe también puede ser 




me getting out of the community [migration] has allowed me to get out of ignorance
108
 (Teresa, 
Fieldnotes, Chupón 2008). The community becomes the place of ignorance, and 
migration to the city a process of acquiring knowledge that may partially replace the one 
offered by formal education.  
Like Teresa, Nelly asserts that today her neighbors in Chapi are no longer opas 
(En. ignorant) because they left their village, like she did: Opas, I do not believe 
anymore, because everybody got out of there [the community] … like myself, they had to 
get out. Therefore, they are not opas anymore.‘109(Nelly I, Chupón 2008). Leaving the 
community and travelling through different towns and cities (Sp. andando) is seen as a 
method of acquiring knowledge of the Creole world. Therefore, today, they are no longer 
opas. Nelly finds that leaving the village and going to other towns have allowed her to 
stop being an ignorant. 
Combining the quotes from Teresa and Nelly, it is possible to explain what it 
means to be engañado and ignorante. There is a causal relationship between them: being 
deceived can be caused by being ignorant. But, as Nelly highlights, students can also be 
engañado by schoolteachers and their desires for power and control; and because the 
students are young –which connotes a lack of knowledge equivalent to ignorance – they 
joined the Shining Path. At the same time, one of the ways to overcome ignorance, 
besides formal education, is urban migration. Leaving the community immerses people in 
a new environment where they need to learn how to live. The migration experience is a 
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 yo no terminé el colegio, pero más bien salir [migrar] me ha hecho salir de la ignorancia.  
109
 ‗opas ya no creo Ahora porque todos hemos salido de aca… como yo también, asi habran andado. 




process through which a person acquires the knowledge that is equated in Chunguinos‘ 
imaginary with the education received in school. 
Carlos explains his ideas about migration and progress in life: 
Q: But to stay in the community, is that not also a way to succeed? Or is it only if one 
migrates to the city, success becomes possible? What do you think? 
Carlos: Staying [in the countryside and community] there is no possibility to overcome a 
relationship with formal education. I do not think [that in staying] one can achieve 
success with education. We cannot easily overcome, but if people stay in the community, 
they certainly do not progress.110 (Carlos, Oronqoy 2008) 
In this quote Carlos addresses two important things. First, progressing in life (Sp. 
superarse) is related to achieving formal education, and ‗good‘ education is not available 
in villages like Oronqoy. Although there is an elementary school, and some secondary 
grades, people consider its quality to be very low. Teachers in rural areas have no 
incentive to work in these communities, and most of them feel that a job in Oronqoy, or 
Chupón, is seen as punishment. Some teachers arrive for the first time to one of Chapi‘s 
villages, and prefer to quit their posts rather than stay in a distant village (at least 10 
hours walking distance to the closest road), without electricity or running water. And 
second, progress cannot be achieved if people stay in the community. Chapi and Oronqoy 
are seen as communities that do not allow people to progress; and staying is seen as not 
aspiring to a better life.111 The idea of progress is attached to modernity, and as Miguel 
mentioned earlier, rural life is equated to a backward life that lacks any possibility of 
progress and success. 
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 ―Q: pero quedarse, ¿no es acaso también una forma de superarse? O ¿solamente logras superarte 
si vas a la ciudad? ¿Qué piensas? 
C: Quedándose no creo que se pueda superar en el aspecto de educación. No creo en lo que es 
educación. No se puede superarse fácilmente, pero si se quedan están casi en ahí, no progresan.”  
111
 I have also seen these ideas in Huancavelica-Peru in 2000, when I was doing my first independent 




One night, I stayed with Nelly‘s family in the ‗tent‘ where they were sleeping 
during the harvesting season. During that evening, while we were sharing some sugar 
cane liquor (Sp. cañazo) and coca leaves, I asked who was ignorant in Chapi, and Nelly 
stated: Mr. Teofilo, Mr. German, Mr. Alejandro. They have not gone to school… they are ignorant 
because they do not think. But today, there are fewer ignorant people [in the community]112 (Nelly-
Oscar 2, Chupón 2008). Oscar and Nelly identify the oldest members of the community 
as ignorant; however, they do not mention that their lack of formal education is due to it 
being forbidden during the hacienda time. Trying to explain herself better, Nelly argues 
that they are ignorant because ‗they do not think‘ (Sp. no piensan), framing to think in an 
urban way that refers to the western knowledge and thought. Throughout formal 
education people acquire knowledge that is validated by the center of power (Lima, 
Cusco, Ayacucho) this is the only knowledge that has value. In other words, it is the 
knowledge provided by the Western world (the urban Criollo/mestizo) which is 
considered as superior to the self-knowledge that people may acquire during their lives. 
This contrasts to regions like Ecuador and Bolivia, where local knowledge is valued as 
part of the indigenous identity (see Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009; Huarcaya 2010).  
Along with the overstated Criollo/mestizo knowledge, the close relationship 
between ignorant (Sp. ignorante) and not thinking (Sp.no pensar) gives us important 
information about the value of education for Andean families. Those who did not go to 
school are considered to be people who do not think, an equation which places education 
as the only device that gives a person the capacity for sound thought. Teresa explains: 
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 ‗el señor Teófilo, el señor Germán, el señor Alejandro. Ellos no han ido a la escuela…son ignorantes 




Here there are ignorant people, that is why they were not the hacienda owners113 (Teresa, 
Chapi, fieldnotes). She considers that ignorance is what prevented hacienda workers from 
owning the plantation, and because they did not know their civil rights, they allowed the 
hacendado to be abusive. 
The same explanation could be extrapolated onto the internal war years, claiming 
that a lack of formal education prevented Chunguinos from knowing their civil rights and 
defending themselves against the abuses committed by both the Shining Path and the 
army. For Teresa, and many of Chapi‘s inhabitants, former hacienda workers are ignorant 
for accepting the life conditions under the hacienda regime, and the internal war. Both 
parts of the local history are considered to be caused by people‘s ignorance; a rarely 
questioned essentialized feature associated with the rural population. However, the part 
of the history in which people struggle to get rid of the hacienda regime, some people 
even spending years in jail, is completely erased from local history. This narrative of 
ignorance is the same that people in Chungui‘s capital use to explain why Oreja de 
Perro‘s population supported the Shining Path.  
Formal education is generally considered to be the instrument that allows people 
to think in the same way that the ruling group does. While talking about the local 
authorities, Nelly‘s husband was telling me that they lacked the capacity (Sp. capacidad), 
which I interpret as a lack of knowledge, while Nelly also states that today‘s authorities 
do not think:  
Nelly: Thoughts are missing, but I just went until third grade more or less, and I think, 
right? 
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Oscar: Sometimes when one walks about, talks to people from other places, you grasp 
experience; you grasp small things, knowledge and experience.  
Nelly: Although I did not go to the school.114 (Nelly- Oscar 2, Chupón 2008) 
Although she only completed three years of primary school, Nelly considers herself able 
to think. Her husband completes her statement by highlighting that andando (En. 
walking, migrating) throughout different places, and meeting different people, have 
allowed them to gain experience and knowledge. Both lacking formal education, they 
have achieved Criollo/mestizo knowledge through migration.  
The experience of leaving the community and of talking with people from 
different regions is what is thought of as acquiring knowledge. This idea is in part caused 
by the way people imagine Chungui as a container that prevents them from getting the 
knowledge that they value. Both Nelly and Teresa migrated to non-Quechua-speaking 
regions, places where they were forced to learn Spanish and confront a society that they 
did not know. An important part of what they learned were their civil rights, like the right 
to be educated and to denounce the abuses of the army. 
Education and knowledge acquired through urban migration prevents people from 
being engañados, as they were during the hacienda time. ‗En cambio, si en este tiempo 
volvería esa hacienda, la gente se rebelaría en una […]  claro porque en esos tiempo no 
había pe el estudio, no tanto…‘ (Nelly-Oscar 2, Chupón 2008). Nelly recognizes that 
during the hacienda time, education was forbidden, and the hacienda workers‘ ignorance 
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 ―Pensamientos faltan imaynaya pero ñuqa riki kani tercero grado pero más o menos pienso no?  
Oscar: No pues a veces cuando uno camina, conversas con otros vas a otros  sitios ahí recoges 
experiencia cualquier cosita recoges, los conocimientos, y agarras experiencias.  





kept them dominated. She sees education as a means of liberation, and she believes that 
the hacienda regime would not return now because they are educated. Nelly considers 
things to be improving, and by considering the number of educated people in the 
community, she affirms that current knowledge about the law, their civil rights and 
Spanish, would be enough elements to rebel if the hacendado tried to come back.  
Formal education has been traditionally important as a provider of valuable tools: 
reading, writing and a command of Spanish, all of which are seen as means that would 
free people from ignorance. Although the knowledge that Nelly and Teresa acquired 
through migration helps them to avoid the engaño, this knowledge is not comparable to 
one offered by school. The former is inferior to that which can be acquired through the 
school system. 
The word engañado is not only used to talk about people‘s relationships to the 
Shining Path, or the state. It has been noted by researchers who worked with indigenous 
people during the Agrarian Reform (Montoya 1989). Anthropologists like Degregori 
(1989) have explained that hacendados represent a group that has traditionally deceived 
the indigenous population; a traditional ruling class that for centuries have dominated 
them, a domination that partly rests on possessing the ‗knowledge‘ to manipulate them.  
Therefore, reading, writing and the use of Spanish have been the traditional ruling class‘s 
instruments of domination. The education boom in the early 1960s allowed the 
indigenous population to overcome local domination and was the beginning of the 
struggle for the land, and better work conditions. The traditional power that dominated 




that was not accessible to the indigenous group. In that context, formal education 
becomes the way to overcome the engaño and be freed from domination. But this 
emphasis on formal education has dismissed the value of local knowledge; rather than 
producing an integrated body that combines the Andes and the urban Creole knowledge, 
only the latter is recognized as being able to give power. 
Formal education (which is also the acquisition of knowledge) is seen as 
acquiring power, a process in which the person ‗opens their eyes,‘ like waking up from a 
lethargic state, which corresponds to the image that the urban Criollo/mestizo group have 
of the Andean population:  
During the Land Reform... teachers told us that this was the time where you needed to 
wake up [...] peasant‘s children were studying, and there they [teachers] used to say ‗it is 
the time to wake up, the President [Velasco] is giving you land.‘ Other teachers told us 
‗without knowing how to read or write you were given land [its property] and your father 
would probably waste it. They told us that. Other teachers in that time called us to 
reclaim ourselves, ‗to open our eyes‘ because you are the hope, they used to say.115 
(Miguel IV) 
Miguel‘s quote about his school experience during the agrarian reform summarizes how 
teachers considered, and still conceive, indigenous people. In 1969 students were called 
to open their eyes; if they did not, teachers asserted that they would waste the land the 
government had given them. School teachers, usually coming from the city, consider that 
illiteracy could make people lose their land, implying that they could be engañados by 
others ‗who know.‘ Therefore, students are called ‗to wake up,‘ indicating that they have 
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 ―durante la reforma [agraria]… los profesores nos decían que es ahora es el tiempo donde 
ustedes deben despertar[…] hijos de campesinos mayor parte todos estudiábamos, y ahí nos decían 
pe, pa‘ ustedes es el tiempo que despierten a ustedes el [Velasco] ha dado tierra habían otros 
profesores nos decían a ustedes sin saber leer y escribir les ha dado a vuestro padre tierra y ahorita 
le desperdician nos ha dicho así y habían otros profesores ese tiempo momento que ustedes deben 




traditionally lived in a lethargic state that is a threat to themselves and their property. 
Although this quote refers to 1969, it does not differ from what teachers today tell their 
rural students; this is a hegemonic process barely questioned within daily interaction 
between schoolteachers and the community. 
When people claim that education overcomes the engañado status, they also refer 
to the importance of learning Spanish, which is one of the main reasons for families to 
send their children to school. Nelly complains that each time she goes to the city 
representing her community to do paperwork or workshops, everything is in Spanish. She 
is aware that in rural areas Quechua is their language, but she finds it difficult to speak 
Spanish in the city. For her, education should be only in Spanish, because that is what 
will allow a child to understand or better grasp (Sp. agarrar bien) what is being said. 
Children learn Quechua as a first language, only becoming exposed to Spanish during the 
first year of school when they are around 6 years old. It is because primary education is 
mainly in Spanish that Nelly finds that they cannot learn well, and consequently, they do 
not ‗think.‘ This is an important disadvantage that complicates the process of learning 
Spanish correctly, and overall, how Quechua becomes an obstacle in the city:  
Elsewhere, like in Ayacucho city, San Miguel … they do not speak to you in Quechua. 
Everything is in Spanish, thus if you do not know Spanish, if you do not understand, you 
do not understand, right? And in order to bring reports to your village, how can you 
bring all these difficulties?116 (Nelly-Oscar 2, Chupón 2008) 
Nelly claims that although in some communities people talk in Quechua, in most urban 
centers people do not. She finds that in order to understand what people are telling her, 
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 ―En otros sitios Ayacucho, San Miguel ¡ay! ya no te hablan de Quechua. Puro castellano, 
entonces si no sabes hablar castellano, si no entiendes, no entiendes, ¿no?  Y para qué traes informe 




she needs to learn Spanish. Being a monolingual Quechua in Peru is a limitation; it 
becomes a handicap when trying to grasp appropriately the knowledge offered. For her, 
speaking Quechua in an urban context is to bring all these difficulties (Sp. traer toda esa 
dificultad), because it limits her access to the knowledge produced there. However, her 
claim is not meant to promote the use and recognition of Quechua as an official language 
within bureaucratic urban spaces. Rather, she considers that a good command of Spanish 
is an instrument of power, a tool that allows one to be visible and that can contest the 
exclusion and marginality that monolingual Quechuas experience. 
For Nelly and Teresa, Quechua is the language of family, of their personal and 
intimate relations, and their everyday life in Chapi. Therefore, when Nelly asserts that 
being a Quechua monolingual is a limitation, she is also talking about the world she 
cannot grasp when someone speaks Spanish: education, and knowledge, which can be 
seen as the public domain. Spanish is seen as an instrument that is not meant to replace 
the use of Quechua in intimate spaces, as she explains that her grandchildren will always 
understand Quechua, because it is their mother tongue.  
Quechua is Nelly‘s language, and she does not intend to stop using it. She only 
speaks Spanish with me, showing me how she controls this source of power. Moreover, 
using Spanish as our language of communication is also the symbol of the relationship 
that she wants to establish with me. 
Being a rural monolingual Quechua also exposes people to discrimination. In an 
racist society, as the Peruvian one, being from the rural Andes (serranos) is highly 




Sure, when you go to the city, we only speak Quechua. Thus, those who pass by us in the 
streets, those who sit in the Plaza, right? They will say ‗these are serranas right? They 
will laugh at us right? They will laugh […] because we speak Quechua, yeah, because we 
are from the sierra.117 (Nelly- Oscar 2, Chupón 2008) 
As the quote states Nelly thinks she is stigmatized when she uses Quechua in the city, 
and although someone from Huamanga city is also a serrano (somebody from the sierra), 
speaking Quechua in an urban context is a marker of race in Huamanga. In the way Nelly 
frames it, she becomes more serrana, more ‗Indian‘ if she uses Quechua in the city. In 
Huamanga, people barely speak Quechua in public spaces.118 The only space where I 
found people using Quechua was in the city market among the women selling coca leaves 
which is a practice that only rural Quechuas do. In other contexts, a state officer might 
use Quechua with a person from the rural Andes, especially if he/she finds the client 
struggling with Spanish. There is a resistance to be monolingual Spanish, and although 
some people aim to ‗protect‘ their children from speaking Quechua, this is an live 
language that Quechuas use in the intimate domains of the family. 
Conclusion: marginality as a racialized practice accepted? 
‗Marginality‘ is a multivocal category used in many narratives whose meaning 
shifts according to who speaks to whom, and in what context. As it is used by Chapi‘s 
inhabitants, it expresses ideas about the relationship they have with the Peruvian state and 
how they consider themselves as not attended by it. In addition, ‗marginality‘ also 
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 ―si claro cuando vas a la ciudad, entonces puro Quechua no más nosotros hablamos. Y lo que 
pasan por nuestros costados en las calles, lo que sienta, ¿no? nos van decir oye esas son serranas 
¿no? Nos van reír ¿sí o no?, nos ríe […] porque  hablamos de Quechua, si pe, porque somos de 
sierra, pe.‖ 
118





becomes a way to talk about how they consider themselves in relationship to the rest of 
Peruvian society, addressing many of their problems from the ignorance that allows them 
to be easily fooled by the hacendado, the guerrilla, the Shining Path, and the Peruvian 
state. 
When people in Chapi use ‗marginality‘ they accept and highlight the subordinate 
position that they have in Peruvian society. However, Chapinos also challenge this 
category by searching in the state, the attention and care that can change their condition 
of being ‗marginal.‘ Using ‗marginality‘ in Chapi has two consequences. First, by 
accepting this subordinate and racialized position, they use the language of the state to 
get its attention and care, especially in the aftermath of the internal war (this strategy will 
be discussed in the next chapter). Second, by using ‗marginality,‘ people in Chapi accept 
and share (probably without acknowledging) the racial ideology and practices that 
consider rural Quechuas as inferior. In other words, by using marginality, ignorance, and 
the other words associated with these, they participate in the very racial ideology that 
considers rural Quechuas to be primitive, illiterate and pre-modern. Although the need to 
get the state‘s attention and aid is very important for Chapi and Chungui, they also 
recognize the racial discrimination against them as rural Quechuas.  
 In some contexts, ‗marginality‘ refers to a geographical space that is isolated and 
forgotten by the state. In this narrative, Chapi has been placed in a corner where it is 
easily forgotten, because it is important neither for the state nor for Peruvian society. 
Behind it rests the state‘s idea that the rural Quechua are disposable, and this is supported 





 Race ideology works silently by shaping practices and behaviors without 
mentioning racial physical features, but stressing racial markers such as education and 
ignorance (de la Cadena 2000). ‗Marginality‘ is a racial category and discourse, 
commonly used without proper acknowledgement of the racial ideology it refers to. 
Chapi‘s families are discriminated against at different levels, inside the district and in 
major urban centers. Race works through social practices that rarely use race as word, but 
have proxy words like pre-modern, irrational and ignorant. Physical markers of race like 
fair skin color are an important feature for people in Chapi who tend get proud of 
offspring with fair skin, and who like to call foreigner‘s attention to this detail.119 
Although the word race is disguised and constituted by other categories like knowledge 
and education, racial practices pervade every sphere of social and political life, and it is 
one of the more determinant and powerful tools of domination in rural areas. Rural 
communities are heavily racialized not only from the perspective of the urban domain, 
but also within the rural setting. There is a tendency to ‗indianize‘ (Sp. indianizar) rural 
areas, a process which keeps them silent and excluded from participating in national 
politics, like the hierarchical discrimination that the town of Chungui exerts over those 
who are from Chapi. Teresa talks about the state that places her community in the corner 
and forgets about them, because they are ‗Indians‘ and the state despises them. However, 
she expresses this racial discrimination through proxies like ‗marginality,‘ and 
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economic status, the more importance it is given to fair skin color, especially in children. It is imagined that 




‗forgotten,‘ as if the community needed to remind the state of its existence and that they 
have also the right to be recognized as citizens. These also allow the perpetuation of the 
racial ideology and its practices without noticing it.  
Throughout the use of the categories ‗marginal,‘ ‗forgotten,‘ and ‗ignorant‘ Chapi 
inhabitants position themselves in the lowest sphere of the social hierarchy, sharing the 
teleological idea (with the rest of the Peruvian society) that in order to progress and 
succeed, they need to be assimilated into the Criollo/mestizo group, which will lead them 
to be modern, which as long as Quechuas cannot achieve.120 Along with this, by avoiding 
the use of explicit racial categories (like Indios), the Peruvian intelligentsia and the state 
imagines that differences between rural Quechuas and urban Criollo/mestizo can be 
erased.  
Although the state has always been present in Chapi, people think of it as absent 
because it is not helping the community in the form they expect: infrastructure projects, 
expansion of health clinics, and roads121. When they claim that before the 1980s they did 
not receive any aid from the state, they highlight that the war has turned them into a 
visible community. Now some aid arrives, and this is because they lived through an 
internal war. The war has transformed them into visible subjects by entering them into 
the national discourse as the most marginal community affected by the internal war.  
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 Seligmann(1989) explains that within contemporary Peruvian society, great ideological emphasis is 
placed upon the social category of Indian. This in turn provokes an awareness of the so-called Indians of 
the kinds of services and goods to which they could have access if they were not labeled as Indians 
(Seligmann 1989: 707) 
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 What people in Chapi constantly demand is the construction of a road and infrastructure projects. The 
road is imagined to be the mean through which the state will arrive and take care of them. The chapter 




‗Marginality‘ also refers to a backward space, in which progress and development 
is not seen as possible for Chapi‘s population. The community is seen as ‗backward,‘ as a 
place where education is poor and ‗success‘ is not possible. Therefore, the goal is to 
achieve modernity, but the one established by the (Western) Criollo/mestizo ideology, 
which is not considered possible in rural areas. Therefore modernity is only achieved 
migrating to urban centers, where education (Spanish) and goods are found. To be 
modern is to migrate to the city, thus becoming less indigenous and acquiring an urban 
lifestyle that represents success and social mobility. 
In addition, people explain that because Chapi is ‗marginal,‘ the internal war 
emerged in a violent way. Placed in the corner, despised and forgotten by the state, the 
Shining Path found supporters and militants. People do not feel safe admitting that they 
may have believed in the insurgent project; it is probably too soon for that. However, 
they recognize that some of their neighbors joined this group, but they carefully explain 
that it is because they did not know anything about politics and they were ignorant. 
Through this explanation, they mean to avoid accountability for the atrocities committed 
during the war, which is also a strategy performed by the Peruvian intelligentsia, who 
only discusses superficial issues about the internal war (see Chapter 1, Saravia and 
Wiesse 2011). The war was also caused by the state‘s active forgetting; therefore, the 
state has the responsibility to compensate the affected communities. And it is only when 
the violence started that they became a visible community for the state. 
As subordinate groups, people in Chapi accept, challenge and resist their 




ignorance through andando, migration, and their experience in urban settings shows us 
the power of racial ideology, since through these practices Chapinos become less 
‗marginal,‘ or less rural, Quechuas moving upward in the Peruvian hierarchy. This 
challenges part of the racial ideology, because they have introduced migration as a 
resource through which Criollo/mestizo knowledge is achieved. Therefore, they can get 
rid of the status of ignorance, although they continue to be rural Quechuas. 
‗Marginality‘ is not only about domination and subordination, it is a complex 
hegemonic process that is better understood through William‘s idea of structures of 
feelings (1977). The advantages of this approach is that it allows one to understand 
‗marginality‘ in the way it is lived by the people in Chapi, being aware of the tensions 
that may appear when other interpretations of marginality (for example. when it is used 
by the state in its family program) clash with individual‘s experiences, ideas and feelings. 
When such tensions occur they cannot yet be called resistance or social transformations. 
They are still in early phase, it is a social and material kind of thinking and feeling not yet 
explicit or fully articulated (Williams 1977: 130-1). Consequently, while ‗marginality‘ is 
a relationship of domination through the racial ideology, for people in Chapi it is also a 
demand to be included and attended to by the state. It can be interpreted as an incipient 
claim by citizens to be integrated, even if for that to happen they need they must play in 
to the racialized practices of the Peruvian society. 
 The narrative of marginality is not part of everyday life; rather this is a discourse 
that aims to explain to foreign visitors (like anthropologists) how the Shining Path got 




used to place themselves in relationship with the rest of the groups composing the 
Peruvian society (Limeño elites, provincial elites, mestizos, etc.).This embeds them  in a 
hierarchy that is not explicitly identified as racial, but in which racial referents are 
embedded, in a latent form. It is a discourse that avoids any accountability for the war 
years; one that aims to frame the state as the main party responsible for the violence, and 
that also demands compensation for their losses. At the same time this is a narrative that 
talks about relationships with the state, how they are viewed and what they expect from 
it. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that ‗marginality‘ has also become a strategy 







‘Marginal’ as a strategy to become visible 
 
 
The previous chapter analysed how people in Chapi use ‗marginality,‘ and look at 
the different categories that emerged with it, which help us to better understand that 
‗marginality‘ is a category that talks about the relationship between this community, with 
other actors like insurgent groups and the governmental agencies. Chapter 4 suggested 
that at the same time people in Chapi seem to accept, and adapt themselves to the racial 
domination imposed by the Criollo/mestizo group. In some occasion Chapinos challenge 
the label of ‗marginal,‘ claiming to be treated and respected as Peruvians citizens. By 
constantly presenting themselves as a ‗marginal community,‘ people in Chapi deploy a 
strategy that aims to transform them into visible subjects for the state and the national 
society, especially in the aftermath of the war. However, ‗marginality‘ is used in a more 
complex form than just reducing it as an instrument and strategy to become visible. 
The PTRC final report was submitted in 2003, and since then, has influenced 
many studies about violence and Human Rights that have produced a particular 
understanding the indigenous population. However, the representation of rural Quechuas 
as despised (Sp. despreciados), dispossessed and excluded has not been challenged or 




domains. The language and representations used in academic writings have been taken-
for-granted by scholars and the national intelligentsia, and have been constantly 
reproduced in the national media. ‗Marginality‘ is a euphemism behind which the state 
hides a racial ideology that the rural Quechuas are pre-modern subjects, irrational, 
ignorant and that need to be ‗de-indianized‘ in order to become like urban 
Criollo/mestizos. An example is how the state uses this label to identify those women 
that, according to the Cuaderno Verde, by having children reproduce poverty and 
backwardness. In doing so, the state articulates in a particular form, race as discursive 
practise and ideology as action (Lemon 2002: 55). The absence of an explicit racial 
ideology within Peruvian political discourses, policies, and texts, does not tell us whether 
or not policy makers have ‗no concept‘ of race. In general people infers that internal, 
biological, and inherited essences from external ‗signs,‘ which produces racialized terms 
inside and outside official discourses and within state institutions. In this sense racial 
categories are extremely complex to understand. For example, I am from Lima, but 
during my fieldwork I was commonly called gringa, which does not necessarily refers to 
someone that is from North America; but rather someone who has fair skin. Indeed, any 
children with fair skin in the community are called gringo(a). From this example, it can 
be said that the meaning of gringa(o) has changed and is also applied to children that 
were born in the community.122 Therefore, racial logic not only lives in the terms that 
refers to things, but in the various ways people use language to signify relations in 
specific contexts (Lemon 2002: 57). 
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As much as human bodies can be represented as raced, racialized connections 
among them are not always clearly seen. However they can be mapped and pointed out. 
Policy makers and state officers, as well as NGOs and Human Rights activists, do not 
live apart from other arenas of discursive production and circulation. Thus we cannot 
assume that discursive practises flow only in one direction (Lemon 2002: 58-60). In other 
words, racialized practises are also used by people in Chapi, when they talk about groups 
that they consider inferiors, backward and pre-modern like the Asháninka (an Amazonian 
indigenous group) that used to live in the Amazonian part of the district. The Asháninka 
are imagined to be nomads and naked all the time, and they are commonly called 
‗campitas.‘People in Chapi feel strongly superior to the indigenous groups in the 
Amazon, 
The Aguarunas [an indigenous group from the Amazon jungle], they live like wild 
animals, in the big jungle, without clothes. The Campas [Asháninka is the proper name] 
are the indigenous living in the Amazon part of Chungui; these people work as slaves for 
Virges [a strong man who has an extended property on the side of Cusco] He is controls 
the river as if it was his property, and kills anyone who crosses toward his property. 
(Cesar, Fieldnotes 2008)  
My intention here is not to include another component to my analysis (like the indigenous 
people from the Amazon area), but to show how racial practices and its ideology are 
complex, and not fixed. Chapi defined themselves as a ‗marginal community‘ but, in 
hierarchy they are better off than what they imagine indigenous life to be like in the 
Amazon jungle. 
In post-war Peru, ‗marginality‘ is also an important strategy used by rural 
communities to become visible subjects to the state. This visibility achieved to using the 




are extremely important, because it seems to be the only way to attract the state‘s 
attention over its responsibilities.  
This chapter analyses ‗marginality‘ as a discursive relationship between Chungui 
and the state, that is not only promoted by the community and its authorities, but also by 
state officers who repeat insistently that the state‘s duty is to attend to forgotten 
communities. In this context, it is not surprising to find that Chungui‘s Mayor –aware of 
the visibility Chungui has achieved with the release of the PTRC Final Report– invests 
his efforts to consolidate the district as the ‗1980s most affected community.‘ Through 
this label, the rhetoric and relationships developed around it, local authorities expect to 
become noticeable in the Peruvian society.  
As much as a strategy to become visible, the rhetoric of ‗marginality‘ is also 
deployed by the state and the aid sector. The imaginary bonding that the state and the 
community are establishing throughout this discourse reinforces the subordinate subject 
positions as ‗war victims‘—racially marking the rural Quechua as opposed to an 
unmarked Criollo/mestizo community (discussed in Chapter 4). Rather than challenging a 
dominated subject position, this rhetoric produces, and reproduces the traditional 
hierarchical system where rural Quechuas are at the bottom of the society, embodying the 
backwardness, isolation and ignorance that halts the modernization process in Peru.  
This chapter explores this discourse of marginality in two sections. The first 
discusses how the state, in the form of the PTRC, has consolidated a language of 
‗marginal community.‘ This section illustrates the importance of the political context in 




also circulates through governmental institutions and the civil society. The second section 
shows how this language is used by state officers to interact with rural populations. 
Through the analysis of two state-community interactions, I look at the different ways the 
state agencies reinforce the label of ‗marginal community.‘ I consider this to be the 
language of contact and interaction between the state and subordinate groups. Through 
these, state officers relate to and negotiate with the rural population, adapting to each 
other‘s knowledge, experiences and demands.  
My discussion in this chapter builds upon Urban‘s work (1996) about replication 
and power, and Lemon‘s (2002) discussion of race and racialized relationships. The 
ascription of ‗marginal community‘ is a discursive strategy that does not index people‘s 
actions; rather, it refers to the set of actions that they receive. Therefore, for 
methodological purposes I consider that the PTRC arise a discourse about the rural 
Quechuas and the internal war, that it will be called original. When people in Chapi and 
Chungui reproduces this discourse, highlighting that they are a ‗marginal community,‘ 
they relocate the original discourse into a new context also produces the addition and 
erasure of other ideas. This process is called replication, and implies original and copied 
discourses, that at the same time addresses the social relationship between the originator 
and copier (see Table 5-1,Urban 1996). Considering the problem of replication, and how 
the copy and the original are related, it is important to inquire how that relationship is 
encoded in the circulating meta-discourse. The meta-discourse provides a crucial link 
between discourse and the social relations that are characterizable independently of 





Original and Replicas 
 
Originator 
PTRC and its heirs 
Original A 
Discourse provoked by the 
PTRC and the FR about the 
internal war. 
Copier 
Chungui and Chapi 
authorities 
Replica A 
Discourse based on the 
discourse developed by the 
PTRC, but that some ideas are 
added and other erased.  
             Source: cf. Urban 1996 
1. Consolidating a national discourse: ‘marginal communities’  
 1.1 Originating the discourse of „marginality‟ 
For the purposes of my analysis, I consider that long before Chunguinos started to 
define themselves as ‗the most marginal community,‘ the PTRC and other agents –such 
as scholars, NGOs and the media– employ this rhetoric to talk about rural Quechuas and 
the internal conflict. Thus, considering the PTRC to be that originator of the discourse 
about ‗marginal communities,‘ I analyze in the following paragraphs PTRC‘s original 
discourse based on its President‘s, Salomon Lerner123, speech at during the submission of 
the Final Report. 
 In 2002, I conducted ethnographic research in Chungui and Oreja de Perro, 
which became part of one of the representative stories that were included in the PTRC‘s 
final report. When I presented a preliminary report in Lima, this caught people‘s attention 
because ‗they‘ (the national intelligentsia composing the PTRC)  did not know the 
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Salomon Lerner is a Peruvian professor specialized in Philosophy, who was the President of the 




magnitude of the violence deployed in Oreja de Perro. The surprised audience even 
questioned the reality of Chunguinos‘ stories. For many of these scholars, these 
testimonies could not be truth because ‗they‘ (the scholars) did not know anything about 
the violence during the war years. After long discussion, it was agreed that the research I 
conducted should be part of the Final Report, immediately becoming one of its 
emblematic stories.  
To understand how the PTRC has nurtured the idea of Chungui as ‗the most 
marginal community,‘ it is important to see first how the rural Quechuas were 
represented within its discourses. The PTRC was mainly composed by an urban coastal 
elite group whose task was to understand the violence of the 1980s in Peru. Among all its 
Commissioner members, only one was not originally from Lima and spoke Quechua, and 
even so, he was criticized for coming from an Ayacucho‘s elite family. Overall this was 
an urban Criollo/mestizo elite group, and these features are very important to highlight as 
these have directly influenced the how the rural population have been viewed, related 
with, and represented. The best examples of this representation are found in public 
discourses. Thus, I analyse some extracts of the Final Report submission‘s discourse 
pronounced by its President the day of the submission. 
Salomón Lerner submitted the Final Report to the state in an official ceremony in 
the Casa de Gobierno in August 2003. Throughout his speech, he characterized the 
historical period analyzed (1980-2000) as a time marked with shame and dishonor: … the 




the state and the Peruvian society.124 It is interesting to observe how innumerous times 
throughout his speech (written by Peruvian sociologists and anthropologists also working 
at the PTRC), he associated the Quechuas with a condition of exclusion and with being 
despised,  
... We live, yet, in a country in which the exclusion is so absolute that tens of thousands of 
people can disappear without anyone in the integrated society, in the society of the non-
excluded, take realize it. 
[...] It is, as we Peruvians know, a sector of the population historically ignored by the state 
and the urban society, one that does enjoy the benefits of our political community. 
These two decades of destruction and death would not have been possible without the 
profound disdain for the most deprived population of the country [...] that contempt is 
woven into every moment of the daily life of Peruvians.125 (PTRC 2003b) 
 
Lerner‘ speech addresses the existence of two different groups within the Peruvian 
society. The first one composed by the historically excluded who lived the worst of the 
internal war (rural Quechuas), and the other group which is composed by the urban 
society (Criollo/mestizo). Those who have directly lived the consequences of this conflict 
are indigenous, whose suffering has been historically ignored by the state and the urban 
society. Moreover, he asserts that the terrible consequences of the war were possible 
because indigenous Quechuas, the most dispossessed and despised population, are deeply 
discriminated in their everyday life. 
  By characterizing the Peruvian society divided in two groups, Lerner‘s discourse 
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 ―Las dos décadas finales del siglo XX son –es forzoso decirlo sin rodeos– una marca de horror y 
de deshonra para el Estado y la sociedad peruanos.‖  
125
 ―…vivimos, todavía, en un país en el que la exclusión es tan absoluta que resulta posible que 
desaparezcan decenas de miles de ciudadanos sin que nadie en la sociedad integrada, en la sociedad de 
los no excluidos, tome nota de ello. 
[…]Se trata, como sabemos los peruanos, de un sector de la población históricamente ignorado por el 
Estado y por la sociedad urbana, aquélla que sí disfruta de los beneficios de nuestra comunidad política. 
Estas dos décadas de destrucción y muerte no habrían sido posibles sin el profundo desprecio a la 
población más desposeída del país […] ese desprecio que se  encuentra entretejido en cada momento de la 




reproduces and reinforces this division. First, his speech is not addressed to the 
‗integrated‘ group of the Peruvian society, because he is excluding the indigenous 
population by portraying them as ‗despised, excluded, and dispossessed.‘ Although, he 
intends to not be included in any of the groups mentioned, it becomes impossible to 
detach him from the urban elite he represents. As the president of the PTRC, Lerner is 
part of the very group he is addressing– a powerful political class that excludes, ignores, 
and dominates those who are different.  
The last part of the speech asserts, 
 The voices of Peruvians anonymous, ignored, despised, which are collected in these 
thousand pages, should be higher and cleaner than all those voices from the comfort of 
power and privilege, who have rush to rise in the last weeks to deny in advance, as so 
often has happened in our country, the whole credibility of their testimonies and to shut 
off all forms of solidarity with the poor.126 (PTRC 2003b) 
This quote is disturbing, because it is founded on the idea that the ‗poor‘ are purer 
because they do not have power or any privileges. The problem with this ideology is that 
it essentializes rural Quechua speakers as bon savages, insinuating that by nature 
indigenous groups are good, that it is in their essence to be good, imagining them as a 
group removed from ‗modernity.‘ The moral judgement behind this quote does not differ 
from the idea expressed by ‗progressive‘ scholars who argued that in Uchuraccay a 
community in the Northern part of the Ayacucho region, in 1983, the murder of 8 
journalists could not be done by the local population, because it was impossible that they 
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 ―Las voces de peruanos anónimos, ignorados, despreciados, que se encuentran recogidas en estos 
miles de páginas, deben ser -son - más altas y más limpias que todas aquellas voces que, desde la 
comodidad del poder y del privilegio, se han apresurado a levantarse en las últimas semanas para 
negar de antemano, como tantas veces ha ocurrido en nuestro país, toda credibilidad a sus 





could kill people. The commission that was called to investigate this event, led by current 
Nobel Prize Vargas Llosa, argued that the population in Uchuraccay was accountable for 
the murders. However, they were not totally responsible for it, because—in the words of 
the Uchuraccay Commission—they were so primitive and outide of the law, that they did 
not know that in Peru it is illegal to kill (Franco 2006: 173). In this case, racialization is 
as much of a discursive practice, as it is a relationship that Criollo/mestizos establish with 
the rural Quechua; which indeed, permeates scholars‘ and the intelligentsia‘s academic 
and political works (for some examples see Fuenzalida 1970; Quijano 1980). 
We found in our studies that those who greatly suffered violence, and those who suffered the 
greatest cruelty, were the in-significant, in other words, those thousands of Peruvians who 
then and now have no meaning and significance for the state and for big part of the Peruvian 
society. They are the poor, excluded, the forgotten forever, who have no other desire like the 
one expressed by a brave man who gave his testimony here in Ayacucho: hopefully some day 
we may be Peruvians.127 (PTRC 2003b) 
 
The last quote of Lerner‘s discourse highlights that the Quechuas were the group that 
most suffered during the war years. However, it is surprising the use of the word 
insignificant (Sp. insignificantes) to name the indigenous population, as if this was the 
only way subordinate groups may be called to highlight their lower social, economic, and 
political position. Although the speech is addressed to the urban elite highlighting and 
repeating again and again that the Quechua population is forgotten, insignificant, 
excluded, despised, only essentialized them, reinforcing a racial hierarchy and 
                                                 
127 ―hemos constatado en nuestros estudios que en gran medida los que sufrieron la violencia, y los que la 
padecieron con la mayor crueldad, fueron los in-significantes, es decir, aquellos miles de peruanos que 
antes y ahora carecen de sentido y de significado para el Estado y para buena parte de la sociedad . Son 
los pobres, los excluidos, los olvidados de siempre, quienes no tienen otra aspiración que ésta que expresó 
por un hombre valiente que dio su testimonio aquí, en Ayacucho: ojalá que algún día también nosotros 






 The discourse ends by arguing, 
…within in its pages it is also included the testimony of numerous acts of courage, acts of 
selflessness, signs of intact dignity that show us that human beings are essentially decent 
and magnanimous. There are those who did not renounce the authority and responsibility 
entrusted to them by their neighbors, there are those who defied the abandonment to 
defend their families transforming into tools their work instruments, there are those who 
put their fate next to those who suffered unjust imprisonment, there are those who took 
their duty to defend the country without betraying the law, there are those who fought to 
defend the uprooting of life. They are in the core and heart of our memories.128 (PTRC 
2003b)  
After extensively talking about the poor and forgotten, indexing the Quechuas with this, 
Lerner tries to place them –at the end of his speech– as subjects with agency, decision, 
and voice. Once reinforcing and reproducing a fragmented and racist society, he tries to 
bring back into the speech the indigenous population by erasing the division that he 
strongly emphasized. The two groups that composed the Peruvian society, and over 
which the discourse is constructed, seem to converge in the last paragraph; erasing a 
division that was very important highlight earlier. For my analysis, this is the original 
discourse that extensively use racialized terms shaping in this way, the relationships that 
the urban Criollo/mestizo group (that Lerner represents) establishes with the rural 
Quechuas. 
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 ―…en sus páginas se recoge también el testimonio de numerosos actos de coraje, gestos de 
desprendimiento, signos de dignidad intacta que nos demuestran que el ser humano es esencialmente 
digno y magnánimo. Ahí se encuentran quienes no renunciaron a la autoridad y la responsabi lidad 
que sus vecinos les confiaron; ahí se encuentran quienes desafiaron el abandono para defender a sus 
familias convirtiendo en arma sus herramientas de trabajo; ahí se encuentran quienes pusieron su 
suerte al lado de los que sufrían prisión injusta; ahí se encuentran los que asumieron su deber de 
defender al país sin traicionar la ley; ahí se encuentran quienes enfrentaron el desarraigo para 




 These discourses are the original129 discourse (Urban 1996), which included the PTRC as 
the originator, but also the media and the national intelligentsia that have developed 
along with the Final Report the idea that Chungui is the ‗most marginal and forgotten 
community.‘ Although ‗marginality‘ has its roots in the Dependence Theory, the way it is 
grounded and related to the internal war and its ‗war victims,‘ lead us to think that this is 
a different discourse, a remodeled one that emerged after the release of the PTRC final 
report. Considering this as the original discourse, will allow us to look at the ways 
Chunguinos have replicated this through face-to-face interactions with the state. 
1.2 The legacy: National program of compensations  
In 2007 the National Compensation Plan (Sp. Plan Nacional de Reparaciones-
PNR) was inaugurated in Ayacucho, and launched the National Program of Collective 
compensations, which expected to develop projects in 440 villages affected by the 1980s 
political violence.130 Build on the idea that the state was partly responsible for war‘s 
outcome –that caused thousands of deaths–this policy was the social and political 
achievement of NGOs, Human Right activists and a group of the civil society concerned 
with the PTRC‘s recommendations. In the way this has been framed, the law will 
compensate collectively, affected communities, and individually, only those that the state 
declares as ‗victims.‘  
Although through this program it is expected that the state will assume its 
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 It can be said that the original is the PTRC‘s speech, and the media‘s may be replicas. However, 
my argument intends to show how this original, that can be combinations of  discourses, sets stage 
for replicas that will be generated by state officers, NGOs and Chunguinos.   
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responsibility during the internal war, it has not been acknowledge the problem that 
involves the state‘s definition as war ‗victim.‘ In general, the state (and the civil society 
behind this program) has not considered the impact that the label of ‗victims‘ would have 
on rural communities, as a reproducer of people‘s subordinate position. Most of these 
communities barely receive state‘s attention, and these groups are also those who lived 
the worst of the internal war. The state requires the affected population to be recognized 
officially as a ‗war victims,‘ compelling them to be register in the Victims Registry (Sp. 
Registro Único de Víctimas-RUV). Once the registration is finished, the ‗victim‘ or 
relative attaches all the documentation available to prove the existence of a missing, 
tortured, or murdered family member. The files are sent to Lima, where a group of urban 
lawyers analyze them, and establish, according to the law, if the person legally qualifies 
as a ‗victim.‘ If this is accepted, the registered ‗victim‘ receives accreditation which will 
give him/her access to some benefits. The RUV was not known in all communities131 
when I started my fieldwork in 2008. Part of problem, people involved on this program 
argue, is the lack of serious governmental support and the restrictive budget. The state 
accepted the law because of pressure from the international community and NGOs. 
However, it is not a political priority–this is a populist policy designed to appease critics. 
In its collective form, the compensation program in Chungui has been developing 
infrastructural projects (the construction of the secondary school and the health clinic) 
since 2007. However, the state is using the compensation money to carry out projects that 
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state should do in a regular basis. 132 Neither the scholarly community nor the Peruvian 
intelligentsia is questioning this state policy. In general, the compensation program has 
not arrived at the most affected communities, like Chapi. This is mainly because the 
‗help‘ is focused on areas that are better connected to the metrepole, where the road 
arrives.133 In October 2009, the first 80 ‗war victims‘ were officially recognized by the 
state; an important milestone for Chungui‘s inhabitants who have enormous expectations 
from individual compensations. For the first time in their lives, Chunguinos have the 
right to access free health care.  
For communities like Chungui, the process of being recognized by the state as 
official ‗war victims‘ has been possible because of the Final Report, and public 
discourses that have placed it in the national scenario as ‗the most marginal and forgotten 
community‘ affected during the war time. This label has placed this community as a 
focus of attention during a short period that faded because of the drug traffic in the 
region, its long distance from Ayacucho city, and lately the presence of Shining Path 
members.  
2. Encountering the state: the path to visibility 
I have discussed how elite public discourses, scholarly as well as popular, have 
produced the image of Chungui‘s inhabitants as a ‗marginal community‘. Although the 
core of the originator discourse is the PTRC, it has received the collaboration of scholars, 
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 I consider that the state‘s duty should attend the basic needs like education and health. What it is 
doing in Chungui and Chapi under the name of collective compensation, is its duty rather than 
compensations for the war crimes. 
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urban elites and the media. Following the Urban‘s suggestion that the relationship 
between original and replica discourses is entangled in the power relationship established 
between the originator and the copier, I explore the replica(s) discourse used by the 
people in Chapi and Chungui, and the governmental agencies that arrived to Chungui 
(Urban 1996). 
 The originator produces and reinforces Chungui as a ‗marginal community,‘ and 
state officers replicate this, through the interactions they have with rural communities in 
workshops and meetings. In this sense, a particular cultural citizenship134 is constructed, 
re-enforced and imposed through everyday practices even as it runs contrary to official 
citizenship which holds all citizens as equal (cf.Ong 1999). 
In this section, I argue that ‗marginality‘ is as double discourse, used by different 
groups with different purposes. On one side it is part of the language of the state, a code 
through which it communicates with and subordinates the rural Quechuas, producing it as 
racialized (inferior) subjects. On the other side it is part of the language used by the rural 
Quechua to become visible in a society where they are invisible, non-important, and 
disposable135. The rhetoric used by the community becomes a strategy to be heard by the 
state and to be considered for his help. Through labels like ‗marginal‘ and ‗marginalized,‘ 
Chunguinos expect to get the state‘s attention and access developmental projects that they 
believe will drive them to progress.  
For analytical purposes, I have divided this discussion on how ‗marginality‘ 
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I use definition of cultural citizenship that considers it as ways to belong according to the 
dominant cultural criteria (Ong 1999: 106) 
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 An example of the disposable character of the rural Quechuas is the forced sterilization practiced during 




works as discursive practise in two levels. The first one looks at the municipality (Sp. 
Municipalidad), and how local authorities use the language as a strategy to place 
themselves in the national political platform. The second level explores how the state, 
through state officers, interacts with the local population in, what I argue is, a racialized 
relationship.  
2.1 The Municipality of Chungui: looking to be visible  
Daniel Huamán is the current Mayor of Chungui, but he has also been a friend, 
guide and collaborator since the first day I met him in 2002. At the time, he was a popular 
young grassroots local leader. He was born in Chungui, and grew up in one of the most 
important and well-off families there. Her mother was the only woman who attended 
school among her peers, and because of this, sheworked as civil registrar for many years. 
Although Daniel‘s family stayed in Chungui during the internal war, his sisters were sent 
to the city of Ayacucho where they finished high school and went to college. Daniel was 
the youngest son, and stayed with his parents in Chungui. He finished secondary school, 
which allowed him to become a local leader, for both Chungui and Chapi.  
Daniel entered into the political arena in 2007. His life changed drastically when 
he was elected as Mayor; he moved to the city of Ayacucho arguing that there it is easier 
to access different institutions, and resources. His duties have distanced him from 
Chungui, especially from the Chapi‘s population to whom he used to be very close. 
During my last fieldwork (2008-2009) he was accused of corruption, and becoming ‗rich‘ 




anymore, and Daniel is fully aware of this.136 
During his years in the Municipality, Daniel has learned to deal with the state and 
aid agencies. He considers that the focus of his work is to direct the state‘s attention 
toward Chungui, which he confessed has been difficult because of the district‘s harsh 
geography and the state‘s neoliberal policy that does not promote public investment. 
Daniel considers that the state is responsible for making Chungui a ‗marginal 
community,‘ and it does not help the community to overcome this. Like the narratives 
analysed in the previous chapter, Daniel understands ‗marginality‘ as an act performed by 
the state toward rural communities becoming thus, and as the undertone of the state‘s 
relationship with Chungui. In other words, authorities find that because the state 
marginalizes the community, its responsibility is for doing something (like projects) to 
change the condition of ‗marginality.‘  
The Mayor and his team are seen as mediators between the community and the 
state. People attend the Municipality office in Ayacucho on daily basis, looking for forms 
of support that go from financial aid to part-time jobs. In the context of extreme 
necessity, the municipality of Chungui fills its population needs: …they come to the 
Municipality, and we are paying health issues like operations, travels, etc. (Daniel 
Huamán). As the quote suggest, the Municipality‘s role is not only about paying bills but 
about keeping elementary schools functioning. Therefore, the municipality pays teachers‘ 
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 When I present my credentials signed by the Mayor, people in Chupón and Oronqoy did not 




salaries in order to keep pre-schools and schools running in the district.137 The 
municipality is the first level of the state, the one that they can approach when they need 
help and support. 
Authorities in this office are constantly looking for financial support to develop 
different infrastructure projects, and they continuously travel to Lima, aiming to establish 
relationships with different governmental agencies, international aid agencies and NGOs. 
In Ayacucho and Lima, where most of the municipality‘s business is done, Chungui‘s 
Mayor becomes the political and social mediator between the community and the central 
state. In every meeting, local authorities start by stating that Chungui is ‗the most 
marginal and forgotten community,‘ an expression that is extensively used by the state 
every time it talks about Oreja de Perro y Chungui.  
During my last conversation with Daniel, in October 2009, he told me that he was 
working with state officals in Lima to name Chungui as the emblematic district in which 
the Compensation program will first start working,138 
[...] we are just proposing to MIMDES, to Ministries Council, in which way, apart from 
special treatment that the VRAE has; the poorest area, the region most affected by the 
violence and how we make this an especial treatment area? Like a landmark district.139 
(Daniel Huamán) 
In order to get the state‘s attention and interest, Daniel reinforces the image of Chungui 
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 There are not enough people concentrated in villages in the district, and people live in a dispersed 
pattern that halts the state to invest in education and health services. In order to avoid this reductions 
and closures, the Major has included in his budget the salary of these teachers. Therefore health and 
education, which should be the central state‘s responsibilities, are now the Major‘s ones. 
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 Although it was not clear in what way the Compensation Program, beyond giving people 
credentials was going to be apply. 
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 ―[…] justamente estamos proponiendo a MINDES, a la presidencia del Consejo de Ministros: de qué 
manera, aparte del tratamiento especial del VRAE, la zona más pobre, la zona más afectada de la violencia 





as the most poor, and affected community. For him, this is the way to get the state‘s 
attention, which will be transformed into projects that will benefit and ‗modernize‘ the 
community. It is probably true that Chungui and Oreja de Perro have more reasons to be 
known that just the violence they experienced during the internal war. But it is also true 
that the current political condition – the drug problem and the re-emergence of the 
Shining Path–and the distance from the regional capital does not help. Chungui does not 
hold oil, mines, or natural gas reserves; instead, it has a history of violence and death that 
may indeed make it the most effected region by the political violence. This history is 
transforming it into a visible community, and the authorities are aware of this. Daniel 
explains what means to be a ‗marginal community,‘ 
Chungui is marginal [...] at the state level there exists such marginalization. There are 
preferences… there is a marginalization... several interests are playing. There is a strong 
marginalization. They say we are the most affected district and do not invest.140 (Daniel 
Huamán) 
Daniel highlights the double discourse of the state. On one hand, the state constantly 
remembers, discursively, that they are a ‗marginal community;‘ but on the other hand, 
they do not do anything to change this situation. Although Daniel does not state it, he 
remarks the state‘s lack of commitment to change Chungui‘s marginal condition, arguing 
that this cannot be done if the state does not help them economically.  
 Daniel explains the discourse of ‗marginal and forgotten community‘ as if this 
were a concrete reality rather than one created throughout discourse. In this case, he 
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 ―Chungui es marginal […] eso es que, a nivel de estado hay tipo una marginación. Preferencias hay… Tipo 
una marginación... hay intereses que juegan mucho. Una marginación fuerte. Dicen que somos el distrito más 





reproduces the PTRC discourse, decontextualizing it and setting a new ground, in which 
the relationship with the state becomes the origin of the ‗marginal‘ condition they suffer. 
To understand the relationship between original A and replica A discourses (see Table 5-
1) we need to look at how that relationship is encoded in the circulating meta-discourse 
(Urban 1996: 23).  
In the discourse presented by Lerner the emphasis of the causes of the internal 
war are found in the society and in the state, as Mayor of Chungui‘s explanation 
highlights. While the original A extensively talks about the despised, ignored and 
insignificant Quechuasthat suffered the consequences of the violence; Daniel‘s replica A 
does not addresses this or any other racial category, but rather emphasizes the state‘s 
responsibility in producing the ‗marginality‘ in which Chungui lives. While the original 
discourse talks about multiple agents that may be held responsible for the high number of 
victims and the 1980s violence, Daniel‘s discourse reduces the responsibility to the state. 
The rest of the society, including the army, is not present in the replica A, it has been 
erased in order to reinforce the state‘s-- the central government‘s—responsibility.  
 2.2 Becoming visible to the state 
During my two years of fieldwork in Ayacucho, the central state personnel was 
only twice in the district of Chungui. Both meetings were related to the National Program 
of Compensations that grants ‗war victims‘ some benefits from the state. Both meetings 
were important not only because these were unique interactions between the state and the 
community, but also because they demonstrated how state officals deployed racialized 




particular language that people are required to use if they expect to be heard. The 
government personnel use this replica (replica B), becoming the copier of the original 
discourse about ‗marginal and forgotten communities.‘  
2.2.1 MIMDES in Oronqoy 
While I was visiting Oronqoy for the first time in May 2008, people were 
expecting an important meeting. Later I learned that the Director of the Agency of 
Displaced Population and Peace Culture in the Women‘s and Human Development‘s 
Ministry,141 Dr. Varillas was arriving to Oronqoy for the first time. This visit was the 
highest official state representative to ever be in Oronqoy, and it was important because it 
was an extremely exigent travel for an official from Lima.142This action was interpreted 
by people in Oronqoy as Varillas‘s commitment toward Chungui‘s development. This 
official was also the first state offical traveling though the district of Chungui.  
 Although some of the most important local authorities were expected to be in 
Oronqoy for the meeting, there were not as many participants as local authorities were 
expecting. The meeting included a few people from neighboring villages and some locals 
who answered the call of their authorities. 
 In his opening statement Varillas introduced himself claiming that 
The big problem in the country is that the state has not had eyes to see, it had not had 
ears to hear, nor had a heart to feel. La Oreja de Perro is the micro region most affected 
in the country ... there are more dead, more missing here... And the problem is that the 
state had the obligation to defend and respect your civil rights, they had to defend your 
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 Dirección General de desplazados y cultura de Paz del Ministerio de la Mujer y Desarrollo 
Humano. 
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 It takes about three days to walk from Chungui to Oronqoy, and includes long walks hiking 




lives and it did not. There is a responsibility from the state and we hope that this state 
now assume that responsibility.143 (Varillas, meeting in Oronqoy) 
Although Varillas is officially representing the state in this meeting he does not align 
himself with it, which avoids for being accountable for the state past actions. He talks 
about the state as if it was a person, with eyes, ears and heart, as if it was somebody who 
could listen to those who lived the war. And he highlights that Oreja de Perro is the most 
affected region in the country, with the highest toll of dead and disappeared people. 
Using a replica from the PTRC‘s discourse, this opening statement places Chapi as the 
most affected community, allowing us to presuppose that they are thousands of victims. 
Then, he continues 
I do not have the certainty that [the state] will meet its duty, but much depends on the 
force of words, much depends on the ability of your organization and to the extent that 
you organize yourself and your voice is not from only one person ... that should be the 
voice of all the Oreja de Perro that is the most affected area of the country by the internal 
war. Then the country will know and meet the most affected area by the internal war but 
also the also the most forgotten region by the state.144 (Varillas, meeting in Oronqoy) 
In the interaction between state officers and rural subjects, I have often found that while 
officials affirm that the state‘s duty is to compensate victims, they exhort people to 
pressure the state if they aim to achieve benefits. Varillas not only openly doubt that the 
state would perform its compensations duties; but also highlights (again) that Oreja de 
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 ―El gran problema del país es que el estado no ha tenido ojos para ver, no ha tenido oídos para 
escuchar, ni ha tenido corazón para sentir. La Oreja de Perro es la micro región más afectada del 
país…aquí hay más muertos, más desaparecido... Y el problema es que el estado tenía la obligación de 
defender y hacer respetar sus derechos, de defender la vida de ustedes y no lo hizo. Hay una gran 
responsabilidad del estado y esperemos que ese estado de ahora asuma esa responsabilidad.‖  
144
 ―yo no tengo la certeza de que lo cumpla [su deber] pero depende mucho de la fuerza de la palabra, 
depende mucho de la capacidad de la organización de ustedes y en la medida de que se organicen y su voz 
no sea de una persona, … que sea la voz de todos de la Oreja de Perro que es la zona más afectada del 
país, entonces el país conocerá y sabrá lo que es la Oreja de perro: la zona más golpeada por la violencia 





Perro is the most affected by the violence in Peru, and ‗the most forgotten community by 
the state.‘ At the same time he produces people in Chapi as ‗marginal,‘ he calls the 
community to take action to claim justice. Varillas talks about how much of the state‘s 
answer depends on how people make their voices heard. It is the situation that the 
squeaky wheel gets the oil, in which if people do not claim for justice, this probably 
would never arrive. As many people have told me during my fieldwork, justice is not a 
civil right–it is something that we need to fight for. Justice is only for those who have 
money. 
Varillas continues talking about the state and compensations, 
[...] that state that once failed to recognize its duty, to protect victims. And now that state 
has to recognize who are the victims and therefore this state has the obligation to 
compensate them ... because the law says that if the state recognize the war victims, then 
the state must compensated them, and if it does compensate it is breaking the law. And 
there, the most important thing is that you organize your community and demand the 
enforced of the law145. (Varillas, meeting en Oronqoy) 
In talking about the compensation program to the ‗war victims,‘ Varillas distances 
himself again from the state he represents and highlights the state‘s legal duty to 
compensate them. He crafts a discourse in which he positions himself in opposition to the 
state, aligning with his audience that he considers as ‗victims.‘  
 Varillas carefully molds Chapi and Oreja de Perro as the most affected area by 
the internal war. He repeats it so many times as if he needed to convince the audience 
about the atrocities they suffered during the period of violence. Such tone and language 
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 ―[…] ese estado que en su momento no supo reconocer, su tarea de proteger a las víctimas. Y ahora ese 
estado tiene que reconocer quienes son las víctimas y por tanto ese estado tiene la obligación de 
repararlos… porque las leyes dicen que si el estado reconoce a las víctimas entonces el estado debe 
reparar, y si no lo repara está infringiendo la ley. Y ahí lo más importante es que ustedes se organicen y 





have important consequences, especially in the way the audience talks to the state in this 
meeting. Although Varillas‘ meeting goal is to listen what people have to say, framing his 
speech in this particular way, repeating so many times that this is a ‗very affected 
community and forgotten by the state,‘ pre-defines the path through which the meeting 
will develop. He probably looks to be empathic with the audience, and wants to be seen 
closer to them. Whatever Varillas good intentions were, it cannot be denied that his 
words are not as transparent as he wanted us to think, and he is constructing a clearly 
difference between ―you‖ and ―we.‖  
Like Lerner, Varillas speaks of the state‘s responsibility for not protecting its 
population. However, as Daniel‘s replica A, Varillas‘ replica B does not talk about 
specific agents of the state, the Shining Path or the army. Rather replica B only talks 
about the role of the state, reducing the Peruvian society role to the lack of knowledge 
about what happened in the Andean highlands. Varillas uses his replica B, that adds the 
need to be organized and to force the state to be liable for the lack of protection during 
the wartime (Cf. Urban 1996). In this, the idea of justice is completely absent. 
The meeting continued, and a first local speaker intervenes, 
 
We would ask for collective and individual compensation, so we could be able to achieve 
a worthy future and our children. Our children who come back, they need to be well 
educated, with good health, to have their mean of land communication. In any form this 
is the target of the human development, otherwise we will always like this. Because the 
people of Oreja de Perro has been forgotten until these decades ... the road, the viability 
to the area of Oreja de Perro to contact too, to make it easy the arrival of governmental 
institutions or NGOs, or the, health professional, teachers and all.146 (Juan, meeting in 
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 ―nosotros pediríamos reparación colectivo e individual para que seamos dignos de alcanzar nuestras futuras 
y nuestros niños, nuestros hijos que vienen atrás para que sean también bueno educados, buenos de su salud, 
para que tenga su vía de comunicación terrestre de alguna forma sea objetivo para el desarrollo humano, caso 
contrario nosotros siempre cuando estaremos así. Porque el pueblo de Oreja de Perro ha sido bien olvidado 





In the first intervention, Juan talks about being able to have a better life for his children, 
achivieng education and health. For him, the goal is to achieve development–presuposing 
and accepting the backwardness condition in which he lives– and not achiving this would 
mean that the community would still be forgotten, as it currently is. Juan makes an 
special emphasis on the road, that he imagines will keep them communicated with the 
state. He argues the importance of the road because it will take them out of this olvidado 
[En. forgotten] corner, and ‗help‘ from governmental institutions and NGOs would use 
this road to bring their help. Health and Education personel will be brought with this 
road, as well as other profesionals who will keep them in contact (Sp. contacto, but 
meaning that they will take care of them) with other institutions. In this context, keep 
contact refers to establishing a permanente relationship with the state.  
The road is imagined as the pathway to modernity and progress. The community 
is in a corner where it is easily forgotten, and the road offers the posibility to establish a 
permanent contact with the state, and reeive the aid that this relationship may bring. 
Building on the original discourse and on Varillas‘ replica, this local replica C repeats 
how the community has been ‗maginalized.‘ Through reframing the original discourse 
(the PTRC‘s), this replica adds the road as the mean to get out of this olvidado condition 
and transforming Chungui into a visible community to the state. On one hand, the lack of 
roads and the difficulties to travel from one community to others in Oreja de Perro are 
                                                                                                                                                 






the most common excuses that state officials and NGOs make to avoid visiting Chapi. On 
the other hand, when Juan talks he is imagining that the forgotten corner147 in which he 
lives, is only a geographical isolation, rather than an ideology, that only the road would 
not change.  
Juan continues, 
We also need in our Oreja de Perro, exhumation of mass graves ... we need that approval 
to exhume these graves and bring these bodies to their areas, at least to light a candle 
and maybe families also urgently need to know a bone of his/her relative. That may be 
given the approval or immediately to cure our wounded in the chest that hurts all the time 
and hurts us.148 (John, meeting in Oronqoy) 
Often I find that each time people speak face-to-face with state officials, their 
interventions are reduced –at least is what state officials think–to a list of things that they 
need. In a way is as if they were tell the state all they need, because the state is present 
there to listen to them. That is probably why the list of needs goes from the recognition of 
their civil rights to the exhumation of clandestine burials. In general, this demand has 
become the common demand in many communities. However, people do not talk about 
the importance of exhumations outside encounters with state agents.149 I usually have 
people telling me how much they have suffered, how traumatized their children are and 
any help arrives. The pain and bad memories are present and they will not go away for a 
long time, and people in Chapi and Chungui should have the right to bury their relatives 
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 In Spanish Peruvians say: donde el diablo perdió el poncho [En. where the devil lost his poncho] 
or clear to hell and gone] 
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 ―También necesitamos en nuestro Oreja de Perro, exhumación de fosas comunes … necesitamos esa 
autorización fiscal para exhumar esas fosas comunes y traer a esos cadáveres a sus zonas siquiera para 
prender una vela y quizás familias también requiere urgentemente conocer un hueso de sus familiares. Que 
puede haber la autorización o el apoyo inmediato para poder alcanzar también el saneamiento esa herida 
en el pecho que toda la vida nos tiene y que nos duele‖  
149 




who were extrajudicialy executed by the army and the Shining Path. However, today 
Chungui and Chapi use a pre-ordered rhetoric, that concentrates in what the state needs to 
hear, not what they really want to say (this will be explain in Chapter 7). In many 
occasions, people do not consider exhumations as a priority of their demands, they look 
for economic support and roads to consolidate their fragil economy. Meeting the state, 
especially in the postwar context and post PTRC, for many communities has meant to tell 
what they are supposed to say as ‗war victims.‘ They have learnt what they need to say 
and what not, and their extensive suffering and their performance of pain and misery, is 
something that always the local authrotiries highlight when they have state personel 
visiting.150 Juan continues talking about what he expects of the state 
So far, we lack of the state. Any Minister, any person, they do not arrive to the end to the 
road to check what people need, what needs have Oreja de Perro. Therefore doctor 
[Varillas] please be kind and send our message to the appropriate institutions that would 
compensate the victims...151 (Juan, meeting in Oronqoy) 
This quote expresses what Juan and the community expect from the state. For him, the 
state has a face; it is embodied in the officials and bureaucrats whose responsibility is to 
take care of the people, forgotten like Oreja de Perro. And Juan claims that neither the 
state nor its officials –like Secretaries (Sp. Ministros) – arrive to the end of the road to 
verify what people‘s needs are and solve them. People in Chapi consider that the state 
does not care about them, because the state is not properly informed about the needs of 
the community. That is why Juan asks Varillas to inform the state what they need, 
                                                 
150 I develop this idea in Chapter 7 
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―Hasta el momento se carece…del estado. Algún Ministro, cualquier persona, no llega a punta 
carretera [a] verificar qué necesidad tiene la población, qué necesidad tiene la Oreja de Perro. 
Entonces doctor tenga la amabilidad de hacernos llegar este mensaje  a las instituciones que 




especially to those institutions that deal with compensations.  
The meeting continues, and now a commoner from Belen Chapi speaks, 
Because they [the state] abuse us, because are ignorant, that sir, it is important that the 
state compensate us. It is important to let us know if it [the state] really wants to repair, 
thank you very much.152 (Manuel, meeting in Oronqoy) 
People‘s interventions address that the state has killed people, highlighting the state‘s 
political responsibility on this period, which may be seen as the replica of the PTRC‘s 
original A discourse. Nevertheless, this replica C153 adds that because rural Quechuas are 
ignorant they are abused by the state. Lerner‘s discourse uses ignored and excluded 
people, but it does not affirm that the indigenous population is ignorant, and because of 
it, they are abused. Rather this is the people‘s interpretation of national history, a 
relationship of domination that goes beyond the war years. The condition of exclusion 
that Lerner addresses throughout his discourse is re-shaped in a causal relationship by the 
meeting participants, in a replica C. Within it the state is represented as an institution that 
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 ―porque ellos [el estado] nos abusan porque somos ignorantes, eso señor, que nos repare, que nos haga 
saber si realmente él quiere reparar eso tienes que hacer señor, muchas gracias.‖  







Original and Replicas 
 
Originator 
PTRC and its heirs 
Original A 
Discourse provoked by the 
PTRC and the FR about the 
internal war. 
 Chungui‘s authorities 
Replica A 
Discourse based on the 
discourse developed by the 
PTRC, but that some ideas are 
added and other erased.  
Dr. Varillas 
Replica B  
People from Chapi 
who attended the 
meeting  
Replica C  
   Source: Based on Urban 1996 
 In general, people constantly repeat the need for compensation because the war left them 
without anything. In this context, state‘s compensation is seen as the help they need to 
recompose their lives. In a way, the idea of compensation is interpreted by ‗war victims‘ 
as the way the state may atone for failing to protect them during the war. At the same 
time, this compensation is seen by Human Right activists and Leftist scholars as a form to 
deliver justice. The state has abused people because they are ignorant, and the verb use is 
in present, which means that the state has not stopped abusing them. 
The government can hear us, because although we are really forgotten community by the 
state, a remote village in the wake of that violence, possibly that time of violence those 
things happened because the town was abandoned [by the state].154 (Esteban, Meeting in 
Oronqoy) 
Addressing, again, the abuse the state has committed on them, Esteban talks about the 
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 ―nos puede escuchar el gobierno porque si bien es cierto aquí verdaderamente somos un pueblo 
olvidado por el estado, un pueblo apartado a raíz de eso posiblemente ese tiempo de violencia esas cosas 




possibility that the violence occurred because the community has been abandoned by the 
state. Referring to his experience as a Shining Path member, he blames the state for 
forgetting his community. In a way Esteban blames this as the cause of the 1980s 
violence.  
The country does not know that this area of Oreja de Perro is the most affected, then the 
state's resources and the resources of the different cooperation sources in the world 
would not be interested if they do not know ... if the state is sensitive then it will to guide 
and prioritize its resources to attend Oreja de Perro... but it will be the responsibility of 
the state, the responsibility of the rulers of the time to meet or not, because they will 
know, Oreja de Perro is the most affected region in the country and for that, we are just 
together now. Thank you.155 (Varillas, meeting Oronqoy) 
One more time Varillas emphasizes that the Oreja de Perro is the most affected area of 
the country by the 1980s political violence. This quote is important because of the two 
ideas he is introducing. First he repeats that the country, the national and international 
community, does not know that Oreja de Perro is the most affected area; repeating in a 
way what Lerner stated in his speech, and adding the international community. Going 
further than the PTRC (but still directly related), he argues that if it all the violence and 
suffering that has affected the community remains unknown, there would not be money 
for the region. And second, Varillas state that if the state would be sensitive with the 
region it would assign economic resources to it. However, he clarifies that this is the 
leaders‘ responsibility and those who arrive to power. Taking the original discourse 
further, Varillas shapes his replica B by telling the audience that Oreja de Perro suffering 
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 ―El país no conoce de que esta zona la Oreja de Perro es la más afectada, entonces los recursos del 
estado y también los recursos de los diferentes fuentes cooperantes del mundo no se van a interesar si no 
saben… si el estado es sensible entonces tendrá que orientar y priorizar sus recursos para atender a la 
Oreja de Perro… pero será la responsabilidad del estado, será responsabilidad de los gobernantes de ese 
momento que cumplan o no, porque ya conocerán, ya sabrá de que la Oreja de Perro es la zona más 




needs to be known if they want to be compensated. And for this, he suggests to ‗exploit‘ 
its conditions of ‗the most marginal and forgotten community‘ affected by the 1980s 
internal war, to receive help. In other words, he suggests that Chungui will be 
transformed into a visible community for the rest of the Peruvian society (urban elites in 
centers of power) only if their war experience and suffering is known. There does not 
seem to be a choice to be ‗marginal‘ or not, Oreja de Perro ‗needs‘ to be the most 
marginal, poor and affected community by the violence, if its goal is to receive an answer 
and attention from the state.  
The law states that you are victims and the law says you must be compensated, therefore 
there we have a common task between you and us, you who are victims that somehow we 
have been alien to this tragedy ... I appreciate that side and acknowledge your critical 
sense, because it must be so, what happened in the country that you have lived has not 
been insignificant, the state owes much to you.156 (Varillas, meeting in Oronqoy) 
Varillas‘ statement highlights to his audience that they are victims, and therefore they 
need to be compensated. He blames the state, this time including himself through ‗us,‘ of 
being indifferent to the tragic violence like Lerner‘s original discourse. But now, Varillas 
considers that the state and the people can join forces to compensate them for all the 
suffering they have experienced. Throughout this statement, Varillas identifies two 
different groups, the ‗war victims‘ that need to be compensated (the rural Quechuas) and 
those who were unaware of the war in the countryside (the urban Criollo/mestizo group). 
He aligns himself with the group that did not answer to people‘ suffering, he is a Creole. 
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 ―La ley dice que ustedes son víctimas y la ley dicen que ustedes deben ser reparados, entonces ahí 
tenemos una tarea común entre ustedes y nosotros, ustedes que son víctimas nosotros que de alguna 
manera hemos sido ajenos de esa tragedia… por ese lado yo valoro y reconozco ese sentido crítico que 
tienen ustedes, porque tiene que ser así, lo que acontecido en el país lo que ustedes que han vivido no ha 





Making this distinction, Varillas places the rural Quechuas as ‗war victims‘ in the Andes, 
and Criollo/mestizos in urban centers; which clearly divides the population in suffering 
‗Indians‘ and insensitive Criollo/mestizos. Finally, what Varillas crafts is a racialized 
discourse, in which rural Quechuas are racially marked and identified as ‗war victims,‘ 
while the urban Criollo/mestizo remains unmarked but only responsible for not being 
aware of the violence occurring in the Andes.157  
 At the end of the meeting, Varillas concludes by exhorting his audience to adopt a 
critical attitude, claiming that they [Chapi] will remain a slave community unless they 
actively criticize their contemporary reality and its politics. He talks specifically about 
how people in rural communities believe on nice speeches that are not always true; in 
other words, Varillas is calling Chapinos ignorant for believing on nice speeches. To 
avoid being fooled, he continues, they people in Chapi need see facts and acts rather than 
get trapped by the nice discourses given by politicians.  
Finally, he explains that he can use his power, to demand on people‘s behalf in 
Lima, but at the end, the important thing is that Chapi as community needs to organize 
itself to claim justice and to demand the civil rights that the state have taken from them. 
Because of the racialized feature that composed the Peruvian society, rural Quechuas do 
not have inherently civil rights. However, rather than be an issue that the state grants to 
all its citizens, Varillas asks people in Chapi to claim them to the state.  
Varillas does not speak Quechua, thus, he had the help of Julián, an 
anthropologist from Ayacucho who is fluent in Quechua. Although he grew up in the 
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city, Julián has its background in the rural area of Ayacucho. He finished anthropology in 
the University of Ayacucho, and as student he used to work for local NGOs. I first met 
him in 2002 when I was working for the PTRC. Since then, we have occasionally met in 
NGOs meetings and at events in Ayacucho and Lima. Julián accompanied Varillas to 
Oronqoy and acted as translator in the meeting. Although he did an accurate translation 
during the meeting, I was surprised that the last part of Varillas‘ speech was translated 
differently.  
While Varillas talks about the importance to have a critical consciousness, Julián 
talks about people‘s role in the war, and how they acted as ronderos (En. civil patrols) 
which he equates with heroes, 
 
―Paykunallam pacificacionta tarirura nispa y chaypi doctor niwarqanchi rikuchkaptinchi 
y ronderukunaqa maypitaq karanchi manachu militar puntaykachispa qepanta qamuq, 
yuyachkankichikimi, chaynamiki kara. entonces cada de estas trece comunidades de la 
oreja hay héroes, héroes vivientes.  
[We were told by the lawyer that only they (the ronderos by themselves, alone) have worked 
toward the pacification process. The lawyer said that you have seen with your eyes, you witnessed, 
and the ronderos too. Where the ronderos were? Where they have we been? They were at the 
front, guiding the militaries, you remember, right? It was like that. Therefore, in each of these 13 
communities there are heroes, they are living heroes]   
Mana pipas riqsinchu, ni enterun paispas yachanchu, cada comunidadmanta kachkanmi 
héroes, heroínas también hay, tanto que ya no están con nosotros pero también otros 
vivos. 
[Nobody knows this, even in the whole country they don‘t know, from each community there are…  
men and women heroes, there are some heroes that they are not more with us., but also they are 
some who are alive]  
Si no también hay historias acá, por ejemplo doctor citara a Marco Wiliams que es uno 
de los personajes que les ayuda bastante.  
[There are also stories here, for example, the one about Marco Williams, who is one of the 
persons who have helped tremendously the community.] 




pacificación y además de cada uno de ustedes como dirigentes como ronderos como 
mamas en las casas, las señoras viudas que quedaron con 7, 4 hijos. 
[And in each village thanks to him, for example he is a hero of the peace process and each of you 
as local leader, as ronderos, as mothers in the house, the widows who were left with 7 or 4 
children.] 
Imaynatataq manteniraku, manchu chayta Peru, mundo chayta yachanaman, chayta 
ñuqa nikichiman,  
[How the ronderos, the mothers, the people managed to survive. It needs to be known in Peru, in 
the world how you people lived during this time…] 
chayman qina ñuqanchik avansasunchik, masta riqsichikusunchik, ama upallalla 
kasunchichu, rimarisunchik fuerteman, organizakuspoa y tanto kay historiantapas,  
[Then we will advance, we will be known by others. We cannot be silent, we will talk, speak out 
organizing ourselves and also for through your stories.] (Julián, meeting in Oronqoy) 
Julián words are a different closing statement from what originally Varillas stated. The 
idea of the need to be critique to what is being offered is not present in Julián‘s last 
statement. Rather, he chooses to erase this, and to align with the audience. Within his 
statement Julián considers that much of the victory of the war is not only the work of the 
army, but also the work of ronderos and widows who fight to achieve peace. Julián 
asserts that Mark Williams, a Belgian who used to run the NGO PROANDE, has helped 
families to return to Oreja de Perro, is a hero because contributed to the return to the 
community. Julián equates Williams as a hero, as if he had fought as rondero (civil 
defence soldiers) leaders who directly confronted the Shining Path. In contrast, those who 
confronted the Shining Path as local authorities did, are not individually recognized as 
heroes. Although Julián calls all of them heroes, his speech implies a hierarchy; at the top 
of which is Williams, recognized by his proper name, and at the bottom is the rest, who 
are rural Quechuas and not a Belgian directors of an NGO.  




Varillas has said. What Julián chooses to say is very important, because he wants to align 
himself with the community. However by doing this, Julián ends placing the community 
at the bottom of the hierarchy by affirming that Williams is an individual hero, which 
reveals his real values and ideas. By stating that a foreigner like Mark Williams is a hero, 
the local heroes that Julián mentioned become diminished, a mass whose names are not 
worth to learn or mention. 
Julián‘s role as translator and social mediator is important in this encounter not 
only because he speaks Quechua, but also because this allows him to align himself closer 
to the community than Varillas. However, his last words rather than bring him closer to 
the audience, highlights the distance between Julián–an urban educated anthropologist– 
and this group of Oronqoy. Like Varillas‘ last statement, Julián ends up framing a 
personal discourse that racializes the audience, as inferior and backward people that need 
to act and claim if they want to be attended by the state. 
2.2.2  The Governmental High-Level Commission (CMAN) in Chungui  
During 2009, the Compensation plan started to be known in the Ayacucho area. 
NGOs, like Comisedh, acted as a statelike institution to communicate and explain 
through workshops the characteristics and features of the program. However, these did 
not took place in Chungui under NGOs‘ and governmental agencies‘ argument that this 
was an isolated and dangerous area.  
When my original fieldwork had to change for security reasons, I was constantly 
visiting Chungui‘s Municipality office in Ayacucho where I gathered news about 




Daniel Human agreed to be interviewed and he invited me to observe the important 
meeting with the CMAN. This commission is responsible to declare who are ‗war 
victims.‘ Chungui‘s Mayor expected this meeting to be an important opportunity to claim 
more attention and help from the state. He assumed, and expressed the importance of this 
event when we were preparing the meeting; that this official visit from the state would 
draw a stronger commitment from the state‘s officials. In the preparation meeting he 
explained to his team: 
[…] what are the results that we will have on Chungui from the Lima authorities‘ visit? 
One gentlemen would be extension ... for the attention of collective compensations, the 
higher number...Two would be that ... mmm...what we have done the work, we are almost 
at number one on the top list of the National Registry of Victims (RUV) in the district. In 
other places, others they say that they have only hired and never, until now there have 
not submitted the forms to the RUV. Therefore, in that sense we want how we will 
surprise authorities from Lima, so Chungui could be implemented as pilot district for 
individual compensations ... Therefore these two critical issues will depend on how we 
organize, how we receive the commission, how we do banners...158 (Daniel Huamán, 
Organizational meeting in Ayacucho) 
Daniel‘s words aim to make an impression, as if he needed to ‗sell the suffering and the 
marginality of his community.‘ First, when he mentions the RUV and how they may be 
the district with the highest number of ‗victims,‘ his tone is like he is in a contest to win 
the state‘s attention and budget. Second, he is not concerned with the content of the 
meeting. Rather he is focused on how his team will organize and receive the 
governmental visitors. The last phrase points to the importance of getting the attention of 
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 ―qué resultados vamos a tener sobre la visita en Chungui de las autoridades de Lima. Uno, sería, 
señores, la ampliación…para la atención de reparaciones colectivas, la mayor cantidad de 
números…; dos sería de que…cómo se llama…lo que…como hemos hecho el trabajo, estamos, casi, 
en el número uno del nivel de Registro Único de Víctimas distritales; los demás, dice, sólo han 
contratado y nunca más, hasta ahora no hay cuando entregar a nivel del Consejo de Reparaciones. 
Entonces, en ese sentido queremos ver… de qué manera sorprendemos a las autoridades de Lima 
para implementación como distrito piloto, para reparaciones individuales.... Entonces, eso es los dos 
temas más cruciales de nosotros porque dependerá cómo nos organizamos, cómo recepcionamos, 




the visitors to the hand-drawn posters and people‘s demands. 
The day of the meeting, since the early morning, Chunguinos and some authorities 
from Chapi were gathering in the town plaza waiting for the meeting to start. This was an 
official state visit that was also organised to give the formal accreditation for the first 
1980s war victims in the district (only 80 persons were accredited). The accreditation 
gives the ‗war victim‘ access for life to free health care, and (if they are implemented) 
individual economic compensation. There were persons from the nearest communities to 
Chungui‘s capital; although in most of the cases it was just one authority per each village 
and community from Chapi.  
When the CMAN committee and other authorities159 arrived to the Chungui‘s 
plaza, they were received by a clapping crowd, with flowers and hand-drawn posters. 
These posters were drawn by women and children, through which they expressed their 
suffering during the 1980s. During the meeting, there were no interventions from Chapi‘s 
authorities; they were silenced by Chungui‘s authorities who speak Spanish. However, 
authorities and some families from Chapi were present and were holding posters claiming 
justice. Without doubt this was a performance to get the state‘s attention, in which only 
certain persons had the power to talk publicly using a pre-defined speech that highlighted 
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―My house was burnt; my husband and my son were killed. I am alone with my 
small children. I want justice for my disappeared relatives‖ 
Chungui plaza, October 2009 
Source: Nathalie Koc-Menard, October 2009 
 
Daniel opened the meeting declaring: The district of Chungui is considered as the poorest 
district in the country, the district most affected by the political violence160 (Daniel Huamán, 
CMAN meeting in Chungui). Like Varillas introductory speech, Daniel finds the need to 
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―el distrito de Chungui está considerado [como] el distrito más pobre del país, el distrito más 




remember the state officials that Chungui is ‗the poorest and most affected district by the 
1980s violence.‘ Although he is not directly demanding attention or directly claiming for 
economic compensation; by using this phrase he is addressing the consequences of the 
internal war, from which it may be inferred that the state‘s duty is to take care of this 
situation. Since the beginning of the event, the mayor on purpose places his community 
in a subordinate status and in extreme need. 
When I arrived to Chungui the meeting day, I was surprised to see the town‘ plaza 
full of governmental posters (Figure 5-2) which were deploying hundreds of projects; 
many of which did not yet exist. I carefully took at these posters and spend long time 
chatting with people from Chapi about how these projects were working. They told me 
that many of them did not exist, and authorities were saying that there will be executed 
‗soon.‘ However, most of the assistants from Chapi clarified that these posters were only 
state propaganda and they depicted projects that did not really exist, and they were sure 
that they would never exist. Nobody questioned this publicly, although among 
Chunguinos there were comments about the behaviour of the government. I realized that 
those who were in the meeting were not there to believe the state‘s discourses about how 
much it has done for the community. Rather, their presence was about performing a role 
of audience, as ‗war victims‘ that have the chance to be face-to-face with the state and 









Collective Compensation Program, Justice for the heroic town! 
 
Chungui Plaza, October 2009 
Source: Nathalie Koc-Menard 
 
This meeting had different meanings for different groups of attendees. For the state, it 
was the means through publicized what it claims it accomplished with the collective 
compensation program, trying to silence those who claim for attention to rural 




accusations for the crimes against humanity occurred during his first term (1985).161 For 
Chungui‘s Mayor this meeting was the mean to reinforce his work as mediator between 
the state, and the local population. As for the population, it was the mean through which 
they pressure the state to develop the collective compensation program project.  
After Daniel‘s opening statement, a state official from the CMAN, Jesús Aliaga 
declared 
Today is a very important and symbolic day, because we are face to face, in another 
context, the community, victims and the state ––embodied in the Regional President, 
local authorities and us, as government officials of the President Garcia government. 
And I am very pleased to see this forest of banners about the projects that are being 
developed; this is concrete evidence that the state is arriving and it is coming back and 
asserting his presence, by all means to the district worst hit by the twenty years of 
violence that we have passed.162 (Jesús Aliaga, CMAN) 
Aliaga starts his speech setting the stage to identify two groups, the state and the ‗war 
victims,‘ as if they were two tangible realities existing independently from each other. 
This generates the illusion of a real encounter with the state, insinuating that a dialogue 
between these groups will happen. It also provides the state with a face embodying this 
group. Aliaga used the governmental posters, indexing and presupposing; that this is the 
way to demonstrate the state‘s interests in Chungui. He continues talking about this as if 
this was the form through which the state deploys his caring for the affected 
communities. 
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 During Garcia‘s first term, between 1985-1990, it was proved that he gave the order to kill the inmates 
who were rebelling in a jail in Lima.  
162 
―Hoy es un día sumamente importante, simbólico; porque estamos frente a frente, en otro 
contexto, la comunidad, las víctimas y el Estado -que lo encarna el presidente regional, las 
autoridades locales y nosotros, como funcionarios del gobierno del presidente García. Y me 
complace mucho el poder ver este bosque de carteles de obra, que significan, ya, la evidencia 
concreta de que el Estado está llegando, que está regresando y haciendo presencia, con toda 





The scenario, the speeches, the audience and the ‗special‘ guests, were part of a 
performance in which misery and suffering have a central role. The ‗poor and excluded‘ 
people received the help provided by the caring state, while state officials looked for the 
fruits of their work as mediators. People‘s experiences, and the multiple times that each 
official asserted and repeated that Chungui is ‗the most marginal and poor community‘ 
was only able to produce the place a as ‗suffering theme park.‘  
Another element that transformed the place into an unreal space was that, in 
contrast with Oronqoy‘s meeting, this one did not require the community‘s voices. In a 
way, the state officials were not there to listen to the ‗war victims.‘ Rather, they were 
there to affirm and show how much the central government cares for this population, and 
how it is working to compensate them for all the years of violence and suffering.  
Aliaga continues embodying his role as the state‘s representative emphasizing 
people‘s civil rights to get compensations (Sp. Reparaciones). He recognizes that the 
state did not protect its citizens (this is the replica D), and the compensation program 
expects to compensate for the errors the state had during the internal war. He continues to 
underline the state‘s efforts to help the Chunguinos, 
We are making progress, however, as government, we perfectly know that the progress in 
the collective needs to be strengthened. Starting by responding individually to the victims 
[...] However, there are basic issues that must be implemented as individual 




                                                 
163
 ―De manera que estamos avanzando, sin embargo, como gobierno, sabemos perfectamente que 
ese avance en lo colectivo, tiene que consolidarse, comenzando a atender también individualmente a 
las víctimas […]Sin embargo, hay cuestiones básicas que tienen que empezar a implementarse como 




Aliaga is an optimist. He thinks that ‗we are moving forward‘ (Sp. Estamos avanzado164) 
and he state that the next step will be the individual compensations that will take the form 
of healthcare and education. President Garcia‘s political apparatus is using state resources 
to promote the coverage of basic services like healthcare and education as individual 
compensations. The state and its bureaucracy is ‗confusing‘ basic rights with individual 
compensations. In doing so, the State is using the idea of compensations to provide the 
basic services that have thus far been denied to the rural Quechua all over the country.  
On July 28th, 2010, in his annual address to the country, President Garcia declared 
that the individual compensation program will start in 2011. However, rather than a real 
commitment to deal with the aftermath of the war –a process that would involve an input 
of significant monetary investment–– this is a populist propaganda to silence the 
opposition and the NGOs that are accusing the government of not taking care of the ‗war 
victims.‘ Neither the state nor Peruvian scholars (there are exceptions like Silva 
Santiesteban) treat the problem of the internal war beyond the compensations program 
and the faceless victims. Talking about the internal war in Peru has become an abstract 
phenomenon, whose causes and consequences are not analysed in a grounded way.  
At the time of my fieldwork (2008-2009), the Individual Compensation Program 
was a project that posed different possibilities for the local audience. For some, it was 
about a significant amount of money that the state would provide to each person who was 
defined as ‗victim.‘ For others, it was about the educational opportunities in Colleges and 
Universities. There is no unanimous view of its meaning. Aliaga continues his talk about 
                                                 
164





It's a great sign because the state, they are 3 levels of government, and we are working 
steadily and articulately, and I am sure that from next year, as these massive banners, we 
will also have a large amount of state investment. From the three levels of government to 
better attend you all not only in the collective, but also in private.165 (Jesus Aliaga, 
CMAN) 
 
The program continued and included the words of one of the Municipality deputies (the 
only person from the community, besides the Mayor, who spoke), 
―ñuqa mañakuni a nombre de todo el pueblo de Chungui ñuqaykun kaniko señor Jesús 
Aliga mas afectasqa kanmi wawakuna wawa karqaniku, chay violencia fecha qinaptin 
chaypi kaqkuna traumadukuna, mana makiyuqkuna, invalidukuna entonces chaytaya 
ñuqaykupas mañakuniku reparación individualtawan‖ (Emma, Municipality of Chungui) 
 
[I request on the name of the town of Chungui …We are mister Jesus Aliaga, the most 
deeply affected, there are children, we were children during the the time of violence. 
Thus those who lived it, they have trauma, childhood traumas. There are those who lost 
their hands, they are handicapped people. Because of these things, we appeal for 
compensations on individual basis for each person.] 
Emma is one of the two women elected as deputy for the Municipality in 2007. She feels 
that she represents the community and starts her statement with a replica E emphasizing 
how much this violence has affected children and how this has traumatized the 
population. Because of this, they are disabled and many of them cannot work properly in 
the field. For her, individual monetary compensations could mean overcoming physical 
injuries and traumas. There is a high percentage of Chungui‘s current population that 
lived through all the war years of military abuse, rapes, murders of the Shining Path, etc. 
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 ―Es una gran señal porque el Estado son los 3 niveles de gobierno, y estamos trabajando 
sostenida y articuladamente, y estoy seguro que, a partir del próximo año, como este poste de 
carteles de obra, tendremos también una gran cantidad de inversión del Es tado, desde los tres 






In most of the cases, people‘s experiences of violence have become different types of 
physical and psychological problems. Some people use these traumas to explain why they 
did not continue attending school classes. And in people‘s rationale, if you are not 
educated there is no possibility of progress in life.  
One of the last statements came from an official program that was giving ‗Peru 
little bag‘ (Sp. bolsita peru) with grains, cereals, and milk. This official brought 50 bags 
for an audience of around 150 people. She states 
…So that our President is also present in these communities that need so much. [...] Soon 
will be here all the institutions that work closely with the Presidency of the Republic, for 
what? To bring development, to bring progress, work to this community that so urgently 
needs it.166 (Rosa Pérez, CMAN) 
This official crafts a discourse in which the Peruvian President is present through the 
social programs organized by his government. The most interesting part of her speech is 
the last phrase where she says ‗the state brings progress, work and development to this 
community that so bad need it,‘ emphasizing with this a hierarchical and racialized 
relationship in which this community is ‗backward and lazy‘. 
She is framing, like many other people do, progress and development as an issue 
that needs to be brought from the outside, voiding the possibility of finding `progress and 
development‘ from inside the community. In the way it is framed, progress and 
development is embodied by the urban Criollo/mestizo who works toward progress and 
success. For this official as well as the state in general, the human capital for progress is 
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 ―Es así que nuestro Presidente de la República está presente también en estas comunidades que 
tanto lo necesitamos. […] Pronto estarán todas las instituciones que trabajamos de la mano, con la 
Presidencia de la República, para qué: para llevar desarrollo, para traer desarrollo, progreso, 





not available within the local population: the ‗good‘ and ‗modern‘ things and ideas 
necessarily come from the city. 
Neither this meeting nor the one at Oronqoy had translators, and people‘s 
opinions were not sought at both venues. On the side of the state, it is a performance that 
aimed to show how it is working to compensate affected communities by the internal 
war. On the side of Chungui‘s authorities, it was a performance to show how needy they 
are and how much support they need to develop and overcome the aftermath of wartime 
violence.  
It was an important meeting, not for its content but for the rare presence of the 
state officials in Chungui. This meeting provided face-to-face interaction that had been 
recurrently requested by the population. The audience did not have a clear voice, which 
contrasted the meeting developed in Oronqoy. It was an important meeting for the 
Municipality as it was able to exhibit the pain and the consequences of the war through 
the graphic images carried by women. These women were not voiceless, since they 
expressed their pain and suffering through their drawings, many of which were extremely 
violent. However, in the political dynamic during the meeting the rural Quechua women 
were formally silenced by the local authorities, and were placed in a clearly subordinate 
and racialized position, while the local authorities speak about their suffering during the 
time of war. Theses ‗feelings‘ and experiences of suffering refer to a pre-determined 




audience167 (for an extended discussion about this see Fassin and Rechtman 2009).  
 This was also an important meeting for the state and the audience because the first 80 
official ‗war victims‘ were granted proper governmental documentation. They are the 
first of a long list that expect to get something from the state; something that could help 
them move on with their lives. 
Conclusion: the circulation of discourse 
Original and replicas 
Discourses that characterize subjects in a particular way, emphasizing their social 
and political exclusion, reinforce pre-existing assumptions about the particular group the 
rhetoric is addressing (Cf. Urciuoli 2009). In the case of ‗marginality,‘ the PTRC‘s 
discourse and that of the state officials, reproduce the Peruvian society as a fragmented 
one in which there are two groups: Creoles and the indigenous population.168 Issues about 
race do not need to be uttered in order to exist and influence people‘s behaviour. 
Therefore, in the case of Lerner‘s discourse, for example, Quechuas are marked with 
respect to the urban Criollo/mestizo group, who remains unmarked. The Quechua subject 
is labelled as the victim of the internal conflict, while the rest of the Peruvian society is 
projected as an insensible group which is unable to respond to violence in the Andean 
highlands. 
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 People‘ suffering experiences are real, and I do not intend to dismiss them. However, it is also important 
to recognize that as much as real; they also belong to a pre-determined discourse in which some things are 
allowed to be uttered, while others are silenced. I intend to stress people‘s agency and consciousness of 
what they are presenting and what they are leaving aside.   
168
 I will not discuss the multiple social groups that can be associated with the Creole groups, like 




Labelling rural Quechuas as victims, in the context of the Peruvian internal war, 
reinforces their historical subordination and domination, nurturing the racialized idea of a 
Quechua population as backward, isolated and passive. ‗Marginal,‘ ‗marginalized,‘  
‗ignored,‘ ‗despised,‘ ‗forgotten‘ are categories indexing a racialized hierarchy 
(euphemisms of ‗Indio‘), where those who are labeled with these categories need to be 
protected and rescued. Therefore, a patronizing relationship emerges which is extensively 
used by the Peruvian intelligentsia who argue for the protection of the population in the 
Andes–as if they were minors in need of an adult defence.169 These categories and the 
marginality rhetoric produce an essentialized idea of who victims are, where they live and 
what ‗we‘ need to do about them (Cf. Urciuoli 2009).  
‗Marginality‘ becomes the language of the state; a language that intends to talk 
about social exclusion, but that creates at the same time, rural communities as outside 
entities, sitting at the margins of the state, unable to be reached by the forces of 
modernity. It reinforces the hierarchical relationship existing between the urban and the 
rural, establishing the rural space as distant, isolated and in extreme need. The margins, 
ideologically and rhetorically, in which these communities exist allow a circular rhetoric 
from which –it seems that– the only way to escape is by becoming war victims.  
The current rhetoric of ‗marginality‘ in Peru is created, and recreated, in 
government agencies, NGOs and official institutions within bureaucratic spaces through 
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which people are identified and classified (Cf. Urciuoli 2009: 34).170 In this context, 
everyday life is affected by these categories, shaping how groups related with each other 
and affecting how they conceive themselves within the national scenario (Cf. Urciuoli 
2009: 22). The imaginary of ‗marginal communities‘ implies the thought that something 
is directly experienced, indexing a lack of power which is correlated with a no 
participation in the political arena. This imaginary of a non-active role in the modern life 
of the nation, produces and positions the state in a higher position of the hierarchy, which 
is at the same time, embedded into a continual expression of race and class backwardness 
(Urciuoli 2009: 32).  
Built over the dependency theory discourse, the current discourse of marginality is 
embedded within a political context that calls for the inclusion of the indigenous group, 
but at the end happens to create more fragmentation. The marginality discourse affirmed 
in the PTRC‘s analysis is the original discourse; that will be –several times- replicated by 
different agents. Paralleled to these replications, new ideas are introduced, and former 
ones may be erased, which produce particular power relationships between groups.  
The discourse of ‗marginality‘ analysed in this chapter is recordable, replicable, 
and the meta-discourse understands them to be group expressions, not intimately linked 
to the individual expressers (Urban 1996: 38). In this sense, it is not about the rhetoric of 
a person but the expression of a group in relationship to other. The PTRC and Lerner‘s 
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discourse extensively highlights the relationship between Creoles/Mestizos and Quechuas 
and therefore, reinforcing the domination and power relationship exerted by the former 
on the latter. Within this rhetoric, the national society–those living in urban centres and 
those who have power are signalled as responsible for the high degree of violence and 
victims produced by the 1980s internal war. In addition, the original discourse does not 
address the people‘s direct participation in the war, assuming that they were caught 
between two fires. Contrasting the original, the replicas indicate and repeat the state‘s 
responsibility within the war period, and how it is accountable for forgotten the 
communities in which the violence happened. All the replicas that were expressed by the 
agents of the state stress the importance of a hierarchical relationship–an important 
division between ‗you‘ (the victims) who suffered during the war years; and ‗we‘ (the 
state) that did not care/listen for your suffering, is emphasized. This relationship is 
strengthened each time a state official asserts that the state did not protect their people 
during the war. At the same time, while criticising its attitude toward the rural Quechua, 
these replicas barely account for the army‘s role within the war. Officials try to explain 
the state‘s indifference by explaining its lacks of knowledge of people‘s suffering and the 
marginal conditions of these communities. Although these replicas explicitly refer to the 
state‘s liability during the war, they also excused the state through the rhetoric of 
marginality by rEduardoing from making it formally accountable for its own crimes. 
My analysis places the PTRC as a discourse producer as it was in a visible 
position of power that enables it to create a discourse, which is backed by scholars 




scholarly findings are rarely questioned (O‘Brien 2003). Its discourse is taken as a 
general truth, that later is used by all the replicators the ground/authority to claim for 
attention (Cf.Urban 1996). 
 
Table 5-3 
Original and Replicas 
 
Originator 
PTRC and its 
heirs 
Original A 
Discourse originated by the 
PTRC with the submission of 
the Final Report. Talks about 





Discourse based on Original 
A, and highlights that this is 
the most marginal community. 
Talks about exclusion, but not 
about racialized practices 
Varillas 
 Replica B 
Discourse based on Original 
A, introducing the category of 
marginality and the most 
suffering community affected 







Discourse base on the 
Original A, and replica A, 
but adds the image of the 
state that needs to approach 
the community to see what 




Discourse based original A 
And Replica B, that is adds 
the populist idea that the 
government is changing 





Discourse based on 
Original A, Replica A, and 
Replica B, that explicitly 
refers to the trauma 
suffered and the 
consequently need for help.  





Power and visibility   
The state has set up a discursive floor in which its compensation program is 
conditioned to those who did not participated in any insurrectionary group, something 
that is almost impossible to strictly follow. This official policy becomes a tool through 
which this population looks to craft itself in a particular way so that it can respond to the 
state‘s demands and be attended, through this they become visible. This has generated an 
important shift, going from explaining their support to Shining Path project (Personal 
fieldnotes 2001) to erasing their agency in order to become only ‗war victims.‘ This label 
only indicates the position of receiving actions, silencing any possible agency subjects 
may have deployed. Erasing people‘s active role may include covering for crimes, but 
also involves people‘s role as ronderos, including the organization of their community 
against the abuses performed by the army and the Shining Path.  
The National Compensation program forces people to fit into a victim rhetoric 
that merges with a pre-existing ‗marginal community‘ discourse and crafting a strategy 
through which Chunguinos expect to be attended by the state. For communities 
embedded in the ‗marginality discourse,‘ geographically isolated and imaginarily more 
distant of what they really are, this seems to be their way to become visible for the 
neoliberal state, the Peruvian society and transnational NGOs. 
Within this hierarchical relationship which has informed everyday practice, 
patronage attitude from state officials is deployed explicitly. For example, Varillas 
instructed his audience in the means to get the state‘s attention. He suggests people to 




people how to get the state‘s interest. Nobody challenges Varillas‘ suggestion or the 
hierarchy he deploys, which reinforces the structural domination of the ‗white‘ urban 
official over the rural Quechua crowd.  
Today, there is an institutional procedure to achieve the status of ‗war victim.‘ 
Through it people define themselves formally in front of the state by using its rhetoric as 
‗war victims,‘ which produces them as tangible subjects within the state logic. In this 
context, what people believe about their role during the war is not important; their goal is 
to transform their community into a tangible reality for the state. While the community 
looks to become visible, the state expects to become visible to its rural communities 
throughout the National Compensation program. The government wants to silence its 
detractors by showing how much it is working in ‗marginal communities‘ like Chungui.  
Like people‘s suffering in this community, one that becomes graphic through 
posters and drawings, the state also needs to show how much it is doing. It needs to show 
off how much it cares for and protects its citizens. But although it officially protects its 
citizens, the cultural citizenship that is ratified in daily practises, is racialized, treating the 
Chunguinos as primitive and needy. 
Overall, ‗war victims‘ in the Peruvian scenario are racialized visible subjects that 
the state is asked to attend.171 Within this relationship, as showed though the quotes 
analysed previously, the state becomes a ‗white‘ unmarked subject that rules over the 
marked subordinate Quechua community. In every speech, it seems to be necessary to 
‗remember‘ the audience that they have been ‗forgotten and marginalized‘ by the state, 
                                                 
171













The Superiority of Peruvian Intellectuals: the ‘Indian Problem’ 
 
 
The War of the Pacific  (Es. La Guerra del Pacífico) caused by border problems 
among Bolivia, Peru, and Chile, started in 1879 and finished with the defeat of Peru in 
1883, with Lima occupied and a substantial loss of territory. The consequences of this 
war, beyond the destruction of Lima, triggered important debates among intellectuals 
who questioned and discussed the fragmentation of Peruvian society, which was seen as 
one of the major causes of the defeat by Chile. Among these problems, Peruvian 
intellectuals argued that indigenous groups, mainly in the rural Andes, did not support the 
Peruvian side during this war, giving help instead to the Chileans, because they did not 
recognize themselves as ‗Peruvians.‘ The founding of the Republic in 1821 had not 
provoked major changes in the social structure, which continued to divide the Peruvian 
society in two major groups: Indios and Criollos. Influenced by 19th century racist 
ideologies and the evolutionary theory, the Peruvian elite considered the indigenous 
population to be the disgrace of the nation (A. Deustua quoted by Flores Galindo 1988).  




and writer, was one of the first to consider that one of critical problems of Peru was the 
indigenous population. He stated, our form of government is reduced to a big lie, because 
it does not deserve to be called Democratic Republic a state in which two or three 
millions live outside the law. The coastal area could be the copy of a republic, but, in the 
interior part of the country there was a sense that every right could be violated by what 
was effectively a feudal regime. In this last region, there were no codes, nor courts, 
because the hacendados and gamonales resolved every issue in advance with the judges 
and executioners. The political authorities, far from supporting the weak and the poor, 
always helped the rich and the strong. There were regions in which the justices of the 
peace and local governors were themselves servants of the haciendas172(González Prada 
1946). 
Although González Prada and others continue to discuss publicly these problems 
emphasize the need to integrate and educate the indigenous population so they could 
become part of the modern Peruvian state. The discussions about the rural Quechuas were 
labeled as el problema del Indio (En. ‗Indian Problem‘), and this has become the main 
topic of discussion during the 20th century. The topic has been approached from diverse 
angles and approaches, ranging from insurgent missions (ELN and MIR) to development 
projects financed by World Bank and IMF. Even though these approaches are completely 
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democrática un estado en que dos o tres millones de individuos viven fuera de la ley. Si en la costa se 
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different, the diagnosis of the core problem has not changed since the 1920s.  
This chapter reviews the most important theoretical approaches that have set the 
foundation of Peruvian social sciences. Although theories change over the time, two 
topics have remained constant in Peruvian academia: the Problema del Indio or ‗the 
Indian Problem‘ and the need to modernize indigenous communities173 so they could be 
integrated into the modern state. This section explains how these two topics have been 
discussed over different periods, and how rather than shed light on the need of their fully 
participation in political spheres, these theories have served to conceal the condescension 
of the Peruvian intelligentsia. The final result is the production of theories that justify the 
domination and power exerted by Peruvian intelligentsia over Andean groups.  
This chapter is divided in four sections. The first discusses Indigenismo and the 
intellectual project to revive the Andean culture as the ‗real‘ Peruvian culture. The second 
part discusses the modernization theory as a project to incorporate the excluded ‗Indians‘ 
into the structures of the Peruvian state, as if the problem was the backwardness and pre-
modern status of the rural population. The third part discusses dependency theory as an 
original Latin America approach that challenged the modernization theory. And the last 
part focuses on the program of development and the NGOs.  
1. Indigenismo in Peru 
Indigenismo is originally defined in the International Encyclopedia of the Social 
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& Behavioral Sciences as the revalorization of Mexico's indigenous culture (Knight 
2001). In the Peruvian case the revalorization of the rural Quechuas was developed by 
scholars without the direct participation of the indigenous group. In the 1900s, Cusco‘s 
intellectual elite understood that the ‗Indian Problem‘ was mainly the lack of integration 
of the indigenous Quechuas into the modern state; therefore their efforts were oriented to 
assimilate this group into the mainstream of the Peruvian society.  
1.1 Cusqueño intellectuals: feeling like an Indio without being an Indio 
During the 20th century Cusco became an important intellectual center of 
discussion of the ‗Indian Problem,‘ which contrasted the discussion that took place in 
Lima. Cusqueño Indigenismo emerged as a social and intellectual movement that 
expected to consolidate a Peruvian nation revalorizing the Pre-Hispanic tradition, which 
was understood to be the real core of the national culture. The major exponents of 
Indigenismo were serranos174 intellectuals who considered that Peru needed to produce a 
unified and renewed culture-race, without the components of the Hispanic colonialism. 
Through this idea Indigenistas proposed a new foundation that would construct what they 
see was the ‗real‘ Peruvian nation (de la Cadena 1998: 91). 
At the end of the 19th and early 20th century, Cusco was being displaced as 
political and economic center, which provoke several discussion among the local elite. 
The regional control that Cusco had profited from in the past, was being giving to Lima 
(the central government) that expected to concentrate most of the political functions and 
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economic benefits. This political change reduced the regional elite‘s power and 
subordinated the entire region to coast. In addition, the development of the railway was 
considered by some groups as completing control from Lima and the submission to the 
foreign capital (Cadena 2000: 45).  
The early development of Peruvian Indigenismo was produced by Generation of 
1909, whose most important representative was Luis Valcárcel. When Valcárcel joined 
the group he was still a young student, but years later would become the Secretary of 
Education and the Director of the Peruvian Indigenista institute. As college students, the 
1909 generation criticized the backwardness of Cusco region, the lack of interest of the 
central government and the exploitation of the indigenous population. The group‘s ideas 
and critiques were meant to eliminate the most violent aspects of the mercantile 
expansion, sponsoring a regional transformation. The 1909 Generation group assumed 
that its role was to constitute an enlightened elite that would ‗wake up‘ the Indios, and 
this was expected to transform Peru into a nation loyal to its historical roots, that was 
proud not only of its Hispanic origins (Renique 1991). 
In Peru, racial categories are relational and shift according the context in which 
they are produced. Cusqueños intellectuals approached the rural Quechuas through the 
traditional racial practices that considered the latter as inferior beings, ignorant and 
savage. The racial idea that the intellectuals had about rural Quechuas allowed the Cusco 
intellectual elites to define themselves as either mestizos or ‗Indians‘, depending on the 
circumstances of their interactions. However, this did not deny that the dominant 




‗Indians‘ were understood as illiterate agriculturalists living in the highlands in traditional 
organizations (Cadena 2000: 87).  
Indigenistas considered that the ‗Indian Problem‘ was the ignorance, the poverty, 
and the marginality of the rural Quechua, who were an obstacle to achieve the regional 
progress (Cf. Renique 1991: 57). The debates developed in Cusco intellectual circles 
were parallel to, and influenced by the topics discussed by González Prada and the Pro-
Indigenous Association175 from Lima (for historical details see Kapsoli 1980). 
Contrasting the debates from Lima‘s intellectual circles, the Cusqueño intellectuals 
claimed that they had the first-hand knowledge of the condition of the indigenous 
population. For these Cusqueño elites, the liberation of the ‗Indian‘ was the means by 
which the region would overcome its problems (Renique 1991). 
Along with internal changes occurring in Cusco, the international political context 
(especially that of the Mexican revolution) also nurtured discussions in the national press 
and intellectual circles. These organizations stimulated what already existed as a moral 
imperative: the intellectuals‘ responsibility in the social transformation that would 
include the abolition of the inequalities and the improvement of the popular classes. 
Education became the objective, since it was considered to be the mean by which the 
consciousness of the masses would arise. The sierra‘s intellectuals imagined themselves 
and assumed the role of being be the guiding force, which was provided by their moral 
superiority and intelligence, of the indigenous mass. 
 During President Leguía‘s government in the 1920s, a commission was appointed 
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to address the indigenous problem, whose government receiving around 7,000 complaints 
related to land disputes in Cusco and Puno. These complaints, along with the fall of wool 
prices, triggered and expanded protests in the form of important mobilizations that 
combined peaceful demonstrations with violence. Daily resistance practices emerged 
gaining persistence, and were encouraged by a President that affirmed ‗Indians‘ rights 
(Renique 1991: 68). The political environment seemed to have changed, and this was not 
dismissed by those who struggled with the landlord‘s class.  
Some of these mobilizations ended in violent outbreaks that caused the dead of 
some hacendados. There were revolts in the countryside around Cusco that caused fear 
and panic of the ruling class, who imagined that these were the preceding actions of a 
bigger and furious ‗Indian‘ insurrection. These conflicts impacted directly the Peruvian 
state, which for the first time as a Republic adopted an Indigenista policy. In 1922 the 
Race Patronage was created with the participation of the Cusqueño Indigenistas. Its 
mission was to exercise ‗tutoring and protection‘ to the ‗Indian‘ population (Renique 
1991: 72), which was closely related with the idea that ignorance and marginality laid at 
the root of the countryside‘s problems. The patronage first action was a public assembly 
in which the indigenous group was allowed to expose its complaints against hacendado 
and local authorities. For the first time this intellectual group filled positions as state 
officials, which established a fluent relationship between the academia and the state (for 
an extended discussion on the role of intellectuals in the state see Renique 1991). 
In the provincias altas (En. the high provinces) of Cusco the rural conflicts 




indigenous mobilizations, who used different means to defend their claims. In Tocroyoc, 
from 1912 the indigenous population was claiming the recognition of a plaza de abastos 
(En. market) where they have sold their wool and buying products for 30 years. Because 
the indigenous group could not prove that they have the appropriate license, their market 
was forbidden to function. In 1920 Domingo Huarcaya, the indigenous leader from 
Tocroyoc, presented a legal claim in Cusco, demanding the creation of a town and market 
in Tocroyoc, and its recognition as district capital. This was an important achievement 
because this new market could concentrate wool production from the region, avoiding the 
middlemen, gamonales and local authorities who used to charge commissions for the 
transactions (Renique 1991: 73-4). 
 Through indigenous leaders, like Domingo Huarcaya, the indigenous group 
responded to the new opportunities given by Leguía‘s government. The Criollo/mestizo 
view of an isolated and backward group that lethargically accepted conditions of 
exploitation was questioned directly by these indigenous actors, as many of them showed 
their capacity to organize their communities, claim their rights, and to decide on their 
own about their futures. This would have meant the emergence of a group to bring the 
social changes that indigenous and intellectuals were looking to produce. However 
Cusco‘s intellectuality did not see these important changes, and continued to see 
indigenous groups and their leaders as inferior subjects in need of their guidance and 
protection of their educated brothers, Cusqueño intellectuals.  
In general, the rebellions against gamonales or strong men (see chapter 3) were 




diminished the active role performed indigenous groups performed within these 
struggles.176 These accusations provoked the incarceration of the indigenous leaders, and 
although in court Indigenistas defended them, they were considered minors. Indigenistas 
brandished an image of ‗Indians‘ as ‗irrational and primitive beings‘ instigated either by 
mestizos or manipulated by fake ‗Indians.‘ Indigenistas intellectuals spoke for indigenous 
leaders in 1920, and in doing so they expressed their own political agenda silencing the 
indigenous voices and project (Cf. Cadena 2000: 125). This attitude consolidated the 
racial superiority, legitimating the domination of the intellectual group over the 
indigenous group. This academic elite‘s feeling of superiority was based on the education 
they achieved and the rational superiority  they assumed they had over the irrational 
indigenous groups. For most intellectuals, in this period and later, the rural Quechuas 
were unable to create leadership, because they were emotionally attached to the ancient 
order (de la Cadena 1998: 105)177. 
Indigenistas had a romanticized view that considered that indigenous rebellion 
would enlighten the (real) Andean culture around the Andes again. However, this view 
did not look to establish a horizontal relationship with the indigenous group. Instead, the 
racial ideology through which Indigenistas understood the native population established 
the need for rational and educated leaders. Cusqueño intellectuals became the ‗only 
possible elite‘ that imagined itself aligned with the ‗Indians,‘ because they not only 
identified with them, but had rational a ideology (Renique 1991: 90). These intellectuals 
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not only felt the need to speak for the indigenous group to change their life conditions, 
but also imposed their political agenda, claiming with it the superiori status given by their 
formal education. They were the good big brothers, bearers of the knowledge that would 
guide the ‗primitive and irrational‘ mass, because they were the educated regional elite 
that felt like ‗Indian.‘ 
 The Cusqueño intellectual group assumed that understanding the reality of the 
Andean population needed a highly emotional commitment that only they could provide, 
since they were closer to the group. This would allow them to debunk ideas like 
backwardness, pain, abandonment and melancholy, that were imagined to have a virtuous 
meaning that only other non-Indian Serranos could understand (Renique 1991). Through 
positioning themselves as Indigenistas, the intellectuals affirmed a Cusqueño identity and 
emphasized their Andean roots that contrasted to the Limeños‘ plan to build a mestizo 
state that ‗improved‘ the ‗Indian‘ race through mixing with the ‗superior‘ European 
blood. 
Although agrarian transformation was among the group‘s tasks, they favored legal 
reform. This was needed before the ‗Indian‘ harassed by hunger and fueled by hate, 
transforms himself into a bloody warrior taking the task into his own hands178 (Kosko 
1924; Renique 1991). At the moment, the Cusco‘s intellectuals need to include 
Indigenous intellectuals, but it was too late. The indigenous rebellions were over, and 
most of its leaders were in jail or were executed. This situation prevented alliances 
between intellectuals and indigenous leaders, becoming only a regional intellectual 
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project that challenged the centralist integration imposed by Lima. Indigenistas‘ struggle 
became in practice mainly a quest to be incorporated into the formal structure of the 
central state as regional managers (Renique 1991: 110). This was more a regional power 
struggle than a regional project concerned with the wellbeing of the rural Quechuas. 
In 1926, the alliance between the intellectual elite and the Indigenous group was 
reinitiated in the Resurgimiento group. The group expected to morally protect the 
‗Indians,‘ who considered its younger siblings179 (Renique 1991: 110-1). Although it only 
lived a few months, the group stayed within the national debate as the symbol of a 
(fictitious) encounter between intellectuals and the indigenous group.  
Jose Carlos Mariategui was an important Peruvian intellectual, founder of the 
Peruvian Socialist Party, and the author of the Siete Ensayos sobre la realidad peruana ( 
En. Seven essays of the Peruvian reality) first published in 1928. He also founded the 
magazine Amauta which gathered an important intellectual generation, including Cusco‘s 
Indigenistas. Mariátegui and Luis Valcárcel had a close relationship through Amauta, 
especially because Valcárcel became the central source the indigenous knowledge that 
Mariátegui would receive about the indigenous situation in Cusco (Renique 1991: 111). 
 Mariátegui took the notion of the ‗New Indian‘ from Valcárcel‘s Indigenismo—the ‗New 
Indian‘ as the carrier of a revolutionary hope--but for him the cultural domain was not as 
fruitful as it was for Valcárcel. For Mariátegui, the ‗Indian Problem‘ was social and 
economic, and socialism had the power to transform the ‗Indians‘ into revolutionary 
elements (de la Cadena 1998: 103). By 1929, Valcárcel affirmed that the ‗Indian 
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Problem‘ had to be solved through the elimination of the feudal system by revolutionary 
actions in which the ‗Indians‘, and not their tutors, needed to take the initiative (Renique 
1991: 117). Although this was an important and significant change, it was not followed 
by the next generation, who instead concentrated on forming a class-baased party.  
For Valcárcel‘s generation the debate about the ‗Indian Problem‘ ended in 1922 
with the acceptance of the state intervention asthe new axis to tutoring the ‗Indians‘ as 
minor subjects in need of guidance. Cusco‘s intellectuals assumed that this reform would 
guarantee the gradual inclusion of the indigenous population into the ‗western 
civilization.‘ From there on their Indigenismo was not about recognizing their struggle to 
free the ‗Indian,‘ rather, it was about their demands to be included within the state, and 
their recognition as a regional political class (Renique 1991: 117). 
During the 1930s and 1940s a long period of political repression went along with 
the consolidation of strength within the central state. While in Lima Hispanic tendencies 
were being developed, in Cusco Indigenismo would continue to be the main view of 
Cusco‘s intellectual circles. Through magazines Indigenismo would achieve an 
ideological consensus that would be transmitted through the press, the university and 
scholar education, as well as the radio (Renique 1991: 130). The most important 
contribution of Indigenismo is that it put in practice various policies oriented to regulate 
Andean indigenous life in the successive years. Luis Valcárcel, and others, moved to 
Lima when they were appointed to important government positions (Renique 1991: 132). 
Indigenismo became the ideology of a regional intellectual elite that influenced 




continued to discuss the ‗Indian Problem‘ throughout the 20th century. 
1.2 The cultural construction of race 
Indigenistas were the first group concerned with the conditions of the indigenous 
population. However, they approached it as the nation‘s problem rather than viewing it as 
the consequences of the colonial legacy that divided Peru into two separated groups: 
‗Indians‘ and Creoles. Indigenistas did not consider themselves as mestizos or creoles; 
neither did they consider themselves to be ‗Indians.‘  
The Indigenista project was not an indigenous project. It was the regional 
intellectual elite that, from a middle-class, privileged position, considered itself sensitized 
by the exploitation and the injustice of the Quechuas in the rural Andes. This group 
established an important hierarchical distance between them and the natives. Within their 
project, they became the decent elder brothers, intellectually prepared to lead the 
indigenous group, an attitude that did not differ from the gamonales‘ paternalism that saw 
and treated the Quechuas as minors (see Chapter 3).  
Since the 19th century, people in Lima looked to project the image of a mestizo 
and progressive city that implicitly considered the need to eradicate the ‗Indian‘ race. The 
indigenous population was considered to be a ‗pure race‘ group naturally located in the 
Andes, that has ‗retrograde and pagan‘ features (Belaunde 1962, cited by Cadena 2000: 
64). Indigenista intellectuals used degeneration theories that assigned races to 
geographical environments and held that there was a racial declination when they 
abandoned the proper places. Therefore, they could stress over moral condition, rather 




Lima‘s intellectual elite. The Cusqueño elite was different from the indigenous mass 
because they were decentes (decent people), which directly referred to ‗an innate higher 
morality‘ (Cadena 2000: 47), that could also be achieved through education. Decency 
was a race and class discourse that stressed the higher morality of the Cusco's regional 
elite had over the indigenous group, whose racial impurity and degeneration was the 
consequence of the centuries of lack of education (Cadena 2000: 48). At the same time 
Indigenistas rejected pre-defined biological differences, accepting as a racial hierarchy 
the intellectual and moral differences presented among subjects (de la Cadena 1998: 90). 
Both, Lima‘s and Cusco‘s intellectuals considered indigenous people as inferior. On one 
side Limeños considered that people from the Andes were racially inferior; on the other 
side, Cusqueños considered this group to have inferior intellectual and moral capacity. 
Therefore, indigenous Quechuas were different to the Cusco‘s intellectuality not because 
of their racial phenotype, but because intellectuals were educated and therefore morally 
superior to them. The impact of the Cusqueño intellectuality silenced issues about racial 
phenotypes, and provoked a racial definition that privileged innate Western rationality 
(intelligence) and high morality, that were acquired though formal education. These 
became the two features defining race as category (Cf. de la Cadena 1998: 90).  
Although race was silenced as category in the 1930s, hierarchical and 
exclusionary racial practices entered into social relationships and regulated interactions 
among people, even intellectuals on the transformation of pure racism into classism and 
elitism. When rhetorically ‗culture‘ and ‗class‘ replaced race, intellectuals also promoted 




supported by a superior intelligence and academic education. These ideas were 
considered racial attributes between 1910 and 1930, and later became naturalized features 
of culture and class (de la Cadena 1998: 87).  
Although Indigenismo was perceived as a decolonizing project by its promoters, 
Cusqueño intellectuals used it to define themselves in racial terms against the people they 
wanted to control, the native population. And because race highlighted intelligence as the 
defining feature, Indigenismo represented the academic doctrine that made them equal to 
the Limeños (de la Cadena 1998: 92). The province‘s intellectuals did not consider 
themselves as mestizos or ‗Indians,‘ although they shared phenotype characteristics with 
both groups. Race was the outcome of an individual‘s relative social position, indicated 
the person occupation and income, but modeled by his or her geographical origins. 
‗Indians‘ were associated with the Andean highlands, while the mestizos were placed in 
the lower valleys. The greater the attitude, the less social status and the more ‗Indian‘ a 
person became. However, since education was acquired, ‗Indians‘ could change their 
social position by education becoming decent and therefore less ‗Indians‘ (see de la 
Cadena 2000). 
Both conservative and progressive groups were preoccupied with race. While the 
conservative group proposed that the way to include the ‗Indian‘ was through the ideal of 
social mestizaje that would allow their education. The progressives proposed that the 
regeneration of the ‗Indian race‘ required them to stay in their ‗proper place‘ (rural 
Andes). In addition, the progressives considered that the ‗Indian Problem‘ was a problem 




hacendados. However, this analysis also contained the implicit and essentialized 
definition of the ‗Indios‘ as an agrarian class. During this period leftist intellectuals did 
not openly proclaim the inferiority of the indigenous group, as through their political 
agendas they subordinated racial and cultural differences to the class struggle (de la 
Cadena 1998: 105). Nevertheless only the conservative group was recognized as racist, 
while the pro-Indian position that privileged culture and racial purity was not (de la 
Cadena 1998: 97).  
The 1920s essentialist definition of ‗Indian‘ has survived until the 21th century, 
under another essentialist notion: ―peasant culture.‖ This concept, as the one in 1920s, is 
constituted by the idea that indigenous groups are only an agrarian class, removes the 
possibility that they could be educated, rational and political subjects. As de la Cadena 
extensively explains, this formulation does not treat peasants as capable of fighting 
abuses and exploitation through silence and withdrawal. Rather, it is about an 
intelligentsia that has chosen to ignore what an Indigenous Other has to say through 
written and spoken means (Cadena 2000: 125). Peruvian intellectuals have consistently 
preferred to speak for than to listen and talk with Andean subjects, and this has deeply 
limited the development of the Andean Anthropology in the last half century.  
2. Modernization theory 
The United States emerged as the global power at the end of WWII, and not only 
focused on the construction of an open world economy, but also spurred the growth of 
social sciences discourses about the Third World. In the following decades U.S. social 





In the scope of this influence, the Cornell-Peru project developed in Vicos-Peru 
(which will be discussed in the next section) has become the ‗paradigm for international 
development in the Third World‘ since 1952 (Ross 2008: 108). The United States‘ 
interest in non-Western economies was twofold. First, the U.S. sponsored projects around 
the globe that focused on peasants and ‗poor populations,‘ including indigenous groups, 
with the aim of changing their behavior by implementing the modernization theory. 
Second, by introducing economic changes that economically assimilated indigenous 
groups into the capitalist system, the U.S. assumed that these would reduce the risk of 
revolts and insurrections led by indigenous communities around the globe.  
Within the Cold War context, U.S. anthropology and social sciences played an 
important role within post-war development policy by contributing to the myth that 
peasants were too conservative in their cultural values to be autonomous agents of 
change. Guided by this, anthropologists elaborated an argument that characterized 
peasants as more constrained by ‗tradition‘ than by agrarian structures, building the idea 
that indigenous peasants ‗could not improve their living conditions at their own initiative‘ 
(Ross 2008: 109). In the following years, this statement profoundly impacted both 
Peruvian academia and the political arena, and established a particular way to understand 
the Andes and its inhabitants. The idea of a group constrained by tradition complemented 
intellectual project of Indigenismo, and gave Peruvian intellectuals an excuse to assume 
the role of promoters of change in the social structure. But beyond Indigenismo, 




superiority, and this has become part of the foundation of Andeanist studies.  
During these years, the U.S. ‗civilizing‘ mission employed Western history 
(Europe and the U.S.) to measure Latin America‘s history, concluding that the way to 
develop and to modernize the region was through the achievement of a democratic 
industrialism. These were carefully crafted in a discourse that combined avowed U.S. 
values and goals with Latin American‘s imagined aspirations. Inglehart succinctly 
defines modernization theory as economic development, cultural change, and political 
change that go together in coherent, and to some extent, predictable patterns toward the 
industrialization of the society (Inglehart 2001). 
After WWII, modernization theory was the most influential trend in area studies. 
The classic modernization theory reached its peak in popularity in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. It was widely assumed by the U.S. government and area-studies circles that 
poverty in under-developed nations facilitated the spread of communism. In addition, it 
was believed that modernization conceived and understood in Western terms would end 
poverty and reduce the possibility of communist outbreaks around the world. In this 
frame of thought, it was also assumed that the North American and Western European 
model of development and modernization was the ideal that Third-World countries 
should aspire to attain. Guidance through the modernization process was planned to be 
developed from economic and political knowledge from the Western countries, mainly 
the U.S. and Europe, using the leading work of historians, political scientists, and other 
policy-makers during this period (Berger 1995: 75).  




knowledge and superiority over the rest of the world. In this sense, modernization theory 
implicitly valued only one political and economic model:  
―Although it was more systematic, modernization theory still reflected continui ty with the 
British Empire‘s ‗white man‘s burden,‘ the French mission civilisatrice, and the racist 
paternalism of the pre- 1945 U.S. imperial state in the Caribbean, Asia and the 
Pacific‖(Berger 1995: 75) 
First, it was assumed to be a period of tutelage, after which the tutored nation would 
emerge as ‗civilized‘ and independent, that would allow it to enter into the capitalist 
system. The proposal focused on the need for cultural transformation in order to achieve 
modernity, building this premise on the idea that there were more and less developed 
nations. Traditional and indigenous cultures were seen as the problem of these emerging 
nation-states (similar to the ‗Indian Problem‘), thus, cultural transformation was the first 
priority in order to ‗be modern.‘  
 Modernization theory saw the world divided between modern and underdeveloped 
states, intensifying with it oppositions like ‗urban vs. rural,‘ ‗modern vs. traditional,‘ and 
‗West vs. East.‘ It was also assumed that changes in one area of society produced 
consequent changes throughout the society. It emphasized that modernization was a 
process of diffusion that would spread throughout the society, affecting economics, styles 
of government, social structure, values, religion and family structure (Berger 1995: 75).  
 Modernization theory would dominate the way U.S. and Peruvian scholars, 
politicians and intellectuals understood rural Andeans. As with Indigenismo, the 
indigenous population was conceived to be the country‘s problem; the only possible 
solution was to modernize them. The challenge was not only to change the way 




progress (changing their mentality). Education would not only become the way 
throughout which the ‗Indian Problem‘ would be imagined to be solved, but also the 
means by which the Quechuas would become modern subjects, leaving behind their 
traditional way of life and (magical) beliefs, which made them pre-modern and backward. 
In other words, to achieve modernity the rural Quechuas needed to become educated 
subjects, which implicitly involved ‗de-indianizing‘ them through the acquisition of the 
Westernized education (for an extensive discussion see de la Cadena 2000).  
2.1  The Vicos Project  
The Vicos Peru-Cornell Project started in 1951 as a scholarly and governmental 
collaboration between Cornell University and the Peruvian Indigenous Institute. This 
project was part of the Cornell University Program on Culture and Applied Social 
Sciences implemented in four other regions around the world. The leader of the project 
was Allan Holmberg, who was the first chair of the department of anthropology at 
Cornell, and who leased the hacienda of Vicos for five years. Faculty and students 
remained involved in the site until 1966180. The goal of the project was to bring the 
indigenous population of Vicos into the 20th century and integrate them into the market 
economy and Peruvian society (Cornell 2005-2008). 
Until 1951 the hacienda of Vicos was the property of the Beneficence Society of 
Huaraz located in the central Andes, a traditional hacienda in which 2,500 indigenous 
(380 Quechua families) lived and worked on the hacienda‘s land to pay for the individual 
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plots on which they produced. They used to work three days per week without payment, 
and workers were forced to supply domestic animals for agricultural work. Additionally, 
the hacienda owner compelled each family to provide free services, such as domestic 
service.  
Holmberg believed that one of the problems of the hacienda system was that it 
concentrated the power and control in the hands of patrons or mestizos who did not live 
in the hacienda, causing the depressed socio-economic state of Vicosinos, 
 ―These have produced in the ‗Indians‘, attitudes of distrust, suspicion, fear, and even hate 
of the outside world. Such are in fact, the prevailing attitudes at Vicos at the time our work 
began‖(1971a: 25)  
This relationship (was assumed by Holberg) that created feelings that made ‗Indians‘ 
mistrust modernity. The Peru-Cornell project worked under the premise of modernization 
theory, and its assumptions and expectations can be summarized in four points. First, it 
was assumed that Peru would not achieve unity and modernization unless it started to 
care for the ‗Indian‘ population. This group constituted at the time 50% of the national 
population, and it was considered to be outside the national culture. Second, it was 
assumed that if the hacienda‘s workers were offered the opportunity to broaden their 
relationships with the outside world, they would adjust to modern conditions and take a 
productive place in Peruvian national life. Third, it was expected that the ‗Indians‘ 
themselves through a new organization (imposed by the project) would take the control 
of the hacienda after the end of the project (Holmberg 1971a: 22).  
From the reports produced by Cornell team, the nature of the relationship between 




voices were not important elements in the research.181 Nevertheless, this did not prevent 
the U.S. team of having their own impressions and views of the studied group: 
―In the context of a modern state, this peasantry plays little or no role in the decision-
making process; its members enjoy little access to wealth; they live under conditions of 
social disrespect; a large majority of them are illiterate, unenlightened, and lacking 
modern skills.‖(Holmberg 1971b: 33) 
Cornell‘s team assumed that peasants by themselves were not able to change their life 
conditions. Moreover, it was recognized that their lack of economic power kept them 
isolated from ‗modern life.‘ Therefore, one of the urgent tasks of the project was to 
increase agricultural productivity. The project leader explained that haciendas were not 
productive because the owner and renter did not invest in the property, and the workers 
made no improvements on their lands due to the lack of tenure security in (Holmberg 
1971b: 46). However, Holmberg did not explain that in the Andes people do not invest in 
the land also because of the uncertainty of the crop due to climate and altitude risk. 
Rather than investing in the land, people invested in cattle (see Mayer and de la Cadena 
1989).  
The project introduced new ‗modern methods‘ like good seeds, fertilizers, and 
pesticides that promised to increase the local productivity; and the returns stayed in the 
community. The money was also used in order to construct health and education 
facilities, and to develop other skills among the workers.  
Part of the program also sought to increase people‘s power, gradually working 
with younger men who were seen ‗more committed to the goals of modernization‘ 
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(Holmberg 1971b: 46-7). In addition, the project directors developed leadership qualities 
among the mayordomos encouraging their participation in meetings that concerned 
hacienda management. The traditional serfs, instead of receiving orders to do the work, 
were gathered in forums in which they received recommendation for projects and in 
which people were encouraged to offer their points of views.  
The Peru-Cornell project was expected to have an impact on all aspects of 
Vicosinos‘ lives although none of project leaders spoke Quechua. Holmberg expected to 
craft Vicosinos as North-American farmers, ‗forgetting‘ that the Andean highlands are 
not the Midwestern plains (for a extended discussionStein 1986-1987; Stein 2000). About 
relationships of power and hierarchies, Holmberg stated 
―From the very beginning, for example, an equality greeting was introduced in all 
dealings with the Vicosinos; they were invited to sit down at the tables with us; no 
segregation was allowed at public affairs.‖(1971b: 55)  
Although there are no descriptions about the relationship between Cornell‘s personnel 
and Vicosinos in the reports, it is not difficult to imagine that a respectful relationship 
between the team and the workers did not erase the hierarchies of power and moral 
superiority that these researchers embodied. Nor are there references about how 
Peruvians, with their internalized racial ideology, related to the Vicosinos. A quote from 
a former mayordomo (Mr. Luna) may represent how locals saw Vicos workers, 
«In fact, the project achieved many things in Vicos». Thanks to the project, people can 
now see that Vicosinos are capable and hardworking people [...] «Look at these 
Vicosinos, they dress exactly the way they did in Vicos twenty years ago s [before starting 
the project] ». But the ‗Indians‘, continued Luna, are a great asset if they are properly 




show him affection»...182 (Himes 1981: 92-3) 
Modernization theory had an embedded racial ideology that considered central the need 
to teach inferior indigenous people about the modern life. The mayordomo‘s quote 
compares people in Vicos with a mules, implying that they are animals, that if are 
properly trained could become a good asset (Sp. buen elemento). The comparison 
between indigenous people and animals is a very common racist practice among Spanish 
speaking people, who aims to express their innate racial and intellectual superiority. 
Although, these ideas are not often expressed directly in interactions, it is common to find 
these racialized practices when Criollo/mestizos discuss or complain about rural Quechua 
behaviour and beliefs. Following this, Huayhua (2010) suggests that state officials and 
teachers refer to indigenous people as if they were not people (Sp. gente), implying with 
this that they are animals who do not care if they travel ‗squashed and touching each 
other‘ (Sp. apretados y tocándose) (for broader discussion see Huayhua 2010: 88-115). In 
this sense, the racial practices has been integrated and naturalized in everyday urban-
rural, Spanish-Quechua relationships and legitimized in this case by the modernization 
theory. 
When the Vicos‘ lease expired in 1957, the Cornell group recommended that the 
Peruvian government give the hacienda to the indigenous workers. The government 
accepted the proposal, and in 1962 the hacienda became the property of the community 
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of Vicos. It was transformed into an agricultural cooperative, maintaining the former 
hacienda land as communal property. 
For the Cornell group, and other scholars, the major lesson of Vicos was that  
―The Sierra, containing major concentration of indigenous populations, many of whom 
live under a medieval type of agricultural organization such as existed at Vicos is lagging 
far behind. …The major lesson[From Vicos] it is that its serfs and suppressed population 
once freed and given encouragement, technical assistance, become productive citizens of 
the nation‖ (Holmberg 1971b: 61) 
In 1962, the Vicosinos had control of their life conditions, and were the owners of the 
land. During these times, they were transformed into modern and ‗productive‘ citizens, 
and for the Peru-Cornell project they had become a successful community. In the 
project‘s imaginary, the modern life Vicosinos had acquired allowed them to become 
Peruvian citizens. Through this, the Vicos project legitimized the idea of the inferior 
nature of the indigenous group, and legitimized the role of scholars and intellectuals in 
changing their traditional pre-modern forms of life. Finally, what originally was viewed 
as a project to ‗help‘ Vicosinos, ultimately served the purposes of the non-indigenous 
population, especially the Cornell University and Peruvian personnel involved in the 
project. 
2.2 Hierarchies and racial ideology in the Vicos Project 
  The Peru-Cornell project operated with the premise that transforming the 
hacienda of Vicos into a North-American Midwestern farm was the desired model that 
Vicosinos wanted to follow. However, the project did not have any interest in developing 
agro-commerce or small production, which may have given the Vicosinos extra-value to 




naturally occur by altering some aspects of Vicosinos‘ life, including the introduction of 
technical development. All these changes would be done without changing the social and 
regional structure in which the community was inserted (Stein 1986-1987). The project 
wrongly considered Vicos was isolated island. 
Within their discourse, North-American and Peruvian researchers –Allan 
R.Holmberg and Mario Vasquez (a Peruvian student who spoke Quechua)– considered 
themselves ―modernizers.‖ They were not only intervening in what they considered 
‗underdeveloped‘ areas, but also considered the inhabitants to be ‗underdeveloped‘ or 
pre-modern. This reinforced the idea that the main problem in Vicos was the indigenous 
group and not their work conditions nor the structures of hierarchical relationships 
beyond the hacienda. The Cornell group expected to eradicate local poverty through 
applying a modernization process, transforming the local population into knowledgeable 
and administered objects (Stein 2000: 28). The team members were not conscious of the 
colonial discourse in which their plan was embedded, which led them to erase cultural 
and historical contexts for  understanding Vicos as if this was a pre-modern space that 
they needed to watch and control. The Andean region was imagined as a place that 
urgently needed to modernize and this required the supervision and direction of the 
‗superior‘ scholars. In addition, Vicos was created as an isolated space outside the 
modern state that needed to be rescued through the assimilation into modernity. This 
project involved the guidance of Western knowledge, but this time embodied by North 
American scholars. 




sociology of the 1950s. The inspiration came from Chicago sociologist Robert E. Park, 
who was in formulating dominant theoretical and methodological assumptions about race 
relationships during this time. Park‘s cycle of race relations was a four-step processs: 
‗contact, conflict, adaptation and assimilation.‘. However, these assumptions were as 
much ideological and political as they were theoretical (Stein 2000: 41). They ignored the 
institutional and ideological nature of race in the Americas, and the systematic presence 
of a racial dynamic in social spheres like education, art, social policy, law, religion and 
science. This approach emphasized racial dynamics as irrational products of individual 
pathologies (Omi and Winant 1994). The goal of the promoters of applied anthropology 
in Peru and in the U.S. was to rationalize and to depathologize those aberrations. Thus, 
the assimilation of Vicosinos into the Peruvian nation-state would produce citizens, who 
in the process needed to get rid of the ‗traditional‘ culture that made them indigenous. In 
short, bcomeing a citizen meant suppressing the ‗Indian‘ component that made them 
backward, irrational and pre-modern (for an extensive discussion about the de-
indianization of indigenous people see de la Cadena 2000). 
The lack of a proper understanding of the racial ideology that operated in Peru, 
and particularly in Vicos, encouraged the use of categories like ‗Indian‘ and Mestizo as if 
they referred to natual kinds. The project did not recognize that these were foremost 
relational social categories. Thus, Stein (2000) explains that Vicosinos were constructed 
in a essentialist way that silenced the binary construction of isolation and modernity in 
which they were forced to fit. Rather than approaching the community to listen and to 




conceived idea of what needed to be done. In this sense, Vicos acted as a human 
laboratory through which the Cornell project implemented its ideas of modernity. 
The racial terminology used by Holmberg and his team was widely accepted 
during the early 1950s. However, Stein argues that even then, hacienda workers preferred 
to define themselves as Vicosinos or hacienda runa. ‗Indio‘ was the label used by the 
town people, a term that in Peru was and is a serious insult, and a marker of racial and 
social inferiority (Stein 2000: 37). The Cornell team imagined that problems of race in 
the U.S. in the 1950s were similar to the ones the group encountered in Peru. 
Consequently, the team never understood the social and political dimensions of the 
process of racialization, and the meaning of labelling someone as Indio or mestizo.  
What seems to be clear from all the critiques to the project is that the Cornell team 
was a group that felt morally and intellectually superior to the indigenous workers. The 
group expected to rescue them from the hacienda regime, transforming them into 
‗productive‘ citizens. In order to achieve their goals, a hierarchical relationship was 
needed under which anthropologists were the ones who made the important decisions. 
Holmberg was unable to avoid some of his team members assuming the role of patron. 
Although Lynch (1981) argued that this was not caused by the team‘s interests, and was 
rather a Vicosino demand; I would rather be more sceptical. The patronage relationship is 
not only about expressing explicit domination, it is also a relationship in which the 
knowledge of one side becomes legitimized by the other who sees it as superior. 
Patronage relationships work in both directions:, intellectuals and scholars consider 




indigenous people legitimize this ideology by accepting that western knowledge is 
superior, placing themselves at the bottom of the hierarchy. Vicosinos depended on the 
word of a person in Lima to act, not because they were incapable of making good 
decisions; rather they accepted the superiority of the knowledge this person embodied. 
The Cornell-Peru project was not able to recognize that they were exerting domination 
over the indigenous group. Domination can also be exerted through academic discourses. 
In this sense, like Indigenismo, the Vicos project was manifestly a top-down approachto 
development .  
Vicos entered into the Cornell-Peru project as a community without a  history. 
During the 1920s, Vicosinos participated in a local workers‘ protest that caused the 
reduction of hacienda‘s work requirement from four days to three per week. Moreover, 
during the 19th century it was also the scene of workers‘ protests. The project imagined 
an inside world, composed of Vicos hacienda, that was surrounded by an outside world, 
and that the history of Vicos began with the project (Stein 2000: 38)  Though the Vicos 
project became paradigmatic to North American and global applied anthropology, it 
barely interested Peruvian scholars. Those who have criticized it have highlighted the 
assumption that it was possible to solve the agrarian problem wholly within the Agrarian 
sector. Rather it was necessary to do it outside it because the fate of the farmer is decided 
outside the field and ... without the participation of farmers (Figueroa 1984). The project 
failed because it looked Vicos as an isolated community, and not as a community inserted 
in a particular agrarian context in which Vicos‘ economic, political and cultural 




 Between 1952 and 1966, the time that the Vicos project operated, it became a 
research site for many U.S. anthropologists, professionals and students producing 
dissertations and reports at Cornell. The project did not train or teach Vicosinos; nor 
(with some notable exceptions), did it include Peruvian scholars as professional equals. 
Rather, the project used Peruvian students as data gatherers (Stein 2000: 49). Part of this 
is because Peruvian scholars were part of the underdeveloped world that the project 
expected to change. The relationship inside the community was fractally reproduced 
between scholars and regions. U.S. imperialism went beyond the economic domain, and 
operated on the ground, using local scholars as data gatherers rather than as colleagues 
who might offer an independent analytical perspective to the project. This practice has 
not changed, and today we can see it in the relationships NGOs establish with their 
fieldworkers in provinces like Ayacucho (see Chapter 7). The hierarchical relationship 
between North and South did not open the possibility for a dialogue, and reproduced 
relationships of colonization between Northern and Southern scholars (for a extense 
discussion see Ribeiro and Escobar 2006).  But so too, in its modern guise, the 
relationship between North and South is fractally reproduced in thee relationship between 
Lima and the Provinces. 
3. Dependency Theory  
Dependency theory—which arose in Latin America in the 1960s—was a social 
science framework that similarly sought to understand underdevelopment, analyze its 
causes, and move toward overcoming it. It was influential in academic circles in the 




and Africa, and continues to be relevant to contemporary debate (Sonntag 2001). 
Over the years, Latin American scholars have continued discussing variant images 
of modernization in light of nationalist projects, their experiences of the geopolitics of 
dependency, and conflicts over the control of resources among national elites and 
indigenous populations. Although initially anthropologists endorsed many of the 
assumptions proposed in the modernization approach, during the late1950s and 1960s 
they challenged the notions of inevitable stages of development. This contributed to 
develop to a new era of research in peasant studies (Seligmann 2006: 329). Many of the 
topics discussed in these debates were based on field research in the region, and the 
questions provoked corresponded to the ones raised previously by the works of Marx, 
Lenin, and Chayanov among others. These approaches explained in a better way why 
approaches like modernization theory were not appropriate for the Latin American 
context (Seligmann 2006: 329-30). 
It is in this context that dependency theory emerged as an alternative to the 
modernization theory. Dependentistas considered that underdevelopment in peripheral 
countries, particularly in Latin American, was the outcome of capitalist development in 
the centers, particularly in the United States and in Europe. Thus, the economy of the 
periphery was inextricably conditioned by its relationship to dominant economies, such 
as the United States (Chilcote 1974b). 
Among the most influential works of this school of thought are Cardoso and 
Faletto (1979), who asserted that capitalist development was possible in some dependent 




market. Thus, unemployment and absorption, wealth and poverty would coexist together 
in the same system. For them dependency was the specific relationship between classes 
and groups that involved a dominant situation that structurally produced relationships 
with the exterior (Cardoso and Faletto 1979: 29). Dependency was not just an external 
variable but also it was embedded in the system of relations among social classes in 
dependent nations (Chilcote 1974a: 9). In short, dependency was produced by the 
combination between internal and external conditions. 
The historicity of underdevelopment required more than just pointing to the 
structural features of the underdeveloped economies. Cardoso and Faletto argued that it 
was necessary to analyze how these economies were historically linked to the 
international market and the way in which social groups inside the country defined their 
relationships with the outside. This implied the recognition that within the political and 
social context dependency was what was at astake, rather than underdevelopment, and 
that dependency historically started with the expansion of economies in the capitalist 
system. Their approach suggested looking at the characteristics of national societies that 
maintain relationships with the exterior (Cardoso and Faletto 1979: 341). Later in the 
1970s Cardoso affirmed that dependentistas understood dependency as dialogic 
relationships between internal and external factors (1977b). 
Although, Cardoso‘s and Faletto‘s approach did not stress revolution as the way 
forward, they suggested that socialism might improve this situation. In addition, their 
approach suggested that politics and internal forces were more decisive in determining 




1974b). At the end for these authors the question was not about who owned international 
industrial firms but rather recognizing that pivotal decision-making structures were 
located outside dependent countries (Cardoso cited  by Chilcote 1974b: 17) 
Dependency theory arrived in North America by the work of André Gunder 
Frank, whose Capitalism and Underdevelopment (1967) outlined the concept of ―the 
development of underdevelopment‖ and articulated a model of historical development 
that was directly linked with underdevelopment, and economic stagnation in the 
periphery, to the extraction of economic surplus by metropolitan powers (Berger 1995: 
109). Franks considered that it was capitalism that generated underdevelopment, 
consequently, the development of underdevelopment would continue in Latin America 
until its people freed themselves from this structure, and the only way possible was by a 
violent revolution (Frank 1969: x). 
Dependentistas‘ studies sought to use the historic-structural method in order to 
analyze concrete situations. Many of these were case studies that presented new 
information and descriptive analysis. At the same time they sought to define relevant 
questions of national politics and of the relations between central capitalist economies 
and the dependent and non-industrialized periphery.  
Dependency theory was a Latin American framework specifically developed to 
understand the problems of the region. It claimed, among other things, an ‗intellectual 
commitment‘ that contradicted the neutrality of social sciences. In other words, 
intellectuals acquired a unique knowledge of the economic and social conditions of the 




considered itself as a radical rupture with the older modernization theory, the two 
frameworks also shared features. In particular, it defined Latin America through its 
shortcomings, such as underdevelopment and the lack of autonomy (Rochabrun 2009: 
190).  
Although Dependentistas were trying to get away from a Eurocentric 
understanding of the world, they approached the indigenous population in similar terms 
to modernization theory. Thus, it was assumed that the rural populations did not want to 
change, preferring their traditional and communal organization. The orthodox Marxism 
of the approach had a lot to say about social classes and its struggles, but this framework 
did not allow thinking about ideology and culture. Dependency theory considered a close 
analysis of the relationships among elites, national bourgeoisie, and the middle class; 
erasing subordinate groups from the account. They were seen as the victims of the 
system, and not possible agents of change. Dependentistas focused on dominant 
economic relationships in which indigenous groups were seen as the historical victims 
within the structures of the colonial relationships that the traditional bourgeoisie had 
perpetuated.  
Dependency theory declined in the middle of the 1970s. Some critics attribute the 
decline to the failure of the revolutionary prophecy and the end of the American wars in 
Southeast Asia. Moreover the rise of new industrialized countries in the region, such as 
Mexico and Brazil, undermined the image of the ―Third World‖ states as subordinate to 
the industrialized powers (Berger 1995: 115). Dependency theory emerged in a political 




declined as the political project came to an end.  
3.1 Dependentistas and marginality 
From the 1960s to the 1970s Peruvian scholars were concerned with the effects of 
internal and external domination produced by dependency, with Cardoso and Falleto‘s 
work occupying prode of place among the dependentistas. Dependentistas posited that 
dependence was internally replicated as the economic surplus of the countryside drained 
into urban areas producing the enrichment of cities, qith , the rural economy acquiring a 
sependent character under the development of the urban area.  
Aníbal Quijano (1977) noticed that there was a structural contradiction between 
development of the urban economy and the dependency that this caused in the rural 
economyso that as the rural economy was being urbanized, there was also less possibility 
for the participation of rural communities in the structure of production and the market. 
This caused the exclusion of the rural population while the urban centers got richer, 
reproducing the inequalities of development and an internal colonialism, through which 
the urban areas dominated the rural ones.  
The dominant interests within the dependent country corresponded with the 
interests of the dominant system in general, provoking an alignment with them rather 
than with the internal group (Quijano 1977). The focus on how classes and groups inside 
the dependent economy were tied with capitalists‘ interests abroad particularly elucidated 
alliances within dependent and dominant countries. In this context, it was not only an 
imposed structure, but it was also the internal participation that perpetuated dependency 




Quijano‘s work was aligned with Cardoso‘s and Faletto‘s approach, and 
categorized as ‗marginal‘ the group that was not able to be absorbed as part of the 
permanent labor force in the capitalist system. Framed in a dual understanding of the 
society (urban/rural, modern/pre-modern), ‗marginality‘ was a category that referred to 
‗one of those commonly used concepts of which one can ask, and from which one can 
derive, almost anything one wishes‘ (Nun 1969), that was not well defined at all. Quijano 
and others found it important to clarify the importance of marginality, 
―Marx clearly demonstrated that the movement of capital necessarily and permanently 
produces a tendency to exclude from the productive apparatus part of the labor force that 
has arisen under its domination and that this inactive labour force contracts and expands 
according to the phases of contraction or expansion in capital‘s cycles[…]‖ (Quijano 
and Westwell 1983: 77)  
Thus, marginality, understood in Marx‘ framework, explained that the labor market was 
based on a surplus population that during contraction cycles was not absorbed, which in 
orthodox Marxist theory was known as the ‗industrial reserve army.‘ Quijano recognized 
that this was used to refer to a problem ―which falls within the province of scientific 
investigation‖ (1983: 77), imagining that this was just an analytical category. He 
explained that the capital was creating a mass of relative surplus population on a global 
scale, and a decreasing proportion of this population was being absorbed (or reabsorbed) 
into the global productive apparatus during the expansive phases. This had implied the 
impoverishment of the excess labor force, increasing poverty within the capitalist system, 
especially in areas dominated by imperialist capital. He continued explaining that the 
relative surplus population had become larger and continued to grow, creating the 
problem of marginality (Quijano and Westwell 1983: 78-9). 




the foundations for an internal circuit of accumulation are being established, and pre-
capitalist production relations are crumbling […] In these countries, the relative surplus 
population [the marginal that cannot be absorbed by the system] thus becomes 
exceptionally large, giving rise to the problem called marginality.‖(Quijano and 
Westwell 1983: 81) 
But marginality was more than a structural problem; it became an ideology, a particular 
way to understand the economic excluded and indigenous populations. The Marxist 
approach privileged economic and social processes, undermining the role of culture and 
ideology. Absent was the racial hierarchy on which many Latin American states are 
constructed, as well as the ruling class‘ racial ideology, even though these are also 
essential elements to understanding the socio-political dynamic (Grosfoguel 2000: 339). 
Combining an analysis of colonialism with the racial ideology and the politics of the 
national state would have attuned the approach by giving it a deeper analysis. 
The analysis of ―marginality‖ developed by Quijano in Peru was challenged by 
Perlman‘s study of a shantytown in Brazil; Perlman argued that far from being 
‗marginal,‘ arguing the residents of Brazilian favelas183, and of similar settlements 
elsewhere in Latin America were strongly integrated into the system but in an 
asymmetrical manner (2005: 4).  In Brazil, the state considered it a solution to the 
―marfinal‖ favelas to remove them by burning and bulldozing houses, forcing residents to 
move into housing complexes in remote areas of the city (Perlman 2005: 3). To do that 
the state used garbage trucks, sending a clear message that they were taking care of the 
‗social garbage.‘ Favelas‘ inhabitants were considered dirty discards, and disposing them 
outside the city was a way to ‗sanitize‘ the city.  
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When Perlman wrote The Myth of Marginality (1976) ‗masses‘ of poor migrants 
were arriving from the countryside to ‗invade‘ the city, which was the paradigm of 
modernity. Modernization theory saw these migrants as maladapted to the ‗modern‘ city 
life, and responsible for their conditions, including their poverty and their lack of formal 
job. Squatter settlements were seen as spaces of crime, violence, prostitution and social 
decline, and marginality was a material force as well as an ideological concept and a 
description of the social reality (Perlman 2005: 5-6).  
The power of the ideology of marginality was strong in Brazil in the 1970s, and it 
justified the removal/destruction of favelas, arguing that this was a danger to the social 
order. The social and cultural resources that favelas provided to urban migrants: housing, 
access to jobs and services, and tightly knit communities were erased by the idea that 
they were the city‘s dirt and threat (Perlman 2005: 8). There was an important fusion 
between the marginal, and the dangerous and violent people that reinforced prejudices 
that all favelas residents were criminals.  
During the 1970s other labels emerged to name the urban poor and their 
problems: social exclusion, inequality, injustice, etc. These categories sought to change 
the focus of responsibility from the subject, to the structures of the state and the society 
(Perlman 2005: 11). During the 1990s, marginality re-emerged in academic circles in 
discussions about the persistent poverty within first world cities. Thus, terms like ‗the 
new marginality‘ began to describe the conditions of the chronic poverty in African-
American ghettos in the U.S. and in the migrant slums of Europe. The idea was that 




for a truly non-integrated, irrelevant mass population relegated to the territorial spaces of 
self-perpetuating ghetto (Perlman 2005: 17-8).  
Today marginality is a category and a narrative that describes the poor and 
excluded groups, explaining that the main problem is that this group has not yet been 
integrated the structures of the modern state. In contrast to the 1970s this narrative is used 
outside scholarly spheres, and has become part of the state‘s discourse. ‗Marginality‘ has 
become an element of common parlance, that when used clouds racial ideologies. In this 
sense, Fujimori‘s regime in Peru in the 1990s explained that poor rural Quechua-speaking 
women were sterilized not because they were indigenous, but because they were 
‗marginal.‘ In this context, the Peruvian state masks a policy to reduce the poor 
indigenous population, through the label of ‗marginal‘ clouding the racial ideology that 
provoked this policy. 
When the label of ‗marginal‘ is used in Peru, it automatically implies that the 
‗marginal‘ group is located in one of the poverty containers: like a rural community in the 
Andes, a favela in Rio or an urban-marginal slum settlements in Lima. And through this 
relationship between group and space, ‗marginality‘ becomes a reality that occurs in 
relationship to an urban center. Rural Quechuas are not the new poor or the new 
marginal, they have always been the poor and the marginal in economic terms, but also 
and especially because their ethnicity and Andean origins. 
3.2 Marginality and race 
Peruvian scholars have not perceived that calling a group ‗marginal‘ has become a 




features, and to a discursive and ideological position from which people learn how to 
speak about things like justice (Tsing 1993 quoted by Poole 2004: 38). Although it can be 
argued that through the category of ‗marginality‘ scholars expected to emphasize the 
condition of economic exclusions of the ‗marginal,‘ the social and political discourses 
imprinted in this category are not acknowledged. Within the Peruvian national imaginary 
the ‗marginal‘ population is composed by ‗the poor‘ who inhabit the margins of the state  
embodied by the Andean highlands. Thus the ‗marginal‘ is a racialized subject and not 
only, as Quijano suggested, ‗the reserve army.‘ 
The language of ―marginality‖ is not merely abstract.  It is concrete and spatial, a 
means by which government officials and social scientists create a geography and make 
tangible a reality that evokes an inside and outside to the state. The outside is imagined as 
barbarian, marginal, violent, and wild; while the inside is a realm of rationality and 
modernity. As a consequence, the ‗marginal‘ become the expression of an imagined 
barbarism that threatens rationality and civilization sthat the state and ruling groups, 
―in terms of spatial language for representing the nation, liberal talk about citizenship and 
civilization has produced an image of Peru as a nested set of dual oppositions pitting the 
Creole coast against the indigenous highlands, the civilizing center against the savage 
periphery‖ (Poole 2004: 41) 
The imaginary of the Andean highlands as ‗marginal‘ and ‗barbarian‘ also 
pervades social scientists‘ analyses. Inheriting many of the assumptions of the Vicos 
project, Peruvian social scientists have taken for granted the ‗underdeveloped‘ and 
backwardness of Quechua-speaking communities, which has not changed in the 
Dependentistas‘ analysis. 




institutions tended, with a few exceptions, to treat Andean tradition as a background 
factor rather than an active force‖ (Salomon 1982: 83) 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s Peruvian scholars like Cotler (1978)and Quijano 
(1980)focused on the consolidation of national political power and its effects in 
‗marginalizing‘ the peasant population in the economic and political arenas (Seligmann 
2006: 338) (See Matos Mar, et al. 1971[1975]; Matos Mar and Mejía 1980).  
In this context Quijano (1980) asserted the existence of a ‗marginal‘ group 
without perceiving the power and effects of the ideologies within which this notion was 
constructed. For him and others, the problem was the existence of two groups: indigenous 
and Criollo, where the former was ‗marginal‘ and needed to be integrated into the latter. 
This approach did not recognize the participation and contribution of these ‗marginal‘ 
populations into national society and the state, and assumed that the only possible 
communication among these groups was through social domination.  
Quijano observed that a third group, that he called cholo184, was emerging and 
would become the joint to link these two groups and the symbol of ―the emergence of an 
incipient mestizo culture, the embryo of the future Peruvian nation‖ (Quijano 1980: 61). 
For him, the cholo was an indigenous person who migrated to the urban center and 
adopted an urban life style, without losing ties with his or her rural community. The 
cholo was, in Quijano‘s imagination, an urbanized and ‗modern‘ (probably more 
developed) version of the indigenous peasant. This author and his racial sentiments were 
                                                 
184
 The category of Cholo originated in the 16
th
 century to classify the indigenous population under the 
colonial regime. This category began to be considered pejoratively within the colonial society only after the 
proliferation of offspring from mixed marriage (mestizo and indigenous) threatened to undermine the  purity 




modeled by the intellectuals‘ beliefs about the role of education in the transformation of 
the racial configuration in Peru. While in the 1920 Cusqueño intellectuals silenced their 
phenotype features through their access to education; in the 1960, intellectuals elevated 
literate peasant leaders redefining them as cholos (de la Cadena 1998: 105). By doing 
this, Peruvian intellectuals reinforced the inferior condition of the rural Quechuas, which 
eliminated the possible existence of educated and indigenous Quechuas. 
In the late 1960s, an important peasant mobilization in the southern Andean 
region was struggling to overturn the regime of land ownership. However, Quijano 
argued that 
―In every peasant movement that I have visited, I have found only one indigenous leader. 
Indigenous leadership does not exist today within the peasant movement; it appears as an 
exception and in isolated fashion, the Indian leader himself going through a process of 
cholificacion. Thus I do not think that an indigenous solution to the peasant problem 
would be feasible‖ (IEP 2000 [1965]: 59-60) 
The colonial discourse of indigenous groups as ‗backward,‘ not ready for providing 
solutions to their problems expresses greatly how peasants have been seen by 
intellectuals and politicians. Far from being recognized as equal subjects, with their own 
political ideas and projects, they were and still are portrayed and treated as ‗inferior‘ 
subjects who need ‗guidance.‘ The discrimination and hierarchies may be subtle, but are 
present. In Quijano‘s argument, only Cholos would overcome the ‗marginalization‘ of the 
indigenous group (Quijano 1980: 64). During the 1960s and 1970s identity labels were 
loaded with references to cultural stages and degrees of class consciousness that 
corresponded to the  the older bio-moral evolutionist categories used by the Indigenistas,. 
Rational knowledge, ‗intelligence‘ and formal education became at this moment the 




 Even though the indigenous population was recognized as changing (see Matos 
Mar, et al. 1971[1975]), the high degree of mobility and change within rural areas were 
not fully conveyed in scholarly writings, which continued to trade in an imagery of 
stagnation and immobility. Seasonal migrations and market-oriented production were not 
mentioned, nor the consumption of industrialized goods and urban lifestyles within rural 
communities. Rural families invested in their children‘s education, looking to send them 
to college whenever it was possible. All these changes, and the ways in which rural 
Quechuas managed to cope with the state‘s bureaucracy, are not mentioned as critical 
elements that tie them with the national society and the state. The lack of recognition of 
these relationships among Peruvian social scientists re-inscribed the image of rural 
Quechuas as completely outside the state, frozen in a pre-modern era. The category of 
cholo only reinforces the prejudice that rural Quechuas do not change by themselves. 
Scholars like Quijano needed to use a new label to differentiate and highlight this ―new‖ 
process.  
4. NGOs and development185  
Development is defined by the International Encyclopedia of Social and 
Behavioral Sciences as originally implied with economic development, but recently, 
more emphasis has been placed on equity, sustainability, the quality of life and popular 
participation. Development Anthropology includes active participation by anthropologists 
in development policies and projects. Some anthropologists are against any involvement, 
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claiming that development is fatally flawed. Others are wary of any ‗applied‘ work. 
(Brokensha 2001) 
Anthropologists have recognized it is critical to analyse the role and culture of 
non-governmental organizations (NGO). This has gone hand in hand with the deepening 
and widespread impact of neoliberal policies and readjustment programs shaped by the 
World Bank and the IMF in the last decades (Seligmann 2006:343). This moment is 
different from the modernization theory in which development projects were oriented to 
modernize the ‗backward and isolated‘ countryside. Instead, this particular moment since 
the 1980s was about the current intervention and substitution for the state by international 
NGOs in a wide range of projects. Recent studies of NGOs have addressed how these 
have come to substitute for government bureaucracies, nationally and internationally 
staffed (for extended discussion see Chapter 7). In addition, NGO workers gather data to 
apply a particular model of development; and although these are often seen as ‗bottom 
up‘ they hardly provide a nuanced view of peasant and indigenous groups within the 
global context (Seligmann 2006:344).  
  
During the 1980s ‗poverty oriented programs‘ concerned with rural development, 
health, nutrition and family planning, arose and for the first time these projects received 
significant resources directly targeting the poor population. This changed the previous 
ideology and created programs ‗concerned with the modernization and monetization of 
rural society, and with its transition from traditional isolation to integration with the 




not changed, and new policies are still driven by the idea that there is a need to 
‗modernize‘ (in a capitalist way) traditional (non-European) societies. Moreover, this 
presupposes that there is only one path to achieve development: the one promoted by the 
international financial institutions. 
Latin America has not been excluded from this process and it has witnessed the 
emergence of hundreds of NGOs, many of which are financed by USAID, UNDP, IDB, 
WB, and international development agencies from the European Union. These agencies 
have were the major employer for social scientists in Peru until the 1990s, when new 
events like the fall of the Berlin Wall redirected aid funds toward other geographical 
areas.  
In Peru alone there are 1,439 NGOs working with funds from international 
cooperation. The Peruvian state receives $400 million U.S. dollars from international aid 
agencies and NGOs $210 million . These numbers do not include the funds coming from 
private agencies, such as religious institutions (Balbi 2007).  
4.1 Power and knowledge in development 
The key flaw is in development work the idea of development itself, which takes 
for granted a positive outcome that has become a certainty in the social imaginary. 
Recent tools of analysis, developed with the turn toward postcolonial studies, have 
guided scholars to question how particular representations have become dominant and 
have shaped the ways in which reality is imagined and acted upon (Escobar 1995: 5). 
These unveil the mechanism through which a certain order of discourse produces 




impossible (Escobar 1995: 5).  
Thus, development is a particular production of thought and action by relating 
three axes: the knowledge it produces, the system of power that employs and regulates it, 
and the forms of subjectivity fostered by these discourse (Escobar 1995: 10). In other 
words, the discourse of development has produced Andean subjects as a ‗marginal and 
excluded‘ group that recognizes its lack of power, and the need to be helped by the 
government: the educated ‗white men.‘  
4.2 The moral project  
Development anthropology is a moral project based on ethical principles (Gow 
2002: 300) that we may share. Dependentistas expected to provide a new vision of the 
economic dependency, but they did not include topics like culture and race which ‗did 
not fit‘ into the Marxist approach they used. At the same time, dependentistas had a pre-
determined political agenda, rather than being more concern with changing the 
hierarchical relationship in which they were embedded in the countryside. 
Despite anthropologists‘ rhetorical commitment to ‗indigenous knowledge,‘ 
‗popular participation,‘ and ‗local decision making,‘ development agencies have only 
allowed anthropologists to have a peripheral position with little influence on policy 
formation (Ferguson 1997: 165). At the same time, if scholars assume that they have a 
superior knowledge so they can decide the fate of others, the problem resides in the 
scholars‘ assumed superiority.  
As anthropologists, we often deal with and make our living from social problems 




particular obligation to reflect critically on how we choose to represent the human 
suffering that engages us. It is not about two distinct, and exclusive, ways to engage 
anthropologically with the world: the spectator that is neutral and objective; and the 
witness that is active and morally committed(see Scheper-Hughes 1992). Both positions 
are related, but the danger is that advocacy actions without acknowledging the system of 
power in which as scholars we are embedded will almost certainly have negative results. 
Taking the Other‘s side without a critical understanding of our own political  
projects and prejudices may silence natives‘ own views of their situation. Therefore, as 
highly committed witnesses, we may end-up imposing our own moral project without 
recognizing the existing difference between what ‗we‘ and the Other want. We may share 
ideas which do not imply that we understand in the same way what needs to be to done. I 
am sure that in many cases, our moral and political commitment may obscure our 
analysis and be imposed as if the Other believed it. In this context, it is important to 
reflect how mediation becomes an important tool in shaping the knowledge we produce.  
Conclusions: good intentions not always have good result… 
Intellectuals with radically opposed political projects have agreed in identifying 
the lack of integration and backwardness of the Quechua population as Peru‘s main 
problem. For example, Vargas Llosa (the 2010 Literature Nobel Prize winner, and 1990 
presidential candidate for the right) and Diaz Martinez (Shining Path ideologue) share the 
an evolutionist approach that establishes the subordinate nature of the indigenous society. 
Both considered Western rationality as the basis of their projects, which led them to 




consequently subordinate to their intellectuals‘ social and intellectual paradigms (Cf. de 
la Cadena 1998: 106). Regardless of political persuasion, there is a consensus as regards 
the intellectual supremacy of their projects and the inferiority of indigenous people. 
Unlike Ecuador and Bolivia, where indigenous intellectual class has emerged, 
Peru has none. By eliding race and placing themselves as morally and intellectually 
superior subjects, Peruvian scholars have reshaped the colonial racial hierarchy 
legitimizing racial/cultural discrimination with the superiority offered by formal 
education and intelligence. 
Thus, it should not surprise us that in 1965 Peruvian intellectuals did not 
recognize Jose Maria Arguedas186 as an anthropologist because he intended to redirect 
mestizaje into intercultural relationships (Cf. De la Cadena 2006: 203). Arguedas was a 
non-indigenous intellectual and an indigenous Quechua, whose work resisted the binary 
classification. In the 1960s Arguedas‘ life and work defied the limits of certified 
sociological-anthropological knowledge.  
Arguedas most popular novel Todas las Sangres was sympathetic to the rural 
struggle of the 1960s, but it ran against the grain of the popular script—popular among 
Leftists intellectuals and politicians, that is—that indigenous people lacked political 
consciousness. At the time it was assumed that by teaching rural Quechuas about political 
activism would transform ‗Indians‘ into peasants; enlightened by their newly found ‗class 
consciousness‘ peasants would leave behind their superstition and Indianess to become 
comrades. However, Arguedas had the courage to challenge this vision by including rural 
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Quechua political leaders in his novel. The novel effectively presented the possibility of 
the ‗Indianization‘ of politics that included indigenous forms of knowledge, which for 
social scientists of his time was a historical impossibility and a moral outrage. During 
those years, the indigenous world and its animated landscape were not the secular arenas 
that modern political organization required (Cf. De la Cadena 2006: 209-10). By 
identifying himself ‗as a civilized man who has not stopped being at the core an 
indigenous Peruvian‘ (Dorfman 1970:45) Arguedas was rejected by the dominant Limeño 
intellectuality as an anthropologist. He could not both claim indigeneity in his novels and 
poems, and the role of the social scientist as were viewed as mutually exclusive.  
The silent racism of the Peruvian intellectuality recognizes the right of every 
Peruvian to be part of the nation. However, at the same time, it places people on a 
differentiated scale according to the subject‘s intellectual capacity and his academic 
knowledge. This legitimization is built upon the evolutionist idea that privileges Western 
rational knowledge over the one considered pre-rational, like the indigenous one (de la 
Cadena 1998: 108). The silent racism that we have highlighted throughout the chapter 
presupposes that intellectuals embodied superior forms, because of the formal Western 
education they received, legitimating their natural political leadership. This has become a 
naturalized rhetoric of exclusion that has justified social hierarchies through the use of 
concepts like ―race‖, ―class,‖ and ―culture,‖ differences are seen as inherited, and 
historically inevitable (Cf. de la Cadena 1998: 108). Throughout the twentieth century 
into the twenty-first, every generation has faced the intellectual challenges of a divided 




built it into their generation‘s social project as natural and inevitable. 
In short, what during 19th century was seen as racism based on ideas of race and 
phenotype features, in the 21th century has become a cultural racism. This means that 
exclusion and hierarchies are legitimized through conditions of intelligence and formal 
education. In this sense, the rural Quechua population is still widely considered to lack 
intelligence and education, which places them, in the Peruvian intellectual imaginary, at 








 Social Mediation: others forms of racial domination 
 
In the last chapter I discussed how Peruvian intellectuals eliminated ―race‖ from 
academic discourses and imposed instead a hierarchy based on Western education. I 
continue this this discussion by looking at how this hierarchy is reproduced on the ground 
by the NGOs that act as social mediators between communities and the government. In 
this context, I propose to understand aid agencies as statelike institutions that are asked to 
fulfill the roles of the state in the areas where the governmenthas not developed the 
apparatus for direct intervention. In short, aid agencies act as private contractors for the 
state.  
By taking over this role, NGOs act as political and social mediators between the 
state and rural communities, imposing political agenda that are being crafted as if they 
were the voices of rural communities. Although NGOs are considered bottom-up 
institutions, in the examples presented in this section I will argue that NGOs often act 
through top-down approaches. In the field, NGO workers embody the upper status 
supported by Western education (and the features associated with it rationality, 
modernity, being urban, etc.) which gives them the power to discriminate against the 




people‘s actual demands into what they consider to be appropriate for the group; I call 
this relationship ―social mediation.‖  It is through such social mediation that the hierarchy 
of Western knowledge and education is used to impose upon subordinate groups 
particular ideologies that are hegemonically accepted.  
The concept of mediation emerged in Marxist literature to explain the ideological 
mechanisms by which the state legitimized the system (Bartra 1976: I). In this sense, 
Bartra considered mediation within the historical context as an ideological phenomenon, 
whose characteristics will depend on the particularities of the given relationships between 
the political leadership and political power (Bartra 1976: 43). In Bartra‘s neo-gramscian, 
framework, the domination of a social class through the state apparatus was an 
inseparable phenomenon from the political- economic-ideological mechanisms that 
grounded the hegemony of a class, as much within civil society as through violence and 
repression (Bartra 1976). . In a gramscian framework, the state is the whole complex of 
practical and theoretical activities through which the ruling class justifies and dominates 
the governed class through its consensus (Gramsci 1971). 
In short, mediation is a political phenomenon structured in particular 
governmental apparatuses. Consequently, inside the state there is a mediation structure 
that creates the illusion of  consensus among social classes, while in reality this is just 
another way to perpetuate domination (Cf. Bartra 1976). Taking Gramsci‘s mediation 
idea, I understand NGOs as members of the civil society as well as an important 
component of the state that from both positions exert domination over subordinate 




that legitimates Western formal education as the core of the Peruvian social hierarchy.  
This chapter is divided in two sections. The first aims to place NGOs within the 
structure of governance by applying the concept of statelike (or proxy state) institutions. 
In the neoliberal economy the state has become a delegating actor that sub-contracts 
NGOs and international aid agencies to fill the state‘s role where it cannot. By using 
statelike institutions and the proxy state (Krupa 2010) I highlight how civil society is 
embedded in the process of governing. In the second section I look at the ways NGOs act 
as social mediators by analyzing two specific workshops. Within these I will analyze how 
these institutions‘ ideologies are imposed and crafted upon people‘s voices, and presented 
as if they were the subjects‘ original demands. These ideologies are generally accepted by 
rural Quechuas, re-inscribing a hegemonic discourse of the Western and urban education. 
In this relationship hierarchies of race and education are conjointly produced and 
reproduced along with discourses of democracy and equality. The problem is that this 
causes Quechua-speaking communities to be framed as illiterate and helpless groups that 
need ‗big brothers‘ (NGOs and scholars) to defend and to guide them. 
1. The state as an on-going process 
In modern Western political thought, the idea of the state is often linked to the 
notion of impersonal and privileged constitutional order with the capability of 
administering and controlling a given territory (Skinner 1978, cf. Neumann 1964 cited by 
Held 1989: 11). There are four traditions of political analysis that have focused on the 
state: (1) liberalism, which is absorbed with the question of sovereignty and citizenship; 




problem of establishing political accountability; (3) Marxism, which rejects the terms of 
reference of both liberalism and liberal democracy, and concentrates upon class structure 
and the forces of political coercion; and (4) political sociology (from Max Weber to 
Anglo-American pluralism and ‗geopolitical‘ conceptions of the state) , which has 
elaborated concerns with the institutional mechanisms of the state and the system of 
nation-states more generally (for a detailed discussion see Held 1989: 12).  
During the last few years, the literature about the state has also focused on how 
states are powerful sites of symbolic and cultural production that are culturally 
represented and understood in particular forms. In this sense, the state becomes an entity 
that needs to be analysed with particular spatial properties, which secure its legitimacy, 
naturalize its authority, and represent itself as superior to other institutions and centers of 
power (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 981). In this line, Corrigan and Sayer (1994) consider 
‗the state‘ not as much a fixed and durable material apparatus, but as a series of 
discursively and procesually constructed claims. Therefore, the state represents a project 
to give ‗unity, coherence, structure and intentionality to what are in practice frequently 
disunited, fragmented attempts at domination (Corrigan and Sayer 1994). This allows us 
to see the state as an on-going project in which its institutions work to posit a more or less 
coherent construction of the state in a situation where coherence and intelligibility might 
not otherwise be at hand (Herron 2003: 1-3). In the same line of thought, Coronil (1997) 
proposes to consider the state to be a complex ensemble of social relations mediated by 
things, or thing-like objectifications of social practice; and these objectifications are the 




In other words, the state is an ensemble of social relations mediated through 
‗things‘ that are also a series of discursive and procesual claims. The state is composed of 
a cluster of agencies and departments, with tiers and levels, each with their own rules and 
resources and often with varying purposes and objectives. To understand the relations 
and processes of the state and their place in shaping society, it is important to grasp the 
way the state is embedded in particular socioeconomic systems (Held 1989: 2). 
Academic discourses about the state deal with two images that come together: 
verticality and encompassment. On one hand, verticality refers to the central idea of the 
state as an institution located ‗above‘ civil society, grassroots and communities. In this 
sense, the state becomes inherently a top-down entity that operates from ‗above,‘ placing 
the civil society and grassroots as groups operating from ‗below.‘ On the other hand, 
encompassment implies the idea of the state is located within an ever widening series of 
circles that start with family and local communities, going up until they enclose the full 
system of nation-states (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 982). In this sense, the locality of the 
state is encompassed by the region, the nation-state and the international community. 
Verticality and encompassment work together producing an implicit scalar and spatial 
image of the idea that the state is understood as ‗above‘ the localities, regions and 
communities that it contains.  
In the Western tradition, the state has been understood as the entity embodying the 
power to control rationality, that stands against the ‗irrationality and the lower passions of 
the lower groups.‘ Therefore, the state is usually placed as morally and ethically ‗higher‘  




it exerts over the population. Even though most academics would refuse today to consider 
the state as a higher entity, it is generally agreed however that the civil society is the 
mediation zone between the state and the ‗grounded‘ community. The imagined 
topography of vertical levels takes for granted that political struggles are coming from 
‗below‘ and rooted within people‘s lives and experiences, as if there were a mediation 
relationship in place that may or may not filter the contents of the struggle (for an 
extended discussion see Brass 1991). Civil society is usually placed in the middle 
imagining to offer a zone of contact between an ‗up there‘ state and ‗grounded‘ 
communities (Ferguson and Gupta 2002). 
The civil society includes those areas of social life organized by private and 
voluntary arrangements between individuals and groups outside of the direct control of 
the state (Held 1989: 6). Picturing the state‘s relation to society through the image of a 
middle zone of contact, vertical encompassment fuses into a single and powerful image 
of the state as an entity operating on a higher level—somewhere ‗up there‘ not related to 
grounded communities.  
The metaphors through which states are imagined and practiced in bureaucracies 
are important to analyse if we aim to understand how rural inhabitants are imagining and 
relating to the state. The state becomes a particular entity that, through social practices, is 
accepted as a legitimate and authoritative territorialized institution, and is also imagined 
to encompass the different levels of the social world. Social life is framed on the set of 
relationships the state establishes with its communities. Both encompassment and 




institutions, producing spatial and scalar hierarchies (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 984).  
1.1 Transnational Governmentality 
There are different forms of transnational connections that are increasingly 
enabling ‗local‘ actors to challenge the state‘s claims of encompassment and vertical 
superiority. Local grassroots operators may trump the national and international appeal to 
‗world opinion,‘ also encompassing the surveillance done by transnational institutions. 
Under different conditions in which states do not have success in claiming the vertical 
heights of sovereignty, the state finds that there are a range of contemporary 
organizations that not only overlap with its traditional functions, but also conditions these 
institutions to follow particular rules.  
The idea of ‗transnational governmentality‘ was coined by Ferguson and Gupta 
(2002), and is pertinent now to understand the state as an entity embedded in a web of 
social relations that goes beyond its verticality, which allows us to include relationships 
with transnational institutions. Building on Foucault‘s notion of ‗governmentality,‘ 
Ferguson and Gupta understand this as a process through which the population is 
governed: by institutions and agencies, including the state; by discourses, norms and 
identities; and by self-regulation. Thus, both the political economy and knowledge 
apparatuses have operated on the population to constitute governmentality as the 
dominant mode of power since the 1900s (Foucault 1991: 101). 'Govermentality' offers a 
way of approaching how rule and power is exercised in society through social relations, 
institutions and bodies that do not automatically seem to fit under the category of ‗the 




Therefore, neoliberal 'govermentality' is characterized by competitive market 
logic and a focus on smaller government that operates from a distance. Neoliberalism 
works by multiplying sites for regulation and domination through the creation of 
autonomous entities of government that are not part of the formal state apparatus, and are 
usually guided by ‗business logic.‘ This logic involves social institutions like NGOs, 
schools, communities and individuals, who are made responsible for activities that were 
formerly carried out by the state (Gupta and Sharma 2006: 277).  
Scholars have sought to refine the analysis of governmentality to deal with the 
shift from the Keynesian welfare state toward so-called free-market policies. Although 
this move has been understood by some as a ‗retreat‘ of the state, it needs to be seen as  a 
transfer of operations from the government to non-state entities (Barry et al 1996: 11-12; 
cited by Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 989). The logic of the market has been extended to 
the operation of state functions in which even core institutions like schools and health 
services, if not privatized, function according to a business model, as this is developing in 
Peru. In the meantime the state‘s social and regulatory functions become de-statized, 
taken over by ‗quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations‘(Rose 1996:56; 
quoted by Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 989). This is not a ‗rolling back of the state‘ since it 
does not mean that there is less government; rather, it is a new form of government 
committed to producing mechanisms that work (independently) from the central state. 
The logic of the new form of governmentality is the production of states that, rather than 
being welfare, rather than be guardians of citizens (like people demand in Chapi) they 




In this sense, the state has changed its approach to the ‗poor‘ by placing on them the 
‗responsibility‘ to change their economic conditions. This type of approach gives up the 
belief that the main cause of poverty was unequal sets of opportunities and resources 
distribution (Cf.Sharma and Gupta 2006). Already embedded in this ideology, I have 
found NGO workers and institutions –in the US and the UK– affirming that the rural poor 
have learned to receive from the state, which has created a ‗culture of welfarism‘ (Sp. 
Cultura asistencialista). In this sense, rather than teaching people ways to improve their 
economic conditions, through welfare the state has moulded people as welfare receivers. 
As a consequence, rather than work, people expect the state to give them what they need. 
The problem exist, but it is so different to consider an American family living in the 
welfare system for years, than a family in Chapi that receives monetary help, that does 
not include housing or food.  
... they showed the victim's face and all the help arrived... they learned that if they need 
help they extend their arms [...] Something must be done, this is a very vulnerable 
population ... but I still think that the best the state can do is teach people to fish and not 
give them the fish. (Nolberto, Paz y Esperanza)187 
Ferguson and Gupta (2002) also suggest going beyond Foucault‘s Eurocentric 
idea of the territorial nation-state as the domain of the state‘s operation. Therefore, they 
extend the discussion of governmentality to modes of government that are being set up on 
a global scale. This includes strategies of discipline and regulation; rules imposed by the 
WTO, IMF, and the WB; transnational alliances forged by activists and grassroots 
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 ―… ellos mostraron la cara de víctima y todo vino del cielo… entonces, aprenden que hay que extender 
la mano para que los ayuden […] Hay que hacer algo, pues es una población bastante vulnerable… pero 
yo sigo pensando de que creo que la mejor apuesta del estado es enseñar a la gente a pescar y no darles el 




organizations; and transnational NGOs. The increasing number of these agencies and 
their actual influences on governmental issues should question the implicit spatial and 
scalar frames of sovereign states.  
The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (among others), are 
institutions of global governance placed ‗above‘ the nation-state. In this context, some 
difficulties emerge around ‗global agreements‘ proposed by the WTO or the IMF, 
because they are the imposition of these supra-national agents intending to act as the state 
(like the policies that demand the reduction of birth rates in Third World Countries). 
Although these entities appear to look for ‗good governance,‘ most of the time they 
impose policies without mechanisms for democratic accountability. This confusion is 
located partly in how states are spatialized and what relationships exist between space 
and government. In this sense, practices of encompassment have been modified by 
supranational influences and controls; the new landscape needs to be proportional to the 
space and scale in which governmentality is executed (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 990).  
Understanding how transnational agencies work upon the spatialized state, some 
African countries can elucidate how states are not able to exercise the power traditionally 
associated with the sovereign nation-state. In general, the Africanist literature has 
understood that the social reality of the region cannot be framed within the traditional 
idea of ‗nation-building.‘ Instead, it has been proposed to approach ‗civil society‘ as a 
means that encompasses a variety of social groups and institutions that only share in 
common that they exist beyond or outside the territorial state (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 




institutions restricting its approach to grassroots and voluntary organizations. Agencies 
and institutions like Sudan‘s rebel army, the Anglo-American Corporation of South 
Africa, and Oxfam may contrast against the state as components of the civil society. 
However, they are not local, national or international phenomena. These groups embody 
a particular local dynamic that is the product and expression of national, regional and 
global forces (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 991). 
For the purposes of this chapter, I consider civil society as the set of social, 
ideological and political relationships that allow the consensus and regulation of class 
relations. Moreover, civil society will also be defined as the way through which dominant 
classes achieve hegemony and domination over the lower ones (cf. Bartra 1976: 48-50). 
Instead of contrasting the state to the civil society as contradictory entities, following a 
Marxist approach, I propose to understand civil society as composing the part of the state 
that enacts governmentality. Apprehending civil society in this sense allows us to better 
understand the state as bundles of social practices, local in their materiality and social 
situatedness as any other entity (Gupta 1995; cited by Ferguson and Gupta 2002). This 
will also let us question beyond what the traditional state/society division provokes (like 
how states rule), and open a view that enables a better approach to understanding 
transnational relationships and mediation performed by civil society‘s groups. NGOs are 
part of what is called civil society, and they exert (like the state) domination over the 
subordinate classes, and especially in Peru upon rural Quechuas.  
Some liberal theorists of the state and society argue that the domination and 




‗rolling back‘ of the state in the neoliberal era would ultimately produce the 
‗democratization‘ of it. This argument has turned out to be fallacious, as one may observe 
in regions like Africa and Latin America, where domination has long been exerted by 
entities others than the state (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 992). Zambia illustrates this 
situation. Originally colonized by the British South African Company, a private 
multinational company equipped with its own army, this company acted under a British 
‗concession‘ and conquered this territory, setting a private system of ownership and race 
privilege that became the Rhodesian colonial system. Today, Zambia continues to be 
ruled in significant part by transnational organizations that, even though are not by 
themselves governments, work together with First World states to effectively rule and 
control the country (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 992).   
1.2 Civil Society: NGOs, BONGOs, CONGOs 
 In its minimum the notion of civil society refers to voluntary groupings, which 
taken together are, ‗a part of society which has a life of its own, which is distinctly 
different from the state, which is largely in autonomy from it. Therefore civil society lies 
beyond the boundaries of the family and the clan and beyond the locality; it lies short of 
the state‘ (Shils 2003: 292,  cited byColloredo-Mansfeld 2009: 16). In Latin America, 
civil society has been credited with opposing and helping to move beyond authoritarian 
rule, which contrasts with the arguments developed about civil society in Europe. In 
Latin America, civil society seems to act as a means to fill in for an absent state 
(Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009: 16)  




democratic local organizations that intend to represent local communities‘ visions of the 
world. However, this account ignores that civil society is also composed of international 
organizations with a pre-defined ideology of how subordinate groups should act. The 
―grassroots‖ are budgetary expressions of USAID, EU agencies, European Churches, and 
Human Rights groups working in the transnational domain. Many of these transnational 
groups have taken over functions and powers of the state, which has transformed them 
into governmental organizations that act as bank-organized NGOs (Bongos), and 
government-organized NGOs (Gongos) (Ferguson and Gupta 2002). 
NGOs becomes actors that help Western transnational development agencies to 
get around ‗uncooperative‘ governments, especially those considered as ‗failed‘, and 
celebrates the empowerment of the civil society by taking over the state‘s functions 
(Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 993). Covered beneath the idea of empowerment, in reality, 
NGOs and transnational development agencies are the ones that get empowered through 
this system by becoming the legitimated group that dominates subordinate groups. 
However, the original philosophy that we hear is that the international community, and 
local NGOs, counteract within ‗failed‘ states looking to empower the civil society.  
Some states have changed from being welfare providers to acting as facilitators of 
development. Although welfare projects do not stop, the neoliberal state is now able to 
farm out welfare tasks to empower agents and communities who are seen as able to 
secure their own livelihoods without ‗depending‘ on the state. Gupta and Sharma suggest 
―Implementing programs that empower marginalized populations to meet their own 
needs facilitate the attainment of neoliberal goals of leaner and more efficient 
government. Furthermore, linking these populations to the project of self-governance and 




Transnational NGOs (CARE, World Vision, etc.) play an important role in Africa, Latin 
America and some regions of Asia organizing local affairs, building and operating 
schools and clinics. They arrive to places where the state seems to have failed to be, or 
has decided not to arrive to reduce costs.188 Although these organizations act locally as 
statelike institutions, they are not the state in the classical definition (Ferguson and Gupta 
2002: 994), but act as it. These are transnational entities that are both local and global 
governing local populations.  
NGOs political entities are better conceptualized as integral components of the 
transnational apparatus of governmentality that do not replace the system of nation-states, 
but rather overlay, and sometimes overtake, the state‘s responsibilities. These 
organizations enact the ‗transnational governmentality‘ that, like the state, exerts 
domination over the Quechua population that they look to ‗help.‘ Therefore, these NGOs 
need to be approached as contemporary organs of the state that may play the role of 
rivals, watchdogs and proxies of the state. Whatever their role is, they coexist with the 
state at the same level and in the same global space; sharing also the technologies of 
government across this space. Therefore, NGOs-BONGOs-GONGOs need to be 
understood and treated as non-state organizations that act as the state in different 
contexts. This approach is helpful, because it allows us to leave aside verticality and 
encompassment as only properties of the traditional territorial nation-state, framing our 
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 The World Bank promotes empowerment as a crucial aspect of development. And at the same time these 
same institutions are asking these states to reduce their interventions in the welfare. The general belief is 
that empowerment will allow people to improve their life conditions, as if inequality and lack of 
opportunities were only related with people‘s willingness to improve and not with economic and political 




understandings in a more broader way to grasp contemporary practices of government as 
ethnographic problems (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 994).  
Statelike institutions govern the conduct of the national state and economies, and 
manage people‘s welfare living in different territories around the world. This 
transnational governance is growing and multiplying the number of global agreements 
that go from regulating development and human rights, to environmental problems and 
the protection of endangered species (Gupta and Sharma 2006: 280).  
The move toward a neoliberal system aims to shrink the state, transforming it into 
a mere management agent that directs the territorialized nation-state from a distance. 
Parallel to this, transnational agencies shape policies from above that states are compelled 
to follow, becoming even more statelike institutions. Thus, the civil society also needs to 
be understood as a major body composed by different groups, in which some dominate 
others, but that may look less connected as they actually are. In many cases, the size of 
grassroots is not as meaningful as seeing how these small grassroots work as the 
extensions of transnational agencies. Local and transnational agencies share particular 
ways to understand social phenomena, embodying locally transnational ideologies like 
the defence of Human Rights. Transnational aid agencies act in the field through these 
grassroots and local NGOs, calling for democracy and equality, as the basis of the 
relationship they establish with social actors. However, at the same time, on the ground 
they reproduce national hierarchies of race and class and legitimizing domination and 
control they have over rural communities. Several NGOs have become brokers of 




and particular ways to understand the world because they ‗know‘ what is best for them. 
In this sense, there is a transfer of Western models to regions like the rural Andes, 
without respecting cultural differences or understanding cultural practices. This transfer 
is facilitated by structures and interests within the so-called Third Wold countries which 
accept these forms and attempt to shape them to their own interests (this will discuss in 
section 2 later in this chapter). Therefore, the transition has many agents, both foreign 
and local, that act in complicity (Cf. Sampson 1996: 126). Local NGOs embody the 
hierarchy of difference that legitimates the intellectual superiority of Peruvian scholars 
over the Quechuas. 
1.3 Proxy state: acting like the state 
Krupa considers that there are ‗too many actors competing to perform the state‘ 
that in the end, has the effect of the state. Following his analysis I will consider that 
NGOs are ‗proxy states‘ or statelike institutions that act like the state, but are not 
officially entitled as such (Krupa 2010: 319). By performing the state‘s actions, NGOs 
have become an important means of the facto domination and control by the state over 
rural communities. Given the collaborative and mimetic relationship between the state 
and NGOs, it is important to understand whether NGOs act independently from the state 
or not, and at which points these institutions identify themselves as the state or not. 
Studying the state ethnographically and historically involves unpacking the production of 
its sense of objective presence—an apparent center of governmental gravity—out of the 
social relations it has internalized (Krupa 2010: 324).  




populations, often considered ‗at the margins of the state‘ (see Das and Poole 2004), have 
been controlled by proxy state forms. Landowners came to capture state practices as part 
of their apparatuses to control workers performing executive, fiscal, judiciary and 
legislatives roles. In many cases (see Chapter 2) the gamonal acted as the state, mediating 
between people‘s personal conflicts, ruling in favour of one party or other and punishing 
offenders. In addition, when schools were instated during the late 1960s, Chapi‘s 
gamonal paid the school teachers. In most cases, the hacendado acted as the caring state 
that not only provided work to his workers, but also an education.  
This idea goes along with Krupa‘s argument about the flower business in rural 
Ecuador that considers itself to be offering people the opportunity for a better life (2010: 
338). In this case, the flower industry imagines itself as a statelike institution, providing 
jobs and salaries, but also giving them health care in a remote area where the state does 
not reach.  
Although the Peruvian Agrarian Reform eliminated the figure of the landowner, 
this did not transform the social practices through which the state and its mediators 
subordinate the population. Therefore, the vertical and hierarchical relationship that 
characterized the relationships between NGOs‘ workers and the rural Quechuas in several 
ways mimics the hacendado-worker relationship that is now legitimized through formal 
education. Embedded in this relationship is paternalism, inherited from the hacienda 
time—becoming a clear example of the lack of change in the way different actors 
approached rural communities. This is a racialized relationship, that pervades almost all 




institutions) (Cf. Scarrit n/y: 28). Treated as children, race is used to blame rural 
Quechuas for their own exploitation, their own poverty, their lack of ambitions, their 
laziness and their lack of education the dominant racism blames the indigenous 
population for its failure to compete in the mestizo culture (Scarrit n/y: 27-9). In this 
scenario, NGOs and the state emerge as the group that guides and educates the ‗Indian‘ in 
Western knowledge. Through this, the state and its mediators reproduce the hierarchy that 
originally legitimized their domination and control over what they consider to be pre-
modern subjects. As I‘ve already discussed, this superiority is also practiced by the 
Peruvian intellectuals. 
2.  NGOs as social mediators: racial practices  
Statelike institutions and proxy states are hired by central governments to perform 
their duties, which often involved reaching isolated communities. NGOs are usually seen 
as a step ahead of the state because through their work they have acquired knowledge 
about particular regions, and they are financed by the international community. These 
institutions are hired to act as proxies of the state in geographical remote areas, 
developing political roles on behalf of the state, but using their own resources. 
Drawing upon some of the ideas presented by Scarrit (2005), I consider the state 
and its mediators as reproducers of the hierarchy of exclusion based on race. Therefore, 
the state and its mediators act as agents governing through the perpetuation of the caste 
division between Criollo/mestizos and indigenous groups. The rural/ urban division (that 
equates Creoles vs. Indians, modern vs. pre-modern, and educated vs. illiterate) nurtures 




face-to-face interactions, the state and its statelike institutions governs rural communities. 
By exerting its power over this population the state and its mediators reinforce practices 
of degradation and humiliation (for concrete examples see Huayhua 2010) that nurture 
patronage relationship with urban Criollo/mestizos (cf. de la Cadena 2000), usually 
embody by the state personnel.  
The mechanisms of racial domination are also exerted by local NGO workers, 
who use a double discourse. On one hand, they display the discourse of empowering 
indigenous communities through democratic practices highlight their citizenship, 
engaging in relationships of respect and equality. On the other hand, in-site sets of 
practices in the countryside NGO personnel display the legitimated hierarchical 
relationship and domination as legitimate representatives of Western education exert over 
what they considerr to be racialized Quechua communities.  
The racialized practices of the state have divided the Peruvian society in two 
groups: Criollo/mestizos who live in the city; and indigenous groups (‗Indians‘) living in 
the countryside. The term ‗Indio‘ (‗Indian‘) is problematic in Latin America, as I already 
explained in the introduction. Although I intend to avoid the use of ‗Indian,‘ choosing 
‗indigenous‘ and Quechua groups instead, the ‗Indian‘ is useful to illustrate how elites 
and NGOs personnel use it to ‗re-inscribe‘ racialized rural Quechuas. 
 Although race terminology is silenced and masqueraded with other categories 
like intelligence, formal education and morality, race is interpreted as differences in 
evolutionary traits that are presented in every sphere of social, political and cultural. Race 




communities are heavily racialized not only from the urban domain, but also amongst 
themselves. This is not a new practice, and my analysis in this section intends to show 
how statelike institutions, like the Peruvian academia, have ‗indianized‘ rural areas, 
keeping its population silent and dominated under the labels of illiteracy and 
‗marginality.‘  
For a long time, modernization has been seen as the paradigm of the Peruvian 
state‘s development. It was assumed that in order to achieve this, the first task was to 
modernize the countryside and its population.189 As it has previously explained, 
Quechua-speaking communities are seen as the major obstacle to achieving 
modernization and progress in Peru, because their traditional practices (farming and 
livestock) are seen as backward and hampering the development of the nation-state. This 
has been a major topic among scholars, NGOs and state officials who constantly argued 
to include the pre-modern indigenous communities into the modern structures of the 
nation-state. Juan Ossio, a well-known Andean anthropologist190 and the current Minister 
of Culture in Peru, explained that in 1983, eight journalists were killed by the population 
of Uchuraccay-Ayacucho (during the internal war) because this was a primitive group: 
 [Ossio‘s] approach explained that peasants [in Uchuraccay] acted as they did [killing 
the journalists] because there were two Peru: a modern one, which belonged to the 
urban and Western side of the country; and another 
primitive, where the peasants who killed the journalist were living, because 
this group belonged to a past world.191 (Chirif 2010) 
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 For an extended discussion of this topic, see Chapter 5 the section about modernization theory. 
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 Ossio is currently a professor of Anthropology at the Catholic University in Peru.  
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 ―Su enfoque, en el primer caso, fue señalar que los campesinos habían obrado como lo hicieron porque 
habían dos Perú: uno moderno, al cual pertenecía la parte urbana y occidentalizada del país; y el otro 
primitivo, donde estaban los campesinos que habían asesinado a los periodistas porque pertenecían a este 




The drastic division between a modern and primitive Peru does not take into account that 
the progress of the modern and Creole Peru was achieved because of the power and 
domination that this group has historically exerted over the indigenous one. Although this 
explanation was expressed almost 30 years ago, its ideology is still present among 
Peruvian intellectuals, scholars, NGO workers and state officials. In this sense, the 
position that Quechuas and the Amazon‘s groups have in the social hierarchy does not 
differ much, since both are seen as naturally illiterate and pre-modern. In a more recent 
interview, Ossio affirms that ‗we‘ (intellectuals and the state) need to teach the Amazon 
groups the benefits of modernity,  
―Journalist: Is it that [the natives in the Amazon] have a concept of development that is 
distinct from ours? 
Ossio: Exactly. They have distinct concepts.  
J: It is an entirely different world. And there is also an aversion toward whites? 
O: Yes. There is an aversion towards whites, who blame for taking what they owe—but 
the indigenous do not reject the state‘s benefits. That is, they are not against the benefits 
of modernity. The question is how do we find the means to grant and fulfil these needs? 
That is the problem.  
J: What are you going to say this Monday to President Alan Garcia when you meet in the 
Governor‘s Palace? 
O: I will tell him that we have to make the State reach these populations and better 
support them, that these populations do not understand these two legislative decrees nor 
the country‘s institutions. We must get more and better education to these 
populations.‖192 (Zárate 2008)  
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 ―-Periodista:¿Es que [los indígenas] tienen un concepto de desarrollo distinto al de nosotros? 
Ossio: Exactamente. Son concepciones distintas. 
 P:Es una concepción totalmente distinta del mundo ¿Aunque hay también una aversión hacia los blancos? 
Ossio: Así es. Hay una aversión hacia los blancos, pues les echan la culpa de que se hayan llevado lo que 
les correspondía, pero los nativos no están rechazando esas bondades. Es decir, no están en contra de los 
beneficios de la modernidad. La cuestión es cómo encontrar los medios para acceder a esta. Ahí está el 
problema. 
P:¿Qué le va a decir este lunes al presidente Alan García cuando se reúnan en Palacio de Gobierno?* 




Ossio embodies the superior position of the state official, intellectual and scholar, and 
from above the social hierarchy he considers indigenous groups as living outside of 
modernity, with aversive feelings toward the white population. He also explains that rural 
groups have a distinct concept of development, as if they did not live in the same 
temporal space as other urban groups (for a discussion, see Fabian 1983). Through this 
statement, Ossio legitimizes the responsibility of the state ‗to educate‘ (Sp. ‗hacer 
pedagogia‘) the indigenous pre-modern subjects about the benefits of the modern era that 
it is assumed they do not know. In this example, Ossio speaks as a state official but also 
as an intellectual authority that has given him his years as a professor of Anthropology 
and researcher. Therefore, the niche from where he talks is criss-crossed among the 
academia, NGOs and the state, producing a discourse that becomes valid within the three 
domains. In contrast to what may happen in the US, in Peru these three actors have 
developed conjoined discourses that have historically nurtured one and other‘s domains.  
 The division in Peru between modern and pre-modern implies a racial 
classification beyond physical features that refers to a racial ideology that legitimizes the 
power urban groups exert over rural communities. Thus, rural inhabitants are considered 
as ‗Indians‘ through euphemisms like ‗marginal,‘ ‗ignorant,‘ ‗pre-modern‘ and 
‗illiterate.‘  
2.1 Race, knowledge and education  
In Latin America we often find that race is defined on cultural rather than 
                                                                                                                                                 
comprenden en qué consisten los dos decretos legislativos ni la institucionalidad del país. Debemos hacer 




biological criteria (Wade 2003: 271). Changing the way a subordinate population is 
named, like shifting between ‗Indian‘ to ‗peasant‘ does not imply that previous meanings 
and hierarchical understandings of race are not acting. In this sense, de la Cadena‘s work 
about ‗indigenous mestizos‘ (2000) is particularly useful to understand how race and 
racism are active and practiced without being mentioned. Through the theoretical 
framework of the racial formation perspective, de la Cadena emphasizes that race is a 
political category whose meaning is shaped through struggle. Her work looks at how 
‗indigenous mestizos‘ in Cusco share with the elite the belief that formal education 
legitimates discrimination, turning racism into a hegemonic and silenced practice. De la 
Cadena‘s findings address important questions about the use of categories among 
different groups and the new meanings they imprint on them, calling our attention to the 
silent racism enacted within national, political, and academic discourses (de la Cadena 
2000).  
In the Peruvian political context, race seems to be absent from social 
relationships. However, when the state and statelike groups organize workshops they 
work with the pre-conceptions that ‗beneficiaries,‘ especially if they are monolingual 
Quechuas, need to be educated in the Western culture so the nation-state could 
successfully develop. The state, NGOs, Aid agencies and the Peruvian intelligentsia 
firmly believe that discrimination is legitimate if it is based on differences in formal 




indigenous about urban practices, like hygiene193. This approach is highly racist; as it is 
assumed that indigenous people should learn and adopt the urban culture in order to 
improve their lives, and further the progress of the nation-state. Within this discourse, 
formal education is seen as the tool to assimilate Andean inhabitants into society, 
establishing as a primordial requirement the use of Spanish as the main communication 
tool.  
Taking de la Cadena‘s ideas about cultural racism further, I argue that 
euphemisms like ‗marginal,‘ ‗illiterate‘ and ‗ignorant‘ mask ideas of race by reinforcing 
the urban/rural division imposed by the state and NGOs. This is important because 
statelike institutions working in the countryside call for the need to educate the rural 
population not for the sake of spreading schools, but rather looking to reduce differences 
between the Quechua monolinguals in the Criollo/mestizo society. In this context, 
‗Indian-ness‘ becomes the social condition that reflects the individual‘s failure to achieve 
educational improvement, and the consequent failure to be a modern citizen (de la 
Cadena 2000: 6). Therefore, ‗Indians‘ are those who live in the countryside, and have not 
achieved the social mobility granted by formal education and urban settlement. ‗Urban 
Indians‘ or ‗indigenous mestizos‘ are the successful group that combined a formal 
education with urban settlement, which has placed them above the rural ‗Indians.‘ The 
hegemonic ideology of racial hierarchy is reinforced by the practices of NGO workers 
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 Governmental social programs in Peru are oriented to ‗teach‘ the rural populations notions of urban 
hygiene. In this sense, rural Quechuas are coerced to follow practices that are not always suitable to be 
performed in extremely cold environments without the facilities of running water system. If they do not 
follow them, teachers and health personnel insult them by calling them ‗Indios‘ and animals. For a 




and state officials, and by the idea among rural Quechuas that formal education is the 
only way to stop being peasant (=‗Indian‘). 
The process of ‗de-Indianization‘ reveals complicity between dominant and 
subaltern groups in associating ‗Indians‘ with the rural Andean countryside, and 
identifying them as the most despicable members of society (de la Cadena 2000: 328). 
This not only allows racism to function as an ‗invisible‘ mean of classifying people, but 
also makes cultural racism unquestionable—even for those who believe they are working 
for a more participatory and democratic society (2000: 329). 
2.2 NGOs: working through social mediation  
During the last few decades social mediation has perpetuated the urban-rural 
division. NGOs are usually urban institutions operating in urban and rural settings. Over 
the years NGOs have understood the rural Andes as particular containers of poor, 
illiterate and marginal groups, statements that have been historically nurtured by social 
scientists in Latin America (for some examples see Fuenzalida 1970; Matos Mar, et al. 
1971[1975]; Theidon 2004). Dependency is one of the important theories that have 
deeply influenced their understanding of the subordinate group, at the same time calling 
for scholars to engage in practice in order to improve people‘s life conditions (for an 
extense discussion see Rochabrun 2009). Thus, during the Marxist fashion several 
scholars migrated and shared the positions of the NGOs and the academia, producing a 
fluent collaboration between them.  
The tradition of Peruvian NGOs is embedded in this frame. Thus, it is not 




the 1970s got together to affect social change through entering the world of development. 
The leftist militancy helped most of these NGOs to refine their ideology and principles, 
orienting them to understand the rural Andean space and its people in a particular way. 
On the path to understand rural communities, scholars and development workers have 
developed theories that have nurtured the hierarchy of difference, naturalizing differences 
and transforming them into structures of power and knowledge.    
If we understand that differences have been transformed into hierarchical 
relationships that overvalue formal education, we can maybe better approach how 
‗Indian‘ is a category undermined and denigrated through the structure of the state with 
the active collaboration of statelike institutions and academic discourses. The state 
system perpetuates the urban-rural division through envisioning rural Andean 
communities as ‗marginal communities.‘ In addition, the state system is structured in 
such a way that rural activities are seen not only as the most degraded and despised in the 
country, but the rural people themselves are seen as dispensable groups that do not 
contribute to the national economy (cf. Scarrit 2005). By staying removed from rural 
affairs, the state has given up its role in the ‗development‘ of the countryside, granting 
NGOs and aid agencies the power to govern rural communities. The racialized system 
reproduced in rural areas by these agents favours the isolation of rural villages from the 
larger society, by imposing a Western urban knowledge and a set of urban values (like 
the modern lifestyle) that collaborate in the framing of rural Quechuas as among the 
lower ranks of racial hierarchies.  




constructing the Peruvian society as two unrelated bodies. The construction of hierarchies 
and structures of power and knowledge are better seen when they are directly at play 
through different groups‘ discourses and interactions. In the following section I look at 
the relationships that two NGOs established with the rural population in Ayacucho. Both 
institutions currently work with the 1980s war victims through meetings and workshops. 
These activities were done in Ayacucho between 2008 and 2009.194  
2.2.1 COMISEDH: acting as statelike institution  
COMISEDH is a NGO that has worked in the Ayacucho region since 1979. 
Traditionally its line of work has been the defence of Human Rights, especially during 
the internal conflict of the 1980s. In 2008 COMISEDH agreed to collaborate with the 
state through the National Compensation Council (Sp. Concejo Nacional de 
Reparaciones-CNR), in order to speed up the information and registration processes of 
the 1980s victims. Although the population in rural communities expects to receive 
individual monetary compensations, at the time of the workshops the state was only 
granting them  access to free healthcare. 
COMISEDH‘s responsibility was to carry out informative workshops in the 
traditional areas of intervention in order to inform the population about the national 
compensation program. In these workshops, COMISEDH added the task of writing a 
letter. Therefore, each workshop ended with the collaboration of all the participants to 
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 Neither of these institutions worked in Chungui or Chapi because they consider that Chungui is an 
extremely isolated and dangerous community that has several security problems (drug mules passing 
through the communities). Instead both institutions worked in closer communities (maximum 4 hour drive 





prepare a letter to the National Compensation Council. These letters were supposed to be 
the participants‘ ideas of how the state should compensate them, and were sent to Lima 
so they could be incorporated as suggestions for the compensations program (see 
Appendix 7-1). Through this COMISEDH expected to include the beneficiaries as active 
participants in the process of compensation. However, these letters were written in 
Spanish—although they were discussed in Quechua—by NGO workers who influenced 
what people stated by re-shaping people‘s originally proposed ideas. The process is more 
complex than affirming that NGO workers erase the people‘s voices, because hegemony 
forces people to accept the workers‘ ideas as superior to theirs because of the formal 
education they received.   
 Like many other NGOs, people working in COMISEDH can be differentiated 
into two groups. One is composed of  professionals, lawyers and social scientists from 
Lima, who  perform as trainers and coordinators. The other group is composed of 
provincial professionals, who speak Quechua fluently and have degrees from the local 
university. This last group works as ‗staff,‘ as interpreters and participants in training-of-
trainers courses, which means that they are not usually in a significant position of power 
(Cf. Sampson 1996: 123) . In the same way that rural Quechuas are seen as backward and 
in need of the guidance of Western knowledge, provincial NGO workers are seen as staff 
that are good at communicating with the target population because they speak the 
language, yet they are rarely asked to act as coordinator or head of an important program.  
Milton is a social communicator from Huamanga who was acting as the 




for MIMDES (En. Secretary of Women and Development affairs) gathering information 
for the IV Peace Census.195 Months later, I found Milton working for COMISEDH as a 
workshop facilitator (Sp. promotor). Milton opened the workshop explaining to the 
audience what the compensation program for the 1980s war victims was, 
―¿Imataq chay reparación?, estadupa qillqamusanman qina nichkan, reparaciunkunaqa 
yanapakuykuna, chay sasachakuy ukupi sufriqkunapaq, chay tukuy dañukuna 
kawsasaqmanta reparasqa kanampaq, justamente kay reparacionkunaqa kansi 1980 
watamanta 2000 watakama chay violencia sufriqkunapaq, porque, a veces,wakinkunaqa 
pantankun, puntataqa karqam chay guerrillakunapas chaypi sufriqmi kani, 
yaykunmanchu chaypi sufriqkuna ninkun, manam chaykunapi sufriqkunaqa 
reparasqachu kanqaku, sino mas que nada, kay sasachakuy ukupi, chay violencia ukupi 
sufriqkunapaq, entonces chaymi ninchik, reparación llapa victimakunapa derechunmi, 
sufriqkunapaq derechunmi mañakunanmi chay reparaciunman, entonces estadupañataq 
obligaciunmi prácticamente‖ (Milton, canaria) 
[What does it mean the compensation? On what the estate has written says that there will 
be compensations, and help for those who have lived in a difficult time, for those who 
have suffered. So those who suffered can receive a compensation for all the harm that 
happened. It is said that these compensations began in 1980 until 2000 for those who suffered 
the time of violence. Sometimes, some people made a mistake by saying that they have also 
suffered when they acted as guides for the guerrillas, and asking if they can be benefited; for 
those who suffered there, there is not any compensation… [these compensations] are 
benefiting those who were excruciated with suffering during the hard time. It is because 
we say compensation is the right of all victims; for those who have suffered. They have 
the right to request to those who manage this system. It is the state‘s obligation.]  
Milton explained that people are entitled to receive the compensation provided by the 
state because they suffered during the 1980s internal conflict. However, each time he 
intervened he found the need to repeat that people have suffered (Qu. sufriqmi) during 
these years, as if his listeners did not know what they lived through during the 1980s.196 
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 The Peace Census is the census that the MINDES has developed to keep track of the number of internal 
war victims and their needs. The compensation program is supposed to be working with the data provided 
by these censuses. 
196
 Milton grew up in Huamanga city, where the war was less violent than in rural areas. However, Milton 
finds the need to repeat and reinforce to its audience that they lived a terrible war as if he needed to 




His quote repeats the word ‗suffering‘ in almost every line, as if he needed to frame an 
environment to legitimize people‘s demands for compensation. However, at the same 
time, by repeating ‗suffering‘ so many times he was seemingly implying that they are 
ignorant about their own experiences during the war.  
Later, when I interviewed Milton, he explained to me his role within these 
workshops, and, in a way, his reasons to use this particular language, 
 Through this program, obviously using their native language, we explained what the 
reparations process consisted of. So many were perhaps not exactly clear on what the 
process was, but they did want more. People in the countryside want to be told what to 
do… in a manner of speaking, they just want a more straightforward explanation. They 
want someone to tell them ―look, you know what, this is how things are done, this way.‖ 
Sometimes people in the countryside are a bit shy, or I don‘t know, perhaps it is just their 
way, no? Within their own group...(and the leaders generally are men)... the men 
formulate the opinions, and the women talk amongst themselves saying, "Yes well, having 
said that, how will things be?"; amongst themselves the women still wonder, but no... 
They do not dare to ask questions. They want more personal explanations, more concrete 
explanations.197 (Milton, Interview in Huamanga) 
Milton carefully looks to distance himself from the rural population by placing himself as 
a non-native Quechua speaker. Although he manages Quechua very well, and this is 
probably the reason why he was hired as a facilitator, he does not want to be identified as 
rural Quechua. The hierarchy between rural and urban and the connotations each of them 
carry, like education, are at play; not only in Milton‘s relationship with people in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
him of repeating how much people suffered during the war, because his discourse is supported on his urban 
and educated background that positions him above his listeners. 
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 ―A través del programa, lógicamente nosotros utilizando su idioma natal decíamos en qué consistía este 
proceso de reparaciones. Entonces, muchos no lo tenían tal vez tan claro, pero querían más. La gente del 
campo quiere que se le explique...cómo quien dice, quiere en realidad una explicación más 
próxima.[Quieren]que alguien les diga ―mira, sabes qué, así es, de esta manera.‖ A veces la gente del 
campo es un poco tímida, o no sé, tal vez será su forma ¿no? Cuando está en grupo se miran entre ellos... y 
los líderes generalmente son varones. Y los varones opinan, y las mamás entre ellas conversan ―sí pues, 
está hablando esto, ¿cómo será?‖; entre ellas siguen preguntándose, pero no...No se atreven a preguntar 





field, but also in the relationship he established with me as an urban Limeña 
anthropologist. Moreover, in the quote Milton implied that the educational level of the 
audience demands a simple discourse, one capable of providing explicit examples that are 
relevant to them. He also addresses the idea that he is dealing with an illiterate group; 
when he asserts that they need simple explanations, he is implying that the group lacks 
the capacity to understand complex ideas. Through this argument Milton also explained 
the lack of questions during meetings, assuming that people do not understand the main 
topic of the workshop. This ideology reinforces the idea of an urban educated mind that 
produces complex ideas that the rural illiterate Quechua-speakers cannot grasp.  
 Milton places himself in a superior position granted by the level of education he 
achieved, and his condition as urban settler. However, his excellent command of 
Quechua seems to act as an important bridge between his urban status and the rural 
beneficiaries he works with. His parents were traders from a rural community in 
Huancasancos (a southern Ayacucho province), and the internal conflict forced them to 
migrate to Huamanga. Milton considers himself as having surpassed his rural origins 
through his achievements in his professional career. Thus, within his imagined identity he 
is above rural groups, because of the hierarchical position given to him by his formal 
education and college degree. The way reality and racial differences are constructed fit in 
to a hierarchy that places native Spanish-speakers above native Quechua-speakers, an 
opposition that parallels the urban/rural and educated/ignorant categories. Milton 
embodies this division, and the transition from ‗Indian‘ to non-Indian; he is not a rural 




particularly worried about distancing himself from them. Within the urban imaginary, 
Milton has surpassed the Quechua rural and illiterate condition, by achieving education in 
the city, and consequently ‗de-indianizing‘ him. In this sense, race ideologies pervade the 
practices of everyday life, the urban/rural and Spanish/Quechua relationships becoming 
particularly racialized within the context of which statelike institutions and NGOs work.   
 When the workshops seems to get out of control, with people (interrupting and) talking 
over each other, the NGO facilitators and workers look to embody the discipline and 
order that their Western knowledge and urban background has given them. In this 
context, the racialized hierarchical structure in which the workshop functions is 
reinforced and legitimized, but rarely challenged 
This is a matter of ordering your responses-- please, in due time!! This is not a 
free-for-all! (Rene, Pampa Cangallo) 
[―…Bien por cuestión de orden las réplicas, ¡¡por favor en su debido momento!! 
¡Ésto no es un coliseo de Gallos!‖]  
Comments comparing beneficiaries to animals are common in the rural Andes. These 
have become daily practices that look to subordinate rural subjects to the lowest possible 
rank, through comparing them to animals (for an extense analysis see the discussion on 
chapter 3, Huayhua 2010). Using comparisons between rural inhabitants and animals 
expresses the deeply despised beliefs that the non-Indian members of Peruvian society 
have toward rural Quechuas. This is not only a hierarchy supported on racial ideologies 
comparing people‘s behaviour to animal fights, but it also expresses the racialized 
imagery of how Quechuas are closer to animals than the non-Indian group.  
COMISEDH‘s specific role within these meetings is confusing for those who 




COMISEDH is informing them of a state project and acting as a statelike institution. It is 
interesting to note that the NGO only recognizes that it is ‗collaborating‘ with the state, 
without aligning itself with it or its policies. Not recognizing that in this context it is 
acting as a statelike institution produces major confusions among the beneficiaries, who 
demand proper attention from the state, and do not understand why an NGO is carrying 
out this project,  
―kay registro único de victimas ruwanampaq encargasqa kachkan exactamente kay 
institución kay Consejo de Reparaciones nisqan, kaytam encargamuchkan estado kay 
registro único de victimas ruwarinampaq. Pero lamentablemente kay Consejo de 
Reparaciuniswan mana riki presupuestuta estado urqumunchu, mana qullqiyuq 
kachkan… imatataq ruwarinqa? […]Qina imatan ruwarimuchkanku kay Consejo de 
Reparaciones? Maskachkanku hukaqkuna yanaparinanta, entonces paykunam nink 
‗manam registro ruwanaykupaqa mana kanchu qullqi,‘ entonces paykuna ruwasanchik 
huk conveniuta, Municipiokunawan, kay Derechos Humanos[COMISEDH], chay ukupi 
llankaq Instituciunkunawan. Chayman qinam wawqi panikuna ari kay Comisión de 
derechos humanos, por ejemplo ari yanapawachkanku, kay registro Único de victimas 
ruwaywan.‖(Milton, Canaria) 
[To do the victims registry is in charge this institution, this, that is named National 
Council of Compensations. This was created by the state, to do the register. But this… the 
state does not have the budget, thus the Council does not have the money, what can do it 
without money? […] so what is this Council doing? They are looking for the help of 
others, they said that they do not have money to make the victims registry, so they are 
making an agreement with the municipality, [and?] with this COMISEDH… with those 
who work in these institutions, according to that brothers and sisters, yes this 
COMISEDH is helping to make the registry.] 
Although Milton explains that COMISEDH is helping (Qu. yanapawachkanku) the 
National Compensation Program, this NGO is acting as a statelike institution, dropping 
its title of ‗non-governmental.‘ Milton explains that the state does not have money, so it 
asks for help from municipalities and organizations like COMISEDH. However, people 
get confused about each institution‘s role and responsibilities, 
Good doctor… tell me why in support of rural peoples that have suffered these social ills, 
only certain NGOs are assuming [the responsibility]... Why not the government? Why not 




nerve to still preside as president?198 (Male #12, Canaria) 
This last quote addresses the problem of the state as an institution that does not attend to 
people‘s needs. The beneficiaries demand the state be held responsible in the post-war 
context. This however becomes distorted, since the NGO is indeed there acting as the 
state. After this confrontation in the workshop, neither Milton (the facilitator) nor the 
other workers of COMISEDH answered to ‗defend‘ the state. Instead of an ally, the state 
is perceived as an antagonist actor. And the NGO, which in this context is acting as a 
statelike institution, does not clarify this. Looking to keep itself in its NGO role, 
COMISEDH does not recognize that it is embodying the state, which is problematic 
because it is, from its perspective, reinforcing the idea that the state does not care about 
those who suffered the violence during the 1980s. When NGOs perform the state‘s role, 
they do not drop their non-governmental status, transforming themselves into ambivalent 
agents.  
According to COMISEDH, it is not only collaborating with the state within a 
formal agreement that transforms it in to a statelike institution; but it is also avoiding 
being recognized as performing the state‘s duty, stressing only its role as an 
‗independent‘ NGO, 
―Entonces kunamkama manam kanchu, no hay apoyo en la salud mental por ejemplo, 
pero al menos por ejemplo COMISEDH, wakin llaqtakunapi chay ancha ancha sufriq 
llaqtakunapi, chayaykuspaku, por ejemplo yanaparirakuña en atención psicosocial 
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solamente los ONGs particulares están asumiendo… ¿y por qué no asume el gobierno? el actual quien ha 






nisqampi, salud mental nisqan proyectuwan chayanku […]Chaypi llankarimunku, chaypi 
puro psicólogos rinku llankariq, sufriqkunawan ari huñunakuykunku y llamkarinku 
nisayman qinapas chay soporte psicológico emocional nisqankunawan paykuanapa 
llankayninkun chaykunaqa.‖ (Milton, Canaria) 
[…until now there is not any help, any support in mental health for example, but at least 
for example COMISEDH in other villages, it has brought help to villages where people 
have undergone a profound, really profound suffering. For example, they have helped on 
what is called mental health programs. They have brought a project called Mental 
Health. They have worked there only psychologists, they were working with those who 
suffered, yes, they have meetings in which they have worked. As I am telling that is called 
psychological emotional support.]  
As many other NGOs in Peru, besides acting as a statelike institution, COMISEDH is 
developing mental health projects financed by international donors. Yet should this not 
be the state‘s work? NGOs are local agents and have a small-scale impact when 
compared with the impact that the state may have. However, it needs to be acknowledged 
that in many cases the state does not seem interested in investing in topics like mental 
health programs for post-war communities, and its priorities are elsewhere. In this 
context, NGOs like COMISEDH develop projects in certain communities that are 
‗randomly‘ chosen, which nurtures the thought that since the state cannot afford projects 
like this in rural areas, NGOs should do it.If we only analyse the discourse used by the 
facilitators and COMISEDH‘s workers, this is an NGO helping the state that maintains its 
impartiality by criticizing the state and its poor attention to the 1980s victims, 
―Bueno señores justamente nirqanchik kay Plan Integral de Repaciones ña 
unanchakamuchkanña, entonces ñuqanchikqa qatipananchikmi chay leyta, chay leypa 
qipampi mana kaspaqa imatam aypasunchik ,manachayqa qillqasqalla chiki kedanqa, 
ñuqanchik insistinchikpiqa siempre incomodasun estaduta, solo así podemos lograr todo 
lo que dice aquí en el plan integral de reparaciones‖ (Milton, Pampa Cangallo) 
[Good , this, that is called the National Compensation Plan and it has existed for many 
years. Thus we have to be benefited under that law, if we do not use that law/ if we are 
not pushing that law what we will obtain? Otherwise that law will remain as written law. 




Milton explains the position of COMISEDH before the state, arguing that they aim to and 
will force the state to accomplish all that has been stated in the National Compensation 
Program, even if this means that they ‗make the state feel uncomfortable.‘ By asserting 
this, he claims that the state does not interact with rural inhabitants, and asserts the NGO 
as the legitimate mediator that will ensure the state accomplishes its program. By placing 
the state far from the rural population, COMISEDH nurtures people‘s idea of a distant 
state that does not care for Andean inhabitants, situating itself as mediator necessary to 
supervise a fair response.  
NGOs create and nurture their roles as mediator, situating themselves between the 
state and the population and creating the idea that rural communities need their support in 
order to be listened and attended. Through performing the role of mediator, COMISEDH 
denies rural subjects the power and the active role that they could perform, removing 
them from any direct interaction with the state. This produces a situation in which rather 
than including beneficiaries as respected actors in a conjoined task, it is a context in 
which the NGO acts as the ‗big brother‘ that protects the community from having a direct 
relationship with the state. By protecting rural subjects from direct interaction with the 
state, NGOs become legitimized mediators that speak for rural communities as if they 
were their representatives. In creating this relationship, Quechua subjects depend on the 
mediation role performed by NGOs to connect to the state, which makes individuals 
heavily dependent on this relationship every time they look to connect with the state 
(Scarrit n/y). Paradoxically, along with trying to incorporate people‘s voices in the 




these groups from getting involved in a direct relationship with the state.  
Bettina is a lawyer working in the headquarters of COMISEDH in Lima. She was 
asked to be present in every workshop, so that she could represent the people in the 
meetings with the National Compensation Council in Lima. It was interesting to see that 
nobody questioned why this Limeña lawyer was the one informing state officials about 
how much people had suffered during the internal conflict. Instead, her presence seemed 
to guarantee the influx of people‘s claims to Lima. Taking this further, we can see how 
Western knowledge achieved through formal education becomes the sole/only condition 
listened to by the state. Rather than challenging this, COMISEDH reproduces this 
hierarchy within its practices on the countryside. Therefore, Quechuas who are supposed 
to benefit from these workshops are excluded from the process of interacting with the 
state, because they ‗do not know‘ (ignorant and illiterate) as much as the people of 
COMISEDH do. In this context, Bettina becomes a legitimated representative of people‘s 
demands to the state. 
 Bettina is placed in a pre-determined hierarchical relationship in which she is the 
‗doctor‘ (the lawyer) coming from Lima with the power to inform officials in Lima about 
people‘s claims. In the field, COMISEDH purports to listen to the people and carry out 
their demands through the letters sent to Lima. These letters were written in Spanish 
within the workshops, they were written in Spanish by Bettina following a structured and 
pre-defined format requiring the use of the language of the state. Through this process, 
when one reads these letters they do not seem to fairly represent the complexity of the 




 Although I witnessed the process by which the letters were conjointly written, the 
outline of the demands was subtly coached by facilitators. The discussions were done in 
Quechua; but the way questions were framed and oriented to trigger ideas for discussion 
projected the NGO‘s ideology and agenda. In the first workshop, local authorities were 
advised to demand for the exhumation of clandestine burials. The facilitator directed the 
authorities toward demanding the exhumation of the victims of Umasi. Milton not only 
suggested that exhumation could be one of people‘s demands, but he also looked for 
Umasi‘s authorities to make eye contact, so they could state this demand. This is a very 
delicate situation because it is not so simple as stating that people are being manipulated 
because the demand did not originate from the participants, but it does show the 
significant influence of NGO facilitators. The line between what people said and what the 
NGO expected that would be said becomes blurred, especially because often people 
hegemonically accept what the NGO suggests. When I asked people why they do not 
question this, my informants often affirmed that ‗the people from the NGO know better 
because they are educated;‘ through this assertion they justified and legitimized the lower 
position they have into the social hierarchy, and the ‗better‘ ideas that NGOs‘ workers 
may have for the benefit of the community. In this context, it is assumed that NGOs have 
good intentions, although these may also be questioned in other contexts (see the next 
section). 
In the actual Peruvian political context, NGOs and Human Right activists support 
the National Compensations Program. Within this group there are NGOs who believe that 





One looks justice, therefore, look for the responsible of the death, the disappearance of a 
person to be punished, imprisoned for example. Compensations are another matter. What 
we have said about economic compensation, compensation in health, collective housing, 
that is a different process. It is not mandatory to make a complaint or have a judicial 
process [open] for a missing person ... to be compensated is not mandatory. It is only 
point at the time of that everything happened ... then there are two different processes: 
one is justice and the other is compensations.199 (Bettina, Pampa Cangallo) 
The way that COMISEDH understands both processes is interesting. One perspective is 
the justice that may be achieved in the courtroom; while the other is the compensation 
granted by the state. However, Bettina explains them as if these were two separate things, 
rather than components of the same process. In general, during my fieldwork I have seen 
more rural communities ask for (monetary) compensations, than demand justice in the 
courtroom. Nevertheless, this does not mean that people do not think economic 
compensations are a way to achieve justice, or at least the justice that the state can give 
them. In chapter 5 some of the ideas that emerged when state officials and Chunguinos 
met were discussed; however, more research about this topic needs to be done if we 
intend to better understand what the meaning of compensations is for the rural 
population. 
In COMISEDH‘s workshop, petitions for justice do not emerge when people talk 
about compensations, and this makes me question how people understand the program. 
This is important because this may actually reflect COMISEDH‘s agenda, rather than 
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 ―uno busca justicia, entonces se busca al responsable de la muerte, que la desaparición de una persona 
sea castigada, encarcelado por ejemplo. Reparaciones es otra cosa. Lo que hemos dicho reparación 
económica, reparación en salud, vivienda colectiva, eso es otro proceso diferente, no es obligator io haber 
hecho una denuncia o tener un proceso judicial [abierto] por una persona desaparecida…para ser 
reparado no es obligatorio [la denuncia]. Basta señalar en el momento del registro todo lo que paso,… 





people‘s voices. In Chapter 5, in the two meetings Chunguinos had with state officials the 
population did not explicitly demand for justice; however, they explained that they 
consider it the state‘s responsibility to compensate them for not protecting their 
community during the years of war. Milton, as do many other NGO‘s workers, do not 
consider rural Quechuas to be looking for justice,  
 [...] on the topic of justice there has to be a responsible. There is someone in fault, 
possibly is having a position. And people said «Yes, but we must leave this to the Lord, he 
is going to punish them. What we will do? It is over [the years of violence] but for 
everything he has done, he will pay [in another world] ... God will take care. Why to file 
a lawsuit? and... when will this arrive[ Justice]! When he will be condemned? Until we 
are behind the trial, we will be death. It is better this way, just like that »... Who gets the 
justice? People with money, but we are poor, what can we do from here?200… (Milton, 
Ayacucho) 
According to Milton, rural Quechuas are not interested in justice, as if the compensation 
program were not also a mechanism to achieve this. However, through a straightforward 
interpretation, Milton assumes that people do not actively seek justice, which places 
Quechuas as passive subjects who do not fight for their rights. Rather than sharing this 
conclusion, I find it important to understand people‘s explanations in the context in which 
they are produced, and to avoid extrapolating these quotes as general truths. People in the 
countryside constantly use the judiciary system, and this is supported by a long tradition 
of struggles that communities have sustained against their neighbours (for an example see 
Poole 2004). However, people barely use this to look for justice for the internal conflict‘s 
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 ―[…] en cuanto al tema de justicia tiene que haber un responsable. Hay un culpable, posiblemente está 
ocupando cargo. Y la gente decía: « Sí, pero hay que dejarlo a Diosito, él se va a encargar de castigar. 
Nosotros qué vamos a hacer, ya pasó eso, pero, por todo lo que ha hecho, allá lo pagará [en otro 
mundo]...Dios ya se encargará. ¿Por qué iniciar juicios? y... ¡cuándo te llegará eso [la justicia]! ¡Cuándo 
lo condenarán! Hasta que estemos detrás del juicio, nos va a llegar la muerte. Mejor que quede así no 
más‘… ¿Quién recibe la justicia? La gente de plata, pero nosotros pobladores que somos pobres, ¿qué 





crimes. During the war years, when people approached state officials (police, military, 
Prosecutor office, etc.) to denounce any crimes performed by the army, the state 
answered by defending the army‘s responsibility. In this sense, possibly people do not 
look for justice in the courtroom because prosecutors have not been helpful in the past. In 
fact, in many cases prosecutors were forced to drop charges because the state (as 
institution) does not take an interest in denouncing the army. In this sense, the problem is 
not that rural inhabitants do not understand the idea of justice; the problem is that the 
Peruvian judicial system is not independent from the central government.  
The gold mine: selling human suffering 
During the last few years the proximity between NGOs and the state has become 
more evident, through the conjoint development of state programs. Although this is not 
new, COMISEDH‘s president was surprised that people recognized this, 
There is a public statement of organizations of relatives of the victims, and they say 
'NGOs and the state are over there. We are over here (social organizations).‘ And NGOs-
- us, right? that is, they are also us, but I am referring to many others with good will, 
with effort, they have joined them. That is what they put here. And they demand of the 
state and NGOs effective implementation of compensations: ‗Enough lies, enough using 
our pain ... 'As you listen. You can feel a great frustration, sadness ... in that period of 
transitional justice: truth, justice, compensations, reconciliation, etc. in all these cases 
NGOs are involved, and grassroots have finally seeing them aligned with the state.201 
(Pablo Rojas, COMISEDH) 
Pablo is one of the founding members of COMISEDH, and he has been its President 
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 ―Hay un pronunciamiento público de las organizaciones de familiares y ellos dicen ‗las ONGs y el 
Estado están por allá. Nosotros estamos por acá (organizaciones sociales).‘ Y las ONGs nosotros ¿no? o 
sea, también nosotros, pero me estoy refiriendo a muchas otras que con muy buena voluntad, con esfuerzo, 
que se han plegado a ellos. Eso ponen acá. Y...demandan al Estado y a las ONGs el cumplimiento efectivo 
de las reparaciones: ‗basta de mentiras, basta de usar nuestro dolor...‘ Así como lo escuchas. Entonces 
puedes sentir una enorme frustración, una tristeza… en ese ejercicio de justicia transicional: verdad, 
justicia, reparaciones, reconciliación, etc. en todo eso las ONGs están metidas, y las organizaciones 




during several periods. His close involvement with human rights organizations and with 
the PTRC‘s recommendations has been expressed through several projects oriented to 
improve people‘s lives in the aftermath of the war. However, he does not accept that 
COMISEDH and other NGOs are identified by the population as being on the side of the 
state, as statelike institutions. In this quote, Pablo implies that rather than be seen as the 
organic expressions of grassroots organizations, people consider them to be aligned with 
the state. This is interesting because Pablo does not acknowledge that there is a 
hierarchical difference between NGOs and grassroots organizations, like the Organization 
of the Families of the Disappeared (Sp. Asociación de familiares de desaparecidos). 
Thus, even though Peruvian intellectuals see themselves as an element of grassroots 
organizations, they are hierarchically above it.202 In the same way Bettina is seen as a 
legitimate representative of people‘s demands in COMISEDH‘s workshops, Pablo sees 
himself as acting on behalf of a group that has placed NGOs on the side of the state, 
rather than alongside the grassroots. 
During my fieldwork in Peru, I witnessed some groups complaining about the 
work of NGOs, especially in regions like Ayacucho that where heavily affected by the 
internal conflict. People in rural communities affirm that these institutions have ‗gotten 
rich off people‘s suffering and pain.‘ This belief is nurtured by a prolific production of 
films, documentaries, novels, books, etc. in which the internal conflict has been 
portrayed, including people‘s misery during these years. The mistrust communities 
express towards NGOs is important because it reveals that people are not receiving 
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 This clearly contrasts the hierarchy that NGO workers legitimized in the countryside when comparing 




answers to their demands. Taking this forward, I would suggest that this may be a process 
that also questions the relationship between NGOs and communities, and the legitimated 
representation the former has upon the latter. In other words, it challenges the legitimated 
mediation that NGOs perform while speaking for rural communities. Through this, the 
manner and effectiveness of the use of people‘s suffering by NGOs is questioned, and 
heard by the international community. Pablo continues this by arguing  
[The boy] raged against TV Cultura with hate, with a contained thing no?, saying «you 
thrive on our pain, and since you have gathered all this ... they have been out with all of 
this, all those festivals ... » But the issue that you going to a festival does not mean that 
you are wining prizes, is not it?, but you could win «... then all these awards they are 
thousands of dollars that you have put in your pockets at the cost of our pain ...» Hey, 
before that was a boy, he was a sweet person, and so, it appears as he has completely 
changed, he spoke with a resentment that left his soul ... « And we are the same and 
worse. Instead you ... » he said. It was a tremendous intervention, which also made it 
absolutely baffled the people of TV Cultura, a charming people, beautiful, committed, 
who works with a high level of quality, etc. etc.. and who that is very sensitive, and I 
know her very well .... They were absolutely shocked with this.203 (Pablo Rojas, 
COMISEDH) 
TV Cultura is a Peruvian organization of social communicators whose mission is to 
strengthen national identity through the democratization of communications and 
networking alternatives. They have produced documentaries and short films based on the 
stories recounted by the PTRC.204 In the last quote, Pablo attempts to explain the way in 
which people are loaded with resentment and believe that organizations like TV Cultura 
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 ―[El chico] despotricó contra TV Cultura con un odio, con una cosa contenida ¿no?, diciendo «ustedes 
se nutren de nuestro dolor, y desde que han recogido todo esto...ahí sale pues han ido a  todo esto, todos 
esos festivales...» Y que tú vayas a un festival no significa que ganes premios ¿no?, pero podrías ganarlos 
«...entonces todos esos premios son miles de dólares que ustedes se han embolsicado a costa de nuestros 
dolor...» Oye, antes de eso era un chico, era una dulzura; y asi, se aparece como un chico totalmente 
cambiado, que hablaba con un resentimiento que le salía del alma... «Y nosotros seguimos igual y peor. En 
cambio ustedes...» les dijo. Fue una intervención tremenda, que además los dejó absolutamente 
desconcertados a la gente de TV Cultura, que es una gente encantadora, hermosísima, comprometida; que 
trabaja con un altísimo nivel de calidad, etc. etc., y que es muy sensible, y que yo la conozco muy bien.... 
Estaban absolutamente golpeados con esto.‖ 
204




are profiting from their suffering and pain. Like the previous quote, rather than trying to 
understand people‘s frustrations, Pablo expresses his surprise that people claim 
institutions are getting rich upon people‘s suffering. In contrasti, I find that this is an 
important complaint that expresses people‘s feelings and mistrusts. Later in the interview, 
Pablo states that these demands have been provoked by the many years people have been 
telling their stories without receiving any concrete answer from the state. In this context, 
people feel frustrated because the only thing they see is the recognition that these 
institutions received, while they themselves are kept at the margins of a scenario where 
they are supposed to be the actors, but are not. By speaking for rural communities and 
mediating between them and the state, NGOs have erased and silenced the Quechua 
subject from the scene.  
2.2.2 Paz y Esperanza: enacting as the state 
Paz y Esperanza (En. Peace and Hope) is a Christian NGO that works in many 
communities across Peru, including Ayacucho.205 One of its most important projects to 
date was the exhumation of bodies in the community of Putis from a 1984 massacre at the 
hands of the Peruvian army. Along with this, they are leading a judicial process against 
the army members involved in this crime.206 Paz y Esperanza claims that justice should 
not be politically traded with the current Compensation Program, and it has started a 
national campaign to prosecute the military personnel responsible for the Putis‘ massacre.  
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 For more information see http://www.pazyesperanza.org/ 
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This project is based on the original demands put forth by Putis‘ inhabitants to 
exhume the bodies of the massacre victims. Supported by the Peruvian Team of Forensic 
Anthropology, the project exhumed and recognized around 20 victims in 2009. This was 
achieved through the legal advice performed by Paz y Esperanza, and the financial 
support given by the international community. Although the director of Paz y Esperanza 
argues that the core of this campaign emerged from the Putis‘ Victims Association, their 
original claim was only the exhumation,  
―... They were demanding all the time for the exhumation. They said that their relatives‘ 
remains were at ground level, that there was a risk to be lost ... and that was their pain 
and whenever they came they spoke about that. So for them, I suppose, it was a painful 
thing pass by there, feeling that their loved ones were there and are not buried. And they 
demanded on their side, and we also requested the prosecutor office to act, therefore 
each time they came we took it to the prosecutor‘s office. That is how we have been 
entering, then we have insisted that exhumations should be done.‖207 (Nolberto, Paz y 
Esperanza) 
Nolberto interpreted people‘s claim to bury their relatives within what he thinks they 
share with him as Human Rights; which means to exhume the clandestine burial and 
starting a judicial process against the perpetrators of this extrajudicial execution. At the 
moment of the interview, I did not question the different meanings at play in this quote; 
but later I realize that people in Putis were not asking for either the exhumation nor 
consequent judiciary process that Paz was attributing to their claims. First, it is important 
to clarify that people used to walk through the clandestine burial in order to go to their 
fields, and they were able to see the bones emerging to the surface which probably scared 
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 ―…ellos pedían en todo momento la exhumación. Decían que sus restos están a flor de tierra, que había 
riesgo que se perdiera…y eso era el dolor de ellos y siempre que venían nos hablaban de eso. Entonces 
para ellos supongo que sería una cosa dolorosa pasar siempre por allí, sentir que están allí sus seres 
queridos y no están enterrados. Y ellos hicieron llegar por su lado y nosotros también pedíamos que la 
fiscalía actué, entonces cada vez que venían lo llevábamos a la fiscalía, así ya hemos estado entrando, 




them. In the Andes people believe that when people die, the soul of the death (Sp. alma) 
hovers around its home for eight days, and the alma‘s influence is felt as malevolent and 
dangerous. When almas cannot cross to the Hanan Pacha (En. Heaven) because they 
were sinful individuals during their lives, they become a kukuchi condemned to wander 
around the glaciers of Qoyllur Rit‘i where they eat people (Allen 1988: 38-48). Taking 
this to other contexts, the dead need to rest peacefully, otherwise they start wondering 
and bothering those who are living. In other words, when people in Putis affirm that they 
see the bones of their relatives, they are not demanding for an exhumation, they are likely 
claiming for a proper burial, so the almas will not bother the living. 
 Although the original claim came from the relatives of those killed in 1983, 
Nolberto considers the role played by the NGO to be key in carrying out the exhumation 
and receiving media coverage on the process, 
― [...] We should recognize the valuable work of Paz y Esperanza. If Paz had not 
intervened, probably at this point they would still fight to make legal medicine to 
intervene. [...] Probably, now families alone could not have done much. What happens is 
that NGOs in particular those on Human Rights issues, we do have these experiences in 
having impact, raising their voices a little, and also they have well-paid lawyers who can 
pursue the case. But the case raised by the context, because this case was published and 
there is a reaction. Moreover, when the big chains of communication raise an issue, 
other small ones bounce [...] they replicated information from the BBC, CNN, finally this 
is the thing‖.208 (Nolberto, Paz y Esperanza) 
According to Nolberto, a significant part of what has been done in Putis is due to the 
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 ―[…] hay que reconocer el r valioso trabajo de Paz y Esperanza. Si Paz no hubiese intervenido, 
probablemente a estas alturas seguirían peleando con medicina legal para que intervengan allí. […] 
Probablemente, ahora los familiares solos no hubiesen podido hacer [gran cosa]. Lo que pasa es que las ONGs 
sobre todo en derechos humanos tenemos estas experiencias de hacer incidencias, de levantar un poco la voz, 
además tener un poco de abogados bien pagados que puedan dedicarse al caso. Pero el caso se levantó tanto 
por la coyuntura porque este caso se publica y hay reacción. Además cuando las grandes cadenas de 
comunicación levantan un tema, los otros pequeños rebotan […] replican información de la BBC de Londres, 





work this NGO has done. Although NGOs have the power to be heard as urban educated 
intellectuals, and even though the organizations call attention to critical issues and often 
with the support of the international media, it is also important to acknowledge that as an 
institution in a higher position of power, Paz may have directed the community and the 
process toward its own agenda. At the time of my fieldwork it was impossible to 
distinguish between people‘s original demands and the ensuing process that involved the 
opening of a legal case against the state. However, the exhumation to be legally valid 
needs to be investigated in the courtroom according to the Peruvian legal system. 
 However, it may be important to question to whom this justice project belongs: if it is a 
joint proposal, between a rural community and the NGO, or if this is Paz‘s project in 
which the local community has little or participation. This is an important question if we 
seek to understand how NGOs‘ mediation plays an important role crafting the voices they 
represent. From the data collected during my fieldwork, I find that Paz y Esperanza 
decided to carry out a Justice project for Putis‘ inhabitants. Legally, once the exhumation 
is done there is a judiciary process to convict those who are found responsible. However, 
this does not necessarily mean that people in Putis were looking for this.  
 I went out to Putis with Paz to participate in a workshop as an observer. The goal 
of the meeting was to organize the community for activities that would commemorate the 
anniversary of the massacre. Two weeks later I observed the public ceremony held in 
Huamanga. The workshop that Paz y Esperanza carried on in Putis was led by a lawyer 
from Huamanga who did not speak Quechua. The most interesting ideas about Putis 




―These are war-torn communities ... On December 13th it will be the 24th anniversary of 
the Putis massacre. There are coming regional and state authorities; we expect the 
arrival of a great number of people for all the things we will do. With this Putis enters the 
history of the government, because of the exhumation.‖ 209 (Fieldnotes Alex, Paz y 
Esperanza) 
For Alex—Paz‘s lawyer—the exhumation process has granted Putis the right to enter in 
the official history. The publicity provoked by the exhumation has granted Putis‘ 
inhabitants the public status of ‗war victims‘ and has also mobilized state agencies to 
channel the implementation of infrastructure projects, such as a school and a health 
clinic. The way this is framed implies that the recognition of the existence of the 
community is granted because there was a massacre and an exhumation; through this 
producing the idea that they only exist because they are ‗victims.‘ 
 During the workshop Alex declared 
―Justice is one of the rights that have been uprooted from you, and this cannot be only 
temporary. The state must provide you with minimum civil rights. Only 30 bodies have 
been identified, the identification of the other 60 has been possible yet... they have to 
unite, support the president of the victims association for the 13th (the anniversary day of 
Putis massacre) to make their demands. [...] In addition the day 13th, Marisela Quispe of 
the National Compensation Registry will give Putis victims the proper identification tags. 
The Mayor of Huanta will lay the first stone for the cemetery / monument.‖ 210 (Alex, Paz 
y Esperanza) 
The ceremony planning to commemorate 24 years since the Putis massacre was expected 
to be an important event, and Alex stresses this. Not only would it be the first time Putis 
would be recognized as an affected community by the 1980 internal conflict, but this 
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 ―son comunidades arrasadas por la guerra… El 13 de diciembre se cumplen 24 años de la 
matanza de Putis. Van a venir autoridades del gobierno regional y del estado, se espera que venga 
una mayor cantidad de gente por todo lo que vamos a hacer. Con esto Putis entra a la historia del 
gobierno, por la exhumación.‖ 
210
 ―La justicia es uno de los derechos que se les ha arrancado, y esta no puede ser solo provisional. El estado 
debe les debe brindar derechos mínimos. Sólo se han podido identificar 30 cuerpos, la identificación de los otros 
60 aún no ha sido posible…se tienen que unir, apoyar al presidente de la asociación de afectados para que el 13 
puedan hacer sus demandas. […] Además el 13 Marisela Quispe del CNR acreditará a las víctimas de Putis, el 




would also be the first and only opportunity for the state to be present to listen to people‘s 
demands. Like the CMAN‘s visit to Chungui, this was an important opportunity to 
demand the state‘s attention. In this sense Alex places himself above the community. 
Adopting an authoritarian tone he stresses that since justice has been denied to them, the 
state needs to provide them with basic civil rights. It is as if Alex needed to explain to the 
group, as if to minors in need of guidance, that they need to work together and use the 
opportunity to demand the state for proper attention. Alex treated his audience as infants 
who did not acknowledge the importance of the event they were organizing.  
Although this is considered a very important event for the community, when I was 
in the meeting I had the impression that people were not engaged with the discussion. It 
brought my attention to how dispersed and distracted participants were, as some of them were 
chatting, and the environment was not as engaging as Alex expected. I wrote down my first 
impressions, asking myself if the community and the NGO facilitator were using the same language. 
In addition, I had the impression that this was more a Paz y Esperanza project than a Putis one. Now, 
although I am convinced that it was important for the people, the NGO and the community were not 
exactly sharing the same ideas. Looking to explore this, on our way back to Huamanga I asked Alex 
about his impressions about Putis and he said  
―… while we think that everything should be in Putis, for issues of memory, they [the 
community] see everything as an opportunity ... [They] have decided that the cemetery is 
here [in Rodeo]. They see the formal recognition of the village as an opportunity.‖211 
(Fieldnotes Alex, Paz y Esperanza) 
The area in which the human remains were buried in 1984 is called Putis, and yet it is not 
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 ―…mientras nosotros pensamos que todo debería ser en Putis, por el asunto de la memoria, ellos [la 
comunidad] lo ven todo como una oportunidad… [Ellos] han decidido que el cementerio sea acá [en 





the village where the meeting was held and where the anniversary was celebrated. 
Although Paz wanted to do a memorial in the place of the exhumation, the community 
considered that this needed to be done in the village they considered to be strategically 
located closer to the road. Alex explains that for the inhabitants of Putis, public attention 
is seen as an opportunity to establish closer relationships with the state, so they could 
have a school and a health clinic. If to achieve this they needed to move the burial, they 
would do it. The inhabitants of Putis, as stated by Alex earlier, see this whole process as a 
means of becoming visible to the state. 
 Here there is a clash between the NGO‘s moral agenda, and people‘s interests. It 
is not surprising that the constructions of national spaces to remember the internal 
conflict and the projects that this may generate (like a museum, etc.) are not people‘s 
priority. To remember the massacre is probably not their goal. Actually, we should 
question why people would even agree with what the intelligentsia considers is best for 
the nation-state. Should not part of recognizing our differences also imply accepting the 
different positions and ideas at hand, and respecting them?  
 The Peruvian intelligentsia (in this I include NGOs and academia) seems reluctant 
to accept that people have their own understandings, beliefs and priorities regarding 
certain events. Rather than understanding these in the context of subjects‘ lives, 
intellectuals judge them by arguing that people are only interested in money and the 
state‘s attention. Here, what is important to explore is how people believe that a close 
relationship with the state will ‗solve‘ the community‘s problems. I have often found in 




interested in the Compensation program because of the monetary compensation. Thus, 
these officials accuse ‗war victims‘ of being only interested in what the state can give 
them, rather than in the process of restoring people‘s civil rights. When scholars and 
officials state these ideas, they judge the rural population from a hierarchical position that 
considers it as an ignorant and pre-modern group interested only in their immediate 
needs.  
A problem of mediation was presented by Maria Elena Garcia (2005), in which 
she found that activists try to engage parents and other community members in 
conversations about bilingual education and cultural identity through parents‘ schools and 
community assemblies. However, if these strategies fail to gain support, intercultural 
activists and capacitadores usually fall back on declaring that education change in 
highland schools is not optional, that it comes from the state and will happen with or 
without community support. When activists need to justify the need for intercultural 
education and projects, they argue that these demands come from community demands 
for an education that better suits their cultural and linguistic reality. The problem, Garcia 
argues, is not about demanding a ‗better education,‘ but rather about how the original 
definition of ‗better education‘ has been ignored and replaced by the ‗expert knowledge‘ 
of linguists, education specialists and others who claim to know what is best for Andean 
subjects and their children (García 2005: 110-32).  
Continuing the meeting, Alex strongly emphasized that Putis is important because 
of the exhumation, reinforcing with this that the visibility the community has achieved is 




―Another aspect to highlight, nobody would have remembered Putis now, it would be 
forgotten if it was not for the remains that have been exhumed here in Putis... December 
13th is a date that marks 24 years of that massacre, and how I am saying only for the 
village any authority would be coming.‖212 (Alex, Paz y Esperanza) 
It should be noted that Alex uses recordar (En. remember) and olvidar (En. forget) to 
emphasize that this community is known because of the massacre. Yet at the same time, 
he stresses the fact that nobody would remember Putis if the exhumation were not done. 
The idea, previously discussed, of being forgotten is a common rhetorical device used to 
stress the position rural communities have in the national hierarchy. The fact that this 
expression is used by an NGO worker, suggests that the identity of ‗war victims‘ is also 
constructed and imposed from above. In this sense, Putis‘ identity cannot be other than 
those who suffered a massacre, and today they ‗exist‘ because of this. 
 Alex continues explaining during the meeting,  
So that day we will support with banners demanding attention and justice for Putis. 
Justice is not only a judicial process, justice is also the attention you deserve for all the 
civil rights that have been uprooted from you. [...] Your justice is that the state provides 
you conditions for regain a decent life with a minimally decent living conditions213 (Alex, 
Paz y Esperanza). 
Justice is not only the judicial process that has been opened, but also the restitution of 
people‘s civil rights. The restitution of rights is also, in Alex‘s discourse, the way to 
achieve a dignified life. While COMISEDH performs the role of a state proxy as an 
institution that carries out state‘s projects, Paz y Esperanza enacts the transnational 
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 ―Otro aspecto que hay que resaltar, nadie se hubiera recordado de Putis ahorita seguiría en el olvido 
Putis, si no fuera por los restos que han sido exhumados en aquí Putis… el 13 de diciembre una fecha que 
se cumple 24 años de esa matanza y como les digo que solamente fuera por el centro poblado no viene 
ninguna autoridad.‖  
213
―Entonces ese día vamos a apoyar con pancartas que exigen la atención de Putis y justicia para Putis. 
Justicia no solamente es un proceso judicial, justicia es también la atención que ustedes se merecen todos 
aquellos derechos que les han sido arrancados. […]Su justicia es que el estado les brinde condiciones para 




governmentality exercised from above the territorial nation-state. In this context, the state 
is held as politically responsible for the Putis massacre,214 and Paz stepped out as a 
watchdog institution supported by the international Human Rights movement. Therefore, 
it is not the power of this NGO that is displayed in the process, but rather the 
transnational apparatus that oversees the territorial state policies and legitimizes the work 
performed by this institution. Paz becomes the proxy of the Human Rights international 
network, and has the power to call the media‘s and international donors‘ attention to the 
crimes against humanity. In the classic view of civil society as the intermediate zone 
between the state and the population, at first glance Paz may be seen as a watchdog. 
However, if we look closely, Paz is not just supervising the transnational discourse about 
Human Rights‘ it is also acting as the victims‘ defence team in a process that seems to fit 
better with a transnational agenda than with Putis‘ demands.  
In this scenario the international Human Rights community plays an important 
role as both observer and judge. The prosecution of those responsible is something that 
the international community will closely watch. Although transnational governmentality 
is acting here, as many of this is driven by the First World‘s economic interests in 
specific regions there are differences in the geo-political interests around the globe.  
 There is a campaign to prosecute the military responsible for the Putis massacre; 
however, this has not had the impact that NGOs expected. In this sense, any intent to find 
the real names of the army members deployed in the Putis‘ base has not been 
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demonstrated. The collusion between the state and the army protects this information, and 
the external pressure is not strong enough—yet. The government‘s immediate interests 
seem to be in the Compensation Program, rather than in allowing the prosecution of the 
army personnel responsible for the violation of human rights. In the public anniversary 
held in Huamanga, Nolberto demanded the need for a political decision to prosecute the 
Putis massacre, 
―In Peru we feel that there is not any political goodwill to contribute to the judiciary 
process that certainly ennobles the Peruvian state, the democratic system for all 
institutions involved in the issue of justice.‖215 (Nolberto, Putis Anniversary) 
My work among NGO personnel, state officials, Human Right activists and 
indigenous communities points to serious problems and contradictions between NGOs 
and the communities for whom they claim to be speaking for. NGOs, acting as statelike 
institutions or as proxies of the international human rights movement, have their own 
agendas framed by a particular morality, and neither of these are necessarily shared with 
the rural communities affected by the 1980s internal conflict. However, rather than 
openly opposing what NGOs suggest, communities see these NGOs‘ projects as a means 
to accomplish their ultimate goal of becoming visible and therefore attended to by the 
state. As social mediators, statelike institutions and proxies of transnational 
organizations, ‗the civilizing forces of enlightened‘ urban NGOs impose the ‗ignorant, 
backward, pre-modern‘ condition of rural communities(Cf. García 2005: 132). In other 
words, the superiority of the Western knowledge of urban NGOs has decided what is best 
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 ―Entonces en el Perú sentimos no hay una buena voluntad política de contribuir al proceso de la 
judicialización que ciertamente dignifica al estado peruano al sistema democrático a todas las 




for Quechua rural communities, whose voices are included when they claim for the 
state‘s attention but excluded when they are considered to be irrational. 
Conclusion: Social Mediation or domination?  
During my fieldwork, it was common to find that people consider the state to be a 
political claim, a sort of ‗answer to people‘s needs.‘ It was not always obvious that the 
state exists in region like Chungui as a coherent, legitimate and authoritative arbiter of 
society and an organizer of national life (Cf.Herron 2003: 1-2). Where the state appears 
to be absent, local NGOs embody the role of the state and in performing this role and 
they reproduce also a racialized domination. 
In this chapter, I have analysed how NGOs become statelike institutions and 
proxies of the state, and how through this they reproduce racial domination over which 
Peruvian society functions. Therefore, the intellectual superiority granted by formal 
education allows NGOs to speak for rural communities as legitimate representatives of 
their claims. In general, rural Quechuas accept this because they share the hegemony of 
the privileges of formal education. In this process, I have described how the moral agenda 
of two NGOs is imposed upon people‘s claims to the state in the post-war context. In this 
sense, cultural differences become erased rather than respected by NGOs workers and 
facilitators, who under the label of a college degree impose their ideas that are later 
crafted as beneficiaries‘ claims. Therefore, exhumations and trials, which are a crucial 
part of the intelligentsia‘s demands for justice, are imposed as people‘s claims, when in 
reality all the people want is a proper burial so the souls will not bother those who are 




Rather than openly question or challenge NGOs‘ moral agenda, beneficiaries play 
along with them—but their goals are different. Some NGO workers consider the 
population is only interested in getting the economic compensation offered by the state; 
however, this is more complex. Rural communities see themselves as historically 
marginalized from the centre of the state, expecting to be paid attention and to become 
visible to the state. In this context, the National Compensation Program has become a 
means of getting the state‘s attention, which people imagine as the source of their much 
needed help. Therefore, the attention that they get for the massacre and exhumation 
becomes a means through which they intend to achieve other goals. In the case of Putis, 
the exhumation and the judicial process against the military personnel in the Putis‘ base 
in 1984 is a means through which they have achieved the status of minor municipality, 
which entitles it to have an elementary school and a health clinic.  
It is also important to see how the language used by NGOs activists separates an 
inside and outside world, which often have contradictory discourses in which discourse 
and practice are not coherent (cf. García 2005). Therefore, it is important to not confuse 
activists‘ and people‘s voices.  
―The leaner and meaner neoliberal Latin American state … has looked to 
nongovernmental actors to implement these new governmental goals. In the process 
neoliberal multiculturalism has had the surprising effect of remapping Peruvian civil 
society in such a way that it seems to include the NGO and state officials (the active 
agents) but exclude the local communities (the passive beneficiaries)‖ (García 2005: 
113) 
In the same line of thought, the Peruvian state has conflated the PTRC, Human Rights 
activists and NGOs ideas to compensate the rural population for the 1980s internal 




COMISEDH seems to intend to include communities in this program, the fixed demands 
of a letter in Spanish brought by a lawyer should not be considered people‘s voices. 
Rather, it is another way through which NGOs mask domination and the superior 
knowledge they consider themselves to have over the ignorant rural Quechuas. 
Looking to protect the rural communities from the abuses of the state, Nolberto 
explains: 
―… The CMAN has made two trips to Putis, promising eight projects. Among them, there 
is one to make a trout farm, that is nonsense! To me that is a very rude thing, if you were 
deceived before and I sent a hoax, now it is done. But no! They have not even thought 
about mental health issues, on issues about memory.This is stupid, but that is how 
politicians move, they want to take advantage of the situation showing as if there ... in 
those cases everyone wants to take advantage.‖216 (Nolberto, Paz y Esperanza) 
Therefore, it is not only that people consider that the state has deceived them, it is also a 
discourse circulating among the NGOs domains. Rather than listen to what people in 
Putis have to say about the state, and what they expect though establishing closer 
relationships, Paz sees the state as a danger, as a threat to its goals in Putis. In this quote, 
Nolberto looks to protect the community from the engaño (En. deception) that the state 
provides.  
Finally, social mediation in the way it is performed by NGOs produces the rural 
Andean highlands as a container of backwardness and illiteracy, as a population that 
cannot speak by itself and that urgently needs a mediator to speak for them, and protect 
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 ―la CMAN ha hecho dos viaje a Putis, con promesas de ocho proyectos. Entre ellos hacer el criadero de 
truchas, eso es una estupidez! Para mí eso es una cosa muy grosera, si antes te engañaron y te mandaron 
con un engaño ahora te lo cumplo. Pues no! ni siquiera han pensado en temas de salud mental, en temas 
de recuerdos. Es una estupidez, pero así se mueven los políticos aprovechan la coyuntura quieren aparecer 












As a way of Conclusion 
Some challenges toward the current analysis of the rural Andes 
 
 
Instead of a summary of conclusions from all the topics this research has 
developed; a more fruitful approach will be presenting the main ideas already discussed 
in frame of the challenges that as scholars we face. Although most of the details 
presented here respond to the particularities of the Andean highlands, the topics discussed 
are also problem in other regions, especially in those areas where indigenous population 
are not fully recognized as citizens, and where civil war and violence have struck them.  
 Rural Quechuas are daily racialized, by the state, statelike institutions, and often 
by scholars, who label them ‗marginal,‘ ‗ignorant‘ and ‗illiterate.‘ Rather than 
understanding differences in horizontal ways, these have been transformed into 
hierarchies of difference. The result is that rural Quechuas continue to be placed at the 
bottom of the social and political structure, without a proper voice. Here the question is 
not if they can or not be listened; instead what needs to be asked is why NGOs and some 
scholars are obsessed to protect Quechuas as if they were minors in need. The problem of 
this social and political mediation is that NGOs and the state, in collusion with scholars, 




arrive. Rural Quechuas are rarely recognized as intelligent and capable subjects, able to 
speak by themselves about their problems and their own projects to the state. When they 
accomplish this, they have passed through the ‗de-indianization‘ process required by the 
Peruvian state and society.  
For people in Chapi ‗marginality‘ is a way to understand and experience the state 
as that they understand should act as ‗guardian‘ and care provider. The idea of a state as 
guardian does not differ much from the NGO ‗big brother‘ which protects them, but also 
provides them support and resources. These topics in the Peruvian postwar context have 
not been extensively discussed, and it is important to understand how relationships with 
the state have changed and how the state as institution is experienced and imagined in 
everyday life by actors in the countryside. The general belief that the state is in debt with 
the rural population, a contribution of the PTRC, has a direct influence in how the state is 
seen and what their direct responsibilities are toward ‗war victims‘ to compensate them. 
My position about this is skeptical, although I firmly belief in the civil rights that ‗war 
victims‘ should have, I also consider that populist arena in which the contemporary 
politics are produced, has produced a particular instability that does not have any 
guarantee of continuity. Thus, social programs and the compensation program may be 
suspended at the beginning of the next government. 
 When people in Chapi use ‗marginality‘ they talk about their relationship with 
the state, a relationship that is accepted as hierarchical and racialized that compels them 
to ‗de-indianize,‘ because their knowledge is backward and magical, in order to be 




visible and included into the Peruvian national society.  
Scholars, Peruvian and North American, working in the Andes rarely talk about 
race and racial practices, probably because it is so embedded in the Peruvian imaginary 
that its importance is barely acknowledged. The superficial discussion of Peru as a racist 
country gets complicated when the problem of race and racial practices (in concrete) are 
proposed to be academically discussed inside governmental agencies, universities and 
research institutions.217 In many cases, scholars and activists fear oseeing themselves 
placed in the Peruvian racial hierarchy. However, personal demons should halt a deep 
analysis of how race in academia is denying the access to Quechuas,218 which can be the 
beginning to recognize them as political and capable actors. As it has been extensively 
discussed in these pages, race in Peru is does not work through phenotypes. Instead, it 
works through complex racial ideologies that have ground in a diversity of racial markers 
(race, place of residence) organized in dichotomies (educated vv. Ignorant, modern vs. 
backward, etc.). 
It is not coincidence that J.M. Arguedas remains as the best example of the racism 
embedded in the Peruvian academia. It is true that there have passed almost five decades 
since the discussion of ‗Todas las Sangres‘  his most controversial novel but it is still 
relevant to analyse. With other names and other stories, differences are transformed into 
hierarchies, and the superiority of the scientific knowledge still erases the possibility to 
have an Andean knowledge within the Peruvian academia.  
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 I met a Peruvian scholar who left a prestigious Research center in Lima because they did not considered 
important to discuss about racial practices in everyday life. 
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 Hilaria Supa is a Congresswoman, the only native Quechua speaker in the Peruvian Congress, who seem 




Scholars working in the Andes, Peruvian and North American, are not 
acknowledging (or do not want to acknowledge) the racial ideologies over which their 
work is constructed. There are some exceptions (de la Cadena 1998; Huayhua 2006; 
Seligmann 2001), and the Final Report of the PTRC. Although the Final Report 
recognized that the Peruvian society is extremely fragmented and race is an important 
element that caused the internal war, the emphasis on the race problem and how the state, 
activists, NGOs, and scholars do not approach this problem is timidly placed in the last 
volumes.  
The twenty years of internal war have deeply affected the rural Andes; daily life 
in the postwar rural Peru is different. Theidon (2004) suggests that this was a war entre 
projimos [En. among neighbor, fellow man], I considered that she is on the wrong 
pathway of analysis. The internal war was between neighbors who had resentments, 
rivalries, hates; this was a violent and bloody war that deeply transformed structures of 
local communities. There were multiple conflicts, especially after the Agrarian Reform, 
and some people inside Andean communities started to get richer while others needed to 
work for the richer neighbors. The problem was not only the work a group needed to do, 
but the attitudes of gamonal that some rich neighbors adopted. In these scenarios, the 
Shining Path found its entryway to rural communities and to their young students.  
Further research needs to be done on the role of ‗humanitarian witness.‘ It is 
important to understand how scholars and activists disempower subordinate subjects, 
specially ‗war victims.‘ Talking about atrocities, repeating testimonies, turning them into 




drawing it closer to these atrocities. However, propaganda, humanitarian witnesses and 
spokespersons do not make real changes. The problem of war and ‗war victims‘ in Peru, 
implies talking about the grounded politics that has allowed this violence to happen; and 
involves assuming political and ethical responsibilities in the ground of the war. It also 
implies questioning about how Quechuas can become citizens, in a structure where only 
Spanish is the official language, when children are shamed of being from the Sierra, 
when the only way to progress [Sp. superarse] is to ‗de-indianize.‘  
 Probably Arguedas had more to tell us know, if we are open enough to listen to him: 
El cerco podía y debía haberse destruido el caudal de las dos naciones (Quechua e 
Hispana) se podía y debía unir. Y el camino no tenía por qué ser, ni era posible 
únicamente el que se exigía con imperio de vencedores […] 
Yo no soy un aculturado; yo soy un peruano orgullosamente, como demonio feliz, habla 
en cristiano e en indio, en español y en quechua. Deseaba convertir esa realidad en 
lenguaje artístico y tal parece, según cierto consenso más o menos general que lo he 
conseguido. (Arguedas 1976) 
 
[The fence could and should have destroyed the flow of the two nations (Quechua and 
Spanish) they could and should join. And the path could not be, or needed to be only the 
one required by conquers [...] 
I'm not an acculturated, I am a proud Peruvian, a demon happy, who talks Spanish and 
Indian, who speaks in Spanish and Quechua. I wanted to turn this reality into artistic 
language and it seems, according to a more or less general consensus I've gotten]  
 
Arguedas was recognized as a magnificent writer; however, he was never recognized as 
an anthropologist because he was too Quechua to be a social scientist. For the 
members219 of the discussion of ‗Todas las Sangres‘ he was too Indian, too Quechua to 
understand the changes the Peruvian society was envisioning in 1965 (IEP 2000 [1965]). 
As scholars, we are in debt to all those who--because they had different views and 
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Appendix 2- 1 
Annual Average of the Coca production in 
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Appendix 2- 2 
The Shining Path incursion in the district of Chungui in 2008 
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Appendix 2- 4 
‗A town in the middle of pain‘ 








Appendix 2- 5 
A town in the middle of pain (picture) 
 
 









Appendix 3- 1  
Chungui, La Convención, Andahuaylas 
 









Appendix 3- 2 
The ELN guerrilla in Chapi, 1963 
Communist type inscriptions, left by the raiders, on the walls of the hacienda 
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Army documents about Edwin Garcia Miranda 
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Appendix 4- 2 
Attack to Ocobamba, November 2007 
 
Source: La Republica, November 4
th
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